Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Department of Transportation petitioned to acquire property owned by Amerco Real Estate Co. and occupied by U-Haul Co. by eminent domain, asserting that the property in question was necessary for a highway expansion project. U-Haul opposed the petition, asserting that the Department lacked authority to condemn its land on grounds that the statutory perquisites for acquiring land in the manner the Department used, were not met. The district court declined to dismiss the petition and instead granted the Department's motion for immediate possession. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the transportation commission's enabling legislation, to the extent that it purported to delegate to the Department the choice of particular properties to be taken for highway projects and the manner of their taking, was an unlawful delegation of the commission's statutorily imposed obligation. The case was remanded back to the district court for dismissal of the Department's original petition. View "Colorado Dept. of Transportation v. Amerco Real Estate" on Justia Law

Brayan Alexis Osuna-Gutierrez was arrested in Kansas. He was a passenger in a rental vehicle on a cross-country trip. The police found approximately seven grams of marijuana belonging to Gutierrez that he had legally purchased in Colorado. Police also found approximately three kilograms of methamphetamine in the rear portion of the car. The government charged Gutierrez and his co-defendants with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Gutierrez ultimately pled guilty to “Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute" (the government dropped the methamphetamine charges). The district court sentenced him to time served, approximately seven months. After leaving jail, Gutierrez was immediately transferred to immigration custody and served with Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order (the expedited removal process). During the removal process, an officer within DHS concluded that Gutierrez was not a legal permanent resident, having come to the United States from Mexico with his mother when he was one year old without being legally admitted. Further, Gutierrez had pled guilty to an aggravated felony. Gutierrez timely petitioned for review of his removal and was deported back to Mexico. Gutierrez argued his deportation was improper because: (1) the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) expedited removal process is illegal; and (2) in any event, it was improper for DHS to use the expedited removal process on Gutierrez because he pled guilty to a misdemeanor, not a felony. The Tenth Circuit found Gutierrez was wrong on both counts, and denied Gutierrez's petition for review. View "Osuna-Gutierrez v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In "Taggert v. Washington," (822 P.2d 243 (1992)), the Washington Supreme Court held that the State could be held liable for crimes committed by parolees if those crimes resulted from the State's negligence in supervising the parolees. Plaintiffs asked the Court to extend "Taggert" to hold that a county jail could be held liable for crimes committed by a former inmate. The crimes at issue in this matter were committed well after the inmate served his time, and long after the county had any duty (or ability) to supervise him. The former inmate in this case was incarcerated for nonviolent crimes, and released approximately one year later. Shortly after release, the former inmate had a psychotic episode and went on a shooting spree, killing six people and injuring several others. Some of his victims and their families (plaintiffs) sued a number of parties, thus implicating the "Taggert" holding. Plaintiffs argued that the jail could have prevented the inmate from committing crimes after he was released, but the Court concluded a jail's duty to supervise and control inmates during incarceration did not include a general duty to somehow prevent inmates from committing crimes after they are lawfully released from incarceration. The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment order in favor of Skagit County. View "Binschus v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Integrity and Buentello filed suit against the City, alleging that its refusal to include them on the non-consent tow list violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal, the City challenged the district court's order requiring it to include plaintiffs on the City's non-consent tow list and to develop neutral criteria for that list. The court has previously held that a class-of-one equal-protection claim is unavailable in a public employment context. The court concluded that this conclusion logically applies as well to a local government’s discretionary decision to include or not include a company on a non-consent tow list. In the alternative, the court concluded that Integrity and Buentello’s class-of-one equal-protection claim fails because they have not shown that the City had a discriminatory intent and because the City has a rational basis for excluding them. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered a judgment of dismissal for the City. View "Integrity Collision Center v. City of Fulshear" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Township of Franklin (the Township) adopted an ordinance revising its regulation of signs, including billboards. The ordinance permits billboards, subject to multiple conditions, in a zoning district proximate to an interstate highway but expressly prohibited digital billboards anywhere in the municipality. A company seeking to install a digital billboard challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Law Division declared unconstitutional that portion of the ordinance barring digital billboards. The trial court viewed the Township's treatment of such devices as a total ban on a mode of communication. In a reported opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. Applying the "Central Hudson" commercial speech standard and the "Clark/Ward" time, place, and manner standard to content-neutral regulations affecting speech, the appellate panel determined that the ban on digital billboards passed constitutional muster. The Supreme Court disagreed: "simply invoking aesthetics and public safety to ban a type of sign, without more, does not carry the day." The Court declared the 2010 ban on digital billboards as unconstitutional and reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "E&J Equities v. Board of Adjustment of Franklin Township" on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon, Inc. (ACLU), made a request under the Oregon Public Records law to inspect and copy certain documents of the Civilian Review Board of the City of Eugene pertaining to city police officers' use of a Taser against "Mr." Van Ornum. The request was ultimately denied, and the ACLU sued for release of the documents under ORS 192.420 (1). The City of Eugene cited, as grounds for its denial the records request, a conditional exemption in the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the exemption did not apply when “the public interest requires disclosure of the information. . . .[W]hen that exemption applies, a trial court must determine, as a matter of both law and fact, the nature and significance of two competing interests - the public’s interest in disclosure and the public body’s interest in confidentiality. Then, the court must balance those competing interests and determine, as a matter of law, which interest predominates." In this case, after considering the nature and significance of the competing interests, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the public interest in disclosure of the requested records predominates, and the trial court erred in declining to order their disclosure. View "American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Eugene" on Justia Law

