Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the denial of Defendant’s special motion to strike, holding that the evidence produced by Plaintiff was properly considered by the trial court in ruling on a pretrial anti-SLAPP motion in determining Plaintiff’s probability of success.Plaintiff, Sweetwater Union High School District, sued to void contracts it approved with Defendants to manage certain projects after a criminal bribery investigation into the awarding of the contracts resulted in a number of guilty or no contest pleas. Plaintiff also sought to secure disgorgement of funds already paid. Defendants brought a special motion to strike under the Anti-SLAPP Statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 425.16. Plaintiff’s response relied on evidence of the various guilty and no contest pleas. The court overruled Defendants’ evidentiary objects and denied their special motion to strike. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, at the second stage of an anti-SLAPP hearing, the court may consider affidavits, declarations, and their equivalents if its reasonably possible the proffered evidence set out in those statements will be admissible at trial. View "Sweetwater Union High School District v. Gilbane Building Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three Muslim residents of California, filed a putative class action against Government Defendants and Agent Defendants, alleging that the FBI paid a confidential informant to conduct a covert surveillance program that gathered information about Muslims based solely on their religious identity. Plaintiffs argued that the investigation involved unlawful searches and anti-Muslim discrimination, in violation of eleven constitutional and statutory causes of action.The Ninth Circuit held that some of the claims dismissed on state secrets grounds should not have been dismissed outright. Rather, the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence necessary for a determination of whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful following the secrecy protective procedure in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The panel held that the Fourth Amendment injunctive relief claim against the official-capacity defendants should not have been dismissed, because expungement relief was available under the Constitution to remedy the alleged constitutional violations. The panel declined to address whether plaintiffs' Bivens claim remained available after the Supreme Court's decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), and thus remanded for the district court to determine whether a Bivens remedy was appropriate for any Fourth Amendment claim against the Agent Defendants. The panel addressed defendants' remaining claims supporting the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims and held that some of plaintiffs' allegations stated a claim while others did not. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Fazaga v. FBI" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Jennifer Henry’s petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline’s authority to discipline her, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 1.428, the statute giving the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline its purported jurisdiction over Jennifer Henry as a hearing master, is constitutional.Henry presided over a hearing in the juvenile court, wherein she acted inappropriately. The Commission later filed a formal statement of charges for Henry’s conduct. Henry filed this petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the Commission’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that section 1.428 is constitutional and that Henry falls under the purview of the Commission’s jurisdiction. View "Henry v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline" on Justia Law

Hornseth worked at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, which houses nuclear-powered vessels; every position requires a security clearance. Hornseth attended rehabilitation for alcoholism and provided the Navy with documents regarding his treatment. From Hornseth’s rehabilitation discharge letter, the Navy learned that Hornseth had used marijuana during his employment. The Commander notified Hornseth that his security clearance was suspended and that the Navy proposed to indefinitely suspend his employment. Hornseth filed a reply. Combs, the deciding official, engaged in communications with the Shipyard’s Human Resources staff, primarily concerning positions that would not require a security clearance. The HR department drafted a “Decision on Proposed Indefinite Suspension” and forwarded it to Combs. Combs signed the decision. The Merit Systems and Protection Board ALJ affirmed, rejecting due process arguments that the reply process was an empty formality because Combs did not have the ability to take or recommend alternative agency action and Combs and the HR staff engaged in an improper ex parte communication. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Homseth received the procedural protections of 5 U.S.C. 7513(b); he received notice, had an opportunity to respond and to be represented, and was provided with a written decision with reasons. Although Hornseth had not seen the communication to Combs before the discovery process, the information it contained was already known to Hornseth or cumulative. View "Hornseth v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

MTA filed suit against Yum Yum in eminent domain to take one of Yum Yum's donut shops that was in the path of a proposed rail line. The trial court determined that Yum Yum was not entitled to compensation for goodwill under Code of Civil Procedure section 1263.510, because Yum Yum unreasonably refused to relocate the shop to one of three sites MTA proposed at the entitlement trial.Based on section 1263.510's legislative history, accompanying Law Review Commission Comments, case law, and the general principles governing mitigation of damages, the Court of Appeal held that a condemnee is entitled to compensation for lost goodwill if any portion of that loss is unavoidable. The court held that a condemnee need only prove some or any unavoidable loss of goodwill to satisfy the condemnee's burden to demonstrate entitlement to compensation for goodwill under section 1263.510. In this case, the court held that the trial court erred in finding that Yum Yum's failure to mitigate some of its loss of goodwill precluded compensation for any loss of goodwill. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a jury trial on the value of the lost goodwill. View "Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Yum Yum Donut Shops" on Justia Law

