Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Volcano Telephone Company, a rural telephone service provider, receives subsidies from the California High-Cost Fund-A (A-Fund) administered by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Volcano Vision, Inc., an affiliate, uses Volcano Telephone’s broadband-capable facilities, subsidized by the A-Fund, to deliver broadband services without contributing to the underlying costs. The PUC considered Volcano Vision’s net revenues in setting Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and future rates. The PUC also required Volcano Telephone to submit broadband service quality metrics related to Volcano Vision’s services.The PUC issued Decision No. 23-02-008, calculating Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and approving rates for 2023. Volcano Telephone and Volcano Vision challenged this decision, arguing that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation constituted an unconstitutional taking and conflicted with federal law. They also contended that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was outside the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The PUC denied rehearing and modified the decision to clarify the reporting requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected the petitioners’ claims, affirming Decision Nos. 23-02-008 and 23-08-051. The court held that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation did not constitute an unconstitutional taking, as the A-Fund program is voluntary, and the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the rate of return was confiscatory. The court also found that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was within the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The court concluded that the PUC’s decisions were supported by substantial evidence and did not violate any constitutional rights. View "Volcano Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC, and affiliates, sought to build and operate interstate electricity transmission lines in Indiana. An Indiana statute granted incumbent electric companies the right of first refusal to build and operate new interstate transmission facilities connecting to their existing facilities. Plaintiffs argued that this statute violated the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) Commissioners from enforcing the statute.The IURC Commissioners and several intervening defendants appealed the injunction. They argued that the IURC did not enforce the rights of first refusal and that the injunction would not redress plaintiffs' injuries. The district court had found that plaintiffs had standing because it believed the IURC enforced the rights of first refusal and that an injunction would prevent MISO from recognizing the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing. The court concluded that the IURC had no relevant responsibilities for enforcing the challenged statute and that any genuine redress would have to operate against MISO, a non-governmental entity not party to the lawsuit. The court noted that MISO had made clear it would not respond to the preliminary injunction as plaintiffs and the district court expected. The court also rejected a dissenting opinion's novel theory of standing, which was not presented by plaintiffs or adopted by the district court. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc." on Justia Law

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Paul Porter applied twice to register a firearm, but the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) denied his applications, citing a previous weapons offense conviction in Maryland. The Maryland records were expunged in 2020, so the full details of the case are not available. However, it is known that Porter pleaded guilty in 2009 to transporting a handgun on a highway, was initially sentenced to three years of incarceration (suspended for probation), and later had his sentence reconsidered to probation before judgment in 2015.Porter sought review of MPD's denial from the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at OAH overturned MPD's decision, reasoning that under Maryland law, a discharged sentence of probation before judgment is not considered a conviction and that failing to recognize this would deny Maryland law full faith and credit.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel the District to adopt Maryland's interpretation of "conviction" for firearm registration purposes. The court concluded that under District law, a sentence of probation before judgment constitutes a conviction for the purposes of firearm registration. The court emphasized that the legislative intent of the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975 was to restrict firearm possession to individuals without disqualifying offenses, and allowing those with probation before judgment to register firearms would undermine this purpose.The court reversed OAH's order and upheld MPD's denial of Porter's application for a firearm registration certificate, holding that Porter "has been convicted" of a disqualifying offense under D.C. Code § 7-2502.03(a)(2), and that subsequent discharge of probation and expungement do not alter this conclusion. View "District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department v. Porter" on Justia Law

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Peyman Roshan, a lawyer and real estate broker, had his law license suspended by the California Supreme Court in 2021 for misconduct. Following this, the California Department of Real Estate (DRE) initiated a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding against his real estate license. Roshan filed a federal lawsuit against the DRE, alleging constitutional violations and seeking to enjoin the DRE's disciplinary action.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Roshan's lawsuit, citing the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings. The district court held that the DRE's disciplinary proceeding was quasi-criminal in nature and that Roshan could raise his federal claims during the judicial review of the DRE action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the Younger abstention doctrine. The court noted that the state proceedings were ongoing, involved important state interests, and allowed Roshan to raise his federal claims. The court also determined that the DRE proceeding was quasi-criminal because it was initiated by a state agency following an investigation, involved formal charges, and aimed to determine whether Roshan should be sanctioned by suspending or revoking his real estate license.The Ninth Circuit concluded that all the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that Roshan had not demonstrated any bad faith, harassment, or extraordinary circumstances that would make abstention inappropriate. Therefore, the district court's decision to abstain from hearing the case was proper, and the dismissal of Roshan's lawsuit was affirmed. View "ROSHAN V. MCCAULEY" on Justia Law

