Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The parties appealed the water court's decision that holdover directors of a water conservancy district could not continue to act on behalf of the district a year after the expiration of their term. The Supreme Court held that the holdover provision in the Water Conservancy Act allowed for a holdover director to continue to serve as a de jure officer, and did not impose a temporal limit on that director's authority to act on behalf of the district. View "Yellow Jacket Water Conservancy District v. Livingston" on Justia Law

This case was an appeal of a final water court order which voided a rule promulgated by the Office of the State Engineer regarding nontributary ground water extracted in the course of coalbed methane (CBM) production and other oil and gas development. The final rules were challenged by owners of vested water rights and citizen groups whose members owned vested water rights. After extensive briefing by the parties, the water court upheld the Final Rules in their entirety except for the "Fruitland Rule," which it invalidated. The water court held that although H.B. 1303 granted authority to the State Engineer to promulgate the Fruitland Rule, the Tribal Rule essentially divested the State Engineer of that authority. The water court also found that the State Engineer had issued an improper "advisory" rule, and thus could not promulgate the Fruitland Rule unless he first obtained a judicial determination of his authority over nontributary ground water underlying the Reservation. The State Engineer, the Tribe, and several Intervenors appealed the water court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule based on the Tribal Rule. The Court concluded the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of this authority: it stated on its face that the Final Rules themselves do not form the basis of or "establish" the State Engineer's authority to administer the nontributary ground water within Reservation boundaries. Because the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of his authority, the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule on that ground. Furthermore, the water court also erred in labeling the Fruitland Rule an "advisory" rule and in requiring the State Engineer to obtain a judicial determination that he had authority to administer nontributary ground water within the boundaries of the Reservation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the water court’s invalidation of the Fruitland Rule and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dick Wolfe v. Pawnee Well Users, Inc." on Justia Law

In June 2013, in Pueblo and El Paso County citizens certified petitions to recall State Senator Angela Giron and State Senator John Morse. A month later, the Governor set a September 10 recall election for both Senate seats. This recall election was the first in Colorado's history for members of the General Assembly. The Governor then submitted an Interrogatory to the Supreme Court pursuant to Article VI, section 3,of the Colorado Constitution to ask whether the prior participation requirement in Article XXI, section 3, of the Colorado Constitution conflicted with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Colorado Court issued an Order holding that the prior participation requirement in Article XXI, section 3, conflicted with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. View "In re Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether Denver could properly use quantified transmountain lawn irrigation return flows (LIRFs) as a substitute supply of water for its Civil Action (C.A.)3635 exchanges. The Court held that that properly quantified transmountain LIRFs are legally indistinguishable from reusable transmountain effluent and, therefore, the water court correctly determined that Denver could use its properly quantified transmountain LIRFs as substitute supply for the appropriative rights of exchange in C.A. 3635. In addition, the Court affirmed the water court's holding that junior appropriators could not claim injury premised solely upon the proper operation of the C.A. 3635 exchanges. View "Denver v. Englewood" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court answered a question of Colorado law certified from the United States Court of Federal Claims. Plaintiffs were landowners who owned property abutting a former railroad right-of-way. The United States authorized the right-of-way to be used as a recreational trail pursuant to the National Trails System Act ("Rails-to-Trails" Act). The issue before the federal court was whether the United States took property for which Plaintiffs should have received compensation. The Colorado Court determined that the centerline presumption was a common law rule of conveyance that presumed a grantor who conveyed land abutting a right-of-way intended to convey land to the center of the right-of-way and absent a contrary intent on the face of the conveyance. Therefore, while the Court held that the centerline presumption applied to railroad rights-of-way, it also held that, to claim presumptive ownership to the centerline of a railroad right-of-way, an adjacent landowner must produce evidence that his or her title derives from the owner of the land underlying the right-of-way. View "Asmussen v. United States" on Justia Law

Kathleen Hopkins retired from the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment. During her period of employment, the Department made contributions to her retirement fund, and once she retired, she began taking retirement payments from that fund. Later, she went to work for the Department again. When she was laid off from this second period of employment, she applied for and was awarded unemployment benefits. Benefits were discontinued and she was issued a notice of overpayment. She appealed the notice and a hearing officer restored her benefits. The Department appealed, and a panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) reversed the hearing officer's decision, reasoning that Hopkins was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because her retirement income exceeded the amount of the unemployment. Hopkins appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the offset provision applied only when the employer contributed to the claimant's retirement fund during the base period of employment that made her eligible for unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court and reversed, finding that the offset provision applied any time the employer has contributed to the retirement fund from which the claimant received payments, regardless of when the contributions were made. View "Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Colorado Dept. of Labor & Employment" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ ruling in favor of the Colorado Department of Local Affairs’ interpretation of CRS 39-4-102. The Court held that Qwest Corporation as a public utility, is valued centrally and therefore was not entitled to the intangible property exemption or the cost cap valuation method found elsewhere in Colorado’s tax statutes. The Court also held that this valuation method did not violate Qwest’s constitutional guarantee under the Equal Protection Clause nor did it violate Qwest’s rights under the Uniform Taxation Clause of the Colorado Constitution. View "Qwest v. Colorado Division of Property Taxation" on Justia Law

The Denver Department of Human Services placed "A.C." in foster care when he was two days old. Before his first birthday, the juvenile court terminated his biological parents' rights, which made him available for adoption. The issue in this case centered on whether the prospective adoptive parents' due process rights were violated when the Department removed the child from their home without prior notice. At the time of the removal, the prospective parents had not yet initiated the adoption process. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that preadoptive foster patents do not possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest, and therefore, no due process violation occurred. View "M.S. v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated this action in 2005 for declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that the current Colorado public school financing system violated the Education Clause because the system failed to provide sufficient funding to support a "thorough and uniform" system of free public schools. Plaintiffs also claimed that local school districts' lack of sufficient financial resources, coupled with the system's restrictions on spending, prevented districts from exerting meaningful control over educational instruction and quality in violation of the Local Control Clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the public school financing system complied with the Colorado Constitution, and reversed the trial court's finding that the public school financing system was unconstitutional. View "Colorado v. Lobato" on Justia Law

Mile High Cab, Inc. appealed directly to the Supreme Court to challenge a district court denial of its application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. After a "lengthy" hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) to whom the application had been assigned found that several incumbent carriers opposing the application had adequately proved that granting the application would be detrimental to the public interest. The Public Utilities Commission (PUC) ultimately adopted the ALJ's recommendation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the record did not clearly contain the finding statutorily required for a denial of Mile High's application by the PUC. As such, the Court reversed the district court, and remanded the case back to the PUC for further consideration. View "Mile High Cab, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law