Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Qwest Corporation sought review of an order of the Federal Communications Commission which denied Qwest’s petition for regulatory forbearance pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 160(a). Qwest filed a petition with the Commission in March 2009 seeking relief from certain regulations pertaining to telecommunications services in the Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The Commission denied the petition, citing insufficient evidence of sufficiently robust competition that would preclude Qwest from raising prices, unreasonably discriminating, and harming consumers. Qwest challenged the Commission’s decision only as it pertained to Qwest’s mass-market retail services. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit denied Qwest's petition: "We are not a 'panel of referees on a professional economics journal,' but a 'panel of generalist judges obliged to defer to a reasonable judgment by an agency acting pursuant to congressionally delegated authority.'" The Court found the Commission's order was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."

The Rural Cellular Association and the Universal Service for America Coalition (together the RCA) petitioned for review of an order of the FCC amending he "interim cap rule," which limited at 2008 levels the amount of support available to competitive eligible telecommunications carriers. In the order under review, the FCC amended the interim cap rule to provide that when a carrier relinquishes its status as an eligible communications carrier, the cap on the support available in that carrier's state is reduced by the amount the relinquishing carrier would have received had it retained it status. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied the RCA's petition for review, holding that the order was a lawful exercise of the FCC's authority under the Communications Act of 1934 as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, did not violate the agency's regulations, and was neither arbitrary and capricious nor unconstitutional.

In 2009, the Board of Health of the City of New York adopted a resolution requiring all tobacco retailers to display signs bearing graphic images showing certain adverse health effects of smoking. The district court held that the resolution is preempted by federal labeling laws. The Second Circuit affirmed, citing the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. 1331-41, a comprehensive program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising, which includes a preemption provision, limiting the extent to which states may regulate the labeling, advertising, and promotion of cigarettes.

Plaintiff Lisa R. Chapo appealed a district court's order upholding the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability and supplemental security income benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits at the last step of the five-step process for determining disability. At step five the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled because, "[c]onsidering [her] age, education [high school], work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [she] can perform," namely the jobs of appointment clerk, escort vehicle driver, and office helper identified by the vocational expert (VE) who testified at the evidentiary hearing. On appeal to the Appeals Council, Plaintiff challenged the ALJ’s decision in several respects, in particular the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion evidence in the record. Upon review of the record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that ALJ’s handling of a testifying doctor's findings was erroneous and, as a result, the dispositive hypothetical inquiry put to the VE was fatally defective. "Indeed, that hypothetical did not even include a restriction (to 'simple' work) that the ALJ himself recognized in his decision." The Court concluded that this matter be remanded for further proceedings, "wherein the ALJ must either obtain a mental RFC determination from an examining source to oppose [the doctor], articulate some other adequate basis for discounting [his] findings, or come back to the VE with a proper hypothetical including those limitations (and his own restriction to 'simple' work, should the ALJ find it appropriate to re-impose such a restriction in the RFC determined on remand)."

Qwest Corporation and the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) appealed a district court's judgment in favor of the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel (OCC) that reversed the PUC's decision setting the maximum rate for certain telephone services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the PUC regularly pursued its authority because it considered all of the statutorily-mandated factors and its decision is supported by substantial evidence. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the district court.

The Supreme Court received a certified question from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The issue centered on whether under RCW 82.04.500 a seller may upon disclosure, recoup its business and occupation (B&O) tax by collecting a surcharge to recover gross receipts taxes in addition to its monthly service fee. The matter stems from Plaintiff-Appellant James Bowden's purchase of three cell phones and a monthly service plan for each phone at a kiosk. The phone company's monthly service fee did not include Washington's B&O tax. However, the tax was listed as a "State B and O Surcharge" on Plaintiff's monthly bills, for which he was charged various amounts for each of the phones. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the phone company's monthly service fee, the sales price of its service contract, did not include the B&O surcharge. Rather, on the Agreement, the surcharge was listed separately under the "Regulatory Recovery Fee" provision described as a gross receipts surcharge. Further, the company's billing statements listed the surcharge separately like it was a sales tax, and both the sales tax and B&O fee were added on to the service fee. The Court therefore answered "no": even if disclosed under RCW 82.04-500, a seller is prohibited from recouping its B&O taxes by collecting a surcharge in addition to its monthly service fee.

In 2006, U.S. Marshals worked with officers in 24 states on a fugitive round-up that led to arrests of 10,733 people, including plaintiff, who was wrongfully arrested because of clerical mistakes. All charges were eventually dropped, but news reporters had filmed her arrest and aired the story, including plaintiff's name and a statement that she was wanted for identity theft, after the dismissal. One station also placed the video on its website, along with a written story. Plaintiff's attorney faxed a cease and desist letter to the station, which removed the story, although it remained accessible by keyword search for several days. Most of plaintiffs' claims against the federal and city governments, the U.S. Marshals Service, the broadcast company and employees, and various named and unnamed Marshals, were resolved. The district court rejected defamation and false light claim against the broadcast company, based on the fair report privilege requirement of proof of actual malice, and a Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), claim against the U.S. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the discretionary function exception. Investigating and apprehending plaintiff was discretionary and not within the safe harbor for intentional torts.

Several company operators filed a complaint against petitioner with the FCC, which ruled that petitioner's increased pole attachment rates violated the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. 224(d), and the FCC's implementing regulations. Petitioner now sought review of that order, arguing that the Act failed to provide for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and that the FCC's decision was arbitrary and capricious, or was otherwise not supported by substantial evidence. The court found the doctrine of collateral estoppel a fatal bar to petitioner's assertion of the constitutional issue, and its remaining arguments unavailing. Accordingly, the court denied the petition.

This case involved a dispute between AT&T Communications and TCG Omaha (collectively AT&T) and the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) regarding the correct interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 86-140, which governs the regulation of access charges. In its order, the PSC determined that telecommunications companies like AT&T could seek the negotiation and review of access charges under section 86-140 only when a local exchange carrier had implemented new or revised access charges, and not "at will." The district court reversed in part and in part modified the decision of the PSC. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court placing certain limitations on the section 86-140 negotiation and review process, holding that the plain language of the statute envisions both a negotiation and review process that are not limited by the statute. Remanded.

Claimant Jerry Benoit worked for Turner Industries for twenty-seven years. For ten of those years he worked as a general laborer for a Lake Charles Citgo refinery, where Turner was contracted to perform general maintenance. Claimant's duties included cleaning chemical discharges and oily waste which collected in the drainage ditches, sewers, and processing units at the refinery. In the course of this work, he was exposed to any number of potentially dangerous or carcinogenic chemicals, including high levels of benzene. In July 2006, Claimant fell ill. He was diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia (AML), known to be linked to high levels of benzene exposure. Despite the medical evidence linking Claimant's cancer to the chemicals he was exposed to at work, his claim for medical benefits was denied. The eventual medical bills totaled over $625,000. Medicaid paid for $203,124.68. The remaining $422,043.59 was "written off" by the medical care providers. Turner paid nothing. Claimant's family filed suit in 2007. The Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC) awarded Claimant total medical expenses and attorney fees. Turner appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the OWC judgment in its entirety. Upon review of the correctness of the OWC award of medical expenses, the Supreme Court concluded the OWC erred in awarding the "written off" medical expenses: "Claimant would receive an improper windfall if he was allowed to recover for medical expenses which have been reduced by health care providers as a result of their contractual arrangements with Medicaid." The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.