Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Town of Apple Valley (Town) and real-party-in-interest and appellant Wal-mart Stores, Inc. (Walmart) appealed the grant of the motion for summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-respondent Gabriel Hernandez. This case involved a measure passed by the Town’s electorate in a special election (Initiative) that amended the general plan to allow for a 30-acre commercial development, which would include a Walmart Supercenter. Walmart provided a gift to Town to pay for the election and Town accepted the payment by adopting a memorandum of understanding (MOU) at a regular council meeting held on August 13, 2013. Hernandez argued the agenda for the Town’s council meeting failed to provide the proper notice of the actions to be taken at the meeting, e.g., that the Town council would vote to send the Initiative to the voters and approving the MOU that accepted the gift from Walmart to pay for the special election. Further, Hernandez alleged that although Walmart was not specifically named in the Initiative, it was clear from the other ballot materials that Walmart was identified within the meaning of article II, section 12 rendering the Initiative unconstitutional. The trial court granted the Motion finding the MOU and Initiative were void and invalid. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Motion was properly granted on the violation of the Brown Act, which invalidated the special election on the Initiative. Since it was likely that the matter would again be placed on the ballot or voted on by the Town council, the Court of Appeal also found that the Initiative as written did not violate article II, section 12. The award of costs was reversed as the memorandum of costs was filed late without a showing by counsel that such late filing was due to mistake of law, inadvertence, or surprise. The attorney fee award was affirmed. View "Hernandez v. Town of Apple Valley" on Justia Law

Petitioners Representative Donald Turner, Jr. and Senator Joseph Benning, sought to enjoin respondent Governor Peter Shumlin (whose last day in office was January 5, 2017), from appointing a successor to the office held by Associate Justice John Dooley, whose term was set to expire April 1, 2017. Justice Dooley did not file a declaration with the Office of the Secretary of State indicating that he would seek retention for another term beyond March 31, 2017, the last day of his then-current six-year term. On December 21, 2016, Representative Turner filed a petition for quo warranto contesting the Governor's authority to appoint Justice Dooley's successor, asserting that although the Vermont Constitution authorized the Governor to fill a vacancy on the Court, no vacancy would exist until Justice Dooley left office nearly three months after Governor Shumlin left his office. The Supreme Court concluded that the Vermont Constitution did not authorize the Governor to appoint an Associate Justice in anticipation of a vacancy that was not expected to occur until the expiration of the justice's term of office, which would occur months after the Governor left office. "In so holding, we emphasize that our decision today rests entirely upon the meaning and purpose of the Vermont Constitution. We reach our decision having in mind the overarching principles of our democracy: the integrity of our governing institutions and the people's confidence in them. The particular identity of the parties or potential nominees to the Office of Associate Justice have no bearing on our decision. Our sole responsibility in this, as in any, case is to apply the law evenhandedly, regardless of the identity of the litigants, the sensitivity of the issues, or the passing political interests of the moment." View "Turner v. Shumlin" on Justia Law

California firefighters and their union sought to compel the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) to continue to enforce Government Code 20909, and allow eligible public employees to purchase at cost up to five years of nonqualifying service credit (airtime) to increase pension benefits paid in retirement, by increasing their service credit. The option was eliminated as of January 1, 2013 under the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act (PEPRA), a reform measure designed to strengthen the state’s public pension system and ensure its ongoing solvency. (Government Code 7522.46, 20909(g)). Plaintiffs argued that elimination of the option violated the California Constitution contracts clause (Art. I, section 9), so that CalPERS lacked authority to refuse to consider applications for the credit. The trial court and court of appeal rejected the argument. Modification of the statute governing airtime service credit was wholly reasonable and carried “some material relation to the theory of a pension system and its successful operation.” Plaintiffs are entitled only to a “reasonable” pension, not one providing fixed or definite benefits immune from modification or elimination by the governing body, and did not establish that elimination of their right to purchase airtime credit cost them their right to a reasonable pension. View "Cal Fire Local 2881 v. California Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an administrative action against Colorado businessman David Bandimere, alleging he violated various securities laws. An SEC ALJ presided over a trial-like hearing. The ALJ's initial decision concluded petitioner Bandimere was liable, barred him from the securities industry, ordered him to cease and desist from violating securities laws, imposed civil penalties, and ordered disgorgement. The SEC reviewed the initial decision and reached a similar result in a separate opinion. In his petition to the Tenth Circuit, petitioner challenged the SEC's opinion as a whole, including both his securities fraud and registration liability, based on a constitutional argument, contending that the ALJ that presided over his hearing had been appointed in violation of Appointments Clause. The Tenth Circuit's decision with respect to this argument "relieves Mr. Bandimere of all liability." During the SEC's review, the agency addressed petitioner's argument that the ALJ was an "inferior officer," as was contemplated by the Federal Constitution. The SEC conceded the ALJ had not been constitutionally appointed, but rejected petitioner's argument because, in its view, the ALJ was not an inferior officer. The Tenth Circuit, after careful consideration, concluded that indeed, the ALJ was an inferior officer. "Nothing in this opinion should be read to answer any but the precise question before this court: whether SEC ALJs are employees or inferior officers. [. . .] Having answered the question before us, and thus resolved Mr. Bandimere's petition, we must leave for another day any other putative consequences of that conclusion." The SEC ALJ held his office unconstitutionally when he presided over petitioner's hearing. View "Bandimere v. U.S. SEC" on Justia Law

