Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

During a regularly-scheduled meeting, the SAU’s Board voted to go into a nonpublic session to discuss two topics: the superintendent’s evaluation, and “emergency functions.” While in nonpublic session, the Board voted to seal the minutes of the meeting. In June 2016, plaintiff David Taylor asked the executive assistant to the superintendent to send him the minutes of the May 12 nonpublic session by e-mail. She informed plaintiff that she could not provide him with those minutes because they were sealed. A month later, plaintiff e-mailed the executive assistant again, asking her to forward to him, by e-mail, a June 22 e-mail regarding the nonpublic session that had been sent to the Board. The executive assistant again denied plaintiff’s request, referring him to the SAU’s Right-to-Know procedure, requiring the public seeking electronic records to come to the SAU’s offices with a thumb drive in sealed, original packaging or to purchase a thumb drive from the SAU at its actual cost. In August, plaintiff filed a complaint in which he alleged the SAU had violated RSA chapter 91-A by voting in closed session to seal the minutes of the nonpublic session of the May 12 meeting and by refusing to e-mail the records he requested. He also challenged the SAU’s practice of charging 50 cents per page for hard copies of public records. Plaintiff sought: invalidation of the vote to seal the minutes of the nonpublic session; release of the sealed minutes; a declaration that the SAU’s thumb drive policy violated RSA chapter 91-A; an order requiring transmission of the requested records to him by e-mail; other injunctive relief; and litigation costs. After review, the trial court found the SAU’s policy for transmitting public records complied with RSA chapter 91-A. Because of the SAU’s decision to keep sealed only the portion of the nonpublic session with respect to emergency functions, the trial court also found that the plaintiff’s challenge of the SAU’s action was “moot in all but one respect,” specifically, the single redacted sentence of the superintendent’s evaluation. On this issue, the court ordered that the SAU provide it with an un-redacted copy of the public minutes for in camera review. The trial court also determined that petitioner’s lawsuit had been necessary to ensure the Board’s compliance with RSA 91-A:3, and, therefore, awarded him litigation costs. However, the trial court ruled that plaintiff had no standing to challenge the cost of paper copies, because there was no evidence that he had asked for, or paid for, such copies. The trial court also found that the Board did not violate RSA 91-A:3, III by producing two sets of minutes for the May 12 meeting, one containing the public portion and the other the sealed portion. Finally, the court declined to enter the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Taylor v. School Administrative Unit #55" on Justia Law

ICN, a religious nonprofit, operates a Nashville mosque and a school. In 2008, it began building a new school building, financed by an ijara agreement, to avoid “running afoul of the Islamic prohibition on the payment of interest.” The bank essentially bought the property, leased it back to ICN, and then sold it back to ICN, with the lease payments substituting for interest payments. The agreement lasted until October 2013; the property was “continuously occupied by [ICN] and physically used solely for exempt religious educational purposes.” The transfer of title prompted the tax assessor to return the property to the tax roll. In February 2014, ICN applied for a property tax exemption, seeking retroactive application. The Tennessee State Board of Equalization’s designee regranted ICN's exemption, but not for the time during which the bank had held title. An ALJ and the State Board’s Assessment Appeals Commission upheld the decision. ICN did not seek review in the chancery court, but filed suit in federal court under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act; the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act; and the Establishment Clause. The court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Tennessee’s statutory provision for state-court appeal provides a plain, speedy, and efficient alternative to federal-court review, so the Tax Injunction Act bars ICN’s suit in federal court. View "Islamic Center of Nashville v. State of Tennessee" on Justia Law

