Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Public Service Company of Colorado applied for a tax refund from the state Department of Revenue. The company argued that it was entitled to a refund because it paid taxes when it was actually eligible for an exemption. The district court held in favor of the company, concluding that electricity was tangible personal property and that the production of electricity constituted manufacturing, thus entitling the company to the exemption (the "manufacturing exemption" under 39-26-709(1)(a)(II) C.R.S. (2013)). Upon review of the Department's argument on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that section 39-26-104(1)(d.1) applied in this case: electricity did not qualify as tangible personal property, and that the Code "contemplate[d] that 'electricity furnished and sold'" was to be taxed as a service. View "Department of Revenue v. Public Service Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner and State Representative Debbie Benefield, and other current or former members of the Colorado House of Representatives, appealed the court of appeals' judgment which reversed the district court's order denying costs and attorney fees for the Colorado Republican Party. In 2006, the Party submitted an Open Records Act request to each petitioner seeking access to responses to a 2005 survey that contained various constituents' viewpoints on a variety of legal, political and social issues. When petitioners declined to make the surveys available, the Party sued to get access. The Party ultimately got 925 of 1584 surveys it requested. The Party then moved for costs and fees as the "prevailing applicant." The Supreme Court concluded that because section 24-72-204(5), "when properly construed," mandated an award in favor of any person who applied for and received a district court order requiring a custodian to permit inspection of a public record. Because the appellate court was correct in its interpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Benefield v. Colorado Republican Party" on Justia Law

Proponents Mike Spaulding and Natalie Menten proposed Initiative 76 which sought to repeal and replace the existing manner of triggering and conducting a recall election under article XXI of the Colorado Constitution, and to institute a new constitutional right to recall state and local non-elected officers. The Title Board set a title and submission clause for the initiative. Registered elector Philip Hayes objected to the Board's action. The Board modified the title and submission clause in response to Hayes' objections, but otherwise denied his motion for rehearing. The proponents contended that the initiative, title and submission clause addressed a single subject and were in compliance with state law. The Supreme Court disagreed, and concluded the Title Board acted unconstitutionally in setting a title for the initiative. The Board's action was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #76" on Justia Law

Proponents Peter Coulter and Lisa Brumfiel proposed Initiative 129 to amend article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution, known as the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR). The Initiative sought to amend TABOR to define the term "fee" and differentiate it from a tax. Petitioner Anthony sought to challenge the initiative, arguing it contained multiple subjects. Alternatively, he argued the initiative's title was misleading. The Supreme Court concluded the initiative contained a single subject, and that the title clearly expressed a single subject. Therefore the Court affirmed the action of the Title Board. View "In re Title, Ballot Title, and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #129" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court issues a rule to show cause to decide whether the district court in this case abused its discretion in holding that as a matter of law, section 12-36.5-104(10)(a), C.R.S. (2013) protected professional review committee records from subpoena or discovery and admissibility in "civil suits," but not administrative proceedings. Upon review, the Court held that the term "civil suit" included administrative proceedings of an adjudicatory nature. Accordingly, the Colorado Medical Board's records were protected from subpoena or discovery or were admissible in the administrative hearing in Dr. Polly Train's medical license. The Court reversed the district court's order requiring the Board produce the records in question. View "Colorado Medical Board v. Office of Administrative Courts" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court centered on the lawfulness of Secretary of State Rule 4.1, 8 Colo. Code Regs. 1505-6:4.1 (2013). Petitioner Colorado Secretary of State Scott Gessler promulgated Rule 4.1 in response to "Sampson v. Buescher," (625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010)). Rule 4.1 increased the contribution and expenditure threshold that triggered issue committee status from $200 to $5000 and exempted retrospective reporting of contributions and expenditures once issue committee status is achieved. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Sampson" did not invalidate either the $200 contribution and expenditure threshold under article XXVIII, section 2(10)(a)(II)of the Colorado Constitution or the retrospective reporting requirement under section 1-45-108(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2013), of the Fair Campaign Practices Act. Because Rule 4.1's $5000 threshold and its retrospective reporting exemption conflicted with these provisions, the Court held Rule 4.1 unlawful and set it aside. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals because the court of appeals properly concluded that Gessler exceeded his authority in promulgating Rule 4.1. View "Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Town of Dillon enacted two municipal ordinances: one authorized a local road improvement project, and another concerning parking enforcement on a public right-of-way. Owners of the Yacht Club Condominiums challenged the ordinances, arguing, among other things, that the ordinances were an unreasonable exercise of the Town's police power because they eliminated the ability of the owners' guests to use the Town's rights-of-way as overflow parking. The trial court concluded the Town's exercise of its police power was unreasonable. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Town appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the ordinances were within the Town's police power to regulate matters of public health, safety and welfare, and reasonably related to the Town's objectives of improving traffic safety and improving water drainage. View "Town of Dillon v. Yacht Club Condominiums Home Owners Association" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court in this case, two novel questions of Colorado law: (1) the interaction between various waiver provisions in the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA); and (2) whether the "recreation area waiver" of the Act applied to injuries sustained on a walkway adjacent to a public school playground. The plaintiff in this case (a minor child) slipped and fell in a puddle of water that accumulated on a concrete walkway at his public elementary school. As a result of his fall, the child sustained a severe head injury. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court: (1) reversed the court of appeals to the extent that it held that the consideration of one CGIA waiver provision affirmatively precluded consideration of any alternative waiver provisions; and (2) the recreation area waiver's requirements were not met in this case because the walkway at issue was not itself a "public facility" nor was it a component of a larger collection of items that qualified as a "public facility." View "Young v. Brighton School District 27J" on Justia Law

The Board of Commissioners of the County of Teller filed a petition seeking the district court's review of the City of Woodland Park's annexation of certain real property. Upon review of the petition and the district court's order denying the City's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order: the district court indeed did not have jurisdiction to review the County's petition under 31-12-116 C.R.S. (2013). View "County of Teller Bd. of County Comm'rs v. City of Woodland Park" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was one of first impression: whether an injury that occurred on a "zip line" on a public school playground met the requirements of the "recreation area waiver" of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. A student was playing on the zip line during lunch recess when she fell and fractured her wrist. Her parents sued the school district in tort. Using the three-step analysis announced in "Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs," the Supreme Court held that a collection on playground equipment considered as a whole qualified as a "public facility" under the recreation area waiver. The court of appeals erred when it held that the zip line individually (rather than the playground collectively) constituted a "public facility." View "St. Vrain Valley School District RE-1J v. A.R.L." on Justia Law