Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

"This appeal is heavy, very heavy, on procedure." Plaintiff-appellee Peggy Walton worked in the New Mexico State Land Office. She was a political appointee of the elected Republican Land Commissioner, Patrick Lyons. Lyons’s decision not to seek reelection for a third term put plaintiff's job at risk: as a political appointee, a new administration could easily dismiss her. To see that she remained employed with the state, Lyons appointed plaintiff to a senior civil service job where she’d be protected by state law against removal for political reasons. A local television reporter ran a report titled “[c]ronies move up as officials move out” - a report highly critical of Lyons and plaintiff. Another reporter introducing the story aired his view that plaintiff was “distinctly unqualified” for her new job and claimed the hiring was “rigged.” Ray Powell, the newly elected Democratic candidate, dismissed plaintiff. Eight days after making the decision to dismiss her but before announcing it publicly, Powell held a meeting with the land office’s advisory board; "glared across the conference table" at plaintiff, spoke of the television news report denouncing her appointment; and, referring to her in all but name, said he “was concerned about . . . ‘protected employees’” who “for some reason didn’t have to meet the leadership criteria” for their appointments. Plaintiff sued when she was dismissed, arguing that she was a protected civil service employee, and under New Mexico Law, Powell had unlawfully retaliated against her for exercising her right to free political association in violation of the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In reply and at summary judgment. Powell claimed qualified immunity. But the district court denied the motion and set the case for trial. Powell appealed, and finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of summary judgment. View "Walton v. NM State Land Office" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale electricity sales. States regulate retail sales. In states that have deregulated their energy markets, “load serving entities” (LSEs) purchase wholesale electricity from generators for delivery to retail consumers. PJM, which manages segments of the electricity grid, operates an auction to identify need for new generation and to accommodate long-term contracts. PJM predicts demand for three years and assigns a share of that demand to each participating LSE. Producers enter bids. PJM accepts bids until it purchases enough capacity to satisfy anticipated demand. All accepted sellers receive the highest accepted rate (clearing price). LSEs then must purchase, from PJM, electricity to satisfy their assigned share. FERC regulates the auction to ensure a reasonable clearing price. Concerned that the auction was not encouraging development of sufficient new in-state generation, Maryland enacted a program, selected CPV to construct a new power plant and required LSEs to enter into 20-year contracts with CPV. Under the contract, CPV sells its capacity to PJM through the auction, but—through mandated payments from LSEs—receives the state price rather than the clearing price. The district court issued a declaratory judgment holding that Maryland’s program improperly sets CPV's rate for interstate wholesale capacity sales to PJM. The Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Maryland’s program is preempted because it disregards the rate FERC requires under its exclusive authority over interstate wholesale sales, 16 U.S.C. 824(b)(1). FERC has approved PJM’s capacity auction as the sole rate-setting mechanism for those sales. Maryland attempts to guarantee CPV a rate distinct from the clearing price, contrary to the Federal Power Act’s division of authority; states may not seek to achieve ends, however legitimate, through regulatory means that intrude on FERC’s authority. View "Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC" on Justia Law

Hyatt claims that he moved from California to Nevada in 1991, but the Franchise Tax Board of California claimed that he moved in 1992 and owed California millions in taxes, penalties, and interest. Hyatt sued in Nevada state court, which had jurisdiction over California under the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision, Nevada v. Hall, seeking damages for abusive audit and investigation practices. After the Supreme Court affirmed that Nevada courts, as a matter of comity, would immunize California to the same extent that Nevada law would immunize its own agencies and officials, Hyatt was awarded almost $500 million. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed $1 million of the award and ordered a retrial on another damages issue, declining to apply a $50,000 cap that would apply in a similar suit against its own officials because California’s efforts to control its agencies were inadequate as applied to Nevada’s citizens. The Supreme Court vacated the award, while affirming Nevada’s exercise of jurisdiction. The Constitution does not permit Nevada to apply a rule of Nevada law that awards damages against California that are greater than it could award against Nevada in similar circumstances. The rule applied here is not only “opposed” to California’s law of complete immunity, it is inconsistent with general principles of Nevada immunity law. The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision lacked a “healthy regard for California’s sovereign status.” “Nevada’s hostility toward California is clearly evident in its decision to devise a special, discriminatory damages rule that applies only to a sister state.” View "Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Donna Green appealed a superior court decision to enter judgment in favor of defendants School Administrative Unit #55 (SAU), Timberlane Regional School District, Nancy Steenson, and Earl F. Metzler, II. This matter arose out of Green's request for documents under the Right to Know law; the trial court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to receive electronic copies of documents that she had requested from defendants. Responding to her request for documents, Steenson, the chair of the school board, told plaintiff could make an appointment to “see the documents” that she had requested. Plaintiff replied, “in that case, give me the file electronically and we will all save money and time”; in response to this communication, the SAU stated that it had already responded to plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff noted that her “request is for an electronic file . . . or a paper report, whichever suits the district,” and she declined to make an appointment to view the documents. Plaintiff explained that “[a]ll of the documents requested could have been emailed or copied in the time it has taken to answer these excuses for not providing [them]. . . . This isn’t that difficult.” In response, the SAU stated that the documents that she requested were immediately “available for public inspection.” After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court found that both proffered interpretations of RSA 91-A:4, V were reasonable. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Right-to-Know statute was ambiguous. "In light of the purpose of the Right-to-Know Law, and our broad construction of it, we conclude that the trial court erred when it determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to the requested documents in electronic format. Although the SAU notified the plaintiff that the documents that she requested were available for inspection, there is no evidence in the record that the paper documents made available constituted 'original records' as contemplated by RSA 91-A:4, V." Accordingly, the Court concluded plaintiff was entitled to the requested documents in electronic format. View "Green v. School Administrative Unit #55" on Justia Law

