Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Texas automobile owners can choose between general-issue and specialty license plates. People can propose a specialty plate design, with a slogan, a graphic, or both. If the Department of Motor Vehicles Board approves the design, the state makes it available. The Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) claimed that rejection of SCV’s proposal for a specialty plate design featuring a Confederate flag violated the Free Speech Clause. The Fifth Circuit held that Texas’s specialty license plate designs were private speech and that the Board engaged in constitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed. Texas’s specialty license plate designs constitute government speech. When government speaks, it is not barred from determining the content of what it says; it is generally entitled to promote a program, espouse a policy, or take a position. States have long used license plates to convey government speech, e.g., slogans urging action and touting local industries and license plate designs are often closely identified in the public mind with the state. Plates serve the governmental purposes of vehicle registration and identification and are, essentially, government IDs. Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates. Forum analysis, which applies to government restrictions on purely private speech occurring on government property, is not appropriate when the state is speaking on its own behalf. That private parties take part in the design and pay for specialty plates does not transform the government’s role into that of a mere forum provider. The Court acknowledged that the First Amendment stringently limits state authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. Just as Texas cannot require SCV to convey the state’s ideological message, SCV cannot dictate design. View "Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, eight male, "out-of-status" aliens who were arrested on immigration charges and detained following the September 11th attacks, filed a putative class action asserting various claims arising out of the discriminatory and punitive treatment they suffered while confined at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) or the Passaic County Jail (Passaic). The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that: (1) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a substantive due process claim against the DOJ defendants, against Hasty with regard to both official and unofficial conditions, and against Sherman with regard to official conditions only, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (2) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an equal protection claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (3) the free exercise claim is dismissed as to all defendants; (4) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged their Fourth Amendment strip search claim against Hasty and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (5) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; and (6) the MDC plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any claims against Zenk.  The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims brought by the Passaic plaintiffs. View "Turkmen v. Hasty, et al." on Justia Law

Shortly before the 2011 election, the Chaffee County Clerk and Recorder received a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request from Marilyn Marks for access to voted paper ballots from the 2010 general election. Because the Clerk believed that Colorado law prohibited disclosing voted ballots, and because Marks requested the ballots within twenty days of an upcoming election, the Clerk filed an action in district court under section 24-72-204(6)(a) seeking an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure of the ballots. Before the district court ruled on the merits of the Clerk's request, however, the General Assembly enacted section 24-72-205.5, C.R.S. (2014), providing that voted ballots are subject to CORA and describing the process by which records custodians must make them available. The Clerk then produced a single voted ballot for Marks to inspect, and the parties agreed that the only remaining issue in the case was whether Marks was entitled to costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that where an official custodian sought an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure under section 24-72-204(6)(a), a prevailing records request or is entitled to costs and attorney fees in accordance with section 24-72-204(5). "Under section 24-72-204(5), a prevailing records requestor is entitled to costs and attorney fees unless the district court finds that the denial of the right of inspection was proper. Here, the district court's order reflects that the Clerk's denial of Marks' request was proper. Consequently, Marks is not entitled to attorney fees in this case." The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding to the contrary. View "Reno v. Marks" on Justia Law

Kelly Kautz, the mayor of Snellville, filed a declaratory action against the members of the Snellville city council, seeking a declaration that she, as mayor, had sole authority to terminate the employment of the city attorney. The trial court ruled against her, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the city council, rather than the mayor, retained the sole power to remove the city attorney. The Supreme Court reversed, finding in the Snellville city charter that "[t]he mayor shall appoint the city attorney, together with such assistant city attorneys as may be authorized, and shall provide for the payment of such attorney or attorneys for services rendered to the city. [. . .] Once the mayor has fulfilled his or her duty to appoint a city attorney, the city attorney can thereafter serve for an indefinite time, as it is undisputed in this case that there is nothing in the Snellville city charter to restrict the city attorney's appointment to office, and the city attorney's term of office is not otherwise prescribed by law." The Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise. View "Kautz v. Powell" on Justia Law

