Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In July 2010, the City and County of Denver issued nine Notices of Final Determination, Assessment and Demand for Payment against various online travel companies: Expedia, Inc.; Hotels.com LP; Hotwire, Inc.; Orbitz, LLC; Trip Network, Inc.; Priceline.com Incorporated; Travelweb, LLC; Site59.com, LLC; and Travelocity.com LP. The Notices claimed unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest due according to the city lodger’s tax article, for the period from January 2001 through April 2010, totaling over $40 million. These online companies filed nearly identical protests, requesting hearings before a Denver Department of Finance hearing officer, and the protests were consolidated by stipulation. Denver petitioned for review of the court of appeals opinion reversing the judgment of the district court and remanding with directions to vacate the subject tax assessments against respondent online travel companies (“OTCs”). The district court had largely upheld the hearing officer’s denial of protests. Unlike the hearing officer and district court, the court of appeals concluded that the city lodger’s tax article was at least ambiguous with regard to both the purchase price paid or charged for lodging, upon which the tax is to be levied, and the status of the OTCs as vendors, upon which the ordinance imposes the responsibility to collect the tax and remit it to the city; and the intermediate appellate court considered itself obligated to resolve all ambiguities in the lodger’s tax article, being a tax statute, in favor of the OTCs. The Colorado Supreme Court found the “fair and reasonable interpretation” of Denver’s lodger’s tax article was that it imposed a duty on the OTCs to collect and remit the prescribed tax on the purchase price of any lodging they sell, to include not only the amount they have contracted with the hotel to charge and return but also the amount of their markup. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore reversed, and the matter was remanded for consideration of the remaining issues raised on appeal by the parties. View "City & Cty. of Denver v. Expedia, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Aurora was the sole owner of the capital stock of Busk-Ivanhoe, Inc., which owned a one-half interest in water rights decreed in 1928 to the Busk-Ivanhoe System for supplemental irrigation in the Arkansas River Basin by Garfield County District Court (in Civil Action 2621, known as the "2621 Decree"). The decree contained no reference to storage of exported water on the eastern slope prior to its decreed use for supplemental irrigation in the Arkansas River Basin. Nevertheless, water decreed to the Busk-Ivanhoe System has been stored in reservoirs before put to beneficial use. In 1987, Busk-Ivanhoe began to put its water rights to use in Aurora. Busk-Ivanhoe did not file an application to change the type and place of use of these rights until 2009. The water court for Water Division 2 approved Busk-Ivanhoe's change application allow use of the rights within Aurora's municipal system. The rulings were confirmed in 2014. The issues raised in this appeal centered on the water court's quantification of the water rights to be changed under the application. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the water court erred when it concluded that storage of the Busk-Ivanhoe rights on the eastern slope prior to use was lawful; (2) because the storage of the water rights was unlawful, the water court erred in concluding the volumes of exported water paid as rental fees for storage in its historic consumptive use quantification of the water rights; and (3) the water court erred in concluding it was required to exclude the twenty-two years of undecreed use of the water rights from the representative study period. The water court's 2014 order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Grand Valley Water Users Ass'n v. Busk-Ivanhoe, Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation petitioned to acquire property owned by Amerco Real Estate Co. and occupied by U-Haul Co. by eminent domain, asserting that the property in question was necessary for a highway expansion project. U-Haul opposed the petition, asserting that the Department lacked authority to condemn its land on grounds that the statutory perquisites for acquiring land in the manner the Department used, were not met. The district court declined to dismiss the petition and instead granted the Department's motion for immediate possession. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the transportation commission's enabling legislation, to the extent that it purported to delegate to the Department the choice of particular properties to be taken for highway projects and the manner of their taking, was an unlawful delegation of the commission's statutorily imposed obligation. The case was remanded back to the district court for dismissal of the Department's original petition. View "Colorado Dept. of Transportation v. Amerco Real Estate" on Justia Law

The State brought a civil law enforcement action against the foreclosure law firm The Castle Law Group, LLC and its principles, as well as some of Castle's affiliated vendors. Among other things, the State alleged that between 2009 and 2014, the Castle defendants conspired with their affiliated vendors to generate and submit deceptive invoices reflecting inflated costs incurred for foreclosure-related services, while falsely representing to mortgage servicers that these inflated costs were "actual, necessary and reasonable." The State alleged defendants' conduct violated the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), the Colorado Antitrust Act of 1992, and the Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The trial court granted a Castle motion limiting the State's expert testimony, and the State appealed the trial court's rulings. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in its limiting orders, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. The Castle Law Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donna Johnson challenged the Ballot Title Board's decision to set the title, ballot title and submission clause for Initiatives 2015-2016 #132 and 133, contending that the titles did not satisfy the clear title requirement and they did not contain a single subject. If passed, the Initiatives, substantially similar in language and form, represented two of several redistricting concepts proposed by the Proponents during the 2016 election cycle. Both Initiatives would have amended article V, section 44 through 48 of the Colorado Constitution by restructuring or replacing the Colorado Reapportionment Commission. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that both of the proposed Initiatives encompassed multiple subjects in violation of Colorado law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Title Board and remanded for revision. View "In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #132 & #133" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Robinson challenged the Ballot Title Board's decision to set the title, ballot title and submission clause for Initiative 2015-2016 #156, contending that the title did not satisfy the clear title requirement and it did not contain a single subject. If passed, Initiative #156 would have added a new section to the Colorado Revised Statutes prohibiting state and local licensing authorities from issuing "a license to food store that offers for sale, in sealed containers for off-premises consumption," certain "intoxicants, namely marijuana, marijuana product, liquor, wine and malt liquor. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the title indeed violated the clear title requirement because it was confusing and failed to help voters decipher the purpose of the initiative, or to help voters decide whether to support or oppose it. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Title Board's setting of title for Initiative #156, and returned it to the Board for revision. View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2015-2016 Initiative #156" on Justia Law