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Gray Television, a broadcaster in Alaska, sought review of a final forfeiture order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC had imposed the maximum forfeiture penalty on Gray for violating the prohibition on owning two top-four stations in a single designated market area (DMA). Gray acquired the CBS network affiliation of KTVA-TV for its own station, KYES-TV, which resulted in Gray owning two top-four stations in the Anchorage DMA. Gray did not seek a waiver from the FCC for this transaction.The FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture (NAL) against Gray, proposing a penalty of $518,283, the statutory maximum. Gray responded, arguing that the transaction did not violate the rule because KYES was already a top-four station according to Comscore ratings data. Gray also contended that the FCC failed to provide fair notice of its interpretation of the rule and that the enforcement action violated the First Amendment and the Communications Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the FCC's determination that Gray violated the rule, finding that the FCC reasonably relied on Nielsen ratings data, which showed that KYES was not a top-four station at the time of the transaction. The court also held that the FCC's interpretation of the rule was reasonable and that Gray had fair notice of the rule's application to its transaction.However, the court vacated the forfeiture penalty and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that the FCC failed to provide adequate notice to Gray that the proposed penalty was based on a finding of egregiousness, which violated due process. Additionally, the court held that the FCC did not adequately explain its consideration of Gray's good faith in determining the penalty amount. View "Gray Television, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

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Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX) operates a space launch business and a global satellite-based internet service called Starlink. In June 2022, a group of SpaceX employees sent an open letter demanding certain actions from the company and solicited support through a survey. SpaceX discharged four employees involved in the letter's distribution for violating company policies. Additional employees were later discharged for lying during a leak investigation and for unrelated performance issues. These employees filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in November 2022, alleging violations of the National Labor Relations Act.The NLRB Regional Director found merit in the claims and issued an order consolidating the employees' cases with a hearing set for March 2024. SpaceX sued the NLRB in the Southern District of Texas (SDTX) in January 2024, challenging the NLRB's structure as unconstitutional and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The NLRB moved to transfer the case to the Central District of California (CDCA), arguing improper venue. The SDTX granted the transfer motion in February 2024. SpaceX petitioned for an emergency writ of mandamus to vacate the transfer order, which was initially stayed but later denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. SpaceX argued that the district court effectively denied its motion for a preliminary injunction by failing to rule on it by May 2, 2024. The Fifth Circuit found that SpaceX did not demonstrate the "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence" required for an immediate appeal. The court noted that participating in the administrative proceeding did not constitute irreparable harm and that the district court did not act unreasonably in waiting to resolve procedural challenges. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed SpaceX's appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

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The case involves two charitable organizations, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. (CMMB) and Food for the Poor, Inc. (FFP), which were issued cease and desist orders and civil penalties by the California Attorney General for allegedly overvaluing in-kind donations and making misleading statements in their solicitations. The Attorney General found that both organizations used inflated domestic market prices for donated medicines, which could not be distributed within the U.S., and misrepresented their program efficiency ratios to donors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and found that the challenged statutory provisions, sections 12591.1(b) and 12599.6(f)(2) of the Government Code, were unconstitutional as they constituted prior restraints on speech. The court vacated the civil penalties and issued permanent injunctions against the Attorney General, preventing the enforcement of these provisions. The court also reformed section 12591.1(b) by adding language to exclude violations of section 12599.6 from the Attorney General's cease and desist authority.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the permanent injunctions without requiring the plaintiffs to plead and prove their entitlement to such relief. The appellate court vacated the injunctions and remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaints and prove their entitlement to injunctive relief. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's reformation of section 12591.1(b), allowing the Attorney General to issue cease and desist orders for violations unrelated to speech. The appellate court also vacated the postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees and directed the trial court to reconsider the fees in light of the remand. View "Catholic Medical Mission Board v. Bonta" on Justia Law