A workers' compensation claimant suffered a hernia and recurrent hernia due to work. He requested a contested hearing on the constitutionality of the hernia provision of the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act, 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 section 61. An administrative law judge determined 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 61 to be constitutional. Claimant appealed. The Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed the determination of the administrative law judge. The question presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review was whether the hernia provision was unconstitutional because: (1) it violated the due process rights of claimants guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1 and Okla. Const. art. 2, sec. 7; (2) it was a special law prohibited by Okla. Const. art. 5, sec. 46; and (3) it failed to provide an adequate remedy for a recognized wrong, in violation of Okla. Const. art. 2, sec. 6. The Supreme Court answered in the negative. However, in light of it's opinion in Corbeil v. Emricks Van & Storage, 2017 OK 71, ___ P.3d ___, this case was remanded for further proceedings concerning the application of 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 61. View "Graham v. D&K Oilfield Services" on Justia Law

Petitioners South Carolina Public Interest Foundation and Edward Sloan, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a declaratory judgment action against Respondents the South Carolina Department of Transportation ("SCDOT") and John Walsh, Deputy Secretary of Transportation for Engineering of SCDOT. Petitioners sought a declaration that SCDOT's inspection of three privately owned bridges violated sections 5 and 11 of article X of the South Carolina Constitution, which Petitioners asserted prohibit the expenditure of public funds for a private purpose. The trial court granted Respondents' motion for summary judgment, finding: Petitioners lacked standing; the controversy was moot and did not fall under any of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine; and Respondents' actions were not ultra vires or unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded, after review: (1) Petitioners established public importance standing; (2) the Court of Appeals erred in concluding this matter was not justiciable because Respondents admitted their conduct was wrongful; (3) Respondents' inspection of the privately owned bridges was unconstitutional because it contravened the constitutional requirement that the expenditure of public funds serve a public purpose. The Court concluded Respondents' conduct was unconstitutional and ultra vires, and reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment. View "South Carolina Public Interest Foundation v. SCDOT" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the State Corporation Commission upholding the constitutionality of Va. Code 56-585.1:1, which suspended the Commission’s biennial base rate reviews for Appalachian Power Company (APCO) and Virginia Electric and Power Company, d/b/a Dominion Virginia Power (Dominion Power) until the years 2020 and 2021, respectively. Appellants - Old Dominion Committee for Fair Utility Rates, VML/VACO APCO Steering Committee and Karen Torrent - appealed. In affirming, the Supreme Court held that section 56-585.1:1 is constitutional under Va. Const. art. IX, 2 because article IX, section 2 does not prohibit the general assembly from suspending the Commission’s biennial base rate reviews. View "Old Dominion Committee for Fair Utility Rates v. State Corp. Commission" on Justia Law

Upon receiving an anonymous tip, the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) investigated allegations of race-fixing, involving gamblers and harness-racing drivers. Plaintiffs, MGCB-licensed harness drivers, attended an administrative hearing but declined to answer questions, invoking their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The MGCB immediately suspended their licenses, based on a requirement that license applicants “cooperate in every way . . . during the conduct of an investigation, including responding correctly, to the best of his or her knowledge, to all questions pertaining to racing.” MGCB later issued exclusion orders banning the drivers from all state race tracks and denied Plaintiffs’ applications for 2011, 2012, and 2013 licenses. Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of their procedural due process and Fifth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The exclusion orders were issued about 30 months before a post-exclusion hearing; Plaintiffs identified a violation of a clearly established right. Under specific conditions, a public employee “may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled answers.” The Supreme Court has held that if a state wishes to punish an employee for invoking that right, “States must offer to the witness whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege and may not insist that the employee ... waive such immunity.” Both rights were clearly established at the time of the violation. View "Moody v. Michigan Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

