Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Kleen Energy Systems, LLC, an electric generating facility, entered into a contract with Connecticut Light and Power Company, an electric distribution company. A dispute subsequently arose concerning the proper interpretation of the contract’s pricing provision. At the request of Waterside Power, LLC, which had entered into a similar contract with Connecticut Light and Power, the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection, acting through the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (the Authority), conducted proceedings to resolve the dispute. Kleen Energy was a participant in, but not a party to, those proceedings. Waterside subsequently filed a petition for a declaratory ruling challenging the decision. The Authority issued a declaratory ruling denying Waterside relief. Kleen Energy filed an administrative appeal from the Authority’s ruling, claiming that it had a contractual right to submit the dispute to arbitration and that the Authority lacked jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling to resolve the dispute. The trial court ultimately concluded (1) the Authority had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling to resolve the dispute, (2) Kleen Energy had waived its contractual right to arbitration, and (3) the Authority had properly resolved the dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in determining that the Authority had jurisdiction to resolve the pricing dispute. View "Kleen Energy Sys., LLC v. Comm’r of Energy & Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

At issue in this certified appeal was the extent of a law enforcement agency’s disclosure obligations under the Freedom of Information Act (Act) with respect to pending criminal investigations. In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, which held that the police’s disclosure obligations during a pending criminal investigation were governed by the statutory predecessor to Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-215, which required a law enforcement agency to release only police blotter information. The legislature subsequently enacted Public Acts 1994, No. 94-246, 13, which amended the statutory predecessor to section 1-215 to require broader disclosure. In the instant case, the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission) found that the Department of Public Safety (Department) violated the Act by failing to disclose certain records from a pending criminal case. The trial court sustained the Department’s administrative appeal, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the enactment of Public Act 94-246 did not legislatively overrule the Court’s conclusion in Gifford that, during pending criminal prosecutions, section 1-215 exclusively governs law enforcement agencies’ disclosure obligations under the Act. View "Comm'r of Pub. Safety v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2003, local districts established for the promotion of tourism were legislatively dissolved to make way for larger regional districts serving that same purpose. Plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation, filed suit against one of the regional districts (Defendant) seeking to hold Defendant liable for damages under a contract that Plaintiff had executed with one of the local districts (Local District). The district court certified questions of law to the Supreme Court regarding the satisfaction of contingent liabilities of the legislatively dissolved local districts. The Supreme Court answered (1) Defendant is not the legal successor to the Local District, as the legislature did not intend to make the regional districts the legal successors to the local districts; and (2) if the Local District transferred any of its assets to another entity and Plaintiff can establish that the assets were fraudulently conveyed, that entity may be responsible for the Local District’s obligations to the extent of the value of the assets received. View "Single Source, Inc. v. Cent. Reg'l Tourism Dist., Inc." on Justia Law

After a hearing, the Department of Children and Families substantiated allegations that Plaintiff, an elementary school teacher, emotionally abused one of his students and recommended that Plaintiff’s name be placed on the Department’s central registry of child abuse and neglect. The trial court affirmed, ruling that the ultimate finding of the administrative hearing officer was supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court reversed and ordered the Department to remove Plaintiff’s name from the central registry. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) failed properly to credit the factual findings and legal conclusions of the administrative hearing officer; and (2) improperly concluded that the definition of “abused” found in Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-120(3) was void for vagueness as applied to the facts of this case. View "Frank v. Dep't of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two unions, filed a petition for a declaratory ruling with the Department of Public Utility Control seeking a ruling establishing that the Department had violated the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act by failing to promulgate regulations prescribing the rights of persons designated as participants in uncontested proceedings before the Department. The Department denied Plaintiffs’ petition. The trial court set aside the Department’s decision, concluding that the Department was required to promulgate the regulations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ appeal because Plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts that, if true, demonstated that they were aggrieved by the Department’s ruling on their petition. Remanded with direction to dismiss Plaintiffs’ appeal. View "Conn. Indep. Util. Workers, Local 12924 v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s spouse (Spouse) applied to the Commissioner of Social Services (Department) for Medicaid benefits. After a review of the combined assets of both Spouse and Plaintiff, the Department concluded that Spouse was not eligible to receive Medicaid benefits. A hearing officer denied Plaintiff’s appeal, as did the superior court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that the Department did not act arbitrarily or abuse its discretion in finding that the Department applied the correct eligibility and availability of assets criteria when evaluating the application for Medicaid benefits submitted by Spouse. View "Palomba-Bourke v. Comm'r of Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff property owner sent a letter to a zoning enforcement officer for the Town of Darien, asserting that permits obtained by her adjoining neighbor had been illegally issued. Plaintiff received no response to that letter. Plaintiff filed an application to appeal. The town zoning board of appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s application for lack of a timely appeal and lack of a “decision” from which an appeal could lie. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal from the decision of the board, concluding that substantial evidence supported the board’s determination that the town zoning enforcement officer did not make a decision that could be appealed. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the zoning enforcement officer rendered a decision that could be appealed either because (1) he actually made a determination regarding the merit of the violations alleged in her letter that he declined to communicate, or (2) because town zoning regulations obligated him to respond to or act upon the illegality alleged in Plaintiff's letter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the zoning enforcement officer’s action or inaction with respect to Plaintiff’s letter did not give rise to an independent “decision” from which an appeal to the board would lie. View "Reardon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

After a malpractice action was filed against a physician licensed by the Commissioner of Public Health (Department), the Department and the physician entered into a consent order, designated as a public document, indicating that the physician had agreed to a reprimand on his license and a civil penalty. A newspaper (Newspaper) subsequently made a request to the Department under the Freedom of Information Act (Act) for the records reviewed by a consultant in connection the Department’s investigation into the case, including an exhibit (exhibit A). After the Department failed to produce exhibit A, the Newspaper filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission). The Department argued before the Commission that exhibit A contained Practitioner Data Bank and Healthcare Data Bank records and that federal law provided a basis to withhold those records. The Commission concluded (1) federal regulations barred disclosure of records received from the Healthcare Data Bank, but (2) regulations did not bar disclosure of records received from the Practitioner Data Bank. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that none of the records were not subject to public disclosure under the Act. View "Comm'r of Pub. Health v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Connecticut Siting Council approved a proposed project of the Connecticut Light and Power Company. Plaintiffs appealed the siting counsel’s decision while the power company’s motion for reconsideration of the decision, with regard to the denial of a second project, was still pending. The siting council subsequently granted the motion for reconsideration and approved the second project. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeal. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs had not appealed from a final decision of the siting council. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in its judgment. View "Citizens Against Overhead Power Line Constr. v. Conn. Siting Council" on Justia Law

While working for Employer, Employee filed notice of a workers' compensation claim related to a lower back injury he received during the course of his employment. Employee was discharged approximately four years later pursuant to a termination agreement that provided that he agreed to release Employer from any and all workers' compensation claims. Employer later brought an action against Employee, alleging civil theft, fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion based on Defendant's admission that he never intended to release his workers' compensation claim. Employee counterclaimed, claiming that Employer's cause of action was in retaliation for Employee's decision to exercise his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. Employer filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim, asserting that the doctrine of absolute immunity shielded Employer from the counterclaim. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss, holding that an employer's right to seek redress for its alleged grievances in court does not outweigh an employee's interest in exercising his rights under the Act without fear of retaliation by his employer, and therefore, absolute immunity did not shield Employer from Employee's counterclaim. View "MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti" on Justia Law