Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Eight residents of Boothbay and Boothbay Harbor challenged a school board’s refusal to put their petition for a new referendum before the voters. The underlying issue concerned a voter-approved bond to renovate local schools. After the bond passed, the residents submitted a petition containing two articles: one seeking to reconsider and repeal the prior vote, and another proposing a new, smaller bond for a different renovation project if the repeal succeeded. The school board rejected the petition, reasoning that it did not present a proper reconsideration question as required by statute and that the second article was unrelated to reconsidering the original referendum.The residents sought judicial review in the Lincoln County Superior Court under Rule 80B and also filed independent claims for a declaratory judgment and attorney fees, alleging a First Amendment violation. The Superior Court found that the petition was not a proper reconsideration petition because it included an additional article and that the independent claims were barred by the exclusivity principle. The residents then appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that the statute governing reconsideration petitions imposes a ministerial duty on the board to initiate a referendum if the statutory requirements are met; thus, the Superior Court had jurisdiction. However, the Court found that the residents’ petition did not comply with the statutory requirements for a reconsideration petition, as it sought affirmative repeal and included a second, unrelated article, making it ineligible for submission to voters. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the independent claims, holding there was no First Amendment violation. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Minerich v. Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor Community School District" on Justia Law

Several pharmaceutical manufacturers and a trade association challenged a Louisiana statute, Act 358, which restricts drug manufacturers from interfering with the delivery of federally discounted drugs through contract pharmacies. The statute was passed in response to manufacturers’ efforts to limit the distribution of discounted drugs under the federal 340B Program, particularly through arrangements with contract pharmacies serving vulnerable populations. The plaintiffs argued that the Louisiana law was preempted by federal law and violated several constitutional provisions, including the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the Due Process Clause’s prohibition on vagueness.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana considered three related cases together. It denied the manufacturers’ motions for summary judgment and instead granted summary judgment for the State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Primary Care Association (LPCA) on all claims. The district court also allowed LPCA to intervene in each case, over the objection of one plaintiff.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Act 358 is not preempted by federal law. It found that the federal 340B statute does not occupy the field of pharmacy regulation and does not conflict with or frustrate federal objectives, as it is silent on the use of contract pharmacies and leaves room for state regulation. The court also concluded that Act 358 does not effect a physical or regulatory taking, does not substantially impair contract rights under the Contracts Clause, and is not unconstitutionally vague. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order permitting LPCA to intervene in AbbVie’s case, finding that LPCA’s interests were adequately represented by the State and it did not show it would present a distinct defense. The court affirmed summary judgment for Louisiana on all claims. View "AstraZeneca v. Murrill" on Justia Law

After President Donald J. Trump began his second term, he issued two executive orders requiring federal agencies to end “diversity, equity, and inclusion” (DEI) programs in their grant and contracting processes. These directives included provisions for agencies to terminate DEI-related offices, positions, and funding (“Termination Provision”); to require federal grantees and contractors to certify compliance with anti-discrimination laws and the absence of DEI programs that violate those laws (“Certification Provision”); and to prepare a report on steps to deter illegal DEI programs (“Enforcement Threat Provision”). The plaintiffs—a city government and two organizations involved in higher education and academic advocacy—alleged that these provisions violated their constitutional rights and sought a preliminary injunction to halt their enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found the plaintiffs likely to succeed on their constitutional claims and issued a nationwide preliminary injunction against most of the challenged provisions, except for the preparation of the enforcement report. The defendants appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted a stay of the injunction pending appeal. The plaintiffs later sought to have the injunction vacated so they could amend their complaint, but the district court denied this request.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Enforcement Threat Provision because their alleged injuries were too speculative and intertwined with intra-governmental processes. However, the court found the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Termination and Certification Provisions because these provisions resulted in concrete and imminent injuries, such as loss of funding or compelled changes in organizational activities.On the merits, the Fourth Circuit concluded the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their facial constitutional challenges. The court ruled that the Termination Provision was not unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment, and that the Certification Provision did not violate the First Amendment on its face. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Natl. Assoc. of Diversity Officers in Higher Edu. v. Trump" on Justia Law

