Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the city's red light ordinance, which permitted the installation and operation of cameras to enforce traffic-control-device violations at certain intersections. The district court dismissed the case based on lack of Article III standing.Although the Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing to bring their damages claims, their constitutional claims must nonetheless be dismissed because they failed to sufficiently allege that they suffered a violation of their constitutional rights.The court held that the dismissal of plaintiffs' federal claims was warranted because the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. In this case, plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance imposed a criminal penalty without providing constitutionally sufficient procedural safeguards. However, the ordinance imposed a civil penalty, and thus the procedures prescribed by the ordinance were constitutionally sufficient. Because the court held that plaintiffs have not stated any federal claims, it declined to consider the state law claims. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions. View "Worthy v. Phenix City" on Justia Law

In late 2016, then-Pennsylvania Attorney General Bruce Beemer petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, pursuant to the Investigating Grand Jury Act, for an order to convene a multicounty investigating grand jury having statewide jurisdiction to investigate organized crime or public corruption or both. This appeal concerned a motion for return of property filed by several Lackawanna County governmental entities (“County”) relative to materials seized by the Office of Attorney General (“OAG”). The OAG seized the County’s property pursuant to search warrants issued by the Supervising Judge of the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. After the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury was empaneled and an investigation was ongoing, an OAG Special Agent and a Pennsylvania State Trooper applied to Judge Sarcione for four warrants to search and seize certain property belonging to the County. Approximately a year later, the County moved for return of property. Notably, the County filed its motion in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, which comprised the 45th Judicial District. In its motion, the County advanced a threefold argument to support its claim of entitlement to lawful possession of the seized materials: (1) the underlying search warrants were unconstitutionally general and overbroad; (2) the seizing of judicial and other governmental officials’ property infringed upon various privacy interests and legal privileges; and (3) the search warrants were invalid under Pa.R.Crim.P. 200. Without confirming or denying the existence of a grand jury investigation due to secrecy concerns, the OAG nevertheless challenged the lower court’s jurisdiction to hear the motion for return. The Supreme Court determined that the judge overseeing the Grand Jury, was empowered to issue search warrants in any judicial district, provided that the warrants related to an investigation of the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. Because there was no dispute the search and seizure warrants for the County’s property related to such an investigation, the supervising judge was authorized to issue them. Further, because the County’s motion for return of property challenged the validity of those search warrants, it related to the work of the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury and had to be presented to the Supervising Judge, who had to adjudicate the motion or conclude it did not raise grand jury secrecy concerns. As the lower court reached the opposite conclusions, the Supreme Court vacated its order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Return of Seized Property of Lackawanna Cty" on Justia Law

In 2005 Paramount leased a parcel of highway-adjacent property in Bellwood, Illinois, planning to erect a billboard. Paramount never applied for a local permit. When Bellwood enacted a ban on new billboard permits in 2009, Paramount lost the opportunity to build its sign. Paramount later sought to take advantage of an exception to the ban for village-owned property, offering to lease a different parcel of highway-adjacent property directly from Bellwood. Bellwood accepted an offer from Image, one of Paramount’s competitors. Paramount sued Bellwood and Image, alleging First Amendment, equal-protection, due-process, Sherman Act, and state-law violations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Paramount lost its lease while the suit was pending, which mooted its claim for injunctive relief from the sign ban. The claim for damages was time-barred, except for an alleged equal-protection violation. That claim failed because Paramount was not similarly situated to Image; Paramount offered Bellwood $1,140,000 in increasing installments over 40 years while Image offered a lump sum of $800,000. Bellwood and Image are immune from Paramount’s antitrust claims. The court did not consider whether a market-participant exception to that immunity exists because Paramount failed to support its antitrust claims. View "Paramount Media Group, Inc. v. Village of Bellwood" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Navajo Nation and several of its individual members sued San Juan County, Utah alleging that the election districts for both the school board and the county commission violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965. The district court denied the county’s motion to dismiss, found that the election districts violated the Equal Protection Clause, and awarded summary judgment to the Navajo Nation. It later rejected the county’s proposed remedial redistricting plan because it concluded the redrawn districts again violated the Equal Protection Clause. The district court then appointed a special master to develop a proposed remedial redistricting plan, directed the county to adopt that remedial plan, and ordered the county to hold special elections based on that plan in November 2018. On appeal, the county challenged each of the district court’s decisions. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Navajo Nation v. San Juan County" on Justia Law

