Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

President Trump, by executive order issued in May 2017, established the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. EPIC filed suit against the Commission and others, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act and sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit defendants from collecting voter data unless and until they complete a privacy impact assessment as allegedly required by the E-Government Act of 2002. The district court concluded that EPIC had standing and denied a preliminary injunction. The DC Circuit affirmed, but based on a different conclusion than that of the district court. The court upheld the denial of preliminary injunction because EPIC did not show a substantial likelihood of standing to press its claims that defendants have violated the E-Government Act. In this case, EPIC has suffered no informational or organizational injury. View "Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity" on Justia Law

Private indirect purchasers of prescription Flonase filed a class action, alleging that GSK had filed sham petitions with the FDA to delay the introduction of generic Flonase and force them to pay more for Flonase than they would have if the generic version were available. Those plaintiffs moved for final approval of settlement after the court certified the class and approved the notice to settlement class members. Louisiana, an indirect Flonase purchaser, qualified as a potential class member but did not receive the notice; it only received a Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Notice, for “the appropriate State official of each State in which a class member resides,” 28 U.S.C. 1715(b) The settlement “permanently enjoined” all members of the settlement class, including Louisiana, from bringing released claims against GSK, even in state court. In an ancillary suit, GSK moved to enforce the settlement against the Louisiana Attorney General. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of the request, finding that under the Eleventh Amendment “a State retains the autonomy to choose ‘not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.'" Although some of Louisiana’s claims fall within the settlement, the state did not waive its sovereign immunity. Receipt of the CAFA Notice was insufficient to unequivocally demonstrate that the state was aware that it was a class member and voluntarily chose to have its claims resolved. View "In re: Flonase Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

The Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced steps to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program by March 2018, concluding that DACA violates the Administrative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of challengers. The government then moved to stay the district court order requiring completion of the administrative record until after resolution of motions to dismiss and for a preliminary injunction. The court stayed its order for one month. The government petitioned the Supreme Court, which vacated. The district court’s order required the government to turn over all “emails, letters, memoranda, notes, media items, opinions and other materials ... actually seen or considered, however briefly, by Acting Secretary ... in connection with the ... decision … all DACA-related materials considered by persons (anywhere in the government) who thereafter provided … written advice or input … all DACA-related materials considered by persons (anywhere in the government) who thereafter provided … verbal input … all comments and questions propounded ... to advisors or subordinates … and their responses, and … all materials directly or indirectly considered by former Secretary of DHS John Kelly leading to his February 2017 memorandum not to rescind DACA. The court should have first resolved the government’s threshold arguments that the decision was unreviewable as “committed to agency discretion,” 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), and that the Immigration and Nationality Act deprives the court of jurisdiction. The court may not compel the government to disclose any document that the government believes is privileged without first providing an opportunity to argue the issue. The Court did not consider the merits of the claims or defenses. View "In Re United States" on Justia Law

Insane Clown Posse, a Michigan music group, performs songs with “harsh language and themes.” Its fans, “Juggalos,” wear distinctive tattoos, clothing, and insignia, including clown face paint and the “hatchetman” logo. The Attorney General’s National Gang Intelligence Center's (34 U.S.C. 41507) 2011 gang-activity report, described Juggalos as “a loosely-organized hybrid gang.” “Juggalo[] subsets exhibit gang-like behavior and engage in criminal activity and violence.” Although “Most crimes ... are sporadic, disorganized, individualistic,” and minor, “a small number of Juggalos are forming more organized subsets and engaging in more gang-like criminal activity, such as felony assaults, thefts, robberies, and drug sales.” Four states recognize Juggalos as a gang. Juggalos who allege that they do not knowingly affiliate with any criminal gang, but have suffered violations of their Fifth Amendment due-process rights and a chill in the exercise of their First Amendment expression and association rights due to the designation, sued under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(b). Some alleged that they had been detained; an Army Corporal with Juggalo tattoos alleges that he is “in imminent danger of suffering discipline or an involuntary discharge.” Local law enforcement caused a musical event to be canceled. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal; the designation was not reviewable because it was not a final agency action and was committed to agency discretion by law. View "Parsons v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to the Board of Pardons and Parole on the question of whether it violated the due process rights of Michael Neese, a Utah prison inmate, under Utah Const. art. I, 7.The Parole Board denied Neese - who had never been convicted of a sex offense, subjected to prison discipline for sexual misconduct, or otherwise adjudicated a sexual offender - an original release date for parole largely based on its determination that he was a sex offender and his refusal to participate in sex offender treatment. Neese filed a pro se petition for a writ of extraordinary release, arguing that the Parole Board violated his due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the Parole Board, concluding that Neese received due process under the Utah Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that before the Parole Board may take the refusal of inmates in the position of Neese to participate in sex offender treatment into consideration in deciding whether to grant them parole, it owes them additional procedural protections described in this opinion. View "Neese v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole" on Justia Law

