Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

ASSE, a third-party Exchange Visitor Program (EVP) sponsor, challenged the Department's sanctions decision. The district court dismissed the suit as unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), because the administration of the EVP is "committed to agency discretion by law." The district court also dismissed ASSE's constitutional claims based on the grounds that the process was fundamentally fair. The court concluded that the Department failed to rebut the strong presumption of judicial reviewability because its regulations provide a “meaningful standard” by which the court can review its exercise of discretion in sanctioning ASSE. Therefore, the court may review the State Department’s final agency action under the standards prescribed by 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). To the extent the petition challenges the agency’s factfinding, the court may review the State Department’s determinations for substantial evidence. Because ASSE did not have a meaningful opportunity to rebut significant portions of the evidence that the Department used against it, the Department did not afford it adequate procedural protections. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding that ASSE failed to state a claim because the process afforded was fundamentally fair. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "ASSE Int'l, Inc. v. Kerry" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant-respondent, City of Ontario, with the consent of defendant-respondent, City of Rancho Cucamonga, established the Greater Ontario Tourism Marketing District (the GOTMD). The GOTMD was comprised of all lodging businesses operating in the two cities, and its mandate was to market and promote the businesses as "tourist, meeting and event destinations" with assessments imposed on the businesses based on their room rates and rental volumes. Plaintiff-appellant, The Inland Oversight Committee (IOC), sued the cities to invalidate the assessments on the ground they were a "tax" that was not approved by a majority or supermajority of the cities' voters as article XIII C of the California Constitution required. IOC claimed the assessments were either a general tax requiring majority voter approval or a special tax requiring supermajority voter approval. The trial court sustained demurrers, without leave to amend, on the ground that neither IOC nor any of its members had standing to challenge the validity of the assessments. IOC appealed. The cities filed a motion to dismiss the appeal along with their respondent's brief, claiming that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of IOC's appeal because IOC's notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the judgment was entered. The Court of Appeal agreed that IOC's notice of appeal was untimely filed, and it accordingly lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. View "Inland Oversight Com. v. City of Ontario" on Justia Law

This appeal from arose from proposed repairs and improvements to the City of Challis’ water distribution system. In 2013, the City initiated a judicial confirmation proceeding seeking approval to incur $3.2 million in debt without a public vote. The Consent of the Governed Caucus challenged the constitutionality of the City’s request based upon Article VIII, section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. The district court granted the City’s request and the Caucus appealed. Finding that the district court erred by failing to apply the legal standard for what constitutes a "necessary" expense under the Idaho Constitution, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Challis v. Consent of the Governed Caucus" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review centered on a dispute between Defendants-Appellants The Board of County Commissioners of Canadian County and certain citizens and officers of Canadian County, over the legal usage of funds generated from a sales tax enacted by the voters of Canadian County in 1996. In response to concerns raised over the legality of using funds generated by the Tax to pay for juvenile programs and services, in addition to the physical structures, an Attorney General Opinion was requested. The Attorney General issued an opinion concerning the matter in 2014. The Attorney General examined the resolution in question, Resolution No. 96-20, and determined that the language did not authorize use of the Tax for the funding of programs, salaries and expenses related to operation of the juvenile bureau, or even certain aspects of the physical facilities. In the wake of the Opinion, the Board ceased using the Tax for funding the programs, services, and salaries deemed outside the purpose of the Tax, and instead sought other funding sources for those items. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Board in the District Court in late 2014, seeking declaratory relief, a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction pending a declaratory ruling, and a writ of mandamus by way of ancillary relief. In an order filed on January 28, 2015, the trial court granted Citizens' request for a temporary injunction, determining: (1) Citizens were likely to prevail in their request for a declaratory judgment; (2) the Board would not suffer irreparable harm if the temporary injunction was issued; and (3) Citizens would suffer irreparable harm if the temporary injunction was not issued. The Board appealed, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof for a temporary injunction. After examining the available evidence, the Supreme Court determined that that the trial court's issuance of a temporary injunction was not an abuse of discretion or against the clear weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the order of the trial court granting a temporary injunction was affirmed. View "Edwards v. Bd. of Cty. Commr's." on Justia Law

The Coeur d’Alene Tribe (Tribe) petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to certify Senate Bill 1011 (S.B. 1011) as law. On March 30, 2015, both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed S.B. 1011 with supermajorities. S.B. 1011 had one purpose: to repeal Idaho Code section 54-2512A, a law which allowed wagering on “historical” horse races. The Tribe alleged that the Governor did not return his veto for S.B. 1011 within the five-day deadline under the Idaho Constitution. The Tribe argued that because the veto was untimely, the bill automatically became law and the Secretary of State had a non-discretionary duty to certify it as law. The Supreme Court agreed and granted the Writ. View "Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney" on Justia Law