Several organizations and individuals petitioned to prevent the Idaho State Tax Commission from implementing a newly enacted parental choice tax credit. This tax credit, established in 2025, provides refundable credits to parents, guardians, and foster parents for certain private educational expenses, including private school tuition and related services, for dependent students not enrolled in public schools. The law caps total annual credits and includes prioritization based on income and previous participation. The petitioners, including advocacy groups, a school district, and parents, argued that the statute creates a separate, non-public education system funded by public resources, allegedly violating the Idaho Constitution’s mandate for a single, general, uniform, and thorough system of public schools. They also claimed the statute failed the “public purpose doctrine,” asserting it primarily benefits private rather than public interests.Before the Idaho Supreme Court, the petitioners sought a writ of prohibition, which would prevent the Tax Commission from carrying out the law. The respondents, including the State and the Idaho Legislature, contested the petitioners’ standing and the merits of the constitutional claims. The Supreme Court determined that the petitioners lacked traditional standing but, given the urgency and importance of the constitutional question and the absence of another suitable challenger, relaxed standing requirements to address the merits.The Supreme Court of Idaho denied the petition. It held that Article IX, section 1 of the Idaho Constitution does not restrict the legislature from enacting educational measures beyond the required public school system, so long as the public system remains intact and constitutionally sufficient. The Court also found that the tax credit serves a legitimate public purpose—supporting parental choice in education—even if private entities benefit. The petition was dismissed, and the Tax Commission was awarded attorney fees and costs. View "Committee to Protect and Preserve v. State" on Justia Law

Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research, a nonprofit organization, filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding and sought to unseal Department of Justice applications for non-disclosure orders related to a 2017 grand jury subpoena for Google account records. At the time of the subpoena, Jason Foster, Empower’s founder, was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, investigating alleged misconduct at the Department. Google notified Foster in 2023 that a subpoena and non-disclosure order had been issued and extended multiple times. Empower argued that the applications should be unsealed, claiming they were judicial records subject to public access under common law and the First Amendment, and that grand jury secrecy had been waived due to public disclosures.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia permitted Empower to intervene but granted only partial unsealing. It held that the applications were ancillary grand jury records protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), limiting unsealing to jurisdictional and legal standard sections. The court found no waiver of secrecy, as disclosures were not sufficiently public to meet the threshold established by precedent. Most of the documents remained sealed, and Empower appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the applications were covered by Rule 6(e)(6), which displaces any common law or First Amendment right of access, and that grand jury secrecy had not been waived by the disclosures identified by Empower. The court also declined to review new evidence (the December 2024 OIG report) not presented to the district court but remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend its motion and supplement the record with the OIG report. View "In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)" on Justia Law

A completed driver reexamination request was submitted to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) by a confidential reporter, prompting the DMV to initiate a review of Richard Louis Brown’s driving qualifications. Brown was notified that he must submit a medical evaluation. His physician, a new provider to Brown, recommended a driving test but did not advise against driving. Following a reexamination, Brown failed a driving test, and his license was suspended. A second hearing officer later reinstated his license, finding no medical basis for the initial suspension and stating that Brown should not have been required to take the tests.Brown filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking disclosure of the reporter’s identity and criminal sanctions against the reporter for alleged false information. The DMV opposed, explaining the confidentiality policy for reporters is intended to promote road safety and prevent retaliatory actions. The trial court denied the petition, applying a public interest balancing test and finding that the interest in maintaining reporter confidentiality outweighed the interest in disclosure. Judgment was entered against Brown, who then appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that due process was not violated by the DMV’s nondisclosure of the reporter’s identity. The court found that the risk of erroneous deprivation was low because the suspension was based on Brown’s failed driving test, not the reporter’s complaint, and Brown received notice and two hearings. The court concluded that neither federal nor California constitutional due process required disclosure of the reporter’s identity under the circumstances and affirmed the superior court’s judgment denying Brown’s petition. View "Brown v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