At issue was whether Sierra Club’s concern regarding the “public health and visibility impacts of burning coal” rose to the level of property within the meaning of the due process clause and whether the protections of the due process clause apply to the right to a clean and healthful environment.This case involved a power purchase agreement between Maui Electric Co., an electric utility company, and Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company (HC&S), a producer of electricity. Maui Electric filed an application with the Public Utilities Commission seeking approval of the agreement, under which Maui Electric would continue to purchase energy generated at HC&S’s facility located in Pu’unene, Maui. Sierra Club filed a motion to intervene, arguing that the Pu’unene plant relied too heavily on coal to meet its power obligations. The Commission denied the motion to intervene and then granted the application to approve the agreement. Sierra Club appealed. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissed the appeal, concluding that no appellate jurisdiction existed over the appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that a due process hearing was required to protect the asserted property right to a clean and healthful environment guaranteed by the article XI, section 9 of the Hawai’i Constitution and defined by Haw. Rev. Stat. 269. View "In re Application of Maui Electric Co., Limited" on Justia Law

In 2013, the juvenile court declared defendant-appellant, R.G. (Minor, born in April 2000), a dependent of the court. In 2016, while Minor remained a dependent of the juvenile court, the State filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging Minor had committed misdemeanor battery. After denying Minor’s request to refer the matter for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.12 assessment and report, Minor admitted the allegation that she had committed misdemeanor battery. The court declared Minor a ward of the court, placed her on formal probation, placed her in the custody of Children and Family Services (CFS), and scheduled the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 241.1. After subsequently receiving a section 241.1 report, the court again declared Minor a ward of the court with “CFS lead jurisdiction.” On appeal, Minor contended the juvenile court prejudicially erred by refusing to refer the matter for a section 241.1 assessment, report, and hearing prior to taking jurisdiction, resulting in violations of Minor’s statutory and due process rights. Moreover, Minor argued the subsequent section 241.1 report and hearing were statutorily inadequate. CFS countered Minor forfeited any contention the section 241.1 report was untimely or inadequate and that any error was harmless. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the court erred by refusing to refer the matter for a section 241.1 report prior to making a determination of Minor’s status and holding the jurisdictional hearing. Furthermore, the subsequent section 241.1 report was inadequate to overcome the court’s initial error, and this error was not harmless. View "In re R.G." on Justia Law

At issue before the Delaware Supreme Court in this matter was whether unelected officials from the Delaware parks and forest departments (whose power was expressly limited) could ban (except for a narrow exception for hunting) the possession of guns in state parks and forests in contravention of Delawareans’ rights under the State’s constitution. "Clearly they cannot. They lack such authority because they may not pass unconstitutional laws, and the regulations completely eviscerate a core right to keep and bear arms for defense of self and family outside the home -- a right this Court has already recognized." As such, the regulations were ruled unconstitutional on their face. View "Bridgeville Rifle & Pistol Club, Ltd. v. Small" on Justia Law

In February 2015, the city of Spokane (City) enacted an ordinance that granted a local property tax exemption to senior citizens and disabled veterans. Relying on a letter by the Washington Department of Revenue (DOR), the Spokane County assessor and treasurer (collectively County) refused to implement the ordinance, believing it to violate the Washington Constitution, Article VII, Sections 1, 9 and 10. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court in this case was whether the City's ordinance indeed violated the Washington Constitution's uniform property tax requirement. The trial court ruled that the ordinance was constitutional and issued a writ requiring the County to apply it. DOR filed a motion to intervene, and both DOR and the County appealed the trial court's ruling. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the City's ordinance was unconstitutional. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Spokane v. Horton" on Justia Law

This matter arose out of a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance whereby citations based on traffic camera images, could be reviewed at an administrative hearing. The case went before the Louisiana Supreme Court after a district court declared the administrative review process, as it existed during 2008 through 2012, was unconstitutional. Specifically, the district court declared the administrative review process violated the due process and access to court provisions of the Louisiana Constitution. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court determined this case was rendered moot. "While the record reveals a convoluted development of this case, what emerges from the trial record is that this case resulted in a number of changes, both legislative and practical, to the administrative review process. Although this case is technically moot, the end result is that the plaintiffs have achieved vindication of the constitutional rights for which they advocated." View "Rand v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law