Through the adoption of Nev. Rev. Stat. 630.356(2), the Legislature gave physicians the right to contest and the district courts the power to review final decisions of the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners. In this case, the Board suspended the license of Appellant, a surgeon licensed in Nevada, for rendering services to a patient while under the influence of alcohol and in an impaired condition. The Board also issued a public reprimand and imposed additional sanctions. Appellant petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s decision and requested a preliminary injunction to stay the sanctions and prevent the Board, while judicial review was pending, from filing a report with the National Practitioner Data Bank. The district court denied Appellant’s injunction request, concluding that section 630.356(2), which prohibits district courts from entering a stay of the Board’s decision pending judicial review, precluded such an action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 630.356(2) impermissibly acts as a legislative encroachment on the district court’s power to do what is reasonably necessary to administer justice, and this is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. View "Tate v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Connecticut’s debt negotiation statutes, Conn. Gen. Stat. 36a-671 through 36a-671e, which authorize the Banking Commissioner to license and regulate persons engaged in the debt negotiation. Plaintiff, a national consumer advocate law firm, petitioned the Commissioner for a declaratory ruling stating that Plaintiff qualified for exemption from the debt negotiation statutes under the attorney exception. This exception exempts only those attorneys admitted to the practice of law in Connecticut who engage or offer to engage in debt negotiation as an ancillary matter to the attorneys’ presentation of a client. The Commissioner concluded that Plaintiff did not qualify for exemption. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the debt negotiation statutes impermissibly intrude on the Judicial Branch’s exclusive authority to regulate attorney conduct and licensure and, therefore, violate the separation of powers provision contained in article II of the state Constitution. View "Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Banking Comm’r" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a dispute between outdoor advertising companies and the City over certain billboards with digital displays. Plaintiff Summit Media filed a motion seeking, among other things, an order that “[a]ll digital displays and sign structures” identified in the trial court's April 2013 order “shall be demolished and removed . . . .” Real parties CBS Outdoor wished to resume the use of their sign structures to display static advertising, as they had before the illegal digital conversion. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion to demolish the signs and denied plaintiff's request for attorney fees. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to require either the demolition of the structural improvements or the removal of the digital equipment, and that plaintiff offers no persuasive authority for its claim. Further, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff had a personal financial stake in this litigation that was sufficient to warrant its decision to incur significant attorney fees and costs in the vigorous prosecution of this lawsuit. View "Summit Media v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

B.S., a 16-year-old with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, had an individualized education program (IEP). A dispute arose and the parents requested a due process hearing. The parties settled several issues, so the only claim remaining was whether B.S. was entitled to compensatory education services for alleged past denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). On the first day of the hearing, B.S.’s counsel spent five hours examining the special education administrator. The district objected, noting the allotted nine hours of time. The ALJ subsequently reminded B.S.'s counsel that the time limit set at the pretrial conference would be enforced, and offered an opportunity to reorder the evidence. B.S. objected to enforcement of the time limits and continued with the lengthy examination of the case manager. B.S's time expired and B.S. was not allowed to question witnesses further or cross-examine district witnesses. B.S. made an informal offer of proof of additional evidence that B.S. had intended to present. After an unfavorable decision, B.S. appealed, also alleging that state defendants established an unpromulgated "best practices" rule restricting the length of testimony in violation of the Due Process Clause. The court dismissed the state defendants, finding that B.S. was challenging only one ALJ's discretionary decision, so the state was not a proper party. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that B.S. did not suffer a legally cognizable injury for which the state could be liable and had not been denied a FAPE. View "B.S. v. Anoka Hennepin Pub. Sch." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit contending that the government's "bulk data program" collection constitutes an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The program operates pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, where section 215 of the Act empowered the FBI to request, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to enter, orders “requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism.” The district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the government from collecting plaintiffs’ call records, but stayed its order pending appeal. After the court determined that the case was not moot, Judge Brown and Judge Williams wrote separate opinions stating the reasons for reversal. Judge Brown wrote separately to emphasize that, while plaintiffs have demonstrated it is only possible - not substantially likely - that their own call records were collected as part of the bulk-telephony metadata program, plaintiffs have nonetheless met the bare requirements of standing. Having barely fulfilled the requirements for standing at this threshold stage, plaintiffs fall short of meeting the higher burden of proof required for a preliminary injunction. Judge Williams wrote that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” that the government is collecting from Verizon Wireless or that they are otherwise suffering any cognizable injury. They thus cannot meet their burden to show a “likelihood of success on the merits” and are not entitled to a preliminary injunction. View "Klayman v. Obama" on Justia Law