Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, Phoenix Police Sergeant Stefani McMichael-Gombar appealed against her suspension for posting content on Facebook that violated the Phoenix Police Department’s Social Media Policy. She argued that the policy was overbroad and violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or that she reasonably believed she had a First Amendment right to make the post. The Phoenix Civil Service Board upheld the suspension, and McMichael-Gombar sought relief in the superior court. The superior court dismissed her complaint, stating that the Phoenix City Charter neither requires nor authorizes the Board to consider the constitutionality of the City’s policies, and this is only tasked with determining if the allegations against an employee are true and if the level of discipline was appropriate. The court of appeals vacated this ruling, determining that the Board must consider whether the disciplinary action properly regards McMichael-Gombar’s constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the Board does not have the authority to decide whether a city policy is unconstitutional, as this power is not explicitly granted to it by the Phoenix City Charter, the rules governing disciplinary proceedings, or the Peace Officers Bill of Rights. However, the court did agree that McMichael-Gombar was entitled to argue and introduce supporting evidence that she reasonably believed she was acting within her First Amendment rights. The court concluded that McMichael-Gombar did not meet her burden to show that the Board precluded her from doing so. Thus, the court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing McMichael-Gombar’s special action complaint. View "MCMICHAEL-GOMBAR v PHOENIX CIVIL SERVICE" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, the Attorney General for the State of Alaska, Treg R. Taylor, sued the Alaska Legislative Affairs Agency. The dispute arose from a disagreement between the executive and legislative branches over when an appropriations bill passed by the legislature would take effect, with potential implications for funding state government in the subsequent fiscal year. The Attorney General asked the court for a declaration that any expenditure of state funds without an effective appropriation was unlawful, unless the expenditure was necessary to meet constitutional obligations to maintain the health and safety of residents or federal obligations. The superior court dismissed the case, holding that the lawsuit was barred by a provision of the Alaska Constitution (article III, section 16) that prohibits the governor from suing the legislature. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed that decision. The court held that, although the Attorney General brought the suit, it was in substance a suit brought by the Governor "in the name of the State" against the legislature. Therefore, it was barred by the Alaska Constitution. The Supreme Court also remanded the issue of attorney’s fees for further proceedings in the lower court. View "Treg R. Taylor, in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of the State of Alaska v. Alaska Legislative Affairs Agency" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a final rule governing the Title X program, which makes grants to assist in the establishment and operation of family planning projects. The Rule interpreted section 1008 of Title X, which bars funds appropriated under the Title X grant program from being “used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.” States challenged the 2021 Rule’s elimination of a prior HHS rule that required grantees to maintain strict physical and financial separation between Title X programs and abortion-related services they might provide and the Rule’s requirement that Title X projects provide referrals for abortion services when requested by the patient.The Supreme Court has held (“Rust,” 1991) that section 1008 is ambiguous as to program integrity and referrals for abortion and that Chevron deference applies. The Sixth Circuit held Ohio is entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining the government from enforcing the 2021 Rule’s program integrity rules in Ohio in a manner that would affect the allocation of funding in Ohio. While the doctrinal landscape undergirding Rust has shifted significantly since it was decided, Rust, and its application of Chevron, remain binding. The 2021 Rule’s referral requirement is not an impermissible interpretation of section 1008 but the program-integrity requirements do not represent a permissible interpretation. View "State of Ohio v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Petitioner had failed to state a ground for the writ.Petitioner pled guilty to rape and aggravated robbery and was sentenced as a habitual offender. In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner alleged that he was innocent of the offense of rape, that the State maliciously applied the habitual offender statute in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that the Arkansas statute requiring that he serve 100 percent of his sentence was unconstitutional. The circuit court found that the claims were not cognizable in habeas and noted that parole eligibility falls within the domain of the executive branch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. View "White v. Payne" on Justia Law

In this case addressing the General Assembly districting plan adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission in September 2023 the Supreme Court granted motions to dismiss brought by Petitioners, who filed motions for leave to file objections instanter to the plan and denied motions to vacate and for leave to file objections, holding that dismissal was warranted.The Commission adopted a new redistricting plan in September 2023 by a unanimous vote. Petitioners moved for leave to file objections. Respondents, members of the Commission, moved to dismiss the cases and to vacate the court's orders declaring the districting plan adopted by the General Assembly in September 2021 as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the motions to dismiss, denied the motions to vacate as moot, and denied the motions for leave to file objections to the September 2023 plan, holding that now that the Commission has adopted a plan with bipartisan support, the facts before the Court bore no resemblance to the allegations in Petitioners' complaints. View "League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Minnesota Tax Court affirming the assessment of the Commissioner of Revenue assessing tax on an apportioned share of Cities Management, Inc.'s (CMI) income from the sale of the S corporation, holding that the income from the corporation's sale was apportionable business income.CMI, which did business in Minnesota and Wisconsin, and its nonresidential partial owner filed Minnesota tax returns characterizing the sale of CMI's goodwill as income that was not subject to apportionment by the State under Minn. Stat. Ann. 290.17. The Commissioner disagreed and assessed tax on an apportioned share of the corporation's income from the sale. The tax court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CMI's income did not constitute "nonbusiness" income under section 290.17, subd. 6 and may be constitutionally apportioned as business income. View "Cities Management, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

