Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Town of Malborough terminated the employment of Emily Chaponis as town assessor after the board of selectmen did not make a motion to reappoint her to a successive term of office. Chaponis filed a grievance through the Union, of which she was a member, alleging that the Town violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Union by discharging her without just cause. An arbitration panel ordered the Town to reinstate Chaponis to her position, concluding that the Town violated the agreement when it terminated Chaponis' employment without just cause. The trial court denied the Town's application to vacate the arbitration award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitrators' award ordering the reinstatement of Chaponis' employment after the statutory expiration of her term of office contravened the mandates of the statutory scheme governing the term of office for municipal officers, and therefore, the award was unenforceable. Remanded. View "Town of Marlborough v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818-052" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a licensed physician and surgeon, was charged with violating the applicable standard of care in his treatment of two children. The Connecticut Medical Examining Board (board) found that Plaintiff had violated the standard of care with respect to his treatment of both children and ordered a reprimand, imposed fines, and placed Plaintiff on probation for two years. The trial court primarily affirmed, as did the appellate court. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the preponderance of the evidence standard applied in his disciplinary hearing rather than the clear and convincing evidence standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the preponderance of the evidence standard applied at the proceeding because the board is an administrative agency subject to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, under which the preponderance of the evidence is the default standard of proof; and (2) the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof at a physician disciplinary proceeding does not offend a physician's due process rights. View "Jones v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned real property on a highway. In 2006, the board of selectmen of the town of Lyme (board) concluded that the highway extended through and across Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff brought an administrative appeal in the superior court. The superior court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, concluding (1) it was entitled to consider the appeal in a trial de novo, and therefore, the motion for summary judgment was procedurally appropriate; and (2) the board exceeded its authority by determining the length of the highway rather than its width. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court properly concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to a trial de novo; but (2) the board was statutorily authorized to determine the width of the highway as well as its length. Remanded. View "Marchesi v. Bd. of Selectmen of Town of Lyme" on Justia Law

Employee, who worked as a driver for Plaintiff, had his commercial driver's license suspended for one year after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Although Employee's misconduct did not occur in the course of his employment, Plaintiff discharged him because he could no longer perform his work duties. The Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board) sustained an award of unemployment benefits to Employee. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly held that Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-236(a)(14), which disallows unemployment benefits to a discharged employee who has been disqualified under law from performing the work for which he was hired as a result of a drug or alcohol testing program, did not apply to a commercial driver like Employee who, while off duty, loses his license for driving under the influence and is therefore unable to work. View "Tuxis Ohr's Fuel, Inc. v. Adm'r, Unemployment Comp. Act" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the town assessor's interim valuations of his property. The Board of Assessment Appeals upheld the assessor's interim valuations. The trial court concluded (1) the assessor improperly relied on Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-55 as authority to conduct the interim assessments and that she should have been guided by Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-53a instead; and (2) because section 12-53a only applied to "completed new construction," the assessor did not have authority to assign value to partially completed construction on the grand lists. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 12-55 provides assessors with broad authority to conduct interim assessments of real property, and the plain language of section 12-53a is applicable only to completed new construction; and (2) therefore, the assessor had the authority, pursuant to section 12-55, to conduct the interim assessments of Plaintiff's property and to assign value to the partially completed construction. View "Kasica v. Town of Columbia" on Justia Law

Employee was injured at Employer's paper bag manufacturing facility while attempting to dislodge a bag that was jammed in a machine. Employee filed this action to recover damages for the alleged intentional misconduct by his night supervisor (Supervisor), claiming that his injuries resulted from Employer's modification of the machine and that Supervisor was Employer's alter ego for the purposes of the intentional tort exception to the Workers' Compensation Act's (Act) exclusivity provisions. The trial court granted summary judgment for Employer, concluding that the Act was Employee's exclusive remedy. At issue on appeal was whether Supervisor was Employer's alter ego under the exception to the exclusivity of the Act for intentional torts committed by a fellow employee identified as the alter ego of the corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employee failed to establish a disputed issue of fact as to whether Supervisor was Defendant's alter ego. View "Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs installed a gabion seawall on their property to mitigate the effects of erosion. Plaintiffs did not seek approval from the town or the department of environmental protection (department) before constructing the seawall. The town subsequently issued a cease and desist order to Plaintiffs, and the department issued a notice of violation to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs submitted a permit application to the department attempting to obtain permission to retain the seawall. The department denied the application and ordered Plaintiffs to remove the seawall. Plaintiffs challenged the removal order. A department hearing officer determined that the department properly exercised jurisdiction and that the department had the authority to order the wall to be removed. The trial court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the department properly asserted jurisdiction over the seawall; (2) the department properly asserted jurisdiction under the Coastal Management Act; (3) substantial evidence supported the department's findings and conclusions; and (4) the hearing officer's decision to order the removal of the entire seawall was not an abuse of discretion. View "Sams v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained a variance from the zoning board of appeals (board) to construct a single-family house on their lakefront property. Plaintiffs then applied for and received a zoning permit and building permit from the town of Lebanon (town) to construct the house. After construction was completed, Plaintiffs constructed a deck. Plaintiffs did not receive the required building permits for the deck, nor did they notify the town of the deck's construction. Several years later, the zoning enforcement officer discovered the deck violated the town's zoning regulations and issued a notice of violation and cease and desist order to Plaintiffs requiring them to abate the setback violation. The board denied Plaintiffs' appeal. The superior court reversed, concluding that the deck at issue was a "building" as that term is used in Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-13a(a) and, therefore, Defendants' enforcement action was untimely under the three year statute of limitations set forth in section 8-13a(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deck was not a "building" under the statute. Remanded. View "Tine v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Lebanon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed to the superior court from the decision of the planning and zoning commission of the town of Clinton (Defendant), granting, subject to certain conditions, its applications for a special permit and for coastal site plan review. Plaintiff caused Defendant to be served with a complaint, but the complaint was not accompanied by a citation or a summons. The trial court dismissed the administrative appeal for lack of personal jurisdiction because the service of process did not conform to the requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-8(f)(2). Plaintiff appealed, claiming that, although the service of process was defective, it should have been allowed to add the citation and serve the corrected process pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-72. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's failure to attach a summons or citations to the complaint was a substantive defect in the service of process and, thus, was not the type of technical defect that was amendable pursuant to section 52-72. View "New England Road, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

Claimant brought a claim before the Claims Commissioner seeking damages from the State as the coadministrator of the estate of her deceased daughter, who had died while confined in a correctional institution. In the course of Claimant's case, the Commissioner issued subpoenas to the Charlotte Hungerford Hospital requesting information about the decedent's treatment there. The Hospital refused to comply with the subpoena, arguing that the Commissioner had no authority to issue subpoenas to nonparties. The trial court enforced the Commissioner's subpoena, and the appellate court affirmed. Subsequently to the Supreme Court's certification of the Hospital's appeal, Claimant settled underlying case, and consequently, the State no longer sought to enforce the subpoenas. The Supreme Court dismissed the Hospital's appeal as moot and vacated the judgments of the lower courts, as the Court could no longer grant relief. View "State v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp." on Justia Law