Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This was one of several similar cases filed in the fall of 2020 by the owners of hundreds of commercial properties in eleven different Colorado counties seeking to compel the assessors in each of the counties to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year. This matter involved the valuation of over 60 parcels of commercial property in Douglas County, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Douglas County property assessors to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations. View "Educhildren v. City of Douglas" on Justia Law

This was one of several cases filed in Colorado in which commercial property owners have sued to compel the county assessor to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year to account for the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. This case concerned the valuation of commercial real property located in the City and County of Broomfield, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the City and County of Broomfield Assessor to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations, and it did not require the Board of Equalization to correct the Assessor’s valuations. View "Hunter Douglas v. City & County of Broomfield" on Justia Law

This was one of several similar cases filed in the fall of 2020 by the owners of hundreds of commercial properties in eleven different Colorado counties seeking to compel the assessors in each of the counties to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year. This matter involved the valuation of 130 parcels of commercial property in Larimer County, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Larimer County property assessors to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations. View "Larimer County v. 1303 Frontage Holdings" on Justia Law

This was one of several cases filed in Colorado in which commercial property owners sued to compel the county assessor to revalue their properties and lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year to account for the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. This case concerned the valuation of hundreds of parcels of commercial real property located in Jefferson County, Colorado. The taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contended that the pandemic and various state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions” that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2022). To this, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the orders were not "unusual conditions:" COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Therefore, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Jefferson County Assessor to revalue the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations, and it did not require the Board of Equalization to correct the Assessor’s valuations. View " MJB Motel v. County of Jefferson" on Justia Law

Colorado’s Attorney General and the Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“UCCC”) (collectively, “the State”) sought to enjoin the respondent corporate entities and individuals that made up the career school known as CollegeAmerica (collectively, “CollegeAmerica”) from engaging in conduct that the State believed to be in violation of Colorado law. Specifically, the State contended that several aspects of CollegeAmerica’s marketing and admissions operations constituted deceptive trade practices under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”) and that CollegeAmerica’s institutional loan program, “EduPlan,” was unconscionable under the UCCC. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded, as did the division below, that the State’s CCPA civil penalty claims were equitable in nature and thus CollegeAmerica was not entitled to a jury trial on those claims. The Court further concluded the division erred in remanding this case for a new trial without first assessing whether CollegeAmerica had, in fact, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of significant public impact and, if so, whether the evidence sufficiently established such an impact. Finally, the Court concluded the division correctly determined that CollegeAmerica’s EduPlan loans as a whole were not unconscionable, although the Supreme Court disagreed with the division’s conclusion that individualized evidence regarding the probability of repayment was necessary to establish unconscionability. View "Colorado v. Center for Excellence in Higher Education" on Justia Law

Front Range Feedlots, LLC challenged certain orders issued by the Colorado State Engineer, and the District Court for Water Division 1 (the “water court”). Specifically, Front Range challenged the State Engineer’s authority to issue an Order to Comply with a February 4, 2020 substitute water supply plan issued to Front Range (the “2020 SWSP”). Front Range further contended that the water court abused its discretion in several ways when it issued its Order Granting Mandatory Injunction, requiring Front Range to comply with the 2020 SWSP and the Order to Comply. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded: (1) under the plain language of the applicable statutes, the State Engineer had the authority to issue the Order to Comply; (2) the State Engineer had the authority to enforce the terms and conditions of the 2020 SWSP after the expiration of that SWSP and Front Range’s withdrawal of its related water court application; (3) the State Engineer properly attached the 2020 SWSP terms and conditions to Front Range, rather than to the water rights at issue; (4) the State Engineer had jurisdiction to require the replacement of depletions from pre-application pumping; and (5) the water court properly exercised its discretion in ordering Front Range to acquire additional replacement sources. View "Front Range Feedlots v. Rein et al." on Justia Law

