Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2022, the City of Sacramento proposed a new storm drainage fee to fund repairs, maintenance, and improvements to its storm drainage system. The fee was calculated based on parcel size and land use, expected to generate approximately $20 million annually, with City-owned properties contributing about $496,000. The City conducted an election, mailing ballots to property owners, including itself, as it owned one percent of the properties. The fee was approved with 22,178 votes in favor and 20,229 against. Without the City's votes, the fee would not have passed.Dessins LLC, a property owner who voted against the fee, filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint against the City and the City Council, arguing that the City's votes should not have counted. The Superior Court of Sacramento County ruled in favor of the City, concluding that the City was entitled to vote in the election. Dessins then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the City, as a property owner of properties subject to the fee, was entitled to vote under article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution. The court found that the plain language of the provision allowed the City to vote and that the City's vote did not subvert the purposes of Proposition 218. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, allowing the storm drainage fee to stand. View "Dessins v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Thomas Sheppheard, Tyler Randall, and Adam Perry, on behalf of minor child J.P., filed a class action lawsuit against the Governor of West Virginia and the Acting Cabinet Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Homeland Security. They sought relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging unconstitutional conditions of overcrowding, understaffing, and deferred maintenance in West Virginia's prisons, jails, and juvenile centers. They claimed these conditions amounted to deliberate indifference to their health and safety.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that their injuries were traceable to the actions of the Governor or the Secretary, or that their injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that the issues were largely due to funding decisions by the West Virginia legislature, which was not a party to the suit. The court also highlighted that the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not the Governor or the Secretary, had the authority to address the conditions in the facilities.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show that their injuries were caused by the Governor's or the Secretary's actions. The court also found that the requested relief, such as appropriations and policy changes, could not be granted by the court as it lacked the power to compel the Governor or the Secretary to take such actions. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs' injuries were not redressable through the requested judicial intervention. View "Sheppheard v. Morrisey" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of certain Wisconsin statutes that grant the Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) the power to pause, object to, or suspend administrative rules. The Governor and other petitioners argue that these statutes amount to unconstitutional legislative vetoes, as they allow JCRAR to halt the implementation of rules without passing legislation. The Legislature contends that these statutes are permissible extensions of legislative power, maintaining that rulemaking must remain subordinate to the legislature.The lower courts had previously upheld the constitutionality of similar provisions. In Martinez v. DILHR, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a three-month rule suspension by JCRAR did not violate the Wisconsin Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements. This reasoning was later extended in SEIU, where the court upheld the multiple suspension provision, allowing JCRAR to suspend rules repeatedly.The Wisconsin Supreme Court, currently reviewing the case, adopted the reasoning from Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, which requires bicameralism and presentment when legislative action alters the legal rights and duties of others outside the legislative branch. Applying this standard, the court found that the challenged statutes empower JCRAR to take actions that alter the legal rights and duties of the executive branch and the people of Wisconsin without requiring bicameralism and presentment. Consequently, the court held that the statutes WIS. STAT. §§ 227.19(5)(c), (d), (dm), and 227.26(2)(d), (im) facially violate the Wisconsin Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements and are therefore unconstitutional. View "Evers v. Marklein" on Justia Law

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to abortion, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 940.04(1), which criminalizes the intentional destruction of an unborn child, does not ban abortion. The plaintiffs included the Attorney General, the Department of Safety and Professional Services, the Medical Examining Board, and three physicians. They argued that the statute either does not apply to abortion or has been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.The Dane County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because § 940.04 does not prohibit consensual medical abortions. The court later issued a declaratory judgment that the statute does not prohibit abortions.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The central question was whether § 940.04(1) bans abortion. The court concluded that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years, which regulates various aspects of abortion, impliedly repealed the 19th-century near-total ban on abortion. The court held that the legislature's detailed regulation of abortion was meant as a substitute for the earlier statute, and therefore, § 940.04(1) does not ban abortion in Wisconsin.The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order, holding that the comprehensive legislative framework governing abortion impliedly repealed the near-total ban on abortion in § 940.04(1). View "Kaul v. Urmanski" on Justia Law

The City of Dallas amended an ordinance regulating the short-term lending industry, which TitleMax of Texas, Inc. claimed severely harmed its business. TitleMax sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the amendment was preempted by state law and violated its due course of law guarantee under the Texas Constitution. TitleMax requested a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the amendment until a trial on the merits, but the district court denied this request.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case and denied TitleMax’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The magistrate judge found that while TitleMax demonstrated potential irreparable harm, it did not show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. The district court accepted this recommendation, leading TitleMax to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that TitleMax did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on its preemption and due course of law claims. The court found that the amended ordinance did not prohibit all Credit Services Organizations (CSOs) or Credit Access Businesses (CABs) from operating, but rather regulated their business models. Additionally, the court determined that TitleMax did not have a constitutionally protected interest in operating its business profitably under the due course of law guarantee. The court held that the ordinance was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in protecting low-income borrowers. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. View "TitleMax of Texas v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