American, a Cincinnati-based title insurance company, is owned by attorneys Yonas and Rink. The Indiana Department of Insurance randomly audited American and found hundreds of code violations, none of which American denies. Examiners recommended a fine of $70,082 plus $42,202 in consumer reimbursements after deviating upward from the guidelines recommendation. After negotiation, the examiners refused to adjust the fines and added a new sanction: the owners would lose their licenses to do business in Indiana. The Department’s attorney informed American that it could seek administrative review but could face the maximum fine of $9.5 million. American agreed to the recommended sanctions, “voluntarily and freely waive[d] the right to judicial review,” and paid the fees. Yonas and Rink gave up their licenses. Months later, American sued the Department’s Commissioner, Robertson, alleging that the Department imposed higher penalties because American is based in Ohio, not Indiana. American’s equal-protection case rested on expert testimony based on a statistical analysis that found that when the Department audits out-of-state companies, it tends to deviate more from its guidelines than when it audits in-state companies; a comment by a Department examiner made during a recorded phone call; and that Robertson was unable to say definitively during his deposition that no one in his department was motivated by in-state bias. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Robertson without reaching the equal protection claim. American offered no meaningful reason to ignore the agreed order. View "American Homeland Title Agency, Inc. v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Schaumburg’s 2016 ordinance requires commercial buildings to send fire‐alarm signals directly to the local 911 dispatch center, NWCDS, which has an exclusive arrangement with Tyco. To send signals to NWCDS, local buildings must use Tyco equipment. Schaumburg’s notice of the ordinance referred to connection through Tyco and stated that accounts would be charged $81 per month to rent Tyco’s radio transmitters and for the monitoring service. Tyco pays NWCDS an administrative fee of $23 per month for each account it connects to the NWCDS equipment. Tyco’s competitors filed suit charging violations of constitutional, antitrust, and state tort law. The district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Contracts Clause claim against Schaumburg. The complaint alleges a potentially significant impairment, the early cancellation of the competitors’ contracts, and Schaumburg’s self‐interest, $300,000 it stands to gain. The court otherwise affirmed, noting that entities not alleged to have taken legislative action cannot be liable under the Contracts Clause. WIth respect to constitutional claims, the court noted the government’s important interest in fire safety. Rejecting antitrust claims, the court stated that the complaint did not allege a prohibited agreement, as opposed to an independent, legislative decision. View "Alarm Detection Systems, Inc. v. Village of Schaumburg" on Justia Law

Four Illinois Villages passed ordinances that require commercial buildings to send fire-alarm signals directly to the local 911 dispatch center through one alarm-system provider, Tyco, which services the area pursuant to an exclusive agreement with the dispatch center. An alarm-system competitor, ADS, sued, citing the Illinois Fire Protection District Act, the Sherman Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Sherman Act claims fail because they are premised on the unilateral actions of the Villages, which ADS did not sue. The court noted that ADS can compete for the contract now held by Tyco. ADS’s substantive due process claim asserted that the district acted arbitrarily and irrationally by going with an exclusive provider rather than entertaining ADS’s efforts at alternative, methods. The ordinances effectively require the district to work with an exclusive provider and there was thus a rational basis to choose an exclusive provider. View "Alarm Detection Systems, Inc. v. Orland Fire Protection District" on Justia Law

Former federal prisoner, plaintiff-appellant Billy May, filed suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), claiming he was denied his due process rights as a prisoner when he was quarantined without a hearing during a scabies infestation at the prison. The magistrate judge granted camp administrator Juan Segovia summary judgment on two issues: (1) the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applied to May; and (2) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the availability of administrative remedies. May appealed to contest both conclusions. Segovia opposed May’s appeal, raising two alternative grounds for affirmance that Segovia raised before the magistrate judge, but the judge did not reach. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge’s conclusions that the PLRA exhaustion requirement applied to May and that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether administrative remedies were available to him. Because the Court affirmed the judgment below, it did not reach Segovia’s alternative arguments. View "May v. Segovia" on Justia Law

The question presented in this case was whether the building inspection fees assessed by defendant, the city of Troy (the City), were “intended to bear a reasonable relation to the cost” of acts and services provided by the City’s Building Inspection Department (Building Department) under the Construction Code Act (CCA). The Michigan Supreme Court held the City’s use of the revenue generated by those fees to pay the Building Department’s budgetary shortfalls in previous years violated MCL 125.1522(1). “While fees imposed to satisfy the alleged historical deficit may arguably be for ‘the operation of the enforcing agency or the construction board of appeals,’ this does not mean that such fees ‘bear a reasonable relation’ to the costs of acts and services provided by the Building Department. Here, the Court was satisfied plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to conclude that the City established fees that were not intended to “bear a reasonable relation” to the costs of acts and services necessary to justify the City’s retention of 25% of all the fees collected. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined there was no express or implied monetary remedy for a violation of MCL 125.1522(1). Nonetheless, plaintiffs could seek declaratory and injunctive relief to redress present and future violations of MCL 125.1522(1). Because the City has presented evidence to justify the retention of a portion of these fees, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Lastly, the Supreme Court concluded there was no record evidence establishing that plaintiffs were “taxpayer[s]” with standing to file suit pursuant to the Headlee Amendment. On remand, the trial court was mandated to allow plaintiffs’ members an opportunity to establish representational standing on plaintiffs’ behalf. View "Michigan Association of Home Builders v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

Seattle voters approved the "Democracy Voucher Program," intending to increase civic engagement. Recipients could give their vouchers to qualified municipal candidates, who could redeem those vouchers for campaign purposes. The city would find the program through property taxes. Mark Elster and Sarah Pynchon sued, arguing the taxes funding the program was unconstitutional. Because the program did not violate the First Amendment, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. View "Elster v. City Of Seattle" on Justia Law