Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission after the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (Defendant) failed to promptly produce certain requested communications. Defendant provided some documents to Plaintiff but withheld hundreds of others, asserting that the communications were covered by the attorney-client privilege. A hearing officer recommended that the Commission find that the documents were exempt from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. Characterizing the communications as containing a mix of business and legal advice, the Commission voted to adopt the hearing officer’s decision. The superior court affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission failed to apply the proper standard for assessing the communications at issue. Remanded. View "Harrington v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a registered sex offender when he was admitted to the state rental assistance program. Thereafter, the legislature promulgated section 17b-812-13(9) of the Regulations of Connecticut States Agencies, which makes sex offender registration a ground for termination or denial of rental program assistance. The Commissioner of Housing (Commissioner) subsequently terminated Plaintiff’s rental program benefits. Plaintiff took an administrative appeal of the Commissioner’s decision to the trial court, which concluded that the Commissioner’s application of section 17b-812-13(9) was not retroactive and therefore did not exceed the authority granted to the Commissioner by the legislature. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commissioner applied section 17b-812-13(9) of the regulations retroactively in this case by imposing a new obligation on Plaintiff’s sex offender status that terminated his rental program assistance; and (2) such retroactive application of the regulation was not statutorily authorized, and therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s administrative appeal. View "Shannon v. Comm’r of Housing" on Justia Law

Brenda Puryear filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities on behalf of her minor daughter, Sarah, alleging that Echo Hose Ambulance and the city of Shelton had discriminated and retaliated against Sarah on the basis of her race and color in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Commission’s human rights referee struck the complaint on the ground that Sarah was not an employee under the “remuneration test” used to resolve similar federal causes of action. The trial court dismissed the Commission’s appeal, concluding that the referee properly applied the remuneration test. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Commission appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court erred in applying the federal remuneration test rather than Connecticut’s common-law “right to control” test to determine whether an unpaid volunteer is an “employee” under the CFEPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in concluding that the remuneration test is the appropriate test for determining whether a volunteer is an employee under CFEPA. View "Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance" on Justia Law

The Department of Motor Vehicles found that Raymond’s Auto Repair, LLC had overcharged for the use of its rotator truck to recover a damaged vehicle prior to the actual towing of that vehicle. The hearing officer ordered Raymond’s to pay a $600 restitution fee. The trial court vacated the reimbursement order, holding that state regulation of the pretowing recovery services at issue was subject to federal preemption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that state regulation of pretowing recovery services, such as Raymond’s use of the rotator truck in this case, was not preempted by federal law. View "Raymond's Auto Repair, LLC v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The Department of Motor Vehicles found that Plaintiff, a towing service, had overcharged for the nonconsensual towing of a motor vehicle trailer and ordered Plaintiff to pay restitution in the amount of $12,787 to the trailer’s insurer. In so finding, the Department rejected Plaintiff’s claim that Connecticut’s statutes and regulations regarding nonconsensual towing services are preempted under 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(C). The trial court reversed in part, concluding that the fees charged by Plaintiff were not subject to state regulation. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment with respect to the determination that state regulation of fees charged for pretowing recovery services provided in connection with a nonconsensual towing is preempted by federal law, holding that state laws regulating the fees charged for recovery services performed in connection with a nonconsensual towing are not preempted by federal law. View "Modzelewski's Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The Indian Spring Land Company (Plaintiff), the owner of an unimproved tract of land, filed an application to construct a gravel access road subject to certain conditions. The Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency of the Town of Greenwich (Defendant) granted Plaintiff’s application, subject to certain conditions. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that its road construction activities were “directly related to its farming operations” and were therefore permitted as of right, thus not requiring the approval of a wetlands agency under Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-40(a)(1). The trial court concluded that Defendant had the necessary jurisdiction to attach special conditions to Plaintiff’s permit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court incorrectly interpreted section 22a-40(a)(1); and (2) under the proper interpretation of the statute, Defendant did not have jurisdiction to regulate the construction of Plaintiff’s access road. View "Indian Spring Land Co. v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency" on Justia Law

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. (Plaintiff) submitted a freedom of information request to the University of Connecticut Health Center (Defendant) for correspondence between Defendant and the National Institutes of Health regarding potential noncompliance with federal animal welfare guidelines. Defendant provided sixty-one pages of redacted records. The redactions were names of individuals who had violated federal protocols and federal grant identification numbers that could be used to identify those individuals. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant with the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission). While the complaint was pending, the Commissioner of the Department of Administrative Services (Department) determined that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure of the redacted material could result in a safety risk. The Commission upheld the determination. The trial court sustained Plaintiff’s appeal, concluding that the Commission applied the wrong standard of review when it sustained Plaintiff’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission applied the proper standard of review and properly upheld the Department’s determination. View "People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the beneficiary of a testamentary trust, entered a long-term care facility in 2012, at which time she applied for financial and medical assistance under Medicaid. The Department of Social Services denied the application for Medical benefits, finding that Plaintiff’s assets, including the trust, exceeded the relevant asset limits. A hearing officer upheld the department’s denial. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trust was not an asset available to her as defined by relevant Medicaid regulations. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the testator intended to create a discretionary, supplemental needs trust and, therefore, the trust corpus and income may not be considered to be available to Plaintiff for the purpose of determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits. View "Pikula v. Dep’t of Social Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the homeowner’s association for a common interest community. Defendant owned a condominium unit in the community. Pursuant to a "standard collection policy" adopted by Plaintiff in 2011, Plaintiff brought this action seeking to foreclose a statutory lien for allegedly delinquent common expenses, attorney’s fees, and costs. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to Plaintiff’s failure to vote to commence a foreclosure action against Defendant’s unit or to adopt a standard foreclosure policy pursuant to the notice and comment requirements of Connecticut’s Common Interest Ownership Act. Plaintiff, in turn, argued that its policy was an "internal business operating procedure" rather than a rule and therefore was not subject to the notice and comment procedures for rules. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff’s standard foreclosure policy was an internal business operating procedure, not a rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the standard foreclosure policy is a rule and that the rule-making requirements are jurisdictional. Remanded with direction to dismiss Plaintiff’s action. View "Neighborhood Ass’n v. Limberger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff allegedly suffered heart problems and psychological injuries during the course of his employment with Defendant, FedEx. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner found that Plaintiff’s physical and psychological injuries were compensable and awarded him total incapacity benefits covering a period of forty-seven weeks. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board upheld the Commissioner’s findings and award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly upheld the Commissioner’s determination that both Plaintiff’s physical and psychological injuries were compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act; and (2) the Commissioner’s award was not excessive. View "Hart v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law