Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Rothe filed suit alleging that the statutory basis of the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) business development program, Amendments to the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 637, violates its right to equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Rothe is a small business that bids on Defense Department contracts, including the types of subcontracts that the SBA awards to economically and socially disadvantaged businesses through the 8(a) program. The court rejected Rothe's claim that the statute contains an unconstitutional racial classification that prevents Rothe from competing for Department of Defense contracts on an equal footing with minority-owned businesses. The court concluded that the provisions of the Small Business Act that Rothe challenges do not on their face classify individuals by race. In contrast to the statute, the SBA’s regulation implementing the 8(a) program does contain a racial classification in the form of a presumption that an individual who is a member of one of five designated racial groups (and within them, 37 subgroups) is socially disadvantaged. Because the statute lacks a racial classification, and because Rothe has not alleged that the statute is otherwise subject to strict scrutiny, the court applied rational-basis review. Under rational-basis review, the court concluded that the statutory scheme is rationally related to the legitimate, and in some instances compelling, interest of counteracting discrimination. Finally, Rothe's evidentiary and nondelegation challenges failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment granting summary judgment to the SBA and DOD. View "Rothe Development v. DOD" on Justia Law

In February 2011, plaintiff Harald Mark Galzinski filed a citizen’s complaint to the Sacramento Police Department against three of the department’s officers related to the taking of biological samples from him following his arrest in December 2003. In July 2014, the department’s internal affairs division notified Galzinski that the division had “reviewed [his] complaint” but “no further action” would be taken on it because, “[b]ased upon the information [Galzinski] provided, the issues [he] raised pertain[ed] to points of law which should have been litigated during [his] criminal trial in 2005. Therefore, the proper venue for resolving [his] complaint would be through the appeals process.” Galzinski sought a writ of mandate from the superior court to compel defendant Samuel D. Somers Jr., Chief of the Sacramento Police Department, and three sergeants in the department’s internal affairs division to “properly investigate” his complaint and to “make official findings as to the validity of [his] allegations.” The superior court denied Galzinski’s petition, concluding that the department had “essentially” found the officers Galzinski accused of misconduct were “ ‘exonerated’ ” and that, in any event, the department did not abuse its discretion “in responding to the complaint in the way that it did.” After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in denying Galzinski’s petition: the procedure for addressing citizen complaints the department established and published obligated the department to conduct an investigation into the allegations of the complaint was sufficient to allow the Chief of Police to make one of four possible findings. Defendants did not comply with these obligations, and Galzinski was entitled to a writ of mandate compelling defendants to perform their ministerial duty to satisfy the obligations imposed by the department’s published procedure. View "Galzinski v. Somers" on Justia Law

Benjamin Garcia appealed a Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision revoking his driving privileges for 180 days. After review, the Supreme Court concluded a police officer's initial approach of Garcia's parked vehicle was not a seizure and a reasonable and articulable suspicion supported the officer's further investigation. Furthermore, the Court concluded North Dakota's test refusal statute and implied consent laws were not unconstitutional as applied in this case, because Garcia refused the police officer's warrantless request to take a chemical breath test after he had been arrested. View "Garcia v. Levi" on Justia Law

Jimmy Johnson fled from police after being stopped for having an expired vehicle license. Armed, Johnson went to a Carolina Convenience Store in Spartanburg, where he took Saroj Patel hostage. The City's police department negotiated with Johnson in an effort to encourage Johnson to surrender. After the negotiations were unsuccessful, the police department cut off the power to the store and sent tear gas and pepper spray into the building's ventilation system in another attempt to induce surrender. After a twelve-hour standoff, the police decided to breach the building with a bulldozer, which resulted in severe physical damage to the property. Given the condition of the store, the City asked Carolina Convenience to tear it down for code violations. After Carolina Convenience refused, the City demolished the building. Carolina Convenience then brought claims for inverse condemnation and negligence against the City for damages to the store. The circuit court granted the City's summary judgment motion as to the inverse condemnation claim, but denied it as to the negligence claim. The jury returned a verdict in the City's favor as to the negligence claim. The store appealed only the inverse condemnation ruling, but the court of appeals affirmed, finding the circuit court properly granted summary judgment as to the inverse condemnation claim. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of the takings claim, the South Carolina Supreme Court simply held that damage to the property during the police department’s hostage rescue effort did not constitute a taking as contemplated by the State Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision as modified. View "Carolina Convenience Stores v. City of Spartanburg" on Justia Law

