Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Plaintiff was working as a police officer when he felt a sharp pain in his right shoulder after attempting to lift a heavy person. A physician determined that Plaintiff had a labral tear, and Plainiff later underwent shoulder surgery. Plaintiff's pain continued. In 2000, Plaintiff suffered an acute myocardial infarction and was transferred to the hospital where he had bypass surgery. Plaintiff filed a claim in 2001, contending that his shoulder condition was misdiagnosed and that his 1996 symptoms were caused by a cardiac problem. The workers compensation commissioner dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Plaintiff's allegation that his heart condition was misdiagnosed following the 1996 incident, and that his 2001 notice of claim was untimely. The compensation review board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board properly concluded that Plaintiff had failed to establish that the medical care exception to the applicable one year statute of limitations applied to toll the statute of limitations, as Plaintiff failed to prove a connection between the 1996 incident and his heart disease.

Plaintiff Harry Kraiza filed an application with the planning and zoning commission of the town of Hartland seeking approval of a proposed subdivision on his property. The commission denied Plaintiff's application, finding it was in violation of the subdivision regulations because the proposed dead-end street that provided the only access to the subdivided lots on Plaintiff's property constituted an extension of an existing loop road on adjacent property and the combined length of the two road exceeded the permissible length for a permanent dead-end street. The superior court and appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the commission incorrectly interpreted the Hartland zoning and subdivision regulations in this case, and the appellate court incorrectly determined that the commission properly denied Plaintiff's application to subdivide his property. Remanded with direction to render judgment sustaining Plaintiff's appeal.

Plaintiff Edward Okeke and Tamara Shockley were unmarried when Shockley gave birth to a son. Shockley affirmed an acknowledgement of paternity form the parties executed after the birth. The last name of the child on the paternity acknowledgement was stated as 'Okeke.' The official birth certificate of the child, however, listed his last name as 'Shockley-Okeke.' Plaintiff filed with the department of public health and amendment of the child's birth certificate. A hearing officer denied Plaintiff's request. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff's administrative appeal. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-42(d)(1), the commissioner of public health has the authority to amend a child's birth certificate where the name on the birth certificate differs from that initially agreed upon by the parents on an acknowledgement of paternity form. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commissioner did not have the authority to amend the birth certificate under the facts of this case.

Defendants, State Five Industrial Park and Jean Farricielli, appealed from a trial court judgment holding them liable, after invoking both reverse and traditional veil piercing principles, for a $3.8 million judgment rendered against Jean's husband, Joseph Farricielli, and five corporations that he owned and/or controlled, in an environmental enforcement action brought by Plaintiffs, the commissioner of environmental protection, the town of Hamden, and the town's zoning enforcement officer. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the facts that were proven in this case did not warrant reverse veil piercing, and judgment on Plaintiffs' veil piercing claims should be rendered in favor of Defendants.

Plaintiff Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. sells its products to Connecticut schoolchildren by having schoolteachers submit to Plaintiff book orders the teachers have collected from students. The books are delivered to the teachers, who then distribute the books to the students. In 2006, the commissioner of revenue services imposed a sales and use tax deficiency assessment on Plaintiff for more than $3 million. Plaintiff protested the assessments. The commissioner upheld the assessments, reasoning that Plaintiff had sold its products using "in-state representatives" pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-407(a)(15)(A). The trial court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding (1) the trial court incorrectly determined that the teachers were not Plaintiff's "representatives" within the meaning of section 12-407(A)(15)(a)(iv), as the teachers serve as the exclusive channel through which Plaintiff markets, sells and delivers its products to Connecticut schoolchildren; and (2) the trial court incorrectly determined that the taxes could not be imposed under the commerce clause, as the activities of the Connecticut schoolteachers who participate in Plaintiff's program provide the requisite nexus under the commerce clause to justify imposition of the taxes.

The local board of education of the City of Bridgeport passed a resolution requesting the state board of education to authorize the commissioner of education to reconstitute the local board. The state board voted to authorize the commissioner to reconstitute the local board. In three separate actions, former local board members and residents and electors of the City filed actions against the state board, local board, and others, alleging state statutory and constitutional violations. The trial court reserved the action for the advice of the Supreme Court. At issue was (1) whether the failure of the state board to require the local board to undergo and complete training, as mandated by Conn. Gen. Stat. 10-223e(h), rendered void the state board's authorization; and (2) whether the local board's resolution requesting that the state board authorize reconstitution resulted in a waiver of the state board's obligation to require training. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the state board's failure to require training rendered void its authorization of reconstitution under section 10-223e(h); and (2) the local board's resolution had no effect on the operation of the statute.

The freedom of information commission ordered the University of Connecticut to disclose databases identifying persons who had paid to attend, donated to, inquired about or participated in certain educational, cultural or athletic activities of institutions within the university. The trial court sustained the university's appeal, concluding that the university could, as a matter of law, create a trade secret entitled to exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. The commission appealed, contending that, in light of the public policy favoring disclosure of public records, the trial court improperly rejected the commission's determination that none of the databases at issue could be trade secrets because the university was not principally involved in a trade. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a public agency can create and maintain trade secrets that are exempt from disclosure under the Act, as long as the information meets the statutory criteria for a trade secret.

Plaintiff, the former town clerk of the town of Watertown, was removed from her position after she failed to report for work. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against the town and certain of its officials (1) seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Defendants to restore her salary and benefits from the time they were discontinued and to continue such payments for the duration of her term, (2) claiming Defendants had violated her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, and (3) seeking recovery of her lost salary. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on counts one and three. The court, however, rendered judgment in favor of defendants on count two of the complaint based upon the jury's finding that there had not been a constitutional violation of due process. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings on counts one and three, holding that the trial court improperly concluded that Plaintiff had a clear legal right to be paid for the balance of her elected term unless or until she was removed from office.

The named plaintiff in the underlying action, Ernest Francis, brought a declaratory judgment action against all members of the Connecticut General Assembly. Francis received a waiver of the process server's service fees, including a fee for copies, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-261(a)(2). The plaintiff in error, state marshal Lisa Stevenson (Plaintiff), effectuated service on all defendants. Francis' son had made the copies of the complaint at his expense. Plaintiff subsequently submitted an invoice claiming fees of, inter alia, $900 for copies of the complaint. The trial court disallowed the fee for copies. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 52-261(a)(2) entitles a process server to the fee for copies even if she has not personally made the copies. The Court concluded that the trial court, the defendant in error, improperly denied Plaintiff's request for fees where (1) the statute was ambiguous, and (2) clear evidence of legislative intent proved that the fee for copies under section 52-261(a)(2) was not contingent upon the process server's making the copies.

Plaintiff HVC Inc. was a trustee of the Honda Lease Trust. During the audit period at issue, several car dealerships entered into thousands of leases with customers (lessees) pursuant to lease plan agreements between the dealerships, the trust, and the servicer of the trust. Under the leases, the lessees were responsible for submitting the vehicle registration renewal application and renewal fees to the department of motor vehicles on behalf of the trust. Upon receipt of the renewal application and fee, the department sent the vehicle registration card to the trust, and the trust forwarded the vehicle registration card to the appropriate lessee. After conducting a sales and use tax audit for the audit period from April 1, 2001 through October 31, 2004, Defendant Pamela Law, the then commissioner of revenue services, issued a deficiency assessment against Plaintiff, concluding that the renewal fees constituted taxable gross receipts of the trust and, therefore, were subject to the sales tax. The trial court rendered summary judgment partially in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the renewal fees paid by the lessess qualified as Plaintiff's gross receipts subject to sales tax under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-408(1).