Maliandi alleges that she began working for Montclair State University (MSU) in 2007 and took medical leave for breast cancer treatment in 2013. Despite having complied with all policies and procedures for taking such leave, Maliandi allegedly was denied her original position when she returned and instead was offered an inferior position, which she declined. She was subsequently terminated. Maliandi then filed suit against MSU, citing the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. 10:5-1 to -49. The district court denied a motion dismiss, determining that MSU is not the state’s alter ego for purpose of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, applying a balancing test to the “close case” and concluding that MSU is an arm of the state. While the funding factor counsels against immunity the status under state law and autonomy factors weigh in favor of extending MSU immunity from suit. In analyzing the funding factor, the court considered the state’s legal obligation to pay a money judgment entered against MSU; alternative sources of funding from which MSU could pay such judgments; and specific statutory provisions that immunize the state from liability for money judgments. View "Maliandi v. Montclair State University" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from efforts to recover Secretary of State Clinton's private emails during her time at the State Department. Although the current Secretary (with the help of the National Archivist) has made efforts to recover those emails, neither the Secretary nor the Archivist has asked the Attorney General to initiate enforcement proceedings, as provided for in the Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. 3105(1). Appellants Judicial Watch and Cause of Action filed suit for agency action unlawfully withheld in violation of Section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(1). The district court dismissed the suits as moot. The court concluded that, because the current Secretary and Archivist have neither asked the Attorney General for help nor shown that such a request could not lead to recovery of additional emails, the suits were not moot. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. The court remanded the case so that the district court can consider the merits in the first instance. View "Judicial Watch v. Kerry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Reid appealed a superior court decision that denied his petition under the Right-to-Know Law, to compel defendant, New Hampshire Attorney General Joseph Foster, to produce unredacted records of the Attorney General’s investigation into alleged wrongdoing by former Rockingham County Attorney James Reams. On appeal, plaintiff argued: (1) the trial court’s ruling violated Part I, Article 8 of the New Hampshire Constitution; (2) that the trial court erred in determining that the investigative records at issue were “[r]ecords pertaining to internal personnel practices,” because the attorney general’s investigation cannot be considered “internal”; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that the attorney general’s investigation of Reams was “conducted jointly with Rockingham County.” “Because we decide cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary,” the New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed plaintiff’s second argument, which raised an issue of statutory interpretation. In it, plaintiff argued that the trial court erroneously “applied a subject matter exemption contrary to the plain language of RSA 91-A:5[,] IV.” Fundamentally, plaintiff’s argument was that records of the defendant’s investigation of Reams did not “pertain[] to internal personnel practices,” because “[t]he Attorney General is simply not the County Attorney’s employer.” The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff’s statutory interpretation and, therefore, vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reid v. New Hampshire Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were four bus companies operating buses over routes in and around the cities of New Britian and Hartford. Each plaintiff had authority to operate a bus service over a specific route pursuant to a certificate of public convenience and necessity. When a new busway was constructed by the state, the state sought to hire new companies to operate buses over the routes Plaintiffs currently operate. In a separate action, Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Commissioner of Transportation from transferring the routes at issue to new operators. While that case was pending, the Commissioner condemned the certificates pursuant to the State’s power of eminent domain. Plaintiff filed the actions that were the subject of this appeal, claiming that the Commissioner lacked the statutory authority to condemn their certificates. The trial court consolidated the actions and granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 13b-36(a) gave the Commissioner authority to condemn the certificates. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend for the term “facilities” in the statute to refer to intangible operating rights reflected in the certificates at issue. View "Dattco, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transportation" on Justia Law

At issue in this matter was a development by Sunroad Enterprises and Sunroad Centrum Partners L.P. (together, Sunroad) of an office, residential, and retail project in the Kearny Mesa area of San Diego. Since 1997 the City of San Diego (the City) Council has approved the area for development under a master plan and over the ensuing years has thrice assessed the project for environmental impacts as required by CEQA. In 2012, Sunroad obtained a permit from the City to begin certain phases of residential development, including constructing several multilevel buildings over parking and ground level retail space. By the next year, Sunroad modified its design plans, ostensibly to meet real estate market demands, and sought the City's approval of the modified plans through a process known as substantial conformance review (SCR). The City's staff found that the modified plans substantially conformed with the conditions and requirements of the previously issued development permit and there was no need for further environmental impact documentation under CEQA. San Diegans for Open Government and CREED-21 (together, plaintiffs) appealed the staff's decision to the City Planning Commission. Following a public hearing, the Planning Commission voted to uphold the SCR decision. The City denied plaintiffs' appeal to the City Council. Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to appeal the SCR decision to the City Council under CEQA and the San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC). The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "San Diegans for Open Govt. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

This case arose from the Broward County (Florida) Sheriff’s potential liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for failing to rehire a former deputy allegedly due to his political loyalties and in violation of his First Amendment rights. Broward County has expressly designated its sheriff as its chief correctional officer (CCO); thus, at issue in this case was the basic question whether a Florida county sheriff, acting in his capacity as chief correctional officer in the hiring and firing of his deputies, was an arm of the state entitled to the benefit of the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. After careful review, and having the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a Florida sheriff was not an arm of the state when acting in this capacity. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Sheriff and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Stanley v. Broward County Sheriff" on Justia Law