Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A group of appellants, including Firearms Owners Against Crime and two firearms dealers, filed a case against the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Commissioner, alleging that PSP was not complying with the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act. The appellants claimed that PSP was intentionally understaffing its Pennsylvania Instant Check System (PICS) Operations Section, leading to significant delays in background checks for firearm purchases, sometimes exceeding seven hours. They argued that these delays violated the statutory requirement for "instantaneous" or "immediate" background checks and caused financial harm to firearms dealers due to canceled transactions.The Commonwealth Court initially issued a preliminary injunction, finding that PSP had a statutory duty to employ sufficient personnel to ensure compliance with the Act and that the delays were causing financial harm to the dealers. However, the court later sustained PSP's preliminary objections, ruling that the statute did not specify a mandatory timeframe for background checks and that the operational decisions regarding staffing were discretionary. The court also dismissed the appellants' request for a refund of the $2.00 background check fee, as the statute did not provide for such refunds.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that while the statute did not require "instantaneous" responses, it did mandate that PSP provide results as quickly as possible with available resources. The court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's denial of injunctive and mandamus relief, as these would compel affirmative action barred by sovereign immunity. However, the court reversed the denial of declaratory relief, allowing the appellants to seek a judicial declaration of PSP's duties under the Act. The court also vacated the order denying leave to amend the petition, allowing the appellants to include new allegations regarding PSP's response to the preliminary injunction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Firearms Owners v. Comm'r of PSP" on Justia Law

Montana Environmental Information Center and Earthworks (MEIC) submitted a formal information request to the Office of the Governor of Montana on November 29, 2021. The request sought various documents related to the Montana Department of Environmental Quality’s (DEQ) dismissal of an enforcement action against Hecla Mining and its President/CEO, as well as information on the Governor’s Office’s involvement in mining and environmental decision-making. The Governor’s Office did not respond to the request, prompting MEIC to follow up multiple times. When the requested records were not provided, MEIC filed a lawsuit against the Governor’s Office, seeking to compel production of the information.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County found that the Governor’s Office had a clear legal duty to honor MEIC’s request and issued a writ of mandamus compelling the production of the information. The Governor’s Office initially appealed but later stipulated to dismissal. MEIC then requested attorney’s fees, which the District Court denied, citing the Governor’s Office’s lack of bad faith and the potential for MEIC to obtain the information through other means.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and addressed whether a party who successfully vindicates its right to know under the Montana Constitution is entitled to a presumption towards awarding attorney’s fees. The Court held that there should be a presumption towards awarding attorney’s fees to plaintiffs who successfully enforce their right to know, as this encourages public engagement and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the attorney’s fees request, considering the presumption towards awarding fees and costs. View "MEIC v. Governor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who own or operate gasoline service stations in Puerto Rico, offered two different prices to consumers: a higher price for those using credit or debit cards and a lower price for those paying with cash. In 2013, Puerto Rico's legislature enacted Law 152-2013, amending Law 150-2008 by removing a provision that allowed merchants to offer cash discounts. Plaintiffs ceased offering the lower price due to the threat of fines and criminal prosecution. They sued the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, arguing that Law 150 is preempted by federal law and is unconstitutionally vague.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico rejected the plaintiffs' arguments and granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court found that neither the Cash Discount Act (CDA) nor the Durbin Amendment preempted Law 150. The court also declined to address the constitutional vagueness argument, noting that the complaint did not allege that Law 150 is unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the CDA and the Durbin Amendment do not preempt Law 150. The CDA regulates the conduct of credit card issuers, not merchants or states, and does not confer an absolute right to offer cash discounts. The Durbin Amendment regulates payment card networks, not states, and does not preempt state legislation restricting cash discounts. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not properly plead a vagueness claim in their complaint, rendering the claim unpreserved for appellate review. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. View "Asociacion de Detallistas de Gasolina de PR Inc. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