A group of individuals traveling through Kansas were stopped by Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) troopers while driving on interstate highways, primarily I-70. In each instance, the drivers and passengers were from out of state, often driving to or from Colorado, and were stopped for alleged traffic violations. After the initial traffic stop was concluded, troopers used a tactic known as the “Kansas Two-Step”—they would briefly disengage, then reinitiate conversation in an attempt to gain consent for further questioning or searches. These stops often led to extended detentions and searches, but no contraband was discovered. The troopers testified that they considered the drivers’ out-of-state status, travel to or from Colorado, and other factors in developing reasonable suspicion.The individuals sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and their constitutional right to travel. Some plaintiffs also brought damages claims, resulting in jury verdicts in their favor. For their claims for injunctive relief, the district court conducted a bench trial and found that KHP had a pattern and practice of targeting out-of-state drivers and using the Two-Step in a manner violating the Fourth Amendment. The court granted a permanent injunction, requiring changes in KHP’s training, documentation, consent procedures, and supervision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing for injunctive relief and whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing because there was a substantial risk they would be stopped again and that KHP had a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. However, the Tenth Circuit found that the injunction was overly broad regarding the use of a driver’s state of origin and the Two-Step tactic. The court affirmed the injunction in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shaw v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2005, an individual was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child and placed on Parole Supervision for Life (PSL) in New Jersey. The State Parole Board imposed two special conditions: a ban on accessing social media and a ban on viewing or possessing pornography. In 2018, the individual was arrested on a parole warrant for allegedly violating both conditions. After a hearing, the Parole Board found violations, revoked PSL, and ordered twelve months of incarceration. The individual challenged the constitutionality of the conditions, arguing they violated First Amendment rights. While an appeal was pending, the Parole Board vacated the revocation in February 2020 and later discharged the conditions. On June 1, 2020, the Board issued a decision stating there was no clear and convincing evidence of violations.The complainant and spouse then filed suit under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA) and the Tort Claims Act (TCA) against the State and others, alleging substantive due process violations, gross negligence, deliberate indifference, and false arrest/imprisonment. The trial court dismissed all claims as time-barred, holding that the statute of limitations began to run at various points before June 2020. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the claims accrued earlier and that even under the favorable-termination rule from Heck v. Humphrey, the relevant accrual event was the Board's February 2020 vacatur of the revocation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the favorable-termination rule from Heck v. Humphrey applies to claims under the CRA and the TCA, meaning that civil rights claims that necessarily challenge the validity of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding do not accrue until that proceeding is terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. The Court determined that substantive due process and related claims accrued on June 1, 2020, making them timely, but that any false arrest/imprisonment claim accrued earlier and was time-barred. The Court reversed the dismissal of the first three counts and affirmed the dismissal of the false arrest/imprisonment claim. View "C.A.L. v. State of New Jersey" on Justia Law

After the Missouri General Assembly enacted Senate Bill No. 22 (SB 22) in 2025, which made several changes to statutes governing ballot summaries and judicial proceedings, a Missouri resident and taxpayer challenged its constitutionality. SB 22 as introduced focused solely on amending the process for judicial review of ballot summary statements. During the legislative process, SB 22 was amended to include provisions expanding the attorney general’s authority to appeal certain preliminary injunctions, a subject unrelated to ballot summaries, and the bill’s title was changed from “relating to ballot summaries” to “relating to judicial proceedings.” After passage by both legislative chambers and the Governor’s signature, the bill became law.The Circuit Court of Cole County reviewed the case after the plaintiff alleged SB 22 violated the Missouri Constitution’s original purpose, single subject, and clear title requirements, as well as equal protection guarantees. The circuit court found the bill did not violate the procedural constitutional provisions, but it did find that the amendment to section 526.010 (concerning the attorney general’s appellate rights) violated equal protection and was severable from the rest of the bill. The court allowed the remaining portions, primarily those addressing ballot summaries, to stand. The plaintiff appealed, challenging the findings on the procedural requirements, while the State cross-appealed on standing and equal protection.The Supreme Court of Missouri heard the case and held that the plaintiff had taxpayer standing because SB 22’s provisions resulted in a direct expenditure of public funds. Upon de novo review, the Supreme Court found that SB 22 violated the original purpose requirement of article III, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution because the added provision regarding the attorney general’s appellate rights was not germane to the bill’s original purpose. The Court further held that the offending provision could not be severed, and therefore invalidated SB 22 in its entirety, reversing the judgment of the circuit court. View "Nicholson v. State" on Justia Law

Ten nonprofit organizations that received federal grants through the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ “Citizenship and Integration Grant Program” filed suit after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) froze and subsequently terminated their grant funding. The freeze and termination followed an executive order issued by the incoming President in January 2025 directing DHS to pause and review grants that funded services to undocumented immigrants, with the aim of ensuring compliance with law and preventing waste, fraud, or abuse. DHS notified grantees of the freeze in February 2025 and terminated the grants in March 2025, prompting the plaintiffs to seek a preliminary injunction to restore the program and funding.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims were essentially contractual—seeking disbursement of funds based on grant agreements—and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not identified a reviewable “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Additionally, it concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to provide adequate legal authority for their ultra vires and separation-of-powers claims.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the relief sought by the plaintiffs was materially indistinguishable from relief denied in recent Supreme Court cases, Department of Education v. California and National Institutes of Health v. Public Health Association. It concluded that claims seeking to enforce contractual obligations to pay money must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims and that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on their alternative constitutional or statutory claims. The district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction was therefore affirmed. View "Solutions in Hometown Connections v. Noem" on Justia Law