Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009 the fire protection district adopted an ordinance requiring commercial buildings and multi-family residences to have fire alarms equipped with wireless radio technology to send alarm signals directly to the district's central monitoring board. The ordinance provided that the district would contract with one private alarm company to provide and service signaling equipment, displacing several private fire alarm companies that have competed for these customers. The alarm companies sued on claims under the U.S. Constitution, federal antitrust law, and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the alarm companies on the basis of state law and enjoined the district from implementing the ordinance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the district has statutory authority to require that commercial and multi-family buildings connect directly to its monitoring board through wireless radio technology. The district does not, however, have authority to displace the entire private market by requiring all customers to buy services and equipment from itself or just one private company.

Verizon Maryland, a telecommunications company, and the staff of the Public Service Commission (PSC) obtained PSC approval of a global settlement of six pending cases. Verizon employed an alternative form of regulation (AFOR) under Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Co. (PUC) 4-301 that included up to $6,000,000 in bill credits to customers with out-of-service complaints that were not resolved in compliance with specified standards. PSC approved the AFOR pursuant to PUC 4-301. A technicians union objected, contending that the service quality aspects of the AFOR did not ensure the quality, availability, and reliability of service required by PUC 4-301. The circuit court affirmed PSC's approval of the AFOR. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PSC acted within its discretion in approving the AFOR, as PUC 4-301's use of the term "ensuring" did not require that PSC be completely certain that Verizon's incentive strategy would result in compliance with standards.

The Arkansas Health Services Permit Commission awarded Hospitality Care Center a permit of approval (POA) for a nursing facility. Gracewood Nursing and Rehabilitation Center subsequently requested approval from the Commission to transfer the POA to it from Hospitality. Twin Rivers Health and Rehab opposed the transfer. The Commission ultimately granted the transfer of the POA. Twin Rivers sought judicial review of the Commission's decision and declaratory relief, naming as defendants the Commission, the Arkansas Health Services Permit Agnecy (AHSPA), Gracewood, and Hospitality. The circuit court granted the summary judgment motion of the Commission and the AHSPA and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded the matter with directions to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law because the Commission did not set forth any findings of fact or conclusions of law to support its decision to grant the transfer of the POA; and (2) dismissed without prejudice that portion of the appeal relating to Twin Rivers's request for summary judgment, as the Court does not hear appeals piecemeal.

The company, which issues preprinted travelers' checks, challenged 2010 N.J. Laws Chapter 25, amending New Jersey's unclaimed property statute, N.J. Stat. 46:30B, to retroactively reduce the period after which travelers checks are presumed abandoned from 15 years to three years, after which the funds must be turned over to the state. The district court denied an injunction. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the Due Process Clause, the Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Commerce Clause. The law has a rational basis. It does not substantially impairment contractual relationships; while the company has the right to use and invest TC funds until the date the TC is cashed or sold, the duration of use is further subject to the lawful abandonment period set by unclaimed property laws. The company has no investment-backed expectation with respect to the longer period of investment.The law does not directly regulate sales in other states.

Merchants challenged 2010 N.J. Laws Chapter 25, amending the unclaimed property statute, N.J. Stat. 46:30B, to provide for escheat of stored value cards (gift cards). Chapter 25 presumes cards to be abandoned after two years of inactivity and requires issuers to transfer remaining value to the state. Issuers must obtain name and address of the purchaser or owner of each card. If the issuer's state exempts cards from its unclaimed property statute, unredeemed balances of cards previously-issued in New Jersey, where information was not recorded, must be reported to New Jersey. The address where the card issued or sold is presumed to be the owner's domicile. The district court enjoined retroactive application of Chapter 25 and prospective enforcement of the place-of-purchase presumption, but declined to enjoin data collection and two-year abandonment provisions. The Third Circuit affirmed. Chapter 25 substantially impaired contractual relationships by imposing unexpected obligations and did not reasonably accommodate the rights of the parties in light of the public purpose. The abandonment period is not preempted by the Credit CARD Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693l-1(c). The place-of-purchase presumption is preempted by federal common law, under which the first opportunity to escheat belongs to the state of the last known address of the creditor, shown by the debtor's records. If the primary rule does not apply, the right to escheat is with the state in which the debtor is incorporated.