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In the spring of 2018, People's Electric Cooperative and Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E) submitted competing bids to provide retail electric service to the Tall Oak Woodford Cryo Plant in Coal County, Oklahoma. The Plant is located in People's certified territory, which grants them exclusive rights to provide electricity under the Retail Electric Supplier Certified Territory Act (RESCTA). OG&E's proposal relied on the Large Load exception to RESCTA, which allows a supplier to extend its service into another supplier's territory for large-load customers. OG&E used third-party transmission facilities to provide service to the Plant without extending its own distribution lines.The Oklahoma Corporation Commission enjoined OG&E from serving the Plant, finding that OG&E was not "extending its service" as authorized by RESCTA. The Commission determined that a retail electric supplier may not use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory under the Large Load exception. OG&E appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and upheld the Commission's determination. The Court held that Article 9, Section 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution requires a limited review of the Commission's order. The Court affirmed the Commission's interpretation that the Large Load exception does not permit a supplier to use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory. The Court's decision applies prospectively only and does not affect existing retail electric services and facilities established under the Large Load exception. View "OKLAHOMA GAS AND ELECTRIC CO. v. STATE" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Consumer Product Safety Commission's (CPSC) second attempt to regulate small, high-powered magnets that pose serious health risks to children when ingested. These magnets, used in various consumer products like jewelry and puzzles, can cause severe internal injuries or death if swallowed. The CPSC's first attempt to regulate these magnets was struck down by the Tenth Circuit in 2016 due to inadequate data supporting the rule. The CPSC then revised its approach and issued a new rule, which is now being challenged by industry groups.The industry groups petitioned for review of the CPSC's new rule, arguing that the CPSC's cost-benefit analysis was flawed and that the rule was promulgated by an unconstitutionally structured agency. They contended that the CPSC's data on magnet ingestions was unreliable, that the CPSC failed to consider the impact of its own enforcement efforts, and that the rule was underinclusive and arbitrary. They also argued that existing voluntary standards were sufficient to address the risks posed by the magnets.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the CPSC's rule was supported by substantial evidence, noting that the CPSC had adequately addressed the shortcomings identified in the previous case and had conducted a thorough cost-benefit analysis. The court also held that the CPSC's structure, which includes removal protections for its commissioners, was constitutional, reaffirming its previous decision in Leachco, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission.The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the CPSC's rule regulating small, high-powered magnets. The court concluded that the rule was necessary to address the significant health risks posed by these magnets and that the CPSC had acted within its authority in promulgating the rule. View "Magnetsafety.org v. Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law

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Jack William Morgan, a Messianic Jew, purchased a turkey log from the commissary at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Thomson in May 2021, which led to the suspension of his kosher diet approval for thirty days by the institutional chaplain. Morgan claimed this forced him to choose between starvation and violating his religious beliefs, and he chose starvation. After exhausting administrative remedies, he sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the prison warden, Andrew Ciolli, seeking changes to dietary policies and monetary damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Morgan has since been transferred to a different BOP facility.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Morgan’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that Morgan did not provide sufficient factual allegations to show that the BOP’s dietary policies substantially burdened his religious exercise. Additionally, the court noted that the BOP is immune from suits for damages under RFRA and that Morgan’s complaint did not include allegations about Ciolli’s conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and focused on two threshold issues: subject-matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. The court determined that Morgan did not adequately allege standing to pursue his claim for injunctive relief, as his threat of future injury was too speculative. Furthermore, the court held that federal sovereign immunity barred Morgan’s claim for monetary damages, as RFRA does not waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity against damages suits. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal but modified the judgment to reflect a jurisdictional dismissal. View "Morgan v BOP" on Justia Law