Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Plaintiff’s decedent filed notices of claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission. The Commission assigned the decedent’s claims to its asbestos docket for adjudication. After the decedent died, Plaintiff, his widow, filed a claim for dependent benefits that was joined with the original claims. The Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association became a defendant in the proceedings. The Association was originally dismissed from the case for lack of exposure. The Commissioner later reinstated the Association as a party to the proceedings. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that the Commissioner properly reinstated the Association as a party to the proceedings because the Commissioner’s broad case management authority permitted him to render a dismissal that was provisional, rather than final, in nature. View "Graham v. Olson Wood Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Commissioner of Environmental Protection (Commissioner) and Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Dominion) alleging that the operation of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station owned and operated by Dominion was causing unreasonable pollution of the state’s waters in violation of the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Plaintiff lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff had standing to bring her action under Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-16. The Court ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether the pending administrative permit renewal proceeding for the nuclear power station’s operation was inadequate to protect the rights recognized by the Act. The administrative proceeding then terminated when the Commissioner issued a renewal permit for Millstone. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff’s action was moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s claims were not moot because a determination that the renewal proceeding was inadequate to protect the rights recognized under the Act could result in the invalidation of the permit under which Millstone is currently operating. View "Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

In 1996, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant, the New Haven Police Department, as a police officer. In 2011, Plaintiff suffered a myocardial infarction. Plaintiff later filed a claim for benefits under Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c(a) for hypertension and heart disease. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits related to his hypertension as untimely but granted his claim for benefits related to his heart disease and myocardial infarction. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Board improperly affirmed the Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff’s hypertension and heart disease were separate diseases, each with its own limitation period for filing a claim for benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the medical evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s hypertension and heart disease were separate medical conditions; and (2) the Board properly affirmed the Commissioner’s decision granting Plaintiff benefits pursuant to section 7-433c related to heart disease. View "Holston v. New Haven Police Department" on Justia Law

James Rock (the decedent) was employed by the University of Connecticut for more than thirty-five years before he died from a form of cancer that can be caused by occupational exposure to asbestos. The decedent never filed a notice of claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Plaintiff, the Estate of James Rock, filed a notice of claim for workers’ compensation benefits on behalf of the decedent. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits for lack of standing. The Compensation Review Board upheld the dismissal but remanded the case to allow Plaintiff to advance a claim for burial expenses, lost wages the decedent sustained between his injury and his death, and medical expenses attributable to a compensable injury. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that an estate is not a legal entity capable of advancing a claim for any form of workers’ compensation benefits, and therefore, Plaintiff did not have standing to pursue any type of workers’ compensation benefits. View "Estate of Rock v. Univ. of Conn." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission after the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority (Defendant) failed to promptly produce certain requested communications. Defendant provided some documents to Plaintiff but withheld hundreds of others, asserting that the communications were covered by the attorney-client privilege. A hearing officer recommended that the Commission find that the documents were exempt from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. Characterizing the communications as containing a mix of business and legal advice, the Commission voted to adopt the hearing officer’s decision. The superior court affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission failed to apply the proper standard for assessing the communications at issue. Remanded. View "Harrington v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a registered sex offender when he was admitted to the state rental assistance program. Thereafter, the legislature promulgated section 17b-812-13(9) of the Regulations of Connecticut States Agencies, which makes sex offender registration a ground for termination or denial of rental program assistance. The Commissioner of Housing (Commissioner) subsequently terminated Plaintiff’s rental program benefits. Plaintiff took an administrative appeal of the Commissioner’s decision to the trial court, which concluded that the Commissioner’s application of section 17b-812-13(9) was not retroactive and therefore did not exceed the authority granted to the Commissioner by the legislature. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commissioner applied section 17b-812-13(9) of the regulations retroactively in this case by imposing a new obligation on Plaintiff’s sex offender status that terminated his rental program assistance; and (2) such retroactive application of the regulation was not statutorily authorized, and therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s administrative appeal. View "Shannon v. Comm’r of Housing" on Justia Law

Brenda Puryear filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities on behalf of her minor daughter, Sarah, alleging that Echo Hose Ambulance and the city of Shelton had discriminated and retaliated against Sarah on the basis of her race and color in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Commission’s human rights referee struck the complaint on the ground that Sarah was not an employee under the “remuneration test” used to resolve similar federal causes of action. The trial court dismissed the Commission’s appeal, concluding that the referee properly applied the remuneration test. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Commission appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court erred in applying the federal remuneration test rather than Connecticut’s common-law “right to control” test to determine whether an unpaid volunteer is an “employee” under the CFEPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in concluding that the remuneration test is the appropriate test for determining whether a volunteer is an employee under CFEPA. View "Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance" on Justia Law

The Department of Motor Vehicles found that Raymond’s Auto Repair, LLC had overcharged for the use of its rotator truck to recover a damaged vehicle prior to the actual towing of that vehicle. The hearing officer ordered Raymond’s to pay a $600 restitution fee. The trial court vacated the reimbursement order, holding that state regulation of the pretowing recovery services at issue was subject to federal preemption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that state regulation of pretowing recovery services, such as Raymond’s use of the rotator truck in this case, was not preempted by federal law. View "Raymond's Auto Repair, LLC v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The Department of Motor Vehicles found that Plaintiff, a towing service, had overcharged for the nonconsensual towing of a motor vehicle trailer and ordered Plaintiff to pay restitution in the amount of $12,787 to the trailer’s insurer. In so finding, the Department rejected Plaintiff’s claim that Connecticut’s statutes and regulations regarding nonconsensual towing services are preempted under 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2)(C). The trial court reversed in part, concluding that the fees charged by Plaintiff were not subject to state regulation. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment with respect to the determination that state regulation of fees charged for pretowing recovery services provided in connection with a nonconsensual towing is preempted by federal law, holding that state laws regulating the fees charged for recovery services performed in connection with a nonconsensual towing are not preempted by federal law. View "Modzelewski's Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The Indian Spring Land Company (Plaintiff), the owner of an unimproved tract of land, filed an application to construct a gravel access road subject to certain conditions. The Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency of the Town of Greenwich (Defendant) granted Plaintiff’s application, subject to certain conditions. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that its road construction activities were “directly related to its farming operations” and were therefore permitted as of right, thus not requiring the approval of a wetlands agency under Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-40(a)(1). The trial court concluded that Defendant had the necessary jurisdiction to attach special conditions to Plaintiff’s permit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court incorrectly interpreted section 22a-40(a)(1); and (2) under the proper interpretation of the statute, Defendant did not have jurisdiction to regulate the construction of Plaintiff’s access road. View "Indian Spring Land Co. v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency" on Justia Law