Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal from a state employee grievance proceeding, a hearing officer’s decision upholding the termination of Nathan Osborn, a special agent with the Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC), was not contrary to law.ABC terminated Osburn’s employment after receiving a complaint that Osburn rummaged, without permission, through the business records of a business owner who had applied for a retail alcohol license. A hearing officer upheld Osburn’s termination, concluding that the warrantless search was not permissible, resulting in a violation of the applicant’s constitutional rights. The circuit court upheld the hearing officer’s determination. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s determination that Osborn violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Osburn’s warrantless inspection of the office of the applicant’s business was not permissible under the highly regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement and that the business owner did not consent to Osburn’s warrantless search of the office. View "Osburn v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission issues separate classes of licenses to manufacturers and distillers, wholesalers, and liquor retailers, Tenn. Code 57-3-201. To obtain a license, an individual must have “been a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made.” The statute imposes a 10-year residency requirement to renew the license. A corporation cannot receive a license “if any officer, director or stockholder owning any capital stock in the corporation, would be ineligible to receive a retailer’s license for any reason specified” and all capital stock must be owned by individuals who meet the same residency requirements. Anticipating litigation, the state sought a declaratory judgment construing the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The district court found the requirements facially discriminatory; held that state regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny just because they do not discriminate against out-of-state liquor; concluded that nondiscriminatory alternatives could achieve the durational-residency requirements’ purposes—citizen health and alcohol regulation; and found that the requirements violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and found the unconstitutional provisions severable. View "Byrd v. Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administration Hearing Commission (AHC) affirming the Missouri Ethics Commission’s (MEC) imposition of fees arising from the failure to Robin Wright-Jones and Wright-Jones for Senate (collectively, Appellants) to comply with the rules of Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 130. The court also affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 105.961.4(6) was not unconstitutional. On appeal, Appellants claimed that the monetary fees assessed by the MEC violated Mo. Const. art. I, section 31. Specifically, Appellants argued that, pursuant to section 105.961.4(6), the MEC may not assess fines for violations of state statutes, regulations, or rules. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) there was no improper delegation of authority to the MEC; (2) the AHC’s decision was supported by the record; and (3) the assessed fees were not excessive. View "Wright-Jones v. Missouri Ethics Commission" on Justia Law

The circuit court erred by engaging in a comprehensive inquiry into the amount the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL) actually needed for its administrative and operating expenses.In the first appeal in this case, the Supreme Court held that the political question doctrine did not bar a judicial interpretation of the meaning of “sufficient sums” for the DHHL administrative and operating expense, pursuant to Haw. Const. art. XII, 1. On remand, the circuit court concluded that DHHL’s actual need for its administrative and operating expenses was more than $28 million and that the legislature was constitutionally obligated to make such an appropriation to DHHL for fiscal year 2015-16. The court also enjoined the State and its director of finance from violating the constitution or breaching their fiduciary duties to Hawaiian Homelands trust beneficiaries. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s final judgment and underlying orders, holding that the circuit court exceeded this court’s mandate in Nelson I when it determined the amount DHHL actually needed for its administrative and operating expenses. View "Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Commission" on Justia Law

Since 1996, Ohio Department of Health regulations have required ambulatory surgical facilities to have a written transfer agreement with a hospital to facilitate treatment in the event of an emergency beyond the capability of the facility. ODH interprets Ohio Adm.Code 3701-83-19(E) to require ambulatory surgical facilities to have a transfer agreement with a hospital within 30 minutes’ transport from the facility. In 2013, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3702.303(A), expressly requiring written transfer agreements to be negotiated with local hospitals. Capital operated with a negotiated written transfer agreement with the University of Toledo Medical Center but in April 2013, the university advised Capital that it would not renew its contract, which expired in July 2013. Capital continued operating without an agreement until January 20, 2014, when it negotiated a new agreement with the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor,52 miles from Capital’s facility. ODH revoked Capital’s health care facility license. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the law, rejecting an argument that its enactment impedes rights guaranteed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. The matter is a policy decision made by the legislature, vesting the authority to license ambulatory surgical facilities in the ODH and defining the scope of judicial review of its decisions. Adhering to the doctrine of separation of powers, the court held that the order revoking Capital’s license was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. View "Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Department of Health" on Justia Law

