Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A private company specializing in the disposal of wastewater from oil and gas fracking leased land in an urban area and constructed two saltwater-injection wells. After two earthquakes were recorded near the wells, the State of Ohio determined the company’s activities caused the seismic events and temporarily suspended operations at both wells. One well was later permitted to resume limited operations, but the suspension of the second well remained until 2021. The company had been aware of seismicity risks before acquiring its leasehold and warned investors of possible regulatory shutdowns.After the suspension, the company pursued administrative and judicial challenges, including an appeal to the Ohio Oil and Gas Commission and the Tenth District Court of Appeals, both of which upheld the State’s actions. The company then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, claiming a regulatory taking of its property. The Eleventh District initially denied relief, but following multiple remands from the Supreme Court of Ohio, it ultimately found no total taking but did find a compensable partial regulatory taking under the Penn Central analysis, ordering the State to initiate eminent-domain proceedings.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the suspension order constituted a total or partial regulatory taking. The court held that the company failed to prove it was deprived of all economically beneficial use, rejecting the total taking claim. The court further held that, under a proper balancing of the Penn Central factors, the State’s actions did not amount to a compensable partial taking. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Eleventh District’s denial of the total takings claim, reversed its partial takings finding, and denied the writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C. v. Mertz" on Justia Law

In this case, Montgomery County, Maryland, enacted amendments to its County Code in 2021 and 2022 regulating firearms. The amendments expanded the definition of “place of public assembly,” prohibited the possession of firearms (including “ghost guns”) in or within 100 yards of such places, and removed exceptions for state-issued handgun permit holders. The amendments also imposed new restrictions concerning minors’ access to firearms and regulated ghost guns and their components. The petitioners, two businesses and eight individuals, claimed these provisions were preempted by state law, not a valid local law, and amounted to an unconstitutional taking.After removal to federal court and a partial remand, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled in favor of the challengers, finding the county’s provisions preempted by state law, not a local law, and an unconstitutional taking, and issued declaratory and injunctive relief. The Appellate Court of Maryland remanded for further analysis of preemption and takings issues, particularly concerning the expansion of “place of public assembly.”The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case, holding that new issues may only be properly added by amending the complaint, not through summary judgment motions. The Court determined that Criminal Law § 4-209(b)(1) authorizes charter counties to regulate firearms in limited contexts (with respect to minors, law enforcement, and within 100 yards of certain public places), and that this authority was not abrogated by other state preemption statutes. The Court found Montgomery County’s regulation valid for parks, places of worship, schools, libraries, courthouses, legislative assemblies, recreational and multipurpose exhibition facilities, and polling places, but invalid for hospitals, health centers, long-term care, childcare facilities, government buildings as broadly defined, and generalized gatherings. The Court also clarified the scope of local regulation regarding minors and found no unconstitutional taking occurred. The judgment of the Appellate Court was vacated and remanded with instructions for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Engage Armament v. Montgomery Cnty." on Justia Law

A Montana ballot initiative, known as BI-9, sought to amend the state constitution by creating a new section that would define and limit the powers of “artificial persons,” such as corporations and other entities, by prohibiting them from spending money or anything of value to influence electoral outcomes. The initiative arose after a previous attempt (BI-4) by the same proponents was rejected for violating the state’s constitutional separate-vote requirement. The Montana Attorney General again found BI-9 legally insufficient, determining that it combined multiple unrelated constitutional changes in a single proposal and therefore violated Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution.After the Attorney General’s finding, the proponents petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Montana for declaratory judgment, challenging the Attorney General’s assessment. The Attorney General argued that BI-9 not only added new material to the constitution but also limited the powers of artificial persons, affected a wide range of entities beyond corporations, and implicitly amended other constitutional provisions, all of which, in his view, required separate votes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the initiative and disagreed with the Attorney General’s conclusions. The Court held that BI-9 constituted a single constitutional amendment under Article XIV, Section 11, because the proposal’s various components were closely related and did not amount to “logrolling” or voter deception. The Court distinguished the current proposal from prior rejected initiatives and found that the specification of affected entities and the consequences of political spending restrictions did not require separate votes. The Court reversed the Attorney General’s rejection of BI-9 and ordered him to prepare and forward a ballot statement to the Secretary of State. View "Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