Rebirth ran a child care ministry—a “child care operated by a church or religious ministry that is a religious organization exempt from federal income taxation,” Ind. Code 12‐7‐2‐28.8. After an unannounced inspection, a Bureau of Child Care employee gave Rebirth a “Plan of Improvement,” stating that Rebirth had violated statutes and regulations governing registered child care ministries and directed Rebirth to cure the purported infractions and submit proof within 10 days. Rebirth believed that it had not committed any violations and did not submit any documentation. The Bureau sent Rebirth a notice of termination. Despite Rebirth’s request to appeal administratively, the Bureau terminated Rebirth’s registration and the child care operation closed. Indiana’s statutory scheme does not give providers an administrative opportunity to challenge the decision to revoke a certificate of registration. Rebirth sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the due‐process clause. The district court dismissed Rebirth’s individual‐capacity claims, citing qualified immunity. After the parties developed an evidentiary record on the official‐capacity claims, Rebirth prevailed on its claims for injunctive relief. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the individual-capacity claims, concluding that the complaint adequately alleged that the defendants violated clearly established law by depriving Rebirth of a property interest (its registration) without first providing any opportunity to be heard. View "Rebirth Christian Acad. Daycare, Inc. v. Brizzi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are Hawaiian residents who challenge the recent efforts by a group of Native Hawaiians to establish their own government. Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s order denying their request for a preliminary injunction to stop activities related to the drafting and ratification of self-governance documents. Separately, another group of Hawaii residents appeals the district court’s denial of their motion to intervene in plaintiffs’ lawsuit. Before the district court, plaintiffs focused their injunction request on the delegation election. That election, however, has been cancelled, and plaintiffs do not argue that similar elections will occur in the future. The court affirmed the dismissal of the interlocutory appeal as moot, concluding that there is no reasonable expectation that plaintiffs will be subject to the same injury again, given the disavowal of any election. Further, the district court retains jurisdiction over the underlying lawsuit, and dismissing the preliminary injunction appeal will not, by itself, insulate defendants’ practices from judicial scrutiny. The court also affirmed the district court's order denying intervention as of right where the court agreed with the district court that the prospective intervenors’ interests would not, as a practical matter, be impaired or impeded as a result of plaintiffs’ litigation. The district court properly reasoned that the prospective intervenors’ claims would raise entirely different issues from those raised by plaintiffs, and that the proposed intervenors could adequately protect their interests in separate litigation. View "Akina v. Hawaii" on Justia Law

In a prison discipline proceeding, prisoner William Johnson was found guilty of possessing contraband. He appealed his punishment to a discipline committee, which affirmed the decision. Represented by counsel, Johnson appealed to the superior court, alleging that the Department of Corrections had deprived him of due process. The court granted the State’s unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the prisoner’s statement of points on appeal was deficient. When Johnson moved for reconsideration but made no attempt to remedy the deficiency, the superior court denied his motion and awarded the State attorney’s fees. Johnson appealed the dismissal and the award of attorney’s fees. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Illinois Constitution of 1970 may be amended by constitutional convention; the General Assembly; or ballot initiatives, Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, sects. 1, 2, 3. Ballot initiatives may only be used for amendments directed at “structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV,” pertaining to Illinois’s legislative branch. The ballot initiative at issue addresses redistricting to redraw the legislative and representative districts following each federal decennial census. In May 2016, SIM filed with the Secretary of State a petition proposing the amendment of article IV, section 3, to replace the current system for redrawing Illinois’s legislative and representative districts. The General Assembly’s role would be eliminated from the process, with primary responsibility for drawing legislative and representative districts falling to a new “Independent Redistricting Commission” selected through a process involving limited legislative input. The State Board of Elections determined that the petition received more than the required number of valid signatures. Days after submission of the petition, a “taxpayer’s suit” was filed (735 ILCS 5/11-303), seeking to enjoin the disbursal of public funds to determine the petition’s compliance with the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/1-1. The circuit court found that the petition did not comply with requirements for inclusion on the ballot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, citing “the plain language of article XIV, section 3.” View "Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), overseen by the USDA, is administered by the states, 7 U.S.C. 2011–2036c. An individual is ineligible for SNAP benefits if he is “fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction . . . for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing.” Michigan’s implementation barred assistance to anyone “subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual.” Michigan had an automated program that compared the list of public-assistance recipients with a list of outstanding felony warrants maintained by the Michigan State Police; when the program identified a match, it automatically closed the recipient’s file and generated a notice of the termination of benefits. In 2015 the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated 7 C.F.R. 273.11(n), clarifying disqualification of fugitive felons. Plaintiffs challenged Michigan's automatic disqualification and notice process. The court certified a class, held that Michigan policy violated the SNAP Act and the Constitution, and issued an injunction requiring Michigan to refrain from automatic disqualifications based solely on the existence of a felony warrant and to provide adequate notices of valid disqualification. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the plaintiffs lacked standing, of mootness, that there is no SNAP Act private right of action, and that Michigan's methods were valid. View "Barry v. Lyon" on Justia Law

John Doe appealed a superior court ruling in favor of Elizabeth Canner. Canner requested access to records relating to Doe’s arrest and prosecution under the New Hampshire Right-to-Know Law. Prior to the filing of Canner’s Right-to-Know requests, Doe had filed a petition for annulment under RSA 651:5 (2016). While Canner’s request was pending, Doe’s annulment petition was granted. The trial court concluded that, notwithstanding the fact that Doe’s petition for annulment had been granted, records relating to Doe’s arrest and prosecution were not categorically exempt from public inspection under the Right-to-Know Law. This case presented an issue of first impression in New Hampshire for the New Hampshire Supreme Court: whether records maintained by arresting and prosecuting agencies pertaining to an annulled arrest and the related prosecution are categorically exempt from public inspection under the Right-to-Know Law. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the superior court's decision and affirmed. View "Grafton County Attorney's Office v. Canner" on Justia Law