When the finances of a Michigan municipality or public school system are in jeopardy, state law, the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, Public Act 436, allows temporary appointment of an emergency manager, with extensive powers that arguably displace all of those of the local governmental officials. Plaintiffs, voters in areas with emergency managers and local elected officials in place, claimed that, by vesting elected officials’ powers in appointed individuals, the law violates their substantive due process right to elect local legislative officials and violates the Constitution’s guarantee, Article IV, section 4, of a republican form of government. They also asserted claims under the First and Thirteenth amendments and under the Voting Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. It is up to the political branches of the federal government to determine whether a state has met its federal constitutional obligation to maintain a republican form of government. The financial conditions of plaintiffs’ localities are the reasons for the appointments of the emergency managers. An entity in a distressed financial state can cause harm to its citizenry and the state in general. Improving the financial situation of a distressed locality is a legitimate legislative purpose, and PA 436 is rationally related to that purpose. View "Phillips v. Snyder" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama Board of Education ("SBOE") and several of its executive directors petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss claims filed against them by respondent Sharper Adams and numerous employees of the Birmingham Board of Education (BBOE). Petitioners sought to have all claims dismissed with prejudice on immunity grounds. The BBOE failed to submit a financial-recovery plan to the SBOE by an April 2, 2012, deadline, and its minimum-reserve fund remained underfunded. Once complete, the financial-recovery plan included, among other things, a reduction in force ("RIF"), which required that the jobs of the respondents, among others, be eliminated. The circuit court determined that petitioners had violated the respondents' federal due-process rights by depriving them of their property interest without due process of law because, the circuit court concluded, the petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Students First Act ("the SFA"). Specifically, the circuit court concluded that the SFA, a state law, required that the respondents receive notice of the fact that the implementation of the RIF would result in the termination of their employment positions with the BBOE and that the petitioners failed to give the respondents such notice. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the respondents' federal due-process rights had been violated. After review, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition in part, and denied it in part. The Court granted the petition with regard to claims against the individual administrators in their official capacities, finding they were entitled to immunity. The Court denied the petition with regard to claims agains the SBOE. View "Ex parte State of Alabama Board of Education et al." on Justia Law

Rothe filed suit alleging that the statutory basis of the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) business development program, Amendments to the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 637, violates its right to equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Rothe is a small business that bids on Defense Department contracts, including the types of subcontracts that the SBA awards to economically and socially disadvantaged businesses through the 8(a) program. The court rejected Rothe's claim that the statute contains an unconstitutional racial classification that prevents Rothe from competing for Department of Defense contracts on an equal footing with minority-owned businesses. The court concluded that the provisions of the Small Business Act that Rothe challenges do not on their face classify individuals by race. In contrast to the statute, the SBA’s regulation implementing the 8(a) program does contain a racial classification in the form of a presumption that an individual who is a member of one of five designated racial groups (and within them, 37 subgroups) is socially disadvantaged. Because the statute lacks a racial classification, and because Rothe has not alleged that the statute is otherwise subject to strict scrutiny, the court applied rational-basis review. Under rational-basis review, the court concluded that the statutory scheme is rationally related to the legitimate, and in some instances compelling, interest of counteracting discrimination. Finally, Rothe's evidentiary and nondelegation challenges failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment granting summary judgment to the SBA and DOD. View "Rothe Development v. DOD" on Justia Law

In February 2011, plaintiff Harald Mark Galzinski filed a citizen’s complaint to the Sacramento Police Department against three of the department’s officers related to the taking of biological samples from him following his arrest in December 2003. In July 2014, the department’s internal affairs division notified Galzinski that the division had “reviewed [his] complaint” but “no further action” would be taken on it because, “[b]ased upon the information [Galzinski] provided, the issues [he] raised pertain[ed] to points of law which should have been litigated during [his] criminal trial in 2005. Therefore, the proper venue for resolving [his] complaint would be through the appeals process.” Galzinski sought a writ of mandate from the superior court to compel defendant Samuel D. Somers Jr., Chief of the Sacramento Police Department, and three sergeants in the department’s internal affairs division to “properly investigate” his complaint and to “make official findings as to the validity of [his] allegations.” The superior court denied Galzinski’s petition, concluding that the department had “essentially” found the officers Galzinski accused of misconduct were “ ‘exonerated’ ” and that, in any event, the department did not abuse its discretion “in responding to the complaint in the way that it did.” After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in denying Galzinski’s petition: the procedure for addressing citizen complaints the department established and published obligated the department to conduct an investigation into the allegations of the complaint was sufficient to allow the Chief of Police to make one of four possible findings. Defendants did not comply with these obligations, and Galzinski was entitled to a writ of mandate compelling defendants to perform their ministerial duty to satisfy the obligations imposed by the department’s published procedure. View "Galzinski v. Somers" on Justia Law