An administrative law judge (ALJ) at the International Trade Commission (ITC) issued a protective order during a dispute between Qualcomm and Apple, requiring recipients of confidential business information, including expert witness Gregory Sidak, to return or destroy that information after the case ended. However, the ALJ who issued the order had been appointed solely by the ITC chairman, not by the full commission as required by the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The ITC later ratified the ALJ’s appointments but did not ratify past actions taken by those ALJs. Years after the underlying case ended, the ITC began investigating Sidak for allegedly violating the protective order’s requirements. Sidak participated in the investigation by exchanging letters and affidavits, but eventually sued, arguing that the protective order was void because it was issued by an unconstitutionally appointed ALJ and never ratified, and sought to enjoin the ITC from enforcing it against him.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found in Sidak’s favor, holding that the protective order could not lawfully be used as the basis for the investigation or for imposing sanctions on him. It permanently enjoined the ITC from taking further action against Sidak based on the challenged order. The ITC appealed the district court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Sidak had standing, that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, and that Sidak had a right of action under the Constitution. The court further held that Sidak’s challenge was both timely and ripe, rejecting the ITC’s arguments that the claim was either too early or too late. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting permanent injunctive relief. View "J. Sidak v. United States International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

John Mercer was charged with two counts of driving while intoxicated (DWI) in Garland County, Arkansas, in 2017. He pled no contest to both charges in 2018. The Garland County District Court imposed fines, required alcohol education, and placed Mercer on at least six months of probation, which included a $25 monthly probation fee and conditions such as random drug and alcohol testing. Mercer made several probation-fee payments as a result. Mercer later filed a lawsuit, alleging that probation and associated fees in DWI cases are not authorized under Arkansas law and therefore constitute an illegal exaction. He also asserted federal and state due-process claims, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and repayment of the fees collected.The Garland County District Court moved to dismiss Mercer’s complaint in the Garland County Circuit Court, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity under the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, rejecting the sovereign immunity defense. After further proceedings and amended complaints, the district court again sought dismissal, but the circuit court denied the motion. The district court then filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, challenging the denial of sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that Mercer’s illegal-exaction claim may proceed because the Arkansas Constitution expressly authorizes such claims, overriding sovereign immunity. The court also held that Mercer’s federal due-process claim survives dismissal, as state sovereign immunity cannot categorically bar federal causes of action in state courts of general jurisdiction. However, the court ruled that Mercer’s Arkansas Civil Rights Act claim is barred by sovereign immunity, as there is no constitutional authorization for such suits against the state. The court affirmed the circuit court’s order in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "GARLAND COUNTY DISTRICT COURT v. MERCER" on Justia Law

Scott Martin operated a business in Harris County, Texas, gathering contact information of criminal defendants from public court records and selling it to private attorneys. His business relied primarily on access to bail bond orders, which contained defendants’ addresses and other contact details. In June 2023, the then-presiding judge of the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law issued an administrative order instructing the district clerk to keep the contents of certain bond orders in misdemeanor cases confidential, making only the title, filing date, and page enumeration available to the public. This significantly reduced the information Martin could access, leading to substantial business losses. Martin unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the order and then filed suit, asserting constitutional and statutory claims and seeking injunctive relief and damages.The case was heard by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The defendants, including the district clerk and judges, moved to dismiss, arguing the order did not violate any constitutional right and that they were immune from suit. The district court, after a hearing, granted the motion to dismiss. The court determined that under Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., Martin’s First Amendment claim failed because the order merely restricted access to government information, not speech. It also found no plausible claim under the Sixth Amendment or Texas law, and concluded Martin had no property interest in the information.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that restricting access to the information in government possession does not violate the First Amendment, and Martin’s other constitutional and state law arguments lacked merit. The court also rejected Martin’s ultra vires claim, finding the judge acted within her statutory authority. Thus, the dismissal was affirmed. View "Martin v. Burgess" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin statute enacted in 2023 required that electronic nicotine delivery systems (such as vapes and e-cigarettes) could only be sold in the state if they had received premarket authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), were pending FDA review as of specified dates, or did not contain nicotine. The law also imposed financial penalties and authorized private lawsuits against violators. Several businesses and consumers involved in the manufacture, distribution, retail, and use of these products challenged the statute, arguing that federal law granting the FDA authority over tobacco products preempted the Wisconsin statute. They also asserted that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause, and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent enforcement.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court found that the Wisconsin law was not preempted by federal statutes, specifically the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA). The court concluded that Congress had not intended to preempt states from imposing additional or more stringent requirements on the sale of tobacco products, and that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits or that the balance of equities favored an injunction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the text and structure of the relevant federal statutes, including the TCA’s preservation and savings clauses, demonstrated that Congress did not preempt state authority to regulate, or even prohibit, the sale of tobacco products. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their preemption claim. View "Wisconsinites for Alternatives to Smoking v. Casey" on Justia Law