Taxpayers Neil Feinberg, Andrea Feinberg, and Kellie McDonald were shareholders in Total Health Concepts, LLC (THC), a Colorado company allegedly engaged in selling medical marijuana. After the Taxpayers claimed THC’s income and losses on their tax returns, the IRS conducted an audit and disallowed certain deductions under 26 U.S.C. 280E, which prohibited deductions for businesses engaged in unlawful trafficking of controlled substances. The IRS then recalculated the Taxpayers’ tax liability and issued a notice of deficiency for the unpaid balance. The Taxpayers challenged that determination in tax court, which affirmed on the basis that the Taxpayers had failed to substantiate the business expenses. Both parties agreed the tax court erred by injecting a substantiation issue into this case not raised in the notice of deficiency, and then placed the burden for refuting that claim on the Taxpayers. But the Commissioner argued the Tenth Circuit should affirm on the alternative ground that the Taxpayers did not meet their burden of proving the IRS’s determination that THC was unlawfully trafficking in a controlled substance was erroneous. The Taxpayers disagreed and contended placing the burden on them would violate their Fifth Amendment privilege. Because the Tenth Circuit concluded allocation of the burden of proof did not constitute “compulsion” under the Fifth Amendment, and because the Taxpayers made no attempt to meet their evidentiary burden, the Court affirmed the tax court on the alternative ground that section 280E prohibited the deductions. View "Feinberg v. CIR" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging causes of action for violations of the Labor Code and the Industrial Welfare Commission's (IWC) wage orders based on the City's alleged failure to pay workers employed as pages and recreation leader specialists wages at or above the statewide minimum wage. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court's dismissal of their action after it sustained without leave to amend the City's demurrer.The Court of Appeal held that legislation setting a statewide minimum wage, generally applicable to both private and public employees, addresses the state's interest in protecting the health and welfare of workers by ensuring they can afford the necessities of life for themselves and their families. Therefore, the Legislature may constitutionally exercise authority over minimum wages, despite the constitutional reservation of authority in charter cities to legislate as to their municipal affairs. In this case, the court held that the trial court erred in sustaining the City's demurrer where the state minimum wage law was designed to address a statewide concern for the health and welfare of workers and was reasonably related to its purpose. Furthermore, the application of the minimum wage requirement did not unconstitutionally impair the memorandum of understanding between plaintiffs and the City. View "Marquez v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this class action, holding that the surcharge imposed by Maricopa County on car rental agencies to fund a stadium and other sports and tourism-related ventures violated neither the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution nor the anti-diversion provision of the Arizona Constitution.Plaintiff, which rented vehicles in Maricopa County and paid the car rental surcharges, sued the Arizona Department of Revenue seeking refunds and injunctive relief for all similarly situated car rental companies. The tax court certified the class and granted summary judgment for Plaintiff, concluding that the surcharge did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause but did violate the anti-diversion provision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the surcharge did not violate the anti-diversion provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the Arizona Constitution’s anti-diversion clause, which requires that revenues derived from taxes relating to the operation of motor vehicles must be allocated for public highways, does not apply to a tax relating to the operation of motor vehicles. View "Saban Rent-a-Car LLC v. Arizona Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (Board) and its members and executive director alleging that the Board had exceeded its power under the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) during the 2019 fiscal plan and territory budget development and certification processes, holding that the complaint was properly dismissed.The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim to relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the federal courts lacked jurisdiction the portion of the complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; (2) the district court properly found that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims challenging the Board’s budget certification decisions; and (3) the district court properly dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief the claims that the Board exceeded its authority under PROMESA. View "Mendez-Nunez v. Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

Allen Lenertz appealed the dismissal of his claim for inverse condemnation against the City of Minot and awarding the City costs and disbursements. Between 2013 and 2014 the City installed a paved street and upgraded the storm water system adjacent to Lenertz's commercial property in southwest Minot. Lenertz's property subsequently suffered three flooding events. In 2016 Lenertz sued the City for inverse condemnation, alleging the City's actions in constructing the street and storm sewer system caused past and future flooding of his property and resulted in a total taking of his property. The City denied a taking occurred and raised affirmative defenses. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court: (1) did not err in ruling Lenertz established only a partial taking of his property; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying his proposed expert witness's testimony; and (3) did not err in granting the City judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 50. The court did abuse its discretion, however, in awarding the City costs and disbursements. View "Lenertz v. City of Minot N.D." on Justia Law