Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

To obtain a driver’s license or motor vehicle registration from a state motor vehicle department (DMV), individuals must disclose personal information. The 1994 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, prohibits disclosure of personal information, “that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information,” except for use by a government agency, in carrying out its functions; by a private person acting on behalf of a government agency in carrying out its functions; in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding; or for investigation in anticipation of litigation. DPPA establishes penalties for improper use. Drivers alleged that the Minnesota Department of Public Safety databases were accessible to law enforcement officers, government agents, and other individuals through an internet portal, and that the information was being accessed for improper purposes. Drivers requested audits detailing past accesses of their motor vehicle records. Audits showed that each Driver’s’ personal information had been accessed hundreds of times, primarily through police departments, sheriff’s offices, or other agencies. District courts dismissed Drivers’ suits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, noting that several claims were untimely, but reversed in part, finding that certain claims alleged patterns of access sufficient to establish improper purpose. View "McDonough v. Anoka Cnty." on Justia Law

Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, local exchange carriers such as Windstream must connect calls made to their customers by the customers of national telecommunications companies such as Sprint. Until 2009, Sprint paid Windstream state access charges for connecting non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls-- made by cable telephone customers over the Internet in Iowa, delivered to Sprint for format conversion, and transferred to Windstream for delivery to its Iowa telephone customers. Beginning in 2009, Sprint withheld state access charges for these calls, claiming that VoIP calls were “information services” and that payment should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, not by state access charges. In 2011, the Iowa Utilities Board found that the calls were telecommunications services subject to state regulation, not information services. Sprint sought state court review and filed a federal action, seeking to enjoin the Board’s decision. The district court abstained because of the parallel state proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. By the time the case returned to the district court, the state court had upheld the Board’s decision. The district court dismissed Sprint’s complaint, holding that issue preclusion barred Sprint from raising the same arguments in federal court. The Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress did not intend that issue-preclusion principles bar federal-court review of the issue of whether the non-nomadic intrastate long-distance VoIP calls at issue are information services, payment for which should be governed by a reciprocal compensation agreement, or telecommunications services subject to state access charges. View "Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

In 1996 (Free Press I), the Sixth Circuit held that the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, requires government agencies to honor requests for the booking photographs of criminal defendants who have appeared in court during ongoing proceedings. Despite that holding, the U.S. Marshals Service denied the Free Press’s 2012 request for the booking photographs of Detroit-area police officers indicted on federal charges. The district court, bound by Free Press I, granted summary judgment to the newspaper in the ensuing lawsuit. A Sixth Circuit panel affirmed, while urging the full court to reconsider the merits of Free Press I. The court noted FOIA Exemption 7(C) which protects a non-trivial privacy interest in keeping “personal facts away from the public eye,” and that individuals do not forfeit their interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public in some form. Criminal defendants do not forfeit their interest in controlling private information while their cases remain pending. View "Detroit Free Press, Inc v. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

Sprint wanted to expand its access to Illinois Bell’s infrastructure at regulated rates even when Sprint customers make calls to, or receive calls from, persons outside the region (Illinois) in which Illinois Bell operates. Sprint invoked “the duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier’s network for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access,” 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2)(A). Illinois Bell refused to make an interconnection agreement, citing a regulation by the Federal Communications Commission. Sprint asked the Illinois Commerce Commission to arbitrate the disputes with the Bell company. The Commission rejected Sprint’s claims, and the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Sprint’s approach would create an incentive for phone companies to engage in postage-stamp pricing so that they would never have to pay access charges when placing calls from their subscribers to subscribers of other companies. Illinois Bell’s approach, though equally arbitrary, has at least the virtue of not affecting how telephone companies decide to price their services. View "SprintCom, Inc. v. Sheahan" on Justia Law

Texas automobile owners can choose between general-issue and specialty license plates. People can propose a specialty plate design, with a slogan, a graphic, or both. If the Department of Motor Vehicles Board approves the design, the state makes it available. The Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) claimed that rejection of SCV’s proposal for a specialty plate design featuring a Confederate flag violated the Free Speech Clause. The Fifth Circuit held that Texas’s specialty license plate designs were private speech and that the Board engaged in constitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed. Texas’s specialty license plate designs constitute government speech. When government speaks, it is not barred from determining the content of what it says; it is generally entitled to promote a program, espouse a policy, or take a position. States have long used license plates to convey government speech, e.g., slogans urging action and touting local industries and license plate designs are often closely identified in the public mind with the state. Plates serve the governmental purposes of vehicle registration and identification and are, essentially, government IDs. Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates. Forum analysis, which applies to government restrictions on purely private speech occurring on government property, is not appropriate when the state is speaking on its own behalf. That private parties take part in the design and pay for specialty plates does not transform the government’s role into that of a mere forum provider. The Court acknowledged that the First Amendment stringently limits state authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. Just as Texas cannot require SCV to convey the state’s ideological message, SCV cannot dictate design. View "Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc." on Justia Law

