Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Denver Department of Human Services placed "A.C." in foster care when he was two days old. Before his first birthday, the juvenile court terminated his biological parents' rights, which made him available for adoption. The issue in this case centered on whether the prospective adoptive parents' due process rights were violated when the Department removed the child from their home without prior notice. At the time of the removal, the prospective parents had not yet initiated the adoption process. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that preadoptive foster patents do not possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest, and therefore, no due process violation occurred. View "M.S. v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated this action in 2005 for declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that the current Colorado public school financing system violated the Education Clause because the system failed to provide sufficient funding to support a "thorough and uniform" system of free public schools. Plaintiffs also claimed that local school districts' lack of sufficient financial resources, coupled with the system's restrictions on spending, prevented districts from exerting meaningful control over educational instruction and quality in violation of the Local Control Clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the public school financing system complied with the Colorado Constitution, and reversed the trial court's finding that the public school financing system was unconstitutional. View "Colorado v. Lobato" on Justia Law

Mile High Cab, Inc. appealed directly to the Supreme Court to challenge a district court denial of its application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. After a "lengthy" hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) to whom the application had been assigned found that several incumbent carriers opposing the application had adequately proved that granting the application would be detrimental to the public interest. The Public Utilities Commission (PUC) ultimately adopted the ALJ's recommendation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the record did not clearly contain the finding statutorily required for a denial of Mile High's application by the PUC. As such, the Court reversed the district court, and remanded the case back to the PUC for further consideration. View "Mile High Cab, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether foster parents who intervene in a dependency and neglect action possess limited rights to participate in a hearing on a motion to terminate parental rights. The Court construed C.R.S. 19-3-507(5)(a) and concluded that foster parents who have properly intervened are afforded the same degree of participation as all other parties at a termination hearing. Furthermore, the Court concluded that parents' due process rights are not impacted by the full participation of foster parents in the termination hearing. View "A.M. v. A.C." on Justia Law

In 2007, Petitioners Curtis Vagneur and Jeffrey Evans submitted two initiative petitions to the Aspen City Clerk regarding the highway entrance to Aspen. Respondents Les Holst, Clifford Weiss, and Terry Paulson filed objections to the petitions. Following a hearing, an administrative hearing officer determined that the proposed initiatives sought to ask electors of Aspen to vote on a change on use of open space to authorize a different entrance to Aspen, to mandate design specifics for that roadway, and to mandate the amendment or rescinding of existing documents previously authorized by the City Council that conflicted with conditions of the proposed roadway. The hearing officer concluded that the initiatives were "improper subjects of the initiative process." The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the initiatives were administrative in nature, and therefore outside the initiative process. The Court concluded that the proposed initiatives were indeed administrative in nature and were therefore not a proper exercise of the people's initiative power. The Court affirmed the hearing officer and the court of appeals. View "Vagneur v. City of Aspen" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an indigent alleged juvenile offender was entitled as of right to a second competency evaluation at the State's expense. Upon receiving an competency evaluation report, the trial court made a preliminary finding that "W.P." was competent to proceed. However, citing ongoing concerns about her client's mental health, W.P.'s public defender objected, requesting a hearing and filing a motion for a second competency evaluation at the State's expense. At the motion hearing, the public defender stated that because the juvenile code was silent, the statutory authority relied upon referred to the adult code which entitled the second evaluation at the State's expense. Concluding that the Children's Code was "specifically silent on that issue," the district court determined that the adult provisions did not apply and denied the request for a second evaluation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the public defender's request for a second evaluation. View "In re People in the Interest of W.P." on Justia Law

Petitioners Jamie Webb, Jeffrey Hermanson, and Michaleen Jeronimus, challenged the legality of the City of Black Hawk’s ordinance banning bicycles on certain city streets. Petitioners, a group of bicyclists, were cited and fined for riding their bikes on the only street providing access through town from the state highway to Central City. Petitioners argued that Black Hawk, as a home-rule municipality, lacked the authority to prohibit bicycles on local streets absent a suitable alternative bicycle route as provided by state statute. Both the trial and district courts ruled in favor of Black Hawk, finding the city had the authority to ban bicycles through both its home-rule and police powers. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that Black Hawk’s ordinance banning bicycles was a matter of mixed state and local concern and conflicts with and is preempted by state law. View "Webb v. Black Hawk" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Colorado law recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege between a guardian ad litem and a minor child with respect to a dependency and neglect proceeding. The Court held that a guardian ad litem holds a minor child's psychotherapist-patient privilege when: (1) the child is too young or otherwise incompetent to hold the privilege; (2) the child's interests are adverse to those of his or her parent(s); and (3) section 19-3-311 C.R.S. (2012) does not abrogate the privilege. In this case, the Court found that the guardian ad litem partially waived the child's privilege when she disseminated a letter from the child's therapist to the juvenile court and to all parties. The Court remanded the case to the juvenile court for a determination of the scope of that waiver. View "L.A.N. et al. v. L.M.B." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Town of Minturn filed an application for a change of water rights. In 2007, the Town made a new application for water rights, the approval of a plan for augmentation, and conditional appropriative rights of exchange. Over thirty parties filed Statements of Opposition. After negotiations between the Town and its opposers, in 2010 the water court granted Minturn's applications and entered stipulated decrees. After the court's order, Minturn realized that the consumptive use numbers that it relied upon to calculate its monthly maximum limitations for diversion did not reflect actual monthly useage data. Minturn conferred with all of its opposers regarding its intention to correct the water court's decrees in order to conform with the newly discovered data. Each opposer agreed with the proposed corrections save one, J. Tucker, Trustee, who opposed the corrections on the ground that the parties' earlier stipulations precluded the water court from making the requested changes. The water court ultimately granted Minturn's request to correct the substantive errors, and J. Tucker appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the corrected findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and decrees of the water court. View "The Town of Minturn v. J. Tucker, Trustee" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in these consolidated cases concerned the actions of the title setting board (Title Board) in setting the titles and ballot titles and submission clauses (or titles) in two groups of initiatives. In case 12SA117, Petitioner Philip Hayes challenged the Title Board's title setting for Initiatives 2011-2012, Numbers 67, 68 and 69. Respondents David Ottke and John Slota were the designated representatives for those proposed initiatives. If adopted, the initiatives would alter how the General Assembly amended or repealed citizen-initiated statutes. In Case 12SA130, Petitioners Barbara Walker and Don Childears challenged the Title Board's title setting for Initiative 201-2012 Number 94 and 95. Respondents Earl Staelin and Robert Bows were the designated representatives. If adopted, Initiative 94 would have amended the Colorado constitution to allow political subdivisions to establish and operate banks; Initiative 95 would have allowed the State to open and operate its own bank. The common threshold question before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether the Title Board had authority to act on motions for rehearing to address challenges to the titles previously set, where fewer than both of the designated representatives of the initiative's proponents appeared at the rehearing. Finding no statutory authority that conferred such authority to the Title Board, the Supreme Court reversed the actions of the Title Board and returned the measures to the Title Board for further proceedings. View "Hayes v. Ottke" on Justia Law