Dr. John Doe, a federal public servant with a security clearance, was convicted of two felonies in Ohio in the early 1990s. He received a pardon from the Ohio governor in 2009, and his felony convictions were sealed by an Ohio court. In 2022, Dr. Doe applied for a position at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), but his application was denied due to a statutory bar against hiring individuals with felony convictions. Dr. Doe then filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of this hiring prohibition and sought to proceed under a pseudonym to avoid public association with his sealed convictions.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. The court acknowledged Dr. Doe's privacy concerns and the lack of unfairness to the government but concluded that the privacy interest in felony convictions does not warrant pseudonymity. The court emphasized the importance of transparency in judicial proceedings, especially in cases involving constitutional challenges against the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that Dr. Doe's privacy interest in his sealed felony convictions was insufficient to overcome the presumption against pseudonymous litigation. The court highlighted the public's significant interest in open judicial proceedings, particularly when the case involves a constitutional challenge to a federal statute. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the relevant factors and denying Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. McKernan" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and its universal-service contribution scheme, which requires telecommunications carriers to contribute to a fund that subsidizes communications services for underserved communities. The FCC uses a formula to determine the contribution amount, and the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private entity, assists in managing the fund and projecting financial needs.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found the contribution scheme unconstitutional due to a "double-layered delegation" of authority. The court expressed skepticism about Congress's delegation of power to the FCC and the FCC's delegation to the Administrator, suggesting that the combination of these delegations violated the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. It found that Congress provided sufficient guidance to the FCC through the Communications Act of 1934 and its amendments, which set clear policies and boundaries for the FCC's actions. The Court also determined that the FCC retained decision-making authority and that the Administrator's role was advisory, not a delegation of governmental power. The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's combination theory, stating that the separate delegations did not compound to create a constitutional violation. View "FCC v. Consumers' Research" on Justia Law

In 2023, Texas enacted H.B. 1181, which requires commercial websites publishing sexually explicit content to verify that visitors are 18 or older. The law aims to prevent minors from accessing such content, with violations resulting in injunctions and civil penalties. Representatives of the pornography industry challenged the law, claiming it was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as it hindered adults' access to protected speech.The District Court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the law was subject to strict scrutiny and that Texas had not shown it was narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means to achieve its goal. The court suggested that encouraging parents to use content-filtering software would be a less restrictive alternative.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction, holding that the law was a regulation of the distribution of materials obscene to minors and only incidentally affected adults' privacy. The court applied rational-basis review, concluding that the age-verification requirement was rationally related to the government's interest in preventing minors' access to pornography.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that H.B. 1181 triggers intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens adults' protected speech. The Court found that the law advances important governmental interests in shielding children from sexual content and is adequately tailored to that interest. The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's judgment, concluding that H.B. 1181 is a constitutionally permissible exercise of Texas's authority to prevent minors from accessing sexually explicit content. View "Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton" on Justia Law

The case involves two organizations, Doc Society and International Documentary Association (IDA), which promote documentary filmmaking globally. They challenged a policy by the Secretary of State requiring visa applicants to disclose their social media information from the past five years. The plaintiffs argued that this policy violated the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming it impeded their core activities and harmed their members.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the plaintiffs had organizational standing but dismissed their claims on the merits, stating they failed to state a claim under the First Amendment or the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that a favorable decision would redress their claimed injuries. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not provide specific allegations showing that their partners and members would return to their prior use of social media or reconsider their willingness to travel to the United States if the policy were vacated. The court reversed the district court's determination that the plaintiffs had standing, vacated the remainder of the district court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, including whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend their complaint. View "Doc Society v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Radio Communications Corporation (RCC), a telecommunications and media company, petitioned for review of a final order issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) implementing the Low Power Protection Act (LPPA). The LPPA allows low power television (LPTV) stations to apply for an upgrade to a Class A license if they meet certain criteria, including operating in a Designated Market Area (DMA) with not more than 95,000 television households. The FCC's order adopted this limitation and used Nielsen’s Local TV Report to determine a station’s DMA.RCC operates an LPTV station, W24EZ-D, in Connecticut, which is licensed to serve Allingtown, a neighborhood of West Haven with fewer than 15,000 television households. However, the station is part of the Hartford-New Haven DMA, which has approximately one million television households. RCC challenged the FCC's order, arguing that the size limitation should apply to a station’s community of license, not its DMA. RCC also raised other statutory and constitutional arguments, including claims that the order contravenes section 307(b) of the Communications Act, violates the Commerce Clause, improperly delegates legislative authority to Nielsen, and restricts programming content in violation of the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC's order adheres to the best reading of the LPPA, which clearly limits Class A license eligibility to LPTV stations operating in a DMA with not more than 95,000 television households. The court found that the FCC properly defined DMA according to Nielsen’s data, as authorized by Congress, and that the statute does not reference "community of license." The court also rejected RCC's constitutional arguments, finding that the FCC's interpretation did not violate the Commerce Clause or the nondelegation doctrine. Consequently, the court denied RCC's petition for review. View "Radio Communications Corporation v. FCC" on Justia Law