Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review a case involving a dispute between the City of Aspen and the Burlingame Ranch II Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The dispute centered around alleged construction defects in an affordable housing project overseen by the City of Aspen. The Association claimed that Aspen had breached express and implied warranties, and Aspen argued that the claims were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), which provides immunity to public entities from claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort.The lower court agreed with Aspen, ruling that the Association's claims sounded in tort, or could sound in tort, and were thus barred by the CGIA. The Association appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court reasoned that the Association's claims could only sound in contract, and thus were not barred by the CGIA. The court relied on the economic loss rule, which generally provides that a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of a contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that the economic loss rule has no bearing on whether the CGIA bars a plaintiff’s claims. The court clarified that the CGIA bars claims that could arise in both tort and contract, and that the economic loss rule cannot rescue an otherwise CGIA-barred claim. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings. View "City of Aspen v. Burlingame Ranch II" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over water rights associated with the Green Mountain Reservoir in Colorado. The City of Golden (Golden) opposed the implementation of an administrative protocol (the Protocol) developed by the United States and other parties, arguing that it would injure its rights upstream of the reservoir. The water court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree, a series of decrees and stipulations governing water rights in the area. Golden appealed this decision.Previously, the water court had ruled that an assessment of injury was not required in this case, as the United States was merely requesting confirmation that the Protocol was consistent with the existing Blue River Decree. The court also rejected Golden's claims that the Protocol contradicted language in the Blue River Decree requiring the "fair" and "equitable" treatment of all parties with interests in the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (CBT), a complex water diversion project.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the water court's ruling. It held that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree and does not violate the prior appropriation doctrine, a principle of water law that gives priority to those who first used the water. The court also rejected Golden's procedural arguments regarding the water court's denial of its motion for reconsideration. View "City of Golden v. City of Aurora" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the question of whether a board of cooperative education services (BOCES) can locate a school within the geographic boundaries of a nonmember school district without the district's consent. The petitioner, Education reEnvisioned BOCES (ERBOCES), had entered into an agreement with the Colorado Literacy and Learning Center’s School for Dyslexic Learners (CLLC) to operate a school within the boundaries of respondent Colorado Springs School District 11 (District 11), which is not a member of ERBOCES. Neither ERBOCES nor CLLC sought or obtained District 11’s permission to do so.The district court initially ruled in favor of ERBOCES and CLLC, interpreting the language of section 22-5-111(2) of the Boards of Cooperative Services Act of 1965 (the BOCES Act) to permit ERBOCES to operate a school at any appropriate location, whether inside or outside of a district providing funding for the facilities. District 11 appealed this decision.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling, concluding that section 22-5-111(2) does not allow a BOCES to open and operate schools within the geographic boundaries of nonmember school districts that do not consent. The court of appeals found that the district court’s interpretation did not give effect to the qualifying language 'within or without a school district providing the money for the facilities.' The court of appeals also noted that the BOCES Act’s statutory framework did not grant a BOCES unrestricted extraterritoriality.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of section 22-5-111(2), when read in context, does not permit a BOCES to locate a contract school within a nonmember school district without that district’s consent. The court did not need to decide whether article IX, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, which pertains to local control of education, prohibits a BOCES from doing so. View "Education reEnvisioned BOCES v. Colorado Springs School District 11" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was called upon to decide a matter related to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). The case involved a wrongful death action brought by the family and estate representatives of two brothers, Walter and Samuel Giron, who died when Officer Justin Hice accidentally collided with their van while pursuing a suspected speeder. Officer Hice and his employer, the Town of Olathe, claimed immunity under the CGIA. The Plaintiffs countered that the Defendants were not entitled to immunity because Officer Hice failed to use his emergency lights or siren continuously while speeding before the accident.The court had to interpret the CGIA and related traffic code provisions to determine the relevant time period for an officer’s failure to use emergency alerts. The court concluded that the CGIA requires a minimal causal connection between a plaintiff’s injuries and the fact that an officer did not use emergency signals while speeding. This means that an officer has access to immunity while speeding only during those times when the officer is using alerts.The court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation that an officer who fails to use his alerts at any point during the pursuit waives immunity for the entire pursuit. Instead, the court held that under section 24-10-106(1)(a) an emergency driver waives immunity only if the plaintiff’s injuries could have resulted from the emergency driver’s failure to use alerts.The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for the court of appeals to determine if Officer Hice’s failure to use his lights or siren until the final five to ten seconds of his pursuit could have contributed to the accident. View "Hice v. Giron" on Justia Law

