Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Krista Dozier slipped and fell on an unmarked puddle of water in the Jefferson County courthouse. She filed a tort action against Jefferson County, which moved to dismiss the case, claiming immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). Dozier argued that the spill was a "dangerous condition" of a public building, an exception to CGIA immunity. The district court found the County's response to the spill reasonable and dismissed Dozier's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the reasonableness of the County's response was irrelevant to jurisdiction and that the County had waived CGIA immunity under the dangerous-condition exception.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that when disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of the existence of the facts necessary to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. Additionally, the plaintiff must show that a public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the condition in question for the dangerous-condition exception to apply. The district court had found the County's response to the spill reasonable, concluding that Dozier failed to establish the spill as a "dangerous condition" and thus lacked jurisdiction over her claims.The Supreme Court of Colorado reinstated the district court's order dismissing Dozier's complaint, emphasizing that the plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood that the public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the dangerous condition to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. View "Jefferson Cnty. v. Dozier" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a railroad company and La Plata County over land use changes made by the railroad at its Rockwood Station. The railroad made several modifications to accommodate increased passenger traffic, including enlarging a parking lot and adding portable toilets and tents. The County claimed these changes violated its land use code and demanded compliance or corrective action.The railroad initially sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction in La Plata County District Court, arguing that the County lacked jurisdiction over its operations. While this case was pending, the County petitioned the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a declaratory ruling that the changes required compliance with the County's land use code. The PUC accepted the petition, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" under the relevant statute, thus requiring compliance with the County's code. The PUC upheld the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed the PUC's ruling.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed several issues raised by the railroad. The court concluded that the PUC had jurisdiction to interpret the relevant land use statute, the County had standing to petition the PUC, and the PUC did not violate the railroad's due process rights. The court also found that the PUC's determination that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" was just and reasonable and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the PUC's decision. View "Am. Heritage Ry.s v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Town of Firestone applied for conditional groundwater rights and an augmentation plan to support its growing water needs. The application included five well fields, but Firestone did not provide specific well locations for three of these fields, instead proposing to use the water court's retained jurisdiction to provide more specific details later. St. Vrain Sanitation District opposed the application, arguing that Firestone's lack of specific well locations made its depletion calculations unreliable and that relying on retained jurisdiction to prove non-injury later was legally impermissible.The District Court for Water Division 1 partially granted St. Vrain's motion to dismiss, finding that Firestone's evidence was insufficient to establish that the proposed well fields would not injure senior water rights holders. The court dismissed without prejudice the claims for the three well fields with unspecified locations and declined to retain jurisdiction, as it could not make a threshold finding of non-injury. The court also allowed St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue at trial, despite a prior conditional stipulation.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the water court's decision, holding that the water court correctly evaluated the application on a case-by-case basis and did not create a new bright-line rule requiring completed wells for conditional groundwater rights. The court also upheld the water court's refusal to retain jurisdiction without a non-injury finding and found no abuse of discretion in allowing St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue. The Supreme Court concluded that the water court's factual findings were supported by the trial record and were not clearly erroneous. View "Town of Firestone v. BCL Colo., LP" on Justia Law

J.D., a juvenile defendant, faced multiple charges and challenged his competency to proceed. The juvenile court ordered the Department of Human Services (the "Department") to conduct an in-custody competency evaluation, which found J.D. incompetent but restorable. The court then ordered outpatient restoration services. Subsequently, J.D. was charged with additional delinquent acts, and the court extended its incompetency finding to all cases, ordering the Department to oversee inpatient restoration services and provide periodic status reports.The Department later reassessed J.D.'s competency without a court order and concluded that he had been restored to competency. J.D. moved to strike the Department's report, arguing that the Department lacked the authority to conduct the evaluation without a court order under section 19-2.5-704(2)(c). The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that the Department had the authority to conduct restoration evaluations as part of its responsibility to provide restoration services.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the Department's responsibility to provide restoration services under section 19-2.5-704(2)(b) includes the authority to perform restoration evaluations without a court order. The court concluded that restoration evaluations are part of the "services necessary to competency restoration." Therefore, the juvenile court properly accepted and considered the Department's evaluation in finding J.D. restored to competency. The order to show cause was discharged. View "In re People ex rel. J.D." on Justia Law

In 2023, the Board of County Commissioners of Weld County approved a new map for electing county commissioners without complying with Colorado's redistricting statutes, arguing that as a home rule county, it was exempt from these requirements. Weld County residents, along with the League of Women Voters of Greeley and the Latino Coalition of Weld County, sued the Board, seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the use of the new map.The Weld County District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, granting summary judgment and enjoining the Board from using the new map. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, the redistricting statutes applied to Weld County, and the Board had violated these statutes. The Board appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, and the plaintiffs petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for certiorari review, which was granted.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the redistricting statutes provide a private right of action and that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The court further held that home rule counties must comply with the redistricting statutes, as these statutes impose mandatory functions rather than structural requirements. The court reversed the district court's allowance for the Board to use the 2015 map and ordered the Board to draw and approve a new map in compliance with the redistricting statutes in time for the 2026 county commissioner election. View "League of Women Voters of Greeley v. The Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of the Cnty. of Weld" on Justia Law