A public employee cannot be terminated for making protected statements during a campaign for public office where that speech has no demonstrated impact on the efficiency of office operations. The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in an action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff's employment as a deputy in the Sheriff's Office for statements plaintiff made during an election campaign. The court held that plaintiff's statements were made as a citizen on matters of public concern; defendant failed to show an adequate justification for his actions, and thus plaintiff's speech was protected by the First Amendment; and defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity where defendant's termination of plaintiff violated a right secured by the First Amendment and that right was clearly established at the time of the termination. View "Morgan v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a group of landowners (“Landowners”) seeking an order compelling the Ohio Department of Natural Resources’ Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (“the Division”) and its chief to commence appropriation proceedings to compensate Landowners for their land that was included in an oil and gas drilling unit. Landowners objected an an order issued by the chief requiring that a reservoir of oil and gas underlying multiple tracts of land be operated as a unit to recover the oil and gas, arguing that the order amounted to a taking of their property for which they must be compensated. The Supreme Court denied Landowners’ petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that Landowners had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to the county court of common pleas. View "State ex rel. Kerns v. Simmers" on Justia Law

Superior, a nonprofit corporation, operates 21 Michigan radio broadcast stations. The City of Riverview owns a 320-foot broadcast tower. With an FCC permit to operate a low-powered FM radio broadcast station, Superior contracted to operate broadcasting equipment on the city-owned tower. Superior installed a single-bay antenna at 300 feet and a transmitter in the equipment shelter. The agreement limited modifications to Superior’s equipment; upgrades required the city’s prior approval. Without the city’s knowledge, Superior obtained a modification of its FCC permit to allow a significant increase in broadcast power. In response to Superior’s request, the city engaged a consultant, who reported that the proposed four-bay antenna would cause Superior’s equipment to occupy 30 feet of tower space instead of its current three feet of space; would expose individuals around the tower to unsafe levels of radiofrequency electromagnetic radiation; and might create radio interference with other tower tenants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city, rejecting arguments under the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 151. The Agreement unambiguously granted the city the right to refuse Superior’s requested upgrade, which the city properly exercised. The city did not enact a “regulation” within the meaning of the Act but acted in its proprietary capacity and had a rational basis for its actions, so that Superior’s constitutional claims failed. View "Superior Communications v. City of Riverview" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court’s review centered on the constitutionality of La. R.S. 32:667, particularly paragraphs La. R.S. 32:667 (H)(3) and (I)(1)(a). Plaintiff David Carver was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) pursuant to La. R.S. 14:98. Plaintiff refused to submit to a chemical test for intoxication and his license was suspended for 180 days. The arrest did not result in a conviction, as Plaintiff participated in a pre-trial diversion program. Plaintiff alleged La. R.S. 32:667 (H)(3) and (I)(1)(a) violated the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. Following the District Court’s finding that the paragraphs violated the Due Process Clauses, the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles (the State) directly appealed that finding to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court found that the applicable paragraphs did not violate the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. Thus, the Court reversed the District Court’s judgment of unconstitutionality and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Carver v. Louisiana Dept. of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

The Milchteins have 15 children. The two eldest refused to return home in 2011-2012 and were placed in foster care by Wisconsin state court orders. In federal court, the Milchteins argued that state officials violated the federal Constitution by either discriminating against or failing to accommodate their views of family management in the Chabad understanding of Orthodox Judaism. Those children now are adults. State proceedings with respect to them are closed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Milchteins’ suit as moot, rejecting arguments the district court could have entered a declaratory judgment because the Milchteins still have 12 minor children, who might precipitate the same sort of controversy. The Milchteins did not seek alteration of the state court judgment, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not block this suit but it is blocked by the requirement of justiciability. The Milchteins want a federal judge to say where a state judge erred but not act on that error: “a naked request for an advisory opinion.” If Wisconsin again starts judicial proceedings concerning the Milchteins’ children, the "Younger" doctrine would require the federal tribunal to abstain. Younger abstention may be inappropriate if the very existence of state proceedings violated the First Amendment but the Milchteins do not contend that it is never permissible for a state to inquire into the welfare of a religious leader’s children. View "Milchtein v. Chisholm" on Justia Law