Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A group called Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts (MNC) submitted a proposed constitutional initiative, CI-132, which would add a section to the Montana Constitution stating that judicial elections shall remain nonpartisan. MNC also submitted a proposed ballot statement: “CI-132 amends the Montana Constitution to require that judicial elections remain nonpartisan.” After the initiative and statement were submitted to the Secretary of State and reviewed by the Legislative Services Division, the Montana Attorney General conducted a legal sufficiency review. The Attorney General found the initiative legally sufficient but rejected MNC’s proposed statement, arguing it did not accurately reflect the current constitutional text and failed to define “nonpartisan.” The Attorney General then issued a revised statement, which MNC challenged as misleading and prejudicial.MNC filed an original proceeding in the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Attorney General’s revised statement violated statutory requirements and asking the Court to certify its own proposed statement. The Attorney General responded, defending his revised statement and criticizing MNC’s version for not reflecting the constitutional status quo and lacking a definition of “nonpartisan.”The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the Attorney General’s revised statement was misleading because it implied CI-132 would change the status quo, when in fact judicial elections in Montana are already nonpartisan by statute. The Court also found that a definition of “nonpartisan” was unnecessary, given voters’ familiarity with the term and the absence of a statutory definition. The Court concluded that MNC’s proposed statement was a true and impartial explanation of the initiative in plain language, meeting statutory requirements. The Court certified MNC’s statement to the Secretary of State and granted the petition for declaratory judgment. View "Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

A group of Maine lobstermen challenged a state rule requiring all federally permitted lobster fishers to install electronic tracking devices on their vessels, which transmit GPS location data whenever the vessels are in the water. This rule was adopted by the Maine Department of Marine Resources (MDMR) to comply with an addendum to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s American Lobster Fishery Management Plan. The addendum aimed to reduce risks to North Atlantic right whales, improve fishery data, and support regulatory enforcement. The tracking devices must remain powered and transmit data at all times, including when vessels are docked or used for personal purposes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, arguing that the MDMR Rule violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as equal protection and state administrative law. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment because the lobster fishery is a closely regulated industry and the rule was not unreasonably invasive. The court noted several concessions by the parties, including that the GPS tracking constituted a search, that the lobster industry is closely regulated, and that the search was administrative in nature.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the lobster industry is a closely regulated industry and that the administrative search exception, as articulated in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), applied. The court found that the MDMR Rule satisfied the Burger test: it served a substantial government interest, warrantless searches were necessary to the regulatory scheme, and the rule provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Thompson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Several landowners in Walton County, Florida, owned beachfront properties that were affected by a county ordinance enacted during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March and April 2020, the county first closed public beaches, then issued a new ordinance that closed all beaches—public and private—making it a criminal offense for anyone, including private owners, to access or use their own beachfront property. The ordinance was enforced by law enforcement officers who entered private property, excluded owners, and threatened arrest for violations. The ordinance remained in effect for about a month, after which it expired and was not renewed.The landowners filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, raising several claims, including a Takings Clause claim under the Fifth Amendment, and seeking both damages and prospective relief. The district court dismissed the claims for prospective relief as moot, finding the ordinance had expired and was unlikely to recur. On the merits, the district court granted summary judgment to the county on all damages claims, holding that the ordinance was not a per se physical taking but rather a use restriction, and that the government’s actions during a public health emergency were entitled to deference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the claims for prospective relief, agreeing that the ordinance’s expiration rendered those claims moot. However, the court reversed the district court’s judgment on the Takings Clause claim, holding that the ordinance constituted a per se physical taking because it barred owners from their property and allowed government officials to physically occupy and control access. The court remanded for a determination of just compensation, holding that no public emergency, including COVID-19, creates an exception to the Takings Clause. View "Alford v. Walton County" on Justia Law