In 2015, Jesus Rodriguez-Morelos began offering Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) classes, falsely claiming they were affiliated with the nonprofit organization United with Migrants. He charged students for these classes, which were not state-approved, and used the nonprofit's name and tax-exempt document without authorization. Complaints about the classes led to an investigation by the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies (DORA), revealing that Rodriguez-Morelos was unlawfully receiving money for the unapproved classes.Rodriguez-Morelos was charged with several crimes, including identity theft under section 18-5-902(1)(a), C.R.S. (2024). A jury convicted him on all charges. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the theft and criminal impersonation convictions but vacated the identity theft conviction. The court concluded that the identity theft statute's definition of "personal identifying information" pertains to individuals, not organizations, and thus did not apply to Rodriguez-Morelos's use of the nonprofit's name and document.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the identity theft statute's reference to "personal identifying information" applies only to information concerning single, identified human beings, not organizations. Therefore, Rodriguez-Morelos's actions did not constitute identity theft under the statute. View "People v. Rodriguez-Morelos" on Justia Law

The petitioners, including The Gazette and the Invisible Institute, sought records from the Colorado Peace Officer Standards and Training Board (POST) regarding peace officer demographics, certification, and decertification. They argued that these records should be disclosed under the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA). POST countered that the records were criminal justice records governed by the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act (CCJRA), which allows the custodian discretion in disclosing records.The Denver District Court agreed with POST, concluding that POST is a criminal justice agency under the CCJRA and that the requested records were criminal justice records. The court found that POST's activities, such as conducting criminal background checks and investigating officers, qualified it as a criminal justice agency. The court held that the custodian did not abuse her discretion in partially denying the records requests due to concerns about officer safety and ongoing investigations.The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, albeit on slightly different grounds. The appellate court concluded that POST is a criminal justice agency because it collects and stores arrest and criminal records information when it revokes a peace officer's certification.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that POST qualifies as a criminal justice agency because it performs activities directly related to the detection or investigation of crime. This includes conducting criminal investigations into officers and applicants suspected of criminal offenses. Consequently, the CCJRA governs the records requested by the petitioners, allowing the custodian discretion in their disclosure. View "The Gazette v. Bourgerie" on Justia Law

Matt Roane was involved in litigation with the Archuleta County Board of Commissioners when he submitted a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request to Archuleta County Clerk and Recorder, Kristy Archuleta, seeking a recording of a recent Board meeting. Archuleta denied the request, claiming it circumvented the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Roane had not sought any records through discovery in his civil action against the Board. Roane then sued Archuleta, alleging a violation of CORA.The district court granted Roane's motion to show cause, rejecting Archuleta's argument that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure prohibited Roane from obtaining evidence outside of discovery procedures. The court ordered Archuleta to produce the recording. Archuleta appealed, arguing that the district court allowed Roane to bypass discovery rules. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order, holding that CORA allows litigants to inspect public records even if they are relevant to pending litigation.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that a litigant may obtain records under CORA even if those records are relevant to pending litigation and the litigant has not made document requests under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The court emphasized that CORA and the Rules of Civil Procedure are distinct legal regimes and that CORA does not limit inspection rights simply because the requester is involved in litigation with the public entity. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Archuleta v. Roane" on Justia Law

Parker Water and Sanitation District, a Colorado special district, applied for six permits to construct wells to withdraw nontributary groundwater from the Denver Basin aquifers. The State Engineer approved the applications and issued the permits, including an allowed average annual withdrawal rate and, for the first time, an explicit condition limiting the total volume of groundwater that could be withdrawn over the life of the permits. Parker challenged this condition, arguing that the State Engineer lacked the authority to impose such a limit.The Water Division One court found in favor of the State Engineer, concluding that section 37-90-137, C.R.S. (2024), and the Statewide Nontributary Ground Water Rules unambiguously set forth a total volumetric limit on the amount of nontributary Denver Basin groundwater a permittee may withdraw. The court determined that the statute and rules require a total volumetric limit equal to the quantity of nontributary groundwater underlying the land owned by the applicant, as determined by the State Engineer at the time the well permit is issued.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the water court's decision, holding that section 37-90-137 unambiguously imposes a total volumetric limit on nontributary groundwater withdrawals over the lifetime of a well permit. The court also held that this limit applies to well permits issued under both the current statute and the earlier version enacted through Senate Bill 213. Additionally, the court concluded that the Statewide Nontributary Ground Water Rules unambiguously impose a total volumetric limit and that the State Engineer has the authority to include such a limit in well permits. The court further held that water court decrees determining use rights for nontributary Denver Basin groundwater set forth a total volumetric limit on withdrawals unless an underlying decree explicitly provides otherwise. Finally, the court found that the water court did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery. View "Parker Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Rein" on Justia Law

Lazy D Grazing Association manages a 25,000-acre ranch along the Colorado-Wyoming border, which lacks sufficient surface water for irrigation. In 2020, Lazy D sought a determination from the water court that the groundwater beneath the ranch in the Upper Laramie Aquifer is nontributary, meaning it is not subject to Colorado's prior appropriation system. This designation would allow Lazy D to control the use of the groundwater. The State Engineer determined that the groundwater was nontributary, prompting opposition from various entities, including the Cities of Sterling and Fort Collins, who feared it would harm their water rights.The District Court for Water Division 1 in Greeley found in favor of Lazy D, determining that the groundwater was nontributary. The Cities of Sterling and Fort Collins appealed, arguing that the State Engineer exceeded his authority, the water court improperly presumed the truth of the State Engineer's findings, and that the court relied on sources not in evidence while discrediting expert testimony without justification.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the water court's decision. The court held that the State Engineer was within his rights to determine the facts regarding whether the groundwater is nontributary, but the final determination is a mixed question of fact and law for the water court. Although the water court erred in giving a presumption of truth to the State Engineer's legal conclusion, this error was deemed harmless as the water court independently concluded that the groundwater was nontributary. The court also found that the water court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to the Cities and did not rely on information outside the record. The water court's reliance on expert testimony was found to be appropriate, and the decision to allow Lazy D to use the nontributary groundwater was upheld. View "City of Sterling v. Lazy D Grazing Association" on Justia Law