The Retirement Systems of Alabama ("RSA"), the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("TRS"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Fund ("PEEHIF"), the Board of Control of TRS ("the TRS Board"), the Board of Control of PEEHIP ("the PEEHIP Board"), David Bronner, as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS and PEEHIP, and various members of the TRS Board and of the PEEHIP Board in their official capacities ("the PEEHIP defendants") sought mandamus review of the Circuit Court's denial of their motion to dismiss the claims filed against them by James Burks II, Eugenia Burks, Martin Hester, Jacqueline Hester, Thomas Highfield, Carol Ann Highfield, Jake Jackson, and Melinda Jackson, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals ("the public-education plaintiffs"). PEEHIP, which is managed by the PEEHIP Board, provided group health-insurance benefits to public-education employees in Alabama. The public-education plaintiffs alleged that a policy adopted by the PEEHIP Board in 2009 changed the amounts participants and their eligible dependents, and this change violated Article V, section 138.03, Alabama Constitution of 1901, as well as the public-education plaintiffs' rights to equal protection, due process, and freedom of association under the Alabama Constitution, the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The public-education plaintiffs also alleged that the 2009 policy violated Alabama public policy and their right to family integrity as protected by the Alabama Constitution. The public-education plaintiffs sought relief in the form of: (1) a judgment declaring "[the PEEHIP defendants'] practice of denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators who are married to another educator and who have dependent children to be unconstitutional, discriminatory and unlawful under both State and Federal law"; (2) an injunction preventing the PEEHIP defendants from "denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators whose spouse is also an educator in the public school system and who have dependent children"; (3) restitution of "amounts ... unlawfully withheld and/or ... amounts [the public-education plaintiffs] have paid for insurance that they would not have paid absent [the PEEHIP defendants'] unlawful conduct" or other equitable relief; and (4) costs and attorney fees. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court granted the petition in part, denied in part, and issue a writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' claims against RSA, PEEHIP, the PEEHIP Board, PEEHIF, TRS, the TRS Board, the members of the TRS Board, and Bronner, in his capacity as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS; to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' state-law claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP; and to dismiss the public-education plaintiffs' claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP, for monetary relief, pursuant to § 1983. The petition was denied with regard to the public-education plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, pursuant to section 1983, against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP. The PEEHIP Board and Bronner were entitled to immunity from the state law claims, but not to immunity from the Eleventh Amendment claims for prospective injunctive relief under section 1983. View "Ex parte The Retirement Systems of Alabama et al." on Justia Law

In 2004, AT&T Corp. filed refund claims with the Finance and Administration Cabinet arguing that, under Ky. Rev. Stat. 139.505, AT&T was entitled to refunds for tax years 2002 and 2003. The Cabinet granted a partial refund for AT&T’s 2002 claim. In 2008, AT&T filed refund claims for tax years 2004 through 2008. In 2011, AT&T filed a declaration of rights action bringing administrative and as-applied constitutional challenges to the amendments to section 139.505. The circuit court dismissed the case, determining that AT&T’s challenges must be adjudicated by the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals (KBTA) before the court would address AT&T’s facial constitutional challenges. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the facial constitutional issue was one that the KBTA could not decide, but that the other claims were properly dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the trial court’s order of dismissal, holding that there were several administrative issues that must be resolved prior to addressing the constitutional claims. View "Commonwealth v. AT&T Corp." on Justia Law

Zivotofsky was born to U.S. citizens living in Jerusalem. Under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003, 116 Stat. 1350, his mother asked Embassy officials to list his place of birth as “Israel” on his passport. Section 214(d) of the Act states for “purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request … record the place of birth as Israel.” Embassy officials refused to list Zivotofsky’s place of birth as “Israel,” citing the Executive Branch’s position that the U.S. does not recognize any country as having sovereignty over Jerusalem. The D. C. Circuit held the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed. The President has the exclusive power to grant formal recognition to a foreign sovereign. The Court cited the Reception Clause, which directs that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” and the President’s additional Article II powers, to negotiate treaties and to nominate the Nation’s ambassadors and dispatch other diplomatic agents. The Constitution assigns the President, not Congress, means to effect recognition on his own initiative. The Nation must “speak . . . with one voice” regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of the United States and which are not, and only the Executive has the characteristic of unity at all times. If Congress may not pass a law, speaking in its own voice, effecting formal recognition, then it may not force the President, through section 214(d), to contradict his prior recognition determination in an official document issued by the Secretary of State. View "Zivotofsky v. Kerry" on Justia Law

PLN filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., request to the Bureau seeking all documents showing money the Bureau paid in connection with lawsuits and claims brought against it between January 1, 1996, and July 31, 2003. The Bureau subsequently withheld information pursuant to exemption 6 and 7(C) of FOIA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau. The court reversed, agreeing with PLN that the Bureau’s use of a categorical explanation for the redactions was improper because of the varied nature of the documents and of the individuals shielded from disclosure, and that the district court did not adequately balance the privacy and public interests at stake. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings View "Prison Legal News v. Samuels" on Justia Law

The Department appealed the district court’s order expanding a preliminary injunction forbidding the Department from decreasing the individual budgets of a class of participants in and applicants to Idaho’s Developmental Disabilities Waiver program (DD Waiver program) without adequate notice. The court rejected the Department's ripeness argument and concluded that the dispute is ripe for adjudication where plaintiffs alleged that they have already felt the effects of the Department's actions in a concrete way; the district court reasonably found that participants’ services are capped by their individual budgets under Idaho law; the district court also did not abuse its discretion in holding that plaintiffs were likely to show that the 2011 Budget Notices did not comply with the notice requirements of the Medicaid regulations; the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that they were denied adequate notice under the Due Process Clause; the Department waived its argument that plaintiffs failed to show that the proposed class was likely to suffer irreparable harm; the court joined a number of its sister circuits in rejecting Eleventh Amendment challenges directed at orders reinstating social assistance benefits prospectively; and the court declined to exercise jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying the motion to approve the 2013 Proposed Notice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "K.W. v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Sheriff's Department and others, alleging that he was severely beaten by deputy sheriffs while being detained in a holding cell. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings because failure to exhaust under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), is an affirmative defense, and because the evidence adduced by defendants - principally in the form of a conclusory affidavit - does not suffice to establish the defense as a matter of law. The court need not consider plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Hubbs v. Suffolk Cnty. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law