A cannabis cultivation business was licensed to operate in Vermont but became the subject of regulatory action after laboratory testing detected myclobutanil, a prohibited pesticide, in its products. The business had previously entered into a corrective action plan with the regulatory board following similar violations in 2023, agreeing to remediation, penalties, and compliance measures. In 2024, after further detections of myclobutanil in both retail and on-site samples, the regulatory board issued a notice of violation with immediate effect, including a stop-sale order for all of the business’s products, a recall requirement, and a proposed license revocation.The business contested the notice and requested a hearing before the Cannabis Control Board. At the hearing, it raised several arguments, including challenges to the Board’s authority under the Vermont Constitution, claims of bias by the Board chair, and alleged due process violations. The Board chair denied a motion for recusal, and after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, the Board found that the business had violated its corrective action plan and used unauthorized pesticides. The Board dismissed one violation as duplicative but upheld others, ultimately revoking the business’s license. The business appealed to an appellate officer, who affirmed the Board’s decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, applying a standard that precludes reweighing factual findings unless clearly erroneous or affected by legal error. The Court held that the Board acted within its statutory authority in issuing a stop-sale order for all products, that the Board’s interpretation of its regulations was reasonable, and that the business failed to preserve or adequately brief its constitutional and evidentiary arguments. The Court also found no due process violation regarding the impartiality of the Board chair, as the business did not make an evidentiary record to support its claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation of the business’s license. View "In re Holland Cannabis, LLC" on Justia Law

A resident of University Heights, Ohio, who practices Orthodox Judaism, sought to use his home for group prayer sessions due to religious obligations and restrictions on travel during the Sabbath. After inviting neighbors to participate in these gatherings, a neighbor complained to city officials, prompting the city’s law director to send a cease-and-desist letter, warning that using the home as a place of religious assembly violated local zoning laws. The resident then applied for a special use permit to operate a house of worship but withdrew his application before the city’s Planning Commission could reach a decision, stating he did not wish to operate a house of worship as defined by the ordinance. Despite withdrawing, he later filed a federal lawsuit against the city and several officials, alleging violations of federal and state law, including constitutional and statutory claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the city and its officials. The court found that the plaintiff’s claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Ohio Constitution were unripe because there was no final decision by the relevant local authorities regarding the application of the zoning ordinance to his property. The court also rejected his Fourth Amendment and Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act) claims on the merits and declined supplemental jurisdiction over a state public records claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that most of the plaintiff’s claims were unripe because he withdrew his application before any final decision was made by the city’s zoning authorities, and thus there was no concrete dispute for federal review. The court also held that his facial challenges to the ordinance were forfeited and, in any event, failed as a matter of law. The court further concluded that the Fourth Amendment and FACE Act claims failed on the merits and found no abuse of discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. View "Daniel Grand v. City of University Heights, Ohio" on Justia Law

A petitioner sought to file a referendum challenging a specific section of a recently enacted state law concerning student and parental rights in public education. The law included provisions aimed at promoting student safety, preventing discrimination, and ensuring parental notification in certain circumstances. The legislature included an emergency clause in the bill, declaring it necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health, or safety, which made the law effective immediately. When the petitioner submitted the referendum to the Secretary of State, the Secretary refused to process it, citing the emergency clause as rendering the legislation exempt from the referendum process under the state constitution.After the Secretary’s refusal, the petitioner filed an original action in the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to process the referendum and to challenge the validity of the emergency clause. The court granted expedited review due to the time-sensitive nature of referendum signature collection. The petitioner argued that the Secretary had a mandatory duty to process all properly filed referenda, regardless of the presence of an emergency clause, and that the validity of such a clause was a judicial question.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the Secretary of State does not have a mandatory duty to process a referendum on legislation that is, on its face, constitutionally exempt from referendum due to a valid emergency clause. The court further found that the legislature’s declaration of emergency in this case was valid, as the record and legislative history supported the need for immediate action. As a result, the petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "Eyman v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Mark and Jane Thompson, residents of Aiken County and the City of Aiken, paid road maintenance fees levied by both the county and city for several years. After the City of Aiken rescinded its fee in 2021 and agreed to reimburse fees paid after that date, the Thompsons filed suit against various city and county officials and entities. They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinances imposing the fees were invalid, reimbursement of unlawfully collected fees, damages under section 8-21-30 of the South Carolina Code, and relief for alleged violations of their constitutional rights.The case was first heard in the Circuit Court for Aiken County. The Thompsons voluntarily dismissed some claims and parties before and during the hearing. The trial court ultimately dismissed the remaining claims, finding that the South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act (RPA) deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction, that section 12-60-80(C) barred class actions against political subdivisions, that section 8-21-30 did not apply to the road maintenance fees or the actions of the county treasurer, and that sovereign immunity barred the unjust enrichment claim. The constitutional claim was dismissed by stipulation. The Thompsons appealed, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina certified the appeal before the Court of Appeals could rule.The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the road maintenance fees at issue were not “taxes” under the RPA, so the RPA did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the individual or class claims. The catchall provision of section 12-60-80(C) does not bar class actions against political subdivisions unless the claim concerns value-based property taxes. The court affirmed the dismissal of the unjust enrichment, section 8-21-30, and constitutional claims, but reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim, both individually and as a class. View "Thompson v. Killian" on Justia Law