In this case, Beverly Stickle sued Jefferson County after sustaining an injury from a fall in a parking structure adjacent to a county building. She claimed that a poorly marked curb, which created an optical illusion and made the walkway and parking area appear as a single flat surface, was a dangerous condition that caused her injury. The county argued for dismissal on the grounds of immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), asserting that the parking structure was not a "building" and that the condition causing the injury was solely due to the parking lot's design. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the parking structure qualified as a "building" under the CGIA. The court also held that the optical illusion was not solely attributable to the parking lot's design but was also, at least in part, a result of the maintenance of the facility. As such, the county was not immune from the lawsuit under the CGIA, and Stickle's claim could proceed. View "County of Jefferson v. Stickle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reviewed a case involving a dispute over the methodology for implementing Tax Increment Financing (TIF) under Colorado's Urban Renewal Law (URL). The respondents, collectively known as AURA, argued that the methodology applied by the Colorado State Property Tax Administrator and the Arapahoe County Assessor was in violation of the URL because it differentiated between direct and indirect benefits when adjusting the base and increment values of blighted property in urban renewal areas. They contended that this methodology deprived urban renewal authorities of property tax revenues they should receive due to enhanced market perceptions of properties located in a TIF plan. The court of appeals agreed with AURA and reversed the district court's summary judgment favoring the Assessor. However, the Supreme Court held that the Administrator's methodology does not violate the URL. The URL does not prescribe a specific methodology but gives the Administrator broad authority to determine how to calculate and proportionately adjust the base and increment values. The court concluded that the Administrator's differentiation between direct and indirect benefits does not conflict with the URL, and therefore, reversed the portion of the division’s judgment concerning the Administrator’s methodology and affirmed that the district court correctly entered summary judgment. View "Kaiser v. Aurora Urban Renewal Authority" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, James Herman Dye was charged with murdering a woman over forty years ago. During pretrial hearings, Dye indicated that he might present evidence suggesting another person, an alternate suspect, committed the crime. The Supreme Court of Colorado clarified that the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Discovery and Procedure Before Trial”) Rule 16(II)(c) requires a defendant to disclose the nature of any defense, including an alternate suspect defense, prior to trial. The Court also clarified that the requirement to disclose the nature of a defense includes identifying any alternate suspects, along with their addresses if they are to be called to testify at trial. However, the Court found that the lower court's order for Dye to disclose "all evidence" related to the alternate suspect defense was overbroad. The Court ruled that the prosecution should conduct its own investigation into any alternate suspect identified. The Court also held that disputes over the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence should be resolved prior to trial. The Court therefore vacated the lower court’s discovery order and directed the lower court to follow the procedures outlined in its opinion. View "People v. Dye" on Justia Law

The “rule of Martin,” applied to state agencies, political subdivisions, and officials acting in their official capacity, was a judicially created rule that precluded standing to challenge a government entity’s decision when: (1) the state agency, political subdivision, or official seeking review is subordinate to the government entity whose action is challenged; and (2) no statutory or constitutional provision expressly authorizes the subordinate party to seek judicial review of the superior government entity’s action. The Colorado State Board of Education (“the State Board”) invoked this doctrine in successfully moving to dismiss claims brought by Adams County School District 14 (“Adams 14”) challenging the State Board’s decision to remove its accreditation and order its reorganization. Adams 14 challenged the district court’s dismissal of its claims and the political subdivision doctrine itself, contending that the doctrine has become unmoored from its jurisprudential origins and results in the unfair denial of judicial relief to public entities that have been injured by state agencies and statutes. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the political subdivision doctrine and its articulation in the rule of Martin generated unnecessary confusion and were ultimately duplicative of the two-part test for standing set forth in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1977). The Court therefore abandoned the doctrine and the rule of Martin and instead hold that Wimberly supplied the sole test for determining whether a party has standing in Colorado. Evaluating each of Adams 14’s claims under Wimberly, the Court further held that all were correctly dismissed for lack of standing. View "Colo. State Bd. of Educ. v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. 14" on Justia Law

The Weld County Colorado Board of County Commissioners (“Weld County”) sought review of rules adopted by the Colorado Air Quality Control Commission (the “Commission”) to minimize emissions of certain pollutants from oil and gas wells. A Colorado court of appeals applied a specialized political subdivision standing test and concluded that Weld County did not have standing to pursue its claims. In Colorado State Board of Education v. Adams County School District 14, 2023 CO 52, __ P.3d __, the Colorado Supreme Court abandoned the political subdivision test because it generated unnecessary confusion, and that a political subdivision, just like any other plaintiff, had to satisfy only the standing test developed in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1977). Applying that holding here, the Court examined whether Weld County has suffered (1) an injury in fact (2) to a legally protected interest. To this, the Court concluded that, although Weld County had a legally protected interest, it could not demonstrate an injury to that interest. Accordingly, Weld County lacked standing to pursue the claims raised here. We thus affirm the division’s judgment, albeit on different grounds. View "Weld County v. Ryan" on Justia Law

A-J.A.B. tested positive at birth for methamphetamine. H.J.B. (“Mother”) admitted methamphetamine use during her pregnancy. In March 2020, less than a month after A-J.A.B.’s birth, the Adams County Human Services Department (“the Department”) filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning A-J.A.B. The Department’s petition noted that it had no information indicating that A-J.A.B. was an Indian child or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe, although the petition did not identify what efforts, if any, the Department took to determine whether A-J.A.B. was an Indian child. At the shelter hearing, Mother’s counsel informed the court that Mother may have “some Cherokee and Lakota Sioux [heritage] through [A-J.A.B.’s maternal great-grandmother].” However, Mother was uncertain if anyone in her family was actually registered with a tribe and acknowledged that she “probably [wouldn’t] qualify” for any tribal membership herself. The juvenile court ordered Mother to “fill out the ICWA paperwork,” but the court did not direct the Department to exercise its due diligence obligation under section 19-1-126(3). At the next hearing, Mother, who had not filled out the ICWA paperwork, again stated that she had “Native American heritage” through A-J.A.B.’s maternal great-grandmother. Because of these assertions, the juvenile court found that the case “‘may’ be an ICWA case.” By December 2020, the Department moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights. At the pretrial conference, Mother’s attorney informed the court that she spoke with A-J.A.B.’s maternal grandmother, who stated that she “thought that the heritage may be Lakota.” Mother’s attorney told the court “it doesn’t sound like there’s a reason to believe that ICWA would apply” and acknowledged that neither Mother nor A-J.A.B. were enrolled members of any tribe. The juvenile court subsequently concluded that “there [was] no reason to believe that this case [was] governed by [ICWA].” The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding that ICWA did not apply because the court had a reason to know that A-J.A.B. was an Indian child. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the Department satisfied its statutory due diligence obligation under section19-1-126(3), and affirmed in different grounds. View "Colorado in interest of H.J.B." on Justia Law