Lawrence Didier appealed an order and judgment denying his discharge from civil commitment. Between 1988 and 2008, Didier was convicted of gross sexual imposition and indecent exposure, and was twice convicted of sexual assault. After a State petition, the district court ordered Didier committed as a sexually dangerous individual in November 2010 under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. Didier petitioned for an annual review hearing under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18 seeking discharge from commitment. Dr. Deirdre D’Orazio, Ph.D., a doctor of clinical and forensic psychology, submitted a report for the North Dakota State Hospital stating her expert opinion was that Didier remained a sexually dangerous individual. The district court held a hearing and subsequently issued an order and judgment denying Didier’s petition for discharge from civil commitment. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that Didier had serious difficulty controlling his behavior based on both his past and present conduct was not clearly erroneous, and was supported by the record. Accordingly, the distric court's order and judgment were affirmed. View "Matter of Didier" on Justia Law

In April 2017 and June 2017, Appellant Diane Zilka filed petitions with the Philadelphia Department of Revenue (the “Department”), seeking refunds for the Philadelphia Tax she paid from 2013 to 2015, and in 2016, respectively. During the relevant tax years, Appellant resided in the City, but worked exclusively in Wilmington, Delaware. Thus, she was subject to four income taxes (and tax rates) during that time: the Philadelphia Tax; the Pennsylvania Income Tax (“PIT”); the Wilmington Earned Income Tax (“Wilmington Tax”); and the Delaware Income Tax (“DIT”). The Commonwealth granted Appellant credit for her DIT liability to completely offset the PIT she paid for the tax years 2013 through 2016; because of the respective tax rates in Pennsylvania versus Delaware, after this offsetting, Appellant paid the remaining 1.93% in DIT. Although the City similarly credited against Appellant’s Philadelphia Tax liability the amount she paid in the Wilmington Tax — specifically, the City credited Appellant 1.25% against her Philadelphia Tax liability of 3.922%, leaving her with a remainder of 2.672% owed to the City — Appellant claimed that the City was required to afford her an additional credit of 1.93% against the Philadelphia Tax, representing the remainder of the DIT she owed after the Commonwealth credited Appellant for her PIT. After the City refused to permit her this credit against her Philadelphia Tax liability, Appellant appealed to the City’s Tax Review Board (the “Board”). The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review as whether, for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis implicated here, state and local taxes had to be considered in the aggregate. The Court concluded state and local taxes did not need be aggregated in conducting a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and that, ultimately, the City’s tax scheme did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court order. View "Zilka v. Tax Review Bd. City of Phila." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the state from enforcing only this additional, preliminary handgun-licensure requirement. The district court originally dismissed that challenge for lack of Article III standing, but we reversed and remanded for a decision on the merits. On remand, the district court again rejected Plaintiffs’ claims, this time holding that Maryland’s handgun licensure law did not violate the Second Amendment. So Plaintiffs appealed once more.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The court explained that the challenged law restricts the ability of law-abiding adult citizens to possess handguns, and the state has not presented a historical analogue that justifies its restriction; indeed, it has seemingly admitted that it couldn’t find one. The court enjoined the enforcement explaining that under the Supreme Court’s new burden-shifting test for these claims, Maryland’s law fails. The court wrote that Maryland has not shown that this regime is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. There might well be a tradition of prohibiting dangerous people from owning firearms. But, under the Second Amendment, mechanism matters. And Maryland has not pointed to any historical laws that operated by preemptively depriving all citizens of firearms to keep them out of dangerous hands. View "Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Wes Moore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit against multiple private entities and government officials, including, as relevant to the instant appeal, the Social Security Commissioner, a Social Security claims representative, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Education (the “Federal Defendants”), asserting a number of claims relating to the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) allegedly improper withholding of his disability benefits.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Chambers’ claims against the Social Security Administration representatives concerning his Social Security benefits and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to its remaining claims against the Federal Defendants. The court explained that while the lack of jurisdiction is a sufficient basis on which to affirm the district court, Plaintiff’s broad challenges to “any of [the court’s] holdings dismissing the federal government defendants” warrant but a brief note. The court found no error in the district court’s dismissal of the Treasury Secretary, given its purely ministerial role in administering the offset for Plaintiff’s outstanding loan, or its dismissal of the Secretary of Education, given Plaintiff’s similar failure to exhaust administrative remedies with that department and failure to advance a colorable constitutional violation. View "Chambers v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law