Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

For several years, Plaintiff Housatonic Railroad Company purchased diesel fuel from a petroleum distributor that was used exclusively by Plaintiff as part of its interstate freight rail business. The distributor remitted the petroleum tax to Defendant, the commissioner of revenue services. The distributor separately billed Plaintiff for the amount of tax it paid to the department of revenue services, and Plaintiff paid that amount directly to the distributor. Plaintiff then submitted requests to the department for a refund of the money paid for the petroleum tax by the distributor to the department. The commissioner denied Plaintiff's request. Plaintiff appealed. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the state was immune from suit because Plaintiff could not establish an exception to sovereign immunity under any of three separate statutory provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of the statutory provisions on which Plaintiff relied permits a rail carrier to bring an action against the state for a refund of taxes paid by a petroleum distributor.

The present matter arose from three related tax appeals involving Plaintiff Goodspeed Airport's property that consisted of a commercial utility airport and forty-three acres of open fields. The superior court denied relief on Plaintiff's claim seeking reclassification and assessment of certain of its real property as open space and disposed of all three appeals. The appellate court concluded that (1) 13.08 acres of Plaintiff's property were ineligible for open space classification; and (2) Plaintiff, notwithstanding the ongoing improper classification of its property by Defendant, the town of East Haddam, was not entitled to judicial relief from the improper assessment of its forty-three acres. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that the trial court properly determined that the 13.08 acres were ineligible for open space classification and that Plaintiff was not aggrieved pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-117a on the basis of Defendant's ongoing overassessment of the forty-three acres. Remanded.

In four decisions, Defendant, the freedom of information commission, ordered Plaintiff, a town ethics commission, to make and maintain, for three years, audio recordings of Plaintiff's executive sessions or any other session closed to the public after finding that (1) Plaintiff violated the open meetings provision of the Freedom of Information Act by convening in nonpublic sessions to discuss certain matters and (2) Plaintiff had failed to comply with the commission's orders to amend its minutes to reflect those discussions. The trial court consolidated Plaintiff's appeals and then dismissed them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the commission's orders exceeded its remedial authority under the Freedom of Information Act. Remanded with direction to render judgments in favor of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff, the commissioner of labor, applied to the superior court for a warrant to inspect the premises of Defendant, a fire company, to investigate whether the fire company was in compliance with the requirements of Connecticut's Occupational Safety and Health Act. The trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the commissioner's warrant application, concluding that the fire company did not fall within the act's definition of a covered employer, which by statutory definition was "the state and any political subdivision thereof" because the fire company was an independent corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fire company did not fall within the core definition of a political subdivision of the state.

Complainant, an attorney and private investigator, asked the town tax assessor to provide him with an exact electronic copy of the file that the department of motor vehicles had provided to the town pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-163 for use in preparing the town's motor vehicle grand list. The assessor denied the request, stating that the electronic file was protected from disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-217. The freedom of information commission ordered the town to provide to complainant an exact electronic copy of the electronic file. Several parties intervened as plaintiffs, and the trial court consolidated their administrative appeals. The court then dismissed the appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding that section 1-217 applies to motor vehicle grand lists and their component data provided to the town assessors pursuant to section 14-163.

Plaintiff, landowner of property consisting in part of wetland soil, filed a petition for a declaratory ruling with the Fairfield town conservation commission, seeking a determination that certain activities, including the construction of roads, were permitted as of right pursuant to section 4.1(a) of the town's inland wetlands and watercourses regulations. The commission, acting it its capacity as the town's inland wetlands and watercourses agency, denied the petition. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined that Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-40(a)(1) and section 4.1(a) of the regulations did not permit, as of right, the filling of wetlands to construct roads, irrespective of whether the roads are directly related to the farming operation.

Letitia Kilby filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, claiming unlawful housing discrimination by Defendants, the town housing authority and a property management company. The Commission found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination occurred. The trial court then granted Defendants' request to file a civil action in the trial court. Kilby moved to intervene, claiming both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that although the statute at issue, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-83(d)(2), did not expressly grant Kilby a right of intervention, it impliedly granted Kilby a right of intervention. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for certification to appeal, but while the case was pending, the legislature enacted Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, which amended the text of section 46a-83 to allow a complainant to intervene as of right in a housing discrimination action brought by the commission on behalf of the complainant. The Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the significance of Defendants' appeal was substantially undermined by Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, and, thus, certification was improvidently granted.

The Town's building officials refused to issue permits to Plaintiff-Appellant Levine for two dwelling units Plaintiff wanted to build on his property. Plaintiff sued for permission to build but lost at trial and appealed, challenging the Town's authority to change its mind after considerable time and money was spent on development. Plaintiff also argueed that there were problems with the trial court's conclusion on his municipal estoppel claim. The Court found that the town properly enacted its land use ordinance, but the lower court improperly applied the law to Plaintiff's municipal estoppel claim to allow him damages for reliance on Town's initial permission to build. Starting in 2005, Plaintiff sought permission from the Town to develop a parcel of land. In 2006, the Town amended its land use ordinance to prohibit the construction of more than one dwelling on a lot, but did not expressly provide whether the revisions would apply to projects already in development. A February, 2006 meeting of the board of selectmen passed a resolution to allow Plaintiff's project to proceed; a September, 2006 meeting rescinded the February approval, and reserved the right to enforce the Town's land use ordinances against Plaintiff's project. In November, 2006, Plaintiff sought the building permits for work already in progress, and the Town refused to issue them. The Court affirmed the lower court's determination that the Town's board had authority under state law to pass the September, 2006 resolution. However, though the Court agreed with Plaintiff that he had demonstrated significant time and money was spent in developing his land. The Court held that the standard used to decide was too strict under state law, and ordered a new trial to resolve Plaintiff's municipal estoppel claim.

The Court considered an appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee Connecticut Motor Cars in which the lower court found that a licensed car dealer or repairer is not entitled to a "gate fee" when it moves a wrecked or disabled vehicle from a storage area to a place where it will be retrieved by the owner. The Plaintiff operates a repair shop that also tows and stores vehicles. When the vehicle owner comes to retrieve his car, Plaintiff charges a fee for the labor and equipment used to move the vehicle from a secured storage area to a retrieval area. Two vehicle owners objected to the "gate fee" and brought complaint before the state car dealer licensing agency. Plaintiff argued that under state law, the storage and moving of the car within its facility was an "exceptional serviceâ¦not included in the tow charge," but the hearing officer disagreed. Upholding the hearing officer's decision, the Court found that the plain language of the law includes "all the activity in the gate fee," and that "the only reasonable interpretation of the regulations is that a gate fee is not permitted."

Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Burton sought an injunction against Defendant-Appellee Dominion Nuclear to halt operation of a power plant, claiming that the plant would cause unreasonable radioactive pollution to Long Island Sound and to an estuary located near her property. Plaintiff also filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to stop Defendant from using a stretch power uprate increase unless Defendant could do so without an increase of radioactive discharge. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Plaintiff's case on grounds that she lacked standing under state environmental protection laws, common law nuisance principles, and federal preemption. Holding that Plaintiff's ex parte application "does not contain allegations of substantive violations giving rise to unreasonable pollution⦠in excess of that permitted under the regulatory scheme," the Court upheld the lower courts's decision to dismiss this claim for lack of standing.