The Heidi Group, Inc. alleged that several Texas officials violated the Fourth Amendment and Texas law by conspiring with a private citizen to steal documents from a cloud-based file storage system. The officials moved for judgment on the pleadings and asserted various immunity defenses. The district court denied the motions in relevant part.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed the case and denied the defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings. The defendants then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The appeal involved four distinct groups of orders: the denial of qualified immunity for individual capacity defendants on the Fourth Amendment claim, the denial of judgment on the pleadings for the official capacity Fourth Amendment claim, the denial of state law immunity for the individual capacity defendants on the unlawful-access claim, and the denial of judgment on the pleadings for the state law religious-discrimination claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal regarding the religious-discrimination claim and declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the official capacity Fourth Amendment claim. The court held that only Gaylon Dacus engaged in state action and was not entitled to qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment claim. The court found that Dacus used a former employee to access Heidi's documents without proper authorization, violating clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court also affirmed the denial of state law immunity for the individual capacity defendants on the unlawful-access claim, as their actions were not in good faith. The court reversed the denial of judgment on the pleadings for Johnson and Kaufman on the individual capacity Fourth Amendment claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Heidi Group v. Texas Health and Human Services Commission" on Justia Law

A group of businesses and individuals in the vision care industry challenged Texas House Bill 1696, which regulates managed vision care plans by limiting the information these plans can provide to their enrollees. The plaintiffs argued that the bill imposed unconstitutional burdens on their rights of commercial speech, associational freedom, and equal protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the bill's enforcement and the defendants, Texas officials, moved to dismiss the case, claiming sovereign immunity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and granted the preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their commercial speech claims and that the equities favored a preliminary injunction. The defendants appealed both the denial of their sovereign immunity defense and the grant of the preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss as it related to Texas Insurance Commissioner Cassie Brown, finding that she had a specific duty to enforce the statute. However, the court vacated the denial of the motion to dismiss as it related to Governor Greg Abbott and Attorney General Ken Paxton, determining that they did not have a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the statute. The court also affirmed the preliminary injunction against Commissioner Brown, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their commercial speech claim and that the balance of equities favored the injunction. The court vacated the preliminary injunction as it applied to Governor Abbott and Attorney General Paxton and remanded the case for modification of the orders. View "Healthy Vision Association v. Abbott" on Justia Law

In 2023, James Broad and Rebecca McCrensky began operating a car-rental agency, Becky's Broncos, LLC, on Nantucket Island without the necessary local approvals. The Town of Nantucket and the Nantucket Town Select Board ordered Becky's to cease operations. Becky's sought preliminary injunctive relief in the District of Massachusetts to continue their business.The District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Becky's request for a preliminary injunction. The court found insufficient evidence of discriminatory effect under the dormant Commerce Clause and concluded that Becky's had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. Becky's appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that Becky's did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of its dormant Commerce Clause claim, as the ordinance did not discriminate against out-of-state businesses. The court also found that Becky's failed to establish a likelihood of success on its antitrust claims due to a lack of a concrete theory of liability. Additionally, Becky's procedural due process argument was rejected because it did not establish a property interest in the required medallions. Lastly, the court held that the ordinance survived rational basis review under substantive due process, as it was rationally related to legitimate government interests in managing traffic and congestion on the island. View "Becky's Broncos, LLC v. Town of Nantucket" on Justia Law