Title VI of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, 126 Stat. 156, known as the Spectrum Act, authorizes the FCC to shift a portion of the licensed airwaves from over-the-air television broadcasters to mobile broadband providers. The Act directs the Commission to carry out the objective of repurposing spectrum through three interdependent initiatives: (i) a reverse auction to determine the prices at which broadcasters would voluntarily sell their spectrum rights; (ii) a reassignment of broadcasters who wish to retain their rights to new channels in a smaller band of spectrum; and (iii) a forward auction to sell the blocks of newly available spectrum to wireless providers, with the proceeds used to compensate broadcasters who voluntarily relinquished their spectrum rights and to pay the relocation expenses of broadcasters reassigned to new channels. Members of the television broadcast industry petitioned for review of the Commission's orders, arguing that the decisions announced in the orders conflict with the Act or are otherwise arbitrary and capricious. The court rejected petitioners’ contention at Chevron step one that the statute unambiguously forecloses the Commission’s use of the improved TVStudy program along with updated data inputs when applying OET-69 to determine a broadcaster’s coverage area and population served; the court rejected petitioners’ argument that the Commission’s decision to use TVStudy and updated inputs amounts to an unreasonable interpretation of the Act at Chevron step two; the court rejected petitioners' arbitrary-and-capricious arguments; in regards to petitioners' procedural challenge, any error in OET’s (rather than the Commission’s) issuing the Public Notice was harmless; and the court rejected petitioners' remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC" on Justia Law

In 2012, the New York Times published the Sanger article, describing a classified government initiative to “undermine the Iranian nuclear program” through “increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems.” Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, Freedom Watch sought records from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the State Department, including “information that refers or relates in any way to information” released or made available to Sanger. The CIA, NSA, and DoD cited national security; each stated that it could “neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence” of responsive records. After FOIA’s deadline expired, Freedom Watch filed suit. The district court dismissed the CIA and NSA based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies; granted DoD summary judgment based on FOIA’s national security exemption; and granted the State Department partial judgment, finding certain requests unduly speculative. Concerning information released to Sanger, the State Department obtained a 60-day extension and produced 79 documents. The court denied a motion to depose a records custodian, finding no evidence of bad faith, and granted the State Department summary judgment. Before oral argument, Freedom Watch moved to supplement the record with news articles relating to the revelation that former Secretary of State Clinton had maintained a private email account on a private server and sought to expand the search on remand. The D.C. Circuit remanded to allow the court to oversee the search of the former Secretary’s emails for records responsive to Freedom Watch’s FOIA request, but otherwise affirmed. View "Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency" on Justia Law

The Federal Communications Commission denied applications to renew 689 wireless spectrum licenses in the 24 gigahertz (GHz) and 39 GHz bands for failure to meet the “substantial service” performance standard during the license term. FiberTower claimed that the Commission’s interpretation of the performance standard as requiring some actual construction in each license area conflicted with the Commission’s statutory mandate in 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(4)(B). The D.C. Circuit declined to address that argument, which was not presented to the Commission. FiberTower also argued that the Commission’s interpretation of “substantial service” was inconsistent with that standard as originally promulgated by the Commission. The court rejected that argument. The court vacated with respect to 42 licenses because FiberTower claimed that their renewal applications stated construction had occurred. View "FiberTower Spectrum Holdings, LLC v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n" on Justia Law

The California State Personnel Board upheld Telish’s dismissal from his position with the California Department of Justice based on findings that he intimidated, threatened to release sexually explicit photographs of, and physically assaulted a subordinate employee with whom he had a consensual relationship. The essential issue was the admissibility of recorded telephone conversations between Telish and his former girlfriend and subordinate employee, L.D., which was received at the administrative hearing. The court of appeal affirmed denial of relief. A participant may properly record a telephone conversation at the direction of a law enforcement officer, acting within the course of his or her authority, in the course of a criminal investigation (Pen. Code 633). Section 633 does not limit the use of duly recorded communications to criminal proceedings. Although Telish contends the criminal investigation was a “sham,” the Board determined L.D. duly recorded the telephone conversations pursuant to the direction of DOJ in connection with a criminal investigation, and the Board’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. View "Telish v. Cal. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

MVH and Holy Family Communications each applied to the Federal Communications Commission for a license to operate a noncommercial educational radio station in the vicinity of Buffalo, New York. To do so, the agency used its comparative selection criteria, which it had promulgated through a notice-and-comment rulemaking. By application of those criteria, the Commission found Holy Family had the superior application and awarded it the license. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the criterion upon which the outcome turned--the weight given to an applicant’s plan to broadcast to underserved populations-- either violated the Communications Act of 1934, which requires the Commission to distribute licenses fairly, or was arbitrary and capricious. That criterion is part of a reasonable framework for achieving goals consistent with the Commission’s statutory mandate, and because MVH offered no support for a waiver except that it came close to the threshold it needed to get the license. View "Mary V. Harris Found. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law