Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Littleton firefighter Jeffrey Christ was diagnosed with glioblastoma multiforme (“GBM,” a type of brain cancer). After undergoing surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation, he returned to work, but ultimately died as a result of the disease. He (and later his widow and child) sought workers’ compensation benefits to cover his cancer treatment, asserting that his brain cancer qualified as a compensable occupational disease under the “firefighter statute” of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado. .At issue here was whether Christ’s employer, the City of Littleton, and Littleton’s insurer, Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. (collectively “Littleton”), successfully overcame a statutory presumption that Christ’s condition resulted from his employment as a firefighter. After review, the Supreme Court held that the employer, through a preponderance of the evidence, could meet its burden to show the firefighter's cancer "did not occur on the job" by establishing the absence of specific causation. Here, the ALJ applied the statutory presumption and found that Littleton established by a preponderance that Christ's GBM condition was not caused by his occupational exposures. A panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (“Panel”) reversed, concluding that Littleton’s medical evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption. In a split decision, a division of the court of appeals affirmed the Panel. Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals’ interpretation of the breadth of the statutory presumption and of the employer’s burden to overcome the presumption, the Court concluded that the court of appeals erroneously evaluated the medical evidence presented by Littleton and erroneously failed to defer to the ALJ’s findings of fact, which are supported by substantial evidence. The court of appeals' judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded back to the Panel for reinstatement of the ALJ’s original findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. View "City of Littleton v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office" on Justia Law

Proponents Mike Spalding and David Ottke proposed Initiative #73, which would amend article XXI of the Colorado Constitution to change the procedures leading to and the conduct of recall elections for state and local elective officials. A review and comment hearing was held before representatives of the Offices of Legislative Counsel and Legislative Legal Services. Thereafter, the proponents submitted a final version of their proposed initiative to the Secretary of State for purposes of submission to the Title Board. The Title Board conducted a hearing, concluded that the proposed initiative contained a single subject, and set a title. Petitioner Phillip Hayes filed a motion for rehearing, contending that the title comprised multiple subjects and was misleading, confusing, and inaccurate. Hayes petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for review The Supreme Court concluded that Initiative #73 contained one subject, namely, the manner in which recall elections are triggered and conducted; however, the title set by the Title Board did not satisfy the clear title requirement because it did not alert voters to central elements of the initiative; it was misleading as to other elements; and, as all parties agreed, it unnecessarily recited existing law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Title Board and returned this measure to the Board to fix a new title. View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #73" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether 39-29-105(1)(a) permitted a deduction for the “cost of capital” associated with natural gas transportation and processing facilities. In general terms, the cost of capital was defined as the amount of money that an investor could have earned on a different investment of similar risk. In this case, the cost of capital was the amount of money that BP America Production Company’s (“BP”) predecessors could have earned had they invested in other ventures rather than in building transportation and processing facilities. BP claimed it could deduct the cost of capital because it was a cost associated with transportation and processing activity. Respondent Colorado Department of Revenue argued that the cost of capital was not a deductible cost because it was not an actual cost. The court of appeals held that the cost of capital as not a deductible cost under the statute. BP appealed, and the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of section 39-29-102(3)(a) authorized a deduction for any transportation, manufacturing, and processing costs and that the cost of capital was a deductible cost that resulted from investment in transportation and processing facilities. The appellate court was reversed and the case remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "BP Am. v. Colo. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a question of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The issue centered on whether the City of Englewood's Ordinance 34 (effectively barring sex offenders from residing within the city) was preempted by Colorado law. The federal district court in this case concluded that such a conflict did exist because Colorado had generally opted for a policy of individualized treatment of sex offenders, and the ordinance acted as a bar to residency. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with the federal district court and found no conflict. With no conflict between state law and the ordinance, the Colorado Court concluded Ordinance 34 was not preempted. The case was returned to the Tenth Circuit for further proceedings. View "Ryals v. City of Englewood" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cathy Ritzert had worked as a teacher for more than twenty years. She worked for the Air Academy High School, part of the Academy School District No. 20. A student's parents complained about Ritzert, and the District placed her on administrative leave, telling her they would recommend dismissal unless she resigned. Ritzert refused. Several months passed without the District making good on its threat to fire her. Ritzert eventually took a new job teaching special needs students in a neighboring district, claiming she did this to mitigate her damages. She still wanted the District to prove it had a legitimate basis for terminating her, so she again refused to quit. The District responded by ordering Ritzert to report to work as a floating substitute. When Ritzert did not comply, the District initiated formal dismissal proceedings, claiming in part that her refusal to return to work constituted insubordination. A hearing officer recommended that Ritzert be retained, finding in part that the District's insubordination allegation was pretextual and unreasonable under the circumstances. The Board dismissed Ritzert for insubordination anyway, making no comment about the complaint that triggered placing her on leave in the first place. Upon review of this matter, the Colorado Supreme Court held that under the Teacher Employment, Compensation and Dismissal Act of 1990 (TECDA), the School Board's order must be fully warranted by the hearing officer's evidentiary findings of fact. Because the Board here "abdicated" that responsibility here, the Court concluded that its decision to dismiss Ritzert for insubordination on the facts of this case was arbitrary and capricious. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case to the Board to reinstate Ritzert. View "Ritzert v. Board of Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Meridian Service Metropolitan District (Meridian) appealed a district court order finding that Meridian sought to appropriate designated ground water that was subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado Ground Water Commission. Meridian petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to decide whether storm runoff could be classified as “designated ground water” subject to administration and adjudication by the Commission, or whether such water was in or tributary to a natural stream (vesting jurisdiction in the local water court). The Supreme Court concluded that because this case presented a question of whether the water at issue here met a statutory definition of “designated ground water,” the Commission had jurisdiction to make the initial determination. View "Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist. v. Ground Water Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed actions of the Title Board in setting title and ballot title and submission clauses for initiative 2013-2014 #89. Proponents complained that the titles did not contain one subject or that the title was not clear. The Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Title Board. View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #89" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed actions of the Title Board in setting titles and ballot title and submission clauses for initiatives 2013-2014 90 and 93. Proponents complained that the titles did not contain one subject or fairly reflect the purpose of the proposed initiatives. The Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Title Board. View "In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #90 and #93" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed actions of the Title Board in setting titles and ballot title and submission clauses for initiatives 2013-2014 85, 86 and 87. Proponents complained that the titles did not contain one subject or fairly reflect the purpose of the proposed initiatives. The Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Title Board. View "In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #85, #86, and #87" on Justia Law

After the Title Board set titles and submission clauses for Proposed Initiative 2013-2014 #103, petitioners moved for a rehearing, claiming the initiative contained more than one subject and was impermissibly vague. One of the initiative's representatives was unable to attend the rehearing. The Secretary of State's office suggested that a designated representative withdraw and a substitute alternate attend the hearing. The Title Board allowed the substitution and proceeded to deny the petitioner's motion. On appeal, petitioners argued that the proposed initiative still contained too many subjects and was impermissibly vague. Furthermore, the argued the Title Board did not have authority to allow the substitute representative. The Supreme Court agreed that the Title Board's approval of the substitute was improper. Therefore, the Court reversed the Title Board's action and remanded the case back to the Board without decision on claims that the initiative addressed more than one subject or was vague. View "In re Proposed Initiative 2013-2014 #103" on Justia Law