Jesse Lipschuetz lived next door to Open Door Ministries. Lipschuetz filed claims against the City of Denver and Open Door looking to revoke a rooming and boarding permit the City granted to Open Door. The trial court concluded the City should not have issued the permit, but stayed revocation until Open Door's cross-claims were resolved. Several months later, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Open Door on those cross-claims. On appeal, Lipscheutz argued Open Door's cross-claims against the City were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act because they "could lie in tort." Therefore, Lipscheutz argued, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the cross-claims. The court of appeals agreed with that reasoning, and reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act did not apply to Open Door's request for prospective relief to prevent future injury. Because Open Door had not suffered an injury before it filed its cross-claims, the Act did not bar those claims seeking prospective relief from future injury. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction over those cross-claims. View "Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz" on Justia Law

Jeffery Freeman was convicted of third degree assault on an at-risk adult. Later, when he applied for a motor vehicle salesperson’s license, the Colorado Motor Vehicle Dealer Board (the Board) denied his application pursuant to the mandatory disqualification statute, section12-6-118(7)(a)(I), C.R.S.(2015). Under the statute, a person who has been convicted of a felony “in violation of article3, 4 or 5 of title 18, C.R.S., or any similar crime” must have his or her application for a license to sell cars denied. The question before the Supreme Court was whether Freeman’s conviction for the felony offense of third degree assault on an at-risk person was a “felony in violation of article 3” for the purpose of the mandatory disqualification statute, where the elements of the crime were contained in section 18-3-204, but the felony enhancement provision was contained in section 18-6.5-103(3)(c). Because the felony enhancement for third degree assault did not constitute a separate offense under "Colorado v. McKinney," (99 P.3d 1038, 1043 (Colo. 2004)), the Supreme Court concluded that Freeman was convicted of a felony “in violation of article 3. . . of title 18,”and therefore he was ineligible to receive a motor vehicle salesperson’s license under section 12-6-118(7)(a)(I). Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals holding to the contrary, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado Motor Vehicle Dealer Board v. Freeman" on Justia Law

On July 4, 2004, the Upper Eagle Regional Water Authority (the “Authority”) diverted 0.716 cubic feet per second (“cfs”) of water at the Edwards Drinking Water Facility on the Eagle River and delivered that water to the Cordillera area for beneficial use. On that date, there was a “free river” (meaning that there was no call on the Colorado or Eagle Rivers). Of the water diverted and delivered to Cordillera, the Authority allocated 0.47 cfs to its Eagle River Diversion Point No. 2 conditional water right (the “Junior Eagle River Right”) and filed an application to make this amount absolute. The State and Division Engineers opposed the application, asserting that the Authority could not make its Junior Eagle River Right absolute when it owned another, more senior conditional water right, the SCR Diversion Point No. 1 water right (the “Senior Lake Creek Right”), decreed for the same claimed beneficial uses at the same location and for diversion at the same point. The water court agreed with the Engineers, and held that the July 4, 2004, diversion had to be allocated first to the Senior Lake Creek Right. The Authority appealed, and the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that where there was no evidence of waste, hoarding, or other mischief, and no injury to the rights of other water users, the owner of a portfolio of water rights was entitled to select which of its different, in-priority conditional water rights it wished to first divert and make absolute. "[T]he portfolio owner must live with its choice. Since it has chosen to make a portion of the Junior Eagle River Right absolute, the Authority may not now divert and use the Senior Lake Creek Right unless it demonstrates that it needs that water right in addition to the Junior Eagle River Right." View "Upper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

In June 2010, the Denver City Council passed Ordinance 333, replacing the old zoning code but including an exception that allowed any person seeking to “erect or alter structures” to apply for a permit under the old zoning code until December 30, 2010. On December 30, 2010, Open Door Ministries (Open Door) applied for a use permit under the old code to change the use of 740 Clarkson Street to provide transitional housing for people in need. The Denver Zoning Authority (“the DZA”) issued the rooming and boarding permit. Open Door then purchased the property for $700,000; made improvements to the property; and began providing room and board to people at risk of becoming homeless. Several months later, Jesse Lipschuetz, who owned a home adjacent to 740 Clarkson, sought administrative review of the DZA’s decision to issue the permit. He argued that Open Door did not meet the exception under Ordinance 333 because the permit was for a change of use, not to “erect or alter” a structure. The DZA defended its decision to issue the permit, explaining that it had consistently interpreted the exception to allow parties to seek any kind of permit under the old zoning code until December30, 2010. The trial court concluded that the City should not have issued the permit, but stayed its order to revoke the permit until Open Door’s cross-claims were resolved. Several months later, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Open Door on the cross-claims. On appeal, Lipschuetz argued that Open Door’s cross-claims against the City were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act because they “could lie in tort.” Because Open Door did not notify the City prior to filing its cross-claims, Lipschuetz argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the cross-claims. The court of appeals agreed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals failed to consider whether, at the time of filing, Open Door had suffered an injury that would subject its cross-claims to the Act. The Court concluded that the Act did not apply to Open Door’s request for prospective relief to prevent future injury. View "Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz" on Justia Law