Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, a petition was filed on behalf of the Seacliff Condominium Association for an order requiring Heather R., the owner of a condominium in Seacliff, to undergo an involuntary 72-hour psychiatric evaluation. The petition alleged that Heather was a threat to “herself . . . and her neighbors” based on “[y]ears of confrontation, threats, aberrant and widely swinging behavior suggesting drug use,” including “taking pictures inside people’s houses, inability to have normal social interactions, [and] lying [in] wait to confront neighbors.” After conducting a statutorily required ex parte screening investigation, which did not include an interview with Heather, the superior court master determined that there was probable cause to believe that she was mentally ill and presented a likelihood of serious harm to others. Heather appealed the evaluation order, claiming that the ex parte investigation violated due process and that the master failed to properly conduct the statutorily required screening investigation. Although this appeal was technically moot, the Supreme Court reached the merits of these claims under the public interest exception. The Court vacated the evaluation order because the superior court master failed to conduct the interview as part of the screening investigation required by statute; the Court did not reach the due process question. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Heather R." on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants AMG Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (AMG), and others, appealed an order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiff-respondent City of Corona (the City), requiring defendants to cease using and immediately remove a billboard, or outdoor advertising sign, that AMG erected in the City without a city or state permit. Defendants claimed the City was enforcing Ordinance No. 2729 against them in an impermissibly discriminatory manner, because the City has allowed another billboard operator, Lamar Advertising Company, to erect new billboards in the City, after the 2004 ordinance was enacted, while denying them the right to do so. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded AMG's claim was unsupported by any evidence in the record, and belied by the City’s evidence. Defendants also claimed the 2004 ordinance violated their equal protection rights, was an invalid prior restraint, and violated their free speech rights under the California Constitution. The Court found no constitutional violation or other error, and affirmed the order granting the preliminary injunction. View "City of Corona v. AMG Outdoor Advertising" on Justia Law

In an inverse condemnation action, the issue facing the Court of Appeal was a unique situation, where a state agency assumed control of a local flood control process, and it determined to provide less flood protection than historically provided by a local agency in order to protect environmental resources. Plaintiffs, whose properties suffered flooding damage when the lagoon level rose above eight feet msl, filed this action in 2007 for inverse condemnation. They alleged they suffered a physical taking from the Department’s actions, and a regulatory taking by the Commission retaining land use jurisdiction over the subdivision throughout this time instead of transferring it to the County. Plaintiffs also sought precondemnation damages and statutory attorney fees. The trial court found the Department and the Commission (collectively, the State) liable for a physical taking and awarded damages, but it concluded plaintiffs’ claim for a regulatory taking was barred. It rejected the State’s arguments that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ complaint. It awarded plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount they incurred under a contingency agreement, but it denied plaintiffs any precondemnation damages. Both the State and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment finding the state agency liable in inverse condemnation for a physical taking of plaintiffs’ properties, and not liable for a regulatory taking. The Court reversed the judgment to the extent the court found another state permitting agency liable in inverse condemnation. View "Pacific Shores v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife" on Justia Law

This case concerns appellants Sandra Baird and Jared Carter's standing to challenge the City of Burlington's recently adopted “Church Street Marketplace District trespass authority” ordinance (trespass ordinance). The Marketplace District is a quasi-public entity organized in 1979 pursuant to the Burlington city charter. It includes member businesses that pay for membership through extra tax assessments and/or membership payments and it is overseen by a Marketplace Commission, a private organization consisting of nine members with an Executive Director. Despite having the character of an outdoor pedestrian mall, Church Street is nevertheless a public right-of-way and is accessible to the public twenty-four hours a day. Thus, all state criminal statutes, rules of criminal procedure, and city ordinances apply within the Marketplace District. Appellants Sandra Baird, a social activist and adjunct college professor, and Jared Carter, an adjunct law professor, are Burlington residents and licensed Vermont attorneys. Both appellants pay real property taxes to the City as well as municipal sales tax on purchases in the city. Appellants also frequent Church Street and have been opposed to the trespass ordinance since its inception. Although appellant Carter has alleged that he was threatened with enforcement of the trespass ordinance on one occasion, neither appellant has in fact received a Marketplace District notice of trespass. appellant Baird filed a complaint against the City for declaratory and injunctive relief, which appellant Carter later joined, claiming that the trespass ordinance was both unconstitutional and ultra vires. In response, the City filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, citing that neither Baird nor Carter had been directly injured by the ordinance. After a one-day hearing, the trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss based on lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants Sandra Baird and Jared Carter appeal a final judgment by the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, granting appellee City of Burlington’s (the City) motion to dismiss for lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm. View "Baird v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

In 2013 Ohio enacted Rev. Code 3503.06(C)(1)(a): “Except for a nominating petition for presidential electors, no person shall be entitled to circulate any petition unless the person is a resident of this state.” Non-profit organizations wrote to Secretary of State Husted, asking whether he planned to “reject[] petitions where the circulator is domiciled in a state other than Ohio[.]” “While a court may ultimately find this law unconstitutional,” Husted responded, “that determination is a decision for the judicial branch, not the Secretary of State… this office and county boards of election will implement this law like any other until such time as the legislature acts to make a statutory change or a court directs otherwise.” One of the non-profit groups hired a firm to gather signatures for an initiative petition, paying a higher-than-usual fee to ensure that the firm hired in-state signature gatherers. The organizations then sought a declaration that the residency requirement was unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, and damages against Husted “as compensation for extra petition circulation charges.” The court granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction and denied Husted’s qualified-immunity motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed the qualified-immunity ruling; the Secretary had no clearly established duty to decline enforcement of the properly enacted and presumptively constitutional statute. View "Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted" on Justia Law

Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. appealed a district court’s dismissal of its due-process claims against the Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT). After KDOT removed two Martin Marietta quarries from its preapproved lists of limestone aggregate suppliers, Martin Marietta unsuccessfully sought pre- and post-deprivation hearings from KDOT. Among its many claims in its federal lawsuit, Martin Marietta asserted a property-right claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming a property interest in keeping its two quarries on “the approved list” of aggregate suppliers, and a liberty interest in its reputation as a supplier of quality materials under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court disagreed, dismissing these claims on the pleadings. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Martin Marietta had not plausibly alleged a protected property interest, and thus that KDOT did not violate Martin Marietta’s procedural-due-process rights by failing to provide pre- or post-deprivation hearings. Furthermore, the Court held that Martin Marietta had no cognizable liberty interest, because KDOT did not make defamatory statements about Martin Marietta and because Martin Marietta failed to allege sufficiently significant harm to its business. View "Martin Marietta Materials v. Kansas DOT" on Justia Law

Article VII, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution required the state legislature to “establish and maintain a system of public schools” open to all children in the state. To fulfill this mandate, the legislature defined three types of school districts according to where the district is located: city school districts, borough school districts, and regional education attendance areas. “[E]ach organized borough is a borough school district”; a borough must “establish[], maintain[], and operate[] a system of public schools on an areawide basis.” Local school boards managed and controlled these school districts under authority delegated by AS 14.12.020. The statute required local borough and city governments to raise money “from local sources to maintain and operate” their local schools. The superior court held that this required local contribution was an unconstitutional dedication of a “state tax or license.” But the minutes of the constitutional convention and the historical context of those proceedings suggested that the delegates intended that local communities and the State would share responsibility for their local schools. Those proceedings also indicated that the delegates did not intend for state-local cooperative programs like the school funding formula to be included in the term “state tax or license.” These factors distinguished this case from previous cases where the Alaska Supreme Court found that state funding mechanisms violated the dedicated funds clause. The Court therefore held that the existing funding formula did not violate the constitution, and reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment holding that the funding formula was unconstitutional. View "Alaska v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review concerned a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance authorizing the issuance of $6,300,000 in bonds to finance a redevelopment project in the Township of West Orange. Plaintiffs filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs claiming that the Township failed to secure the statutorily required approval for the bond ordinance from the Local Finance Board, which is a part of the Division of Local Government Services within New Jersey's Department of Community Affairs. As a result, plaintiffs claim the bond ordinance was invalid. The trial court dismissed the action because plaintiffs filed their complaint fifty-three days after final publication of the bond ordinance (well outside the twenty-day period permitted by Rule 4:69-6(b)(11)). The Appellate Division affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court held that because plaintiffs did not present any extraordinary circumstances to allow the trial and appellate courts to consider their claims, those courts properly dismissed plaintiffs' petition. View "In re Petition for Referendum to Repeal Ordinance 2354-12 of the Twp. of W. Orange" on Justia Law

Petty Officer Walter Jackson filed suit claiming that the Board's denial of his request to correct his navy record violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.; the Due Process Clause; and equitable principles. A recommendation against re-enlistment stemmed from Jackson’s unauthorized absence from his naval base, a subsequent disciplinary infraction, and two adverse performance evaluations. The court applied a deferential standard of review and concluded that, given Jackson’s infractions in the Navy, the Board reasonably denied Jackson’s requests for record correction. The court rejected Jackson's remaining contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "Jackson, Jr. v. Mabus, Jr." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, petitioners Deere & Company, CNH America LLC (CNH), AGCO Corporation (AGCO), Kubota Tractor Corporation (Kubota), and Husqvarna Professional Products, Inc. (Husqvarna), all appealed superior court orders that granted summary judgment to the State on their constitutional challenges to Senate Bill (SB) 126. SB 126 was enacted in 2013, amending RSA chapter 357-C to define "motor vehicle" as including "equipment," which "means farm and utility tractors, forestry equipment, industrial equipment, construction equipment, farm implements, farm machinery, yard and garden equipment, attachments, accessories, and repair parts." Like its federal counterpart and similar state statutes, RSA chapter 357-C, "the so-called ‘dealer bill of rights,''" was enacted "to protect retail car dealers from perceived abusive and oppressive acts by the manufacturers." RSA chapter 357-C regulated, among other things, a manufacturer's delivery and warranty obligations and termination of dealership agreements. RSA chapter 357-C also defines unfair methods of competition and deceptive practices. Violation of any provision of RSA chapter 357-C constitutes a misdemeanor. Petitioners manufactured agricultural, construction, forestry, industrial, lawn, and garden equipment, including commercial mowers, wheel loaders, backhoes, and agricultural tractors. Their complaint alleged that: (1) retroactive application of SB 126 substantially impaired their existing dealership agreements in violation of the State and Federal Contract Clauses; and (2) SB 126 violated the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution because it voided or otherwise rendered unenforceable mandatory binding arbitration clauses in existing dealership agreements, thereby conflicting with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In sum, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld SB 126 against petitioners' claims that it violated the State and Federal Contract Clauses. The Court agreed with the trial court that the preempted provisions were severable from the remaining provisions of RSA chapter 357-C as applied to petitioners. The Court rejected Husqvarna's argument that SB 126 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Court also rejected Husqvarna's contention that SB 126 had either a discriminatory purpose or effect within the meaning of the dormant Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, the Court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the State on Husqvarna's dormant Commerce Clause claim and remanded for the trial court to consider, in the first instance, whether SB 126 was unconstitutional under the "Pike" balancing test. View "Deere & Co. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law