Chance Gordon, a licensed California attorney, appealed the district court's order of summary judgment for the CFPB on its enforcement action for violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. 5531, 5536, and Regulation O, 12 C.F.R. 1015.1-11. On January 4, 2012, President Obama, relying on his recess-appointment power, named Richard Cordray as the CFPB’s initial Director. President Obama renominated Cordray as Director on January 24, 2013. The parties agree that while Cordray’s initial January 2012 recess appointment was invalid, his July 2013 confirmation was valid. The court concluded that, while the failure to have a properly confirmed director may raise Article II Appointments Clause issues, it does not implicate the court's Article III jurisdiction to hear this case. That its director was improperly appointed does not alter the Executive Branch’s interest or power in having federal law enforced. The subsequent valid appointment, coupled with Cordray’s August 30, 2013 ratification, cures any initial Article II deficiencies. Because the CFPB had the authority to bring the action at the time Gordon was charged, Cordray’s August 2013 ratification, done after he was properly appointed as Director, resolves any Appointments Clause deficiencies. On the merits, the court concluded that CFPB is entitled to summary judgment on all counts because there is no dispute as to material fact regarding Gordon's liability. Because the district court conscientiously tailored the injunction at issue, it did not abuse its discretion in granting equitable judgment. However, because the district court may have impermissibly entered a monetary judgment against Gordon for a time period prior to the enactment or effective date of the relevant provisions of the CFPA and Regulation O, the court vacated and remanded for further consideration. View "Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting (MFBH) is a Maine ballot question committee that was a proponent of November 2014 Ballot Question 1 concerning bear hunting and trapping. As early as September 2013, the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife used agency resources to communicate with the public in opposition to Question 1. MFBH filed a complaint against the Department alleging that the Department’s campaign activities constituted an ultra vires expenditure of public funds. In November 2014, Maine voters defeated the ballot question. The Department subsequently filed a motion to dismiss MFBH’s complaint on the grounds of mootness and standing. In March 2015, the superior court dismissed the complaint as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case is moot and that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. View "Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

In 2014, Petitioner Theresa Maxwell suffered an injury to her knee while working for her Employer, Respondent Sprint PCS. She promptly notified her Employer and timely filed a CC-Form-3 with the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Employer admitted Petitioner's injury to her knee was compensable, and she had surgery to repair a tendon in her knee. Petitioner also received temporary total disability benefits from February 6, 2014, until February 24, 2014. After reaching maximum medical improvement on July 2, 2014, she returned to her pre-injury position with her employer earning her pre-injury wages. Later that year, Petitioner filed a request for a contested hearing on the issue of permanent partial disability. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner sustained 2% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of the injury to her knee and that the rate of compensation was $323.00 for a total award of $2,261.00. However, because she returned to her pre-injury position and pay, the ALJ ordered the award of benefits be deferred at a rate of $323.00 beginning July 2, 2014, for every week Petitioner worked in her pre-injury or equivalent job. Petitioner appealed the order, and the Workers' Compensation Commission sitting en banc affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that scheduled members are exempt from the AMA Guides under the AWCA. The Court also held that the permanent partial disability deferral provision of 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 45(C)(5) was an unconstitutional violation of due process under Art. 2, section 7.51 Sections 45(C)(5)(a-e) were invalid and stricken. The deferral of permanent partial disability benefits to a subclass of injured workers under 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 46(C) was an unconstitutional special law under Art. 5, sec. 59.52. Only that portion of Section 46(C) that made the deferral provision applicable to injuries to the body as a whole or "other cases" was invalid. Any definitional provisions found in 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 section 2, as were deemed invalid to the extent they were inconsistent with the Court's opinion with regard to this matter. On remand, the Commission, through its ALJs, were mandated to take all action necessary to implement the pronouncement made by this case. View "Maxwell v. Sprint PCS" on Justia Law

Bo Schmidt appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend his driving privileges. Schmidt argued the implied consent advisory was misleading, the chemical test was a warrantless search and North Dakota's refusal statute is unconstitutional. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schmidt v. Levi" on Justia Law

In 2013, the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation (OPRHP) announced the adoption of a regulation prohibiting smoking in each state park located in New York City, as well as other designated areas under the jurisdiction of OPRHP. NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. (CLASH), a nonprofit organization dedicating to protecting the interests of smokers, commenced this hybrid N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action challenging the rule as unconstitutional and in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Supreme Court granted the petition, concluding that the rule violated the separation of powers doctrine. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that OPRHP and its commissioner acted within the confines of OPRHP's legislatively delegated power and did not usurp the authority of the legislature by promulgating the regulation at issue. View "NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. State Office of Parks, Recreation & Historic Pres." on Justia Law

In 2013, the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation (OPRHP) announced the adoption of a regulation prohibiting smoking in each state park located in New York City, as well as other designated areas under the jurisdiction of OPRHP. NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. (CLASH), a nonprofit organization dedicating to protecting the interests of smokers, commenced this hybrid N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action challenging the rule as unconstitutional and in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Supreme Court granted the petition, concluding that the rule violated the separation of powers doctrine. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that OPRHP and its commissioner acted within the confines of OPRHP's legislatively delegated power and did not usurp the authority of the legislature by promulgating the regulation at issue. View "NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. State Office of Parks, Recreation & Historic Pres." on Justia Law