Houston police officers Manual Salazar and Nestor Garcia, members of the Gang Division Crime Reduction Unit, fatally shot David Anthony Salinas on July 14, 2021, following a pursuit in a sting operation. His widow, Brittany Salinas, filed a lawsuit against Officers Salazar and Garcia and the City of Houston, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Texas Tort Claims Act, and the state-created danger theory of constitutional liability.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in full. The court found that Brittany Salinas had standing to bring her claims but concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that the claims against the City of Houston were meritless. Brittany Salinas timely appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Salinas based on the identifying information on his vehicle and his refusal to stop when the officers engaged their lights. The court also found that the officers did not violate Salinas' Fourth Amendment rights, as they reasonably believed he posed an immediate threat when he continuously reached within his vehicle despite their commands to show his hands. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the § 1983 claims against the officers, finding that they were entitled to qualified immunity.Regarding the claims against the City of Houston, the court found no constitutional injury and affirmed the dismissal of the § 1983 claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Texas Tort Claims Act claims, as they were foreclosed by the ruling on qualified immunity and barred by case law. The court concluded that the City of Houston's sovereign immunity had not been waived. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims. View "Salinas v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Carter W. Page filed a lawsuit against the United States, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and several current and former FBI officials. Page alleged that the FBI unlawfully obtained four warrants to electronically surveil him under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and leaked information obtained from these warrants to the press, causing him reputational harm and lost business opportunities. The district court dismissed Page's claims, finding them either time-barred or insufficiently pleaded.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Page's second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that Page's FISA claims were time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations and that his claims were insufficiently pleaded. The court also dismissed Page's Patriot Act claim against the United States, with the majority concluding it was time-barred and the partial dissent finding it legally insufficient. Additionally, the court dismissed Page's Bivens claim and Privacy Act claims for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Page's FISA and Patriot Act claims as time-barred. The court held that Page had actual or inquiry notice of his FISA claims by April 2017, more than three years before he filed his complaint in November 2020. The court also found that Page's Patriot Act claim was barred because he failed to file his administrative claim with the FBI within two years of its accrual. The court concluded that Page had sufficient information by April 2017 to discover the basis for his claims, making them time-barred. View "Page v. Comey" on Justia Law

Bryan and Ami Hauxwell, farmers using ground and surface water for irrigation, submitted a request to pool ground water from several registered wells for the 2023-2027 allocation period. The Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) denied their application, citing a rule that allows denial for any reason, including rule violations. The denial was communicated through a letter and a marked application. The Hauxwells challenged this denial, alleging it violated their constitutional rights and was arbitrary and capricious.The Hauxwells filed a petition for review with the district court for Frontier County, Nebraska, under the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They argued that the denial was contrary to a court order staying penalties previously imposed by the NRD. The NRD moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the letter was not a final agency action or an order in a contested case, and thus not subject to judicial review under the APA. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the letter did not arise from a contested case and was not a final order of the decision-making body.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the letter denying the Hauxwells' pooling application was not an "order" as defined under the NGWMPA. The court explained that the term "order" in the NGWMPA includes orders required by the act, a rule or regulation, or a decision adopted by the board of directors of a natural resources district. However, the letter in question did not meet these criteria, as it was not issued as part of any case or proceeding and was not required by any specific authority. Consequently, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

The City of Oxnard and two other public agencies formed the City of Oxnard Financing Authority through a joint powers agreement. The Financing Authority approved two lease revenue bonds to finance public capital improvements. Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. and Aaron Starr challenged the approval of these bonds, arguing they violated constitutional debt limits under the California Constitution. The trial court ruled in favor of the City and the Financing Authority, leading the plaintiffs to appeal.The trial court found that the bonds did not require voter approval under the Offner-Dean rule, which allows for contingent obligations that do not create immediate debt. The court also determined that the City and the Financing Authority complied with the procedural requirements of the Joint Exercise of Powers Act in authorizing the bonds. The trial court dismissed other causes of action for writ of mandate/administrative mandamus and declaratory relief, as the plaintiffs had an adequate legal remedy through the reverse validation action.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the additional payments required by the lease agreements were not unconstitutional long-term debt obligations, as they were contingent upon the City's use and occupancy of the leased properties. The court also found that the lease-leaseback funding arrangement complied with the Offner-Dean rule and that the City had made a valid finding of significant public benefit under the Marks-Roos Act. The judgment in favor of the City and the Financing Authority was affirmed, allowing the issuance of the lease revenue bonds to proceed. View "Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. v. City of Oxnard" on Justia Law