The Republican Party sued the Cook County Board of Election Commissioners, arguing that the Board must include on the ballot a candidate that the Party slated for the House of Representatives in the November 2016 election. The Board had never announced a plan to exclude the candidate. The district court entered an injunction compelling the Board to keep this candidate on the ballot. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Party’s dispute with two additional defendants, elected as ward committeemen, based on the Party’s refusal to seat them, is not a federal claim. The Party’s “anticipatory federal contention,” that ”if state law does not respect the Party’s eligibility rules, then Illinois violates the First Amendment,” was only a potential response to a potential contention by the committeemen that all elected ward committeemen must be seated on the Party’s central committee. The district judge did not consider the fact that public officials were not contesting the Party’s claims or the possibility that he was issuing an advisory opinion. If the committeemen had sued the Party, demanding membership on its central committee, their claim would have arisen under Illinois law. View "Cook County Republican Party v. Sapone" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a judgment dismissing an action seeking to recover money unlawfully collected by the City of Pocatello from users of the City’s water and sewer systems. In 2005, the city government decided that the City should be able to operate its water and sewer systems at a profit like private utilities. By law, the City was required to charge and collect sufficient fees so that its water and sewer systems “shall be and always remain self-supporting.” Those fees had to be sufficient to pay when due all bonds and interest as required by Idaho Code section 50-1032(a) and “to provide for all expenses of operation and maintenance of such works . . . , including reserves therefor,” as required by Idaho Code section 50-1032(b). The City wanted to obtain a profit in excess of the amounts necessary for the water and sewer systems to remain self-supporting. This profit was paid into the general fund. The City instituted a program called "PILOT," which stood for payment in lieu of taxes, under which city-owned water and sewer departments paid "property taxes" to the City as if they were private entities, and the departments then passed this cost on to their customers. The “property taxes” were then paid into the City’s general fund. Plaintiffs sought a refund of the PILOT sums that they had paid. In granting summary judgment, the district court held that the imposition of the PILOT was not a compensable taking. The district court appeared to rely upon two grounds for that decision: (1) "Some courts have made that determination on the grounds that money is not 'property' within the meaning of the Takings Clause," and (2) "Other courts ‘have concluded that governmental-imposed obligations to pay money are not the sort of governmental actions subject to a takings analysis.?” The Idaho Supreme Court determined both of these rationales were incorrect, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hill-Vu Mobile Home Pk v. City of Pocatello" on Justia Law

The Jackson County Michigan Board of Commissioners begins its monthly meetings with a Christian prayer. Bormuth, a non-Christian resident, attended meetings because he was concerned about environmental issues. During the prayer, Bormuth was the only one in attendance who did not rise and bow his head. Bormuth felt isolated and worried that the Commissioners would hold his action against him. He raised the First Amendment issue during a public comment period. The Commissioners reacted with “disgust.” Bormuth filed suit asserting that this prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause. The Commissioners declined Bormuth’s application to serve on an environmental committee. The district court granted the County summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit initially reversed, but on rehearing, en banc, affirmed. “Since the founding of our Republic, Congress, state legislatures, and many municipal bodies have commenced legislative sessions with a prayer.” Jackson County’s invocation practice is consistent with the Supreme Court’s legislative prayer decisions and does not violate the Establishment Clause. View "Bormuth v. County of Jackson" on Justia Law

J.S. challenged her involuntary commitment to the Montana State Hospital (MSH). The only issue J.S. raised on appeal waswhether she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. J.S. suffered from bipolar disorder. She exhibited signs of psychosis and delusions after being “clipped” by a car and hit by the car’s mirror. She sustained several cuts and abrasions. Less than a month after being hit by a car, J.S. was taken to the emergency room for a severe cut on her leg that was untreated. J.S. was unable to communicate due to her extreme level of psychosis and delusional thinking. She was paranoid, irritable, and unable to consent to voluntary treatment. The cuts were dead tissue, which if not treated correctly, could have lead to the loss of the limb. Treatment of the wound required J.S. to change the dressings twice a day and take two antibiotics, one of which J.S. had to take four times a day and the other two times a day. J.S. would need to maintain supplies, and health officials were concerned, due to her presenting mental condition, J.S. would be unable to care for herself. The State sought to involuntarily commit J.S. to MSH. The district court ordered the commitment, and J.S. appealed, raising only an ineffective-assistance claim, rather than challenge the commitment itself. The Montana Supreme Court found no Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel for a civil commitment proceeding, and as such, rejected J.S.’ claim. The order of commitment was affirmed. View "Matter of J.S." on Justia Law