Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioners, Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc., Dixville Telephone Company, Dunbarton Telephone Company, Inc., and Granite State Telephone, Inc., four exempt incumbent rural local exchange carriers (RLECs), appealed an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that denied their motion to rescind or declare null and void registrations of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) authorized by the PUC to engage in business as telephone utilities in the service territories of RLECs. Citing RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, among other statutes, the petitioners alleged that the PUC, before issuing the registrations, had failed to provide notice, hold hearings, and determine whether allowing such competition would be consistent with the public good. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Appeal of Union Tel. Co.," the petitioners specifically argued that federal law did not preempt these requirements. The PUC ultimately denied the petitioners' request and ruled that section 253(a) of the Telecommunications Act preempted RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, II. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that section 253(a) preempted state and local laws, regulations, and requirements that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." View "Appeal of Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Following the death of a college student in Shippensburg, Hearst Television, Inc., d/b/a WGAL-TV and its reporter, Daniel O'Donnell (Requester), filed a Right to Know Law (RTKL) request with Michael Norris, the Coroner of Cumberland County (Coroner), seeking the student's manner of death. The Coroner rejected the request, and the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records (OOR) upheld the Coroner's decision. On appeal, the trial court and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Section 1236.1(c) of the Coroner's Act and the under the RTKL, the record indicating the manner of death was immediately available to Requester. View "Hearst Television Inc. v. Norris" on Justia Law

Leyse received a prerecorded telemarketing call from a radio station. He sued, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 2394, which prohibits certain prerecorded telemarketing calls. The district court dismissed, finding that the Federal Communications Commission had issued regulations exempting the type of call at issue from the TCPA’s prohibitions; that the FCC was authorized by Congress to do so; that the court should defer to the resulting regulation; and that the regulation passed muster under Chevron. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that “Chevron deference” applies to the regulation and that the regulation is valid under Chevron. The court rejected an argument that it lacked jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. View "Leyse v. Clear Channel Broad. Inc." on Justia Law

An FCC investigation concluded that Jerry and Deborah Stevens operated an unlicensed FM radio station from their Austin, Texas residence in violation of section 301 of the Communications Act of 1934. The FCC issued a forfeiture order in the amount of $10,000. Thereafter, the government brought an action to enforce the forfeiture in district court pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 504(a). The Stevenses moved to dismiss the enforcement action, arguing that the FCC lacked jurisdiction to regulate intrastate broadcasts and that section 301 did not apply to radio broadcasts. The district court denied the motion, determining it did not have jurisdiction to consider legal challenges to the validity of an FCC forfeiture order in a section 504(a) enforcement action. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Stevenses' legal defenses in the government's action to enforce the forfeiture order, as the Stevens failed to raise legal challenges to the validity of the order in a timely petition for review in the appropriate court of appeals. View "United States v. Stevens" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Alltel Entities (collectively Petitioners Alltel Communications, Inc. and its regional subsidiaries), were included in the definition of "telephone company" for the purpose of increased license fees in S.C. Code Ann. section 1220-100 (2000). Pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment, the Administrative Law Court (ALC) granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioners, finding that they were not telephone companies for purposes of section 12-20-100. Alternatively, the ALC found that if the statute were ambiguous, Petitioners would prevail under the rule that an ambiguity in a taxing statute must be construed in favor of the taxpayer. Though the court of appeals recognized that the application of section 12-20-100 to Petitioners was not "absolutely clear," it reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter to the ALC for additional fact finding. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the ALC's grant of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. The term "telephone company" was not a defined term and its application to Petitioners was "doubtful." The presence of an ambiguity in a tax assessment statute requires that a court resolve that doubt in favor of the taxpayer.

Petitioner Qwest Corporation sought review of an order of the Federal Communications Commission which denied Qwest’s petition for regulatory forbearance pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 160(a). Qwest filed a petition with the Commission in March 2009 seeking relief from certain regulations pertaining to telecommunications services in the Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The Commission denied the petition, citing insufficient evidence of sufficiently robust competition that would preclude Qwest from raising prices, unreasonably discriminating, and harming consumers. Qwest challenged the Commission’s decision only as it pertained to Qwest’s mass-market retail services. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit denied Qwest's petition: "We are not a 'panel of referees on a professional economics journal,' but a 'panel of generalist judges obliged to defer to a reasonable judgment by an agency acting pursuant to congressionally delegated authority.'" The Court found the Commission's order was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."

The Rural Cellular Association and the Universal Service for America Coalition (together the RCA) petitioned for review of an order of the FCC amending he "interim cap rule," which limited at 2008 levels the amount of support available to competitive eligible telecommunications carriers. In the order under review, the FCC amended the interim cap rule to provide that when a carrier relinquishes its status as an eligible communications carrier, the cap on the support available in that carrier's state is reduced by the amount the relinquishing carrier would have received had it retained it status. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied the RCA's petition for review, holding that the order was a lawful exercise of the FCC's authority under the Communications Act of 1934 as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, did not violate the agency's regulations, and was neither arbitrary and capricious nor unconstitutional.

In 2009, the Board of Health of the City of New York adopted a resolution requiring all tobacco retailers to display signs bearing graphic images showing certain adverse health effects of smoking. The district court held that the resolution is preempted by federal labeling laws. The Second Circuit affirmed, citing the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. 1331-41, a comprehensive program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising, which includes a preemption provision, limiting the extent to which states may regulate the labeling, advertising, and promotion of cigarettes.

Plaintiff Lisa R. Chapo appealed a district court's order upholding the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability and supplemental security income benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits at the last step of the five-step process for determining disability. At step five the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled because, "[c]onsidering [her] age, education [high school], work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [she] can perform," namely the jobs of appointment clerk, escort vehicle driver, and office helper identified by the vocational expert (VE) who testified at the evidentiary hearing. On appeal to the Appeals Council, Plaintiff challenged the ALJ’s decision in several respects, in particular the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion evidence in the record. Upon review of the record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that ALJ’s handling of a testifying doctor's findings was erroneous and, as a result, the dispositive hypothetical inquiry put to the VE was fatally defective. "Indeed, that hypothetical did not even include a restriction (to 'simple' work) that the ALJ himself recognized in his decision." The Court concluded that this matter be remanded for further proceedings, "wherein the ALJ must either obtain a mental RFC determination from an examining source to oppose [the doctor], articulate some other adequate basis for discounting [his] findings, or come back to the VE with a proper hypothetical including those limitations (and his own restriction to 'simple' work, should the ALJ find it appropriate to re-impose such a restriction in the RFC determined on remand)."

Qwest Corporation and the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) appealed a district court's judgment in favor of the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel (OCC) that reversed the PUC's decision setting the maximum rate for certain telephone services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the PUC regularly pursued its authority because it considered all of the statutorily-mandated factors and its decision is supported by substantial evidence. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the district court.