This matter arose out of disputes between Antero Resources Corporation (“Antero”) and Airport Land Partners, Ltd (“Airport Land”) and other royalty owners (collectively, “Royalty Owners”) over whether Antero could deduct certain post-production costs from royalty payments under the applicable leases’ royalty clauses. Royalty Owners alleged that Antero has underpaid royalties in violation of their respective lease contracts. Royalty Owners filed individual breach-of-contract suits against Antero for dates between December 2016 and April 2017. Antero moved to dismiss the suits, arguing that the claims should have been brought before the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (“COGCC” or “the Commission”) in the first instance. Statutorily, COGCC lacked jurisdiction under section 34-60-118.5(5), C.R.S. (2022), to engage in contract interpretation to resolve a bona fide dispute between parties under an oil and gas lease. But in 2017, without any intervening change to explain the shift, two district courts changed course, asserting that COGCC had responsibility for resolving contract disputes on the theory either that the contract terms were unambiguous or that settled law compelled a certain interpretation. The Colorado Supreme Court returned to the longstanding statutory mandate that COGCC lacked jurisdiction to resolve bona fide disputes of contract interpretation and held that such a dispute exists where the parties disagree in good faith about the meaning or application of a relevant contract term. View "Antero Resources v. Airport Land Partners" on Justia Law

In 2019, plaintiff John Dewey Institute, Inc. (“JDI”) submitted a charter school application to the Douglas County Colorado School Board. Section 22-30.5-108 (“section 108”) of the Charter Schools Act created a four-step procedure in which a charter school applicant may potentially twice appeal an adverse decision of a local board of education to the State Board. The parties agreed that section 108 precluded judicial review of State Board decisions rendered after a second appeal under section 108(3)(d). They disagreed, however, as to whether this appeal-preclusion language also barred judicial review of final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal under section 108(3)(a)—a scenario in which the State Board has affirmed the local board’s decision to deny a charter school application, thus rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Applying the plain language of section 108 and the statutory scheme as a whole, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that section 108(3)(d)’s appeal-preclusion language applied to all final decisions of the State Board rendered under section 108, including when, as here, the State Board affirmed the local board’s denial of a charter school application during an initial appeal, thereby ending the matter and rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling declaring that final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal were subject to judicial review. This matter was remanded with instructions that the case be returned to the district court for the dismissal of JDI’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Colorado State Board of Education v. Brannberg" on Justia Law

G.L.A. (“Mother”) brought L.S., who was one year old at the time, to the hospital for medical treatment. Hospital staff conducted a skeletal survey, which revealed that L.S. had a broken tibia; two additional fractures that were healing; severe bruising and swelling to his groin; and significant bruising on his back, face, and genitals. The hospital sent a referral to the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services, and the state filed a petition for dependent or neglected children in district court, alleging that Mother had physically abused L.S. The district court adjudicated L.S. dependent or neglected. About a month later, the court found that an appropriate treatment plan couldn’t be devised for Mother based on L.S.’s serious bodily injury(“SBI”), and Mother appealed. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the State satisfies its burden of proving that an appropriate treatment plan can’t be devised for a respondent parent in a dependency and neglect case when the State establishes by a preponderance of evidence a single incident resulting in serious bodily injury to the child. To this, the Court concluded that it did: the district court erred by imposing a clear and convincing burden of proof on the State at the dispositional hearing. Because there was no dispute L.S. sustained a serious bodily injury, the district court’s order granting Mother’s motion for directed verdict was reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "In Re Colorado in the interest of L.S." on Justia Law

Walker Commercial, Inc. (“Walker”) filed a Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 106(a)(4) complaint seeking review of the decision of Marshall Brown, the Director of Water of the City of Aurora (“Director”), to levy a storm drain development fee against Walker’s real property. Walker filed its Rule 106(a)(4) complaint in district court thirty days after the Director’s final decision—two days past Rule 106(b)’s twenty-eight-day filing deadline. Walker contended that C.R.C.P. 6(b) allowed the district court to extend Rule 106(b)’s filing deadline upon a showing of excusable neglect. The Director disagreed, arguing that Rule 6(b) did not apply to Rule 106(b) because Rule 106(b)’s deadline established a limitation period that was jurisdictional and that must be strictly enforced. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the Director and concluded that Rule 6(b) does not apply to extend Rule 106(b)’s twenty-eight-day filing deadline. The Court concluded the district court properly dismissed Walker’s Rule 106(a)(4) amended complaint as untimely. Because the original complaint was untimely, the trial court also properly dismissed Walker’s additional Claim 3 raised in its amended complaint. View " Brown v. Walker Commercial" on Justia Law