Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was one of first impression: whether the requirements of a statutory "recreation area waiver" can be met by a party injured in a public golf course's parking lot. Specifically, the issue was reduced to whether a public golf course's parking lot qualified as a "public facility" under the Governmental Immunity Act, and whether such lot is "located in" a "recreation area." Respondent Marilyn Daniel drove to a public golf course in Colorado Springs to see her Congressional Representative speak at the clubhouse. Instead of parking in a lot close to the clubhouse, respondent parked on a street a block away. As she crossed the golf course parking lot, she stepped in a hole, fell and fractured her hip. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a parking lot serving a public golf course is a "public facility" under the recreational area waiver. A three-step analysis should be used to determine whether a public facility is "located in" a "recreation area:" (1) determine which specific portions of the property should be considered a "putative recreation area;" (2) determine whether the public entity's primary purpose in building or maintaining that area was for the promotion of recreation; and (3) determine whether the facility at issue was located within the boundaries of that recreation area. The Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in categorically holding that the recreation area waiver did not apply to this type of parking lot. View "Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

Petitioner Western Logistics, Inc. appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm the Industrial Claim Appeals Office's decision that certain individuals were employees rather than independent contractors under Colorado law. The appellate court found that the individuals were not simultaneously providing services for others in the field, and were not free from petitioner's control and direction. Upon review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in affirming the Appeals Office's decision: because the court felt the independent-trade-or-business issue and the control-and-direction issue may have been related, the Court did not address the control-and-direction issue. The Court reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals to vacate the portion of its decision that addressed the control-and-direction issue, then to remand the case to the Appeals Office for further proceedings. View "Western Logistics, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether an individual was an independent contractor as opposed to an employee for unemployment tax liability purposes. Waterman Ormsby was a geologist contracted to work on a project basis for Softrock Geological Services, Inc. In 2011, the Division of Employment and Training audited Softrock and issued a notice of liability on grounds that Softrock should have treated Ormsby as an employee for Colorado Employment Security Act (CESA) purposes. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that whether an individual was "customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service performed" was a question of fact. Whether the individual worked for another was not dispositive of whether the individual was engaged in an independent business. The Court disagreed with the appellate court, however, that whether an individual was engaged in an independent trade or business could be determined by applying a nine-factor test to create a presumption of an independent contractor relationship under statute. Instead, the Court held that the determination must be based on a totality of the circumstances test that evaluates the dynamics of the relationship between the putative employee and the employer. The factors listed in the statute might be relevant to that determination, but the statute does not provide an exhaustive list of factors to be considered. The case was remanded to the appellate court to return the case to the Industrial Claim Appeals office for further proceedings. View "Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Softrock Geological Services, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Election Rule 10.7.5, promulgated as a temporary or emergency rule on the evening of the November 5, 2013 election. Plaintiffs were registered electors of the Adams 12 Five Star School District who sued seeking judicial review of the Secretary of State's authority to promulgate the rule, and for an order to direct the Clerk and Recorder of Adams County to finish counting votes and to certify the vote tally for all candidates in the school district director election. The district court ruled that the Secretary acted in excess of his authority in promulgating the emergency rule, and ordered all defendants to complete and certify the vote count for all candidates in the Adams 12 director district 4 election. The Secretary petitioned the Supreme Court for review of whether the district court erred in holding "Rule 10.7.5 [was] contrary to and in conflict with existing election statutes." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rule 10.7.5 indeed "contravene[d] the election code by permitting a designated election official to usurp the courts' express authority to resolve . . . issues." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court only in holding that Rule 10.7.5 conflicted with existing election rules. View "Hanlen v. Gessler" on Justia Law

The Colorado Division of Insurance initiated an investigation into Milton Trujillo's application to renew as a insurance producer license with bail bond authority. It later denied the application based on a complaint it received. The Division charged Trujillo with twelve counts of violating the insurance code, professions and occupations code, and Division regulations. The ALJ revoked the license; the Commissioner of Insurance adopted the ALJ's decision. The court of appeals affirmed the Commissioner's action, determining that Trujillo violated a fiduciary duty prescribed by 10-2-704(a). The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals erred in applying section 10-2-704(1)(a) to this case: "[w]hile there are unappealed findings of fact upon which the Commissioner on remand could uphold the sanction it ordered, it is not clear [to the Court] whether, absent the agency's construction of 10-2-704(1)(a), the Commissioner would have exercised his authority to revoke Trujillo's license and deny his renewal application." The case was therefore remanded for redetermination by the Commissioner the appropriate sanction for Trujillo's conduct. View "Trujillo v. Colorado Division of Insurance" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression: whether a proposed amendment to the fire department's disciplinary system was subject to collective bargaining under the Charter of the City and County of Denver. Upon review of the Charter, and construing its plain language as a "harmonious and sensible whole," the Supreme Court concluded that Denver had the authority to both draft and implement disciplinary rules, and that that authority was not limited by the firefighters' right to collectively bargain. The court of appeals held that discipline was a term and condition of employment under the Charter and not subject to collective bargaining. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "City & County of Denver v. Denver Firefighters" on Justia Law

Following an election recount in the Town of Center, Maurice Jones and Citizen Center filed suit seeking to set aside the results of the recount. Jones argued that voters' right to ballot secrecy had been violated. The district court set aside the results and ordered a new recall election. The three officials who had been elected in the recall petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the district court's decision. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the recall results and ordering a new election. As such, the Court reversed the district court and enter judgment in favor of the newly elected officials. View "In re Jones v. Samora" on Justia Law

This case centered on the contested March 19, 2013 election in Center, Colorado. The district court set aside the results of the recall, ordered a new recall election, and allowed the recalled officials to continue until the new election was conducted. The recalled officials challenged the district court's decision, arguing that court erred in setting aside the recall and ordering a new election, and erred in determining that there were flaws in how the votes were counted. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law in setting aside the recall and ordering a new recall election. Accordingly, the Court returned the case back to the district court with directions that judgment be entered that the replacement officials were duly elected. View "In re Jones v. Samora" on Justia Law

Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. appealed the appellate court's decision to reverse an Industrial Claim Appeals Office decision disallowing respondent Elaine Loofbourrow's award of temporary disability benefits. The ICAO concluded that once respondent's treating physician placed her at maximum medical improvement, temporary total disability benefits could not be awarded for the injury for which she was initially treated. The appellate court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, such an independent medical exam was not a prerequisite to temporary total disability benefits. After its review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court was correct in its decision: because a determination of maximum medical improvement has no statutory significance with regard to injuries resulting in loss of no more than three days (or shifts) of work time, respondent's award of temporary total disability benefits was not barred by her failure to first seek a division-sponsored independent medical examination. View "Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. v. Loofbourrow" on Justia Law

A Jefferson County Sheriff Deputy was transporting two juveniles from a court hearing. The two were seated in the rear of the transport van, handcuffed. En route, another driver allegedly turned into an intersection without yielding and collided with the transport van. As a result of the collision, the juveniles sustained multiple injuries. The juveniles sued the County, alleging the deputy transporting them was negligent. The County claimed it was immune from suit. The trial court denied the County's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. Upon review of the County's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in finding allegations of negligence alone were sufficient to overcome the statutory grant of immunity and the presumption of good faith afforded to law enforcement. The Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Young v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law