Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In October 1999, pursuant to the Service Delivery Strategy Act (SDS), Greene County, Georgia and five municipalities within the County, including the City of Union Point, entered into various intergovernmental agreements governing local services. In 2015, the City of Union Point filed a “Complaint for TRO, Interlocutory and Permanent Injunction,” alleging that Greene County had unilaterally discontinued police and fire dispatch and communications services to the City’s police and fire departments and had ignored attempts to resolve the issue. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order directing the County to resume dispatch and communications services. A month later, in response to a motion to dismiss, the City amended its complaint to seek a declaratory judgment and mediation under the SDS Act. After the County filed a second motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity, standing, and untimely request for mediation, the City again amended its complaint to assert claims for breach of contract, mandamus, specific performance, injunction and attorney fees, and attached a certified copy of the service delivery agreements on file with the Georgia Department of Community Affairs. Before the Georgia Supreme Court, this case called into question the constitutionality of the evidentiary hearing process provided by OCGA 36-70-25.1 (d) (2). In its order entered at the end of the hearing process, the trial court found that portion of the statute unconstitutional, and further found that sovereign immunity barred all claims and remedies except those provided for in the SDS Act itself. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on sovereign immunity, but reversed its finding on the constitutionality of OCGA 36-70-25.1 (d) (2). Furthermore, the Court found the trial court exceeded the bounds of the statutory process by going beyond the remedies provided to order particular actions by the parties and by considering matters not submitted to mediation. View "City of Union Point v. Greene County" on Justia Law

Teachers who worked for Denver Public Schools (“DPS”), and Denver Classroom Teachers Association (collectively, “the teachers”), filed this suit, alleging that DPS invoked Senate Bill 10-191, which under certain circumstances allowed a school district to place a nonprobationary teacher on unpaid leave, to remove hundreds of teachers from their positions in violation of both due process of law and the contracts clause of the Colorado Constitution. School District No. 1 and members of the Colorado Board of Education (collectively, “the District”) moved to dismiss the suit, and the trial court granted that motion. A division of the court of appeals reversed, relying on the Colorado Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting predecessor statutes to the relevant (codified as the Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990 (“TECDA”)) and concluded due process violations occurred under those predecessor statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the TECDA did not create a contractual relationship or vest nonprobationary teachers who were placed on unpaid leave with a property interest in salary and benefits. View "Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Masters" on Justia Law

Teachers who worked for Denver Public Schools (“DPS”), and Denver Classroom Teachers Association (collectively, “the teachers”), filed this suit, alleging that DPS invoked Senate Bill 10-191, which under certain circumstances allowed a school district to place a nonprobationary teacher on unpaid leave, to remove hundreds of teachers from their positions in violation of both due process of law and the contracts clause of the Colorado Constitution. School District No. 1 and members of the Colorado Board of Education (collectively, “the District”) moved to dismiss the suit, and the trial court granted that motion. A division of the court of appeals reversed, relying on the Colorado Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting predecessor statutes to the relevant (codified as the Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990 (“TECDA”)) and concluded due process violations occurred under those predecessor statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the TECDA did not create a contractual relationship or vest nonprobationary teachers who were placed on unpaid leave with a property interest in salary and benefits. View "Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Masters" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from an action brought by teacher Linda Johnson against Denver School District No. 1 (“the District”) and the District’s Board of Education, in which Johnson argued that by placing her on unpaid leave, the District breached her contract and violated her due process rights. The federal district court concluded that because Johnson was placed on unpaid leave, rather than terminated, she was not deprived of a property interest. Johnson appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit. After analyzing the statutory history and the current statutory language, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) (CRS 2015) applied to all displaced nonprobationary teachers, not just nonprobationary teachers who were displaced because of a reduction in enrollment or an administrative decision to eliminate certain programs (the reasons stated in subparagraph (VII)). Furthermore, the Court held that nonprobationary teachers who placed on unpaid leave had no vested property interest in salary and benefits, meaning a nonprobationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under subparagraph (IV) is not deprived of a state property interest. View "Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

Florence County challenged the validity of the West Florence Fire District, arguing that it violated the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Wagener v. Smith, 71 S.E.2d 1 (1952) and conflicted with the state's constitutional provisions concerning special legislation and home rule. The circuit court held in favor of Florence County on all three grounds, and the West Florence Fire District appealed. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed on constitutional grounds. View "County of Florence v. West Florence Fire District" on Justia Law

Paul Knopf, the former Director of the Planning and Development Department (“City Planner”) in Evanston, Wyoming (“City”), sued Mayor Kent Williams under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Knopf claimed Mayor Williams did not reappoint him to his position as City Planner because he had sent an email to the City Attorney raising concerns about impropriety relating to a City project. Thus, Knopf alleged that Mayor Williams retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. Mayor Williams moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the court denied. In this interlocutory appeal, the Mayor asked the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse that denial, arguing that a reasonable person in his position would not have understood Knopf to have spoken outside of his official duties, and that a “reasonable official: would have believed the email at issue here exceeded the scope of Knopf’s official duties. A split panel concluded Knopf failed to show a violation of clearly established federal law on an essential element of his claim, thus the Court reversed the district court’s denial of sovereign immunity to Mayor Williams. View "Knopf v. Williams" on Justia Law

Paul Knopf, the former Director of the Planning and Development Department (“City Planner”) in Evanston, Wyoming (“City”), sued Mayor Kent Williams under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Knopf claimed Mayor Williams did not reappoint him to his position as City Planner because he had sent an email to the City Attorney raising concerns about impropriety relating to a City project. Thus, Knopf alleged that Mayor Williams retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. Mayor Williams moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the court denied. In this interlocutory appeal, the Mayor asked the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse that denial, arguing that a reasonable person in his position would not have understood Knopf to have spoken outside of his official duties, and that a “reasonable official: would have believed the email at issue here exceeded the scope of Knopf’s official duties. A split panel concluded Knopf failed to show a violation of clearly established federal law on an essential element of his claim, thus the Court reversed the district court’s denial of sovereign immunity to Mayor Williams. View "Knopf v. Williams" on Justia Law

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of Billings (City) and the Montana Municipal Interlocal Authority (MMIA) (collectively, Defendants) in this “Petition for Release of Documents” seeking documents related to a civil judgment MMIA paid on behalf of the City. Defendants released to Plaintiff all non-privileged documents and provided privilege logs describing those documents withheld on the ground of attorney-client or attorney-work-product privilege. In his petition, Plaintiff asked for the release of “everything related to” the civil judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the privileged documents were not subject to disclosure under the Montana Constitution. View "Nelson v. City of Billings" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of Billings (City) and the Montana Municipal Interlocal Authority (MMIA) (collectively, Defendants) in this “Petition for Release of Documents” seeking documents related to a civil judgment MMIA paid on behalf of the City. Defendants released to Plaintiff all non-privileged documents and provided privilege logs describing those documents withheld on the ground of attorney-client or attorney-work-product privilege. In his petition, Plaintiff asked for the release of “everything related to” the civil judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the privileged documents were not subject to disclosure under the Montana Constitution. View "Nelson v. City of Billings" on Justia Law