When Neighborhood Health Plan of Rhode Island (NHP), a not-for-profit corporation that operated a licensed health maintenance organization that provided health insurance coverage to its enrollees, began reimbursing ophthalmologists at a higher rate than the rate paid to optometrists for performing the same services, two optometrists brought an action on behalf of all optometrists who had entered into participating provider agreements with NHP during the period that the differential reimbursement policy was in effect, contending that this differential reimbursement violated state law. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of NHP, reasoning that the antidiscrimination provision in R.I. Gen. Laws 5-35-21.1(b) applied only to expenditures of public funds and that NHP did not violate the statute because NHP paid for the ophthalmologists' services using private money. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute at issue was not ambiguous; and (2) the motion justice did not err in concluding that NHP is not an agency or department of the state and cannot otherwise be considered a state actor.

The Information Security Management Act, 44 U.S.C. 3541â49, requires that federal agencies meet information security standards. Compliance is monitored by the Office of Management and Budget. The Department of Justice purchased a license for plaintiffâs compliance product. Plaintiff participated with DOJ in seeking designation as a "Center of Excellence." Without notifying plaintiff, DOJ developed an alternative product, accessing plaintiff's database to learn the systemâs architecture. OMB selected DOJ as a Center of Excellence and required agencies to purchase from COEs. DOJâs product substituted its alternative for plaintiff's software. Plaintiff filed, in district court, a Lanham Act claim; a common law unfair competition claim; and a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Months later, plaintiff filed, in the Court of Federal Claims, claims of: breach of oral or implied contract, breach of license agreement, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed all but the Lanham Act claim. The Claims Court dismissed all claims, applying 28 U.S.C. 1500, which precludes it from exercising jurisdiction over "any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff ⦠has pending in any other court any suit ⦠against the United States." The Federal Circuit reversed, in part, reasoning that the license agreement claim does not arise from substantially the same facts as the district court claim.

Wehrenberg, Inc. operated a restaurant-style concession offering hotdogs, pizza, and similar items at four of its movie theaters. Wehrenberg charged its customers the four percent state sales tax imposed by Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.202. Wehrenberg then filed a sales tax refund claim with the Director of Revenue, asserting that the concession items should have been taxed at the one percent rate set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.014. The Director and the AHC denied the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the food for sale at Wehrenberg's concession stands was not intended for home consumption, the one percent state sales tax rate set forth in section 144.014 did not apply to Wehrenberg's food sales.

Plaintiff HVC Inc. was a trustee of the Honda Lease Trust. During the audit period at issue, several car dealerships entered into thousands of leases with customers (lessees) pursuant to lease plan agreements between the dealerships, the trust, and the servicer of the trust. Under the leases, the lessees were responsible for submitting the vehicle registration renewal application and renewal fees to the department of motor vehicles on behalf of the trust. Upon receipt of the renewal application and fee, the department sent the vehicle registration card to the trust, and the trust forwarded the vehicle registration card to the appropriate lessee. After conducting a sales and use tax audit for the audit period from April 1, 2001 through October 31, 2004, Defendant Pamela Law, the then commissioner of revenue services, issued a deficiency assessment against Plaintiff, concluding that the renewal fees constituted taxable gross receipts of the trust and, therefore, were subject to the sales tax. The trial court rendered summary judgment partially in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the renewal fees paid by the lessess qualified as Plaintiff's gross receipts subject to sales tax under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-408(1).

Trade associations representing commercial ship owners and operators petitioned for review of a nationwide permit issued by the EPA for the discharge of pollutants incidental to the normal operation of vessels. Petitioners raised a number of procedural challenges, all related to the EPA's decision to incorporate into the permit conditions that states submitted to protect their own water quality. The court held that because petitioners had failed to establish that the EPA could alter or reject state certification conditions, the additional agency procedures they demanded would not have afforded them the relief they sought. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.