Eighteen transgender women incarcerated in federal women’s prisons challenged a federal executive order that directed the Attorney General to ensure that “males”—defined by biological sex assigned at conception—are not detained in women’s facilities. These plaintiffs were a small group of transgender women whom the Bureau of Prisons had, after individualized assessments, placed in women’s facilities. Each had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, received long-term hormone therapy, and some had undergone gender-affirming surgeries. The plaintiffs alleged that transferring them to men’s prisons would expose them to grave risks of violence, abuse, and psychological harm.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the plaintiffs preliminary injunctive relief, blocking their transfers and requiring the government to maintain their housing in women’s facilities. The district court found that transgender women are at a significantly higher risk of harm in men’s facilities and that the government was aware of these risks. The court also rejected government arguments that judicial review was barred or that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, holding instead that no effective administrative remedy was available.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that judicial review of constitutional claims was not barred by statute and that the government had not shown exhaustion of available administrative remedies. However, the court vacated the preliminary injunctions, finding that the district court’s broad, categorical reasoning was not defended by the plaintiffs on appeal, who instead advanced more individualized grounds. The record did not contain the necessary factual findings as to each plaintiff’s specific vulnerabilities. The case was remanded for further proceedings, and the expired injunctions were dismissed as moot. View "Doe v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A sign operator installed two advertising signs near Interstate 85 in Atlanta in 1993, after obtaining permits under the city’s 1982 sign code. These permits were renewed several times. In 2015, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the city amended its sign code, removing several content-based provisions but allowing lawful, nonconforming signs to remain. When the sign operator later sought to upgrade the signs, the city approved the changes, but private parties challenged the decision. The Superior Court of Fulton County found that the original permits were unlawful under the 1982 code, making the signs illegal. The city then ordered removal of the signs and issued citations when the order was not followed.The sign operator, joined by the property owner and its president, sued the City of Atlanta in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, seeking a declaration that the 1982 sign code was unconstitutional under the First Amendment and seeking to enjoin its enforcement. The district court initially dismissed some claims for lack of jurisdiction, then reconsidered and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the code was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, which the city had not attempted to satisfy.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs only had standing to challenge the provision of the 1982 code that applied to their signs—section 16-28.019(7)—rather than the entire code. The court further held that this provision, which distinguished between on-premises and off-premises signs, was content-neutral under the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and injunction and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the provision meets the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard. View "Anderson v. City of Atlanta, Georgia" on Justia Law

Two individuals who are transgender women, one living in Montana and the other in Alaska, challenged recent Montana laws and administrative policies that restrict the ability to amend the sex designation on birth certificates and driver's licenses. These state actions, enacted in response to legislative changes, allow amendments to these documents only in limited circumstances such as clerical errors, not to reflect a person’s gender identity. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions forced them to carry identification that does not match their gender identity, resulting in concrete harms such as disclosure of their transgender status during routine activities and difficulties in verifying their identity.The case was filed in the First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of equal protection, right to privacy, and prohibition against compelled speech under the Montana Constitution, as well as violations of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court found that the plaintiffs had standing, demonstrated concrete and particularized injuries, and satisfied all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the policies likely violated Montana’s Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against transgender individuals on the basis of sex, and that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm without relief. The District Court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the challenged state policies as applied to amending birth certificates and driver’s licenses.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing and whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order. It held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the state policies likely constitute unconstitutional sex discrimination under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution, warranting preliminary injunctive relief. View "Kalarchik v. State" on Justia Law