The plaintiff resided at an apartment complex with his son, who was arrested for aggravated armed robbery by the local police department. After the arrest, the police informed the apartment management, which then evicted both the plaintiff and his son based on a lease provision prohibiting criminal conduct. The plaintiff sought information about his son’s arrest from the city and police department under the Texas Public Information Act, but his request was denied after the city consulted the Texas Attorney General and invoked a law-enforcement exception.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the plaintiff filed suit against the city, the police department, the apartment complex, a debt collection agency, and the Texas Attorney General, alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and Texas law. All defendants either appeared, filed answers, or moved to dismiss. The plaintiff moved for default judgment against each defendant, but the district court denied those motions and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. On appeal, the plaintiff only challenged the denial of default judgment, as he did not brief arguments regarding the dismissals and thus forfeited them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the denial of default judgment for abuse of discretion. The court held that default judgment was not warranted because the city, police department, and debt collector had all appeared or answered, and the Attorney General had not been properly served. The court also found that arguments regarding attorney conflict and judicial bias were either forfeited or unsupported. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of default judgment. View "Clark v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a law firm and its principal, challenged a Montana statute enacted in 2021 that prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s vaccination status or possession of an immunity passport. The law applies broadly to businesses, governmental entities, employers, and public accommodations, with certain exceptions for schools, daycare facilities, and healthcare providers. One provision of the law also prohibits requiring individuals to receive vaccines authorized only for emergency use or still undergoing safety trials. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute violated several provisions of the Montana Constitution, including rights to a clean and healthful environment, equal protection, inalienable rights, and the constitutional requirement that a bill’s subject be clearly expressed in its title.The case was first heard in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Richland County. The District Court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed most of their constitutional claims, but allowed the claim regarding the bill’s title and single-subject requirement to proceed. On remand from the Montana Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Netzer Law Office, P.C. v. State, the District Court ultimately held that the main antidiscrimination provision of the law complied with the constitutional clear-title requirement, but that the provision prohibiting mandates for emergency use or trial vaccines did not, and voided that subsection.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ other constitutional claims. The Supreme Court held that the law’s title was sufficiently clear and not misleading as to its main antidiscrimination provision, affirming its validity. However, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s invalidation of the provision regarding emergency use and trial vaccines, holding that this subsection was germane to the bill’s general purpose and did not violate the clear-title or single-subject requirements. Thus, both challenged provisions of the statute were upheld. View "Netzer v. State" on Justia Law

An armed fugitive fleeing law enforcement entered a print shop owned by the plaintiff, forcibly removed him, and barricaded himself inside. After a thirteen-hour standoff, Los Angeles Police Department SWAT officers used dozens of tear gas canisters to subdue the fugitive, causing significant damage to the shop and its contents. The parties agreed that the officers’ actions were authorized, reasonable, and lawful. The plaintiff alleged that the damages, which exceeded $60,000, were caused exclusively by the police.The plaintiff initially sought compensation from the United States Marshals Service, which denied the claim and referred him to the City of Los Angeles. After the City did not respond to his claims or his attorney’s letter, the plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The City moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Takings Clause does not require compensation for property destroyed by police acting reasonably in an emergency. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the City’s initial motion but later granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the destruction was a valid exercise of police power and not a compensable taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the government’s destruction of private property, when necessary and reasonable for public safety, is exempt from the Takings Clause. The court relied on historical understanding and longstanding precedent, concluding that such actions fall outside the scope of the Takings Clause. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. View "PENA V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law