Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a partnership and an LLC, were related entities with common owners. The partnership acquired a commercial office complex and later transferred ownership of the property to the LLC. In 2008, the City of Norwalk’s tax assessor set the fair market value of the partnership at approximately $49 million. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ property tax appeal and reduced the valuation of the LLC’s property by approximately $15 million. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeal because the LLC had not appeared in administrative proceedings before the City’s Board of Assessment Appeals and did not initiate the appeal to the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the tax appeal was initially brought by a nonaggrieved party, the partnership, the appeal was also maintained by the LLC, an aggrieved party that had properly been added to the trial court proceedings by way of a promptly filed amended complaint. View "Fairfield Merrittview Ltd. P’ship v. City of Norwalk" on Justia Law

The Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Meriden granted a variance to Mark Development, LLC to use a parcel of real property located in a regional development zone as a used car dealership on the grounds that the effect of applying the Meriden Zoning Regulations was so severe as to amount to a practical confiscation. Plaintiffs, the City of Meriden and two of its officers, appealed from the Board’s decision granting the variance. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs’ appeal in part and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. Both parties appealed. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to sustain Plaintiffs’ appeal, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been deprived of all reasonable uses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court correctly found that substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that the property had been practically confiscated. View "Caruso v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

Michael Aronow, an orthopedic surgeon at the University of Connecticut Health Center, filed a grievance with the Health Center Appeals Committee against Jay Lieberman, the chairman of the orthopedic surgery department at the Center, accusing Lieberman of attempted intimidation and harassment. Aronow requested copies of the Committee’s report of its findings regarding Aronow’s grievance as well as the report written by the president emeritus of the University, but the Center denied Aronow’s request, concluding that the reports were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 10a-154a. The Freedom of Information Commission, however, concluded that the reports were not exempt from disclosure under the statute and ordered the center to provide Aronow with a copy of the reports free of charge. The trial court dismissed Lieberman’s appeal, concluding that the Commission properly determined that the reports did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a faculty member under section 10a-154a and were therefore not exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reports in this case did not constitute a “record of the performance and evaluation” of a state university faculty or professional staff member within the exemption created by section 10a-154a. View "Lieberman v. Aronow" on Justia Law

An inmate was attacked by another inmate and died from his injuries. Plaintiffs, the victim’s mother and sister, applied for compensation from Defendant, the Office of Victim Services. Defendant declined to compensate Plaintiffs. After a hearing, the Victim Compensation Commissioner denied Plaintiffs’ request for review. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the Commissioner’s decision. More than four years later, shortly before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ appeal on the ground that it was untimely filed. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Plaintiffs did not timely appeal in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-211a. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of section 54-211a by properly serving a writ of summons and a complaint on Defendant within thirty days of the Commissioner’s decision. View "Cales v. Office of Victim Servs." on Justia Law

Kleen Energy Systems, LLC, an electric generating facility, entered into a contract with Connecticut Light and Power Company, an electric distribution company. A dispute subsequently arose concerning the proper interpretation of the contract’s pricing provision. At the request of Waterside Power, LLC, which had entered into a similar contract with Connecticut Light and Power, the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection, acting through the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (the Authority), conducted proceedings to resolve the dispute. Kleen Energy was a participant in, but not a party to, those proceedings. Waterside subsequently filed a petition for a declaratory ruling challenging the decision. The Authority issued a declaratory ruling denying Waterside relief. Kleen Energy filed an administrative appeal from the Authority’s ruling, claiming that it had a contractual right to submit the dispute to arbitration and that the Authority lacked jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling to resolve the dispute. The trial court ultimately concluded (1) the Authority had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling to resolve the dispute, (2) Kleen Energy had waived its contractual right to arbitration, and (3) the Authority had properly resolved the dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in determining that the Authority had jurisdiction to resolve the pricing dispute. View "Kleen Energy Sys., LLC v. Comm’r of Energy & Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

At issue in this certified appeal was the extent of a law enforcement agency’s disclosure obligations under the Freedom of Information Act (Act) with respect to pending criminal investigations. In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, which held that the police’s disclosure obligations during a pending criminal investigation were governed by the statutory predecessor to Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-215, which required a law enforcement agency to release only police blotter information. The legislature subsequently enacted Public Acts 1994, No. 94-246, 13, which amended the statutory predecessor to section 1-215 to require broader disclosure. In the instant case, the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission) found that the Department of Public Safety (Department) violated the Act by failing to disclose certain records from a pending criminal case. The trial court sustained the Department’s administrative appeal, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the enactment of Public Act 94-246 did not legislatively overrule the Court’s conclusion in Gifford that, during pending criminal prosecutions, section 1-215 exclusively governs law enforcement agencies’ disclosure obligations under the Act. View "Comm'r of Pub. Safety v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2003, local districts established for the promotion of tourism were legislatively dissolved to make way for larger regional districts serving that same purpose. Plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation, filed suit against one of the regional districts (Defendant) seeking to hold Defendant liable for damages under a contract that Plaintiff had executed with one of the local districts (Local District). The district court certified questions of law to the Supreme Court regarding the satisfaction of contingent liabilities of the legislatively dissolved local districts. The Supreme Court answered (1) Defendant is not the legal successor to the Local District, as the legislature did not intend to make the regional districts the legal successors to the local districts; and (2) if the Local District transferred any of its assets to another entity and Plaintiff can establish that the assets were fraudulently conveyed, that entity may be responsible for the Local District’s obligations to the extent of the value of the assets received. View "Single Source, Inc. v. Cent. Reg'l Tourism Dist., Inc." on Justia Law

After a hearing, the Department of Children and Families substantiated allegations that Plaintiff, an elementary school teacher, emotionally abused one of his students and recommended that Plaintiff’s name be placed on the Department’s central registry of child abuse and neglect. The trial court affirmed, ruling that the ultimate finding of the administrative hearing officer was supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court reversed and ordered the Department to remove Plaintiff’s name from the central registry. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) failed properly to credit the factual findings and legal conclusions of the administrative hearing officer; and (2) improperly concluded that the definition of “abused” found in Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-120(3) was void for vagueness as applied to the facts of this case. View "Frank v. Dep't of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two unions, filed a petition for a declaratory ruling with the Department of Public Utility Control seeking a ruling establishing that the Department had violated the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act by failing to promulgate regulations prescribing the rights of persons designated as participants in uncontested proceedings before the Department. The Department denied Plaintiffs’ petition. The trial court set aside the Department’s decision, concluding that the Department was required to promulgate the regulations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeal because Plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts that, if true, demonstated that they were aggrieved by the Department’s ruling on their petition. Remanded with direction to dismiss Plaintiffs’ appeal. View "Conn. Indep. Util. Workers, Local 12924 v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s spouse (Spouse) applied to the Commissioner of Social Services (Department) for Medicaid benefits. After a review of the combined assets of both Spouse and Plaintiff, the Department concluded that Spouse was not eligible to receive Medicaid benefits. A hearing officer denied Plaintiff’s appeal, as did the superior court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that the Department did not act arbitrarily or abuse its discretion in finding that the Department applied the correct eligibility and availability of assets criteria when evaluating the application for Medicaid benefits submitted by Spouse. View "Palomba-Bourke v. Comm'r of Soc. Servs." on Justia Law