Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Dr. Mila Means, a Wichita family practitioner announced she would begin offering abortion services to the public. At that time, no doctors were performing abortions in Wichita. The last doctor to do so, Dr. George Tiller, had been shot to death in 2009 by an anti-abortion activist named Scott Roeder. On about January 15, 2011, Defendant Angel Dillard wrote a letter to Dr. Means and mailed it to her office in an envelope bearing Defendant’s name and return address. Upon receipt, Dr. Means notified Wichita police. Shortly after receiving the letter, Dr. Means’ staff found an Associated Press article on the internet which discussed Defendant’s friendship with Scott Roeder, Dr. Tiller’s murderer. This article reported that Defendant had befriended Roeder while he was in jail for the murder. The article indicated that Defendant admired Roeder for following his convictions and being “the only one able to stop abortions in Wichita.” These cross-appeals arose out of a civil enforcement action brought by the United States under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE) .The government alleged Defendant violated FACE by sending a threatening letter to Dr. Means. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss but subsequently granted her motion for summary judgment, concluding that Defendant’s letter did not contain a true threat because: (1) it did not suggest unconditional, imminent, and likely violence; and (2) it predicted violence by third parties but did not suggest Defendant would herself engage in violence against the doctor. The government appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Defendant then cross-appealed, arguing the district court should have granted her earlier motion to dismiss both because the government lacked standing to bring this action against her and because FACE is unconstitutional both facially and as applied. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded a reasonable jury could have found that Defendant’s letter conveyed a true threat, that she subjectively intended to threaten Dr. Means, and that she wrote to Dr. Means in order to intimidate her from providing reproductive health services. The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant was reversed. The Court found no other reversible error. The case remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Dillard" on Justia Law

This case concerns a plan to replace public housing units destroyed by Hurricane Ike in part by redeveloping on two of the sites destroyed by Ike. At issue are questions concerning the scope of standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.; whether Congress intended by that Act to abrogate States' sovereign immunity; and whether defendants can avail themselves of a safe harbor provision in the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended by the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dismissal of the Individual Plaintiffs and GOGP because they did not appeal; plaintiff has Article III standing to bring her claim that the planned redevelopment will deprive her of the social and economic benefits that result from living in an integrated community; Congress did not make clear an intent to abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from suits brought under the Fair Housing Act, a conclusion reached by other courts considering the issue; and the district court properly granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants on plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act claim, concluding that plaintiff's claim was precluded by a safe harbor provision found at 42 U.S.C. 1437p(d). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McCardell v. HUD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly the part-time Chief Magistrate of Newberry County, brought this action in the South Carolina Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to determine whether defendants Newberry County and Wayne Adams, County Administrator, had the authority to abolish part-time magistrate positions in Newberry County. In addition, the Court permitted the Senate President Pro Tempore to intervene in this action. Defendants and the Intervenor agreed with plaintiff that defendants did not have such authority, contending that all of defendants' actions have been done in compliance with the South Carolina Constitution and applicable statutes. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with all parties that defendants did not have the authority to abolish part-time magistrate positions in Newberry County. Rather, as permitted by code section 22-4-80(E), the part-time magisterial positions, including the one previously held by plaintiff, had been combined into one full-time magistrate position, and the Newberry County magistrates have been lawfully appointed pursuant to S.C. Const. art. V, sec. 26. While the Court declined plaintiff's invitation to expand the scope of this case to address issues of an alleged constitutional conflict between S.C. Const. art V, sec. 26 and art. V, sec. 4, and his related statutory claims, the Court reviewed all of plaintiff's arguments and found nothing of merit warranting the exercise of our authority to add necessary parties and address these additional arguments. View "Jayroe v. Newberry County" on Justia Law

Shortly after his birth in 2003, the County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) placed a dependent child named J.J. with appellant Rita Marshall. Marshall cared for J.J. for two and a half years and began the process of adopting him. However, in June 2006, the Agency commenced proceedings that led to J.J.'s removal from Marshall's care and his placement in another home for adoption. Marshall filed this action against the County of San Diego and several County social workers who were involved in the proceedings that led to J.J.'s removal. In the causes of action relevant to this appeal, Marshall brought two claims pursuant to 42 United States Code section 1983 claiming her right to due process in removing J.J. without providing her adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, and in making deliberately false statements to the trial court that led to the removal. Marshall also brought a section 1983 claim against the County, alleging that the social workers violated her constitutional rights pursuant to a County custom or policy. The trial court concluded that the social workers were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Marshall's claims against them because there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the social workers had violated Marshall's "clearly established" constitutional rights. The court also concluded that the County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Marshall's section 1983 claim. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that Marshall had a clearly established constitutional right not to have J.J.'s placement terminated based on a social worker's statement that was either deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for its truth. However, the Court concluded further that the social workers were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Marshall's claims premised on this theory of liability because there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that that J.J.'s placement with Marshall was terminated based on statements that were either deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for their truth. The Court rejected the remainder of Marshall's other claims, and affirmed the judgment. View "Marshall v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law

Appellant Collette Brown, a resident of Concord Township, Delaware County, appealed the Commonwealth Court's order affirming the trial court's dismissal of her petition to place on the November 2014 ballot, a referendum question seeking to change the Township's governmental status from second-class to first-class. Appellant's petition contained 994 signatures (8.5%) out of the Township’s 11,640 registered voters and claimed that as of the 2010 census, the Township had a population density of around 1,258 inhabitants per square mile (“IPSM”). As stated, both figures easily exceeded the statutory thresholds of 300 IPSM and 5% registered voter signatures, which Appellant believed operated as conjunctive preconditions. Seven named qualified electors (“Appellees”) filed objections and claimed the petition was substantively and procedurally defective under Pennsylvania law, which they argued was time-limited to the first municipal or general election occurring at least ninety days after the 2010 census. That same day, the Delaware County Bureau of Elections intervened and requested declaratory relief, claiming that in addition to not satisfying the statutory requirements, the petition should have been dismissed because a home rule study referendum question was already on the ballot (which voters later approved), and that if Appellant’s referendum question were successful, the subsequent change in Township government could violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that pursuant to 53 P.S. section 55207, second- to first-class township referendum questions shall be submitted to voters at the first general or municipal election occurring at least ninety days after fulfilling both the population density ascertainment and petition signature filing requirements as set forth in the statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re: Ballot Quest to Concord Twp" on Justia Law

Dibble and Akemann were arbitrators for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. At the time of their appointments, the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/14, provided that each arbitrator would be appointed for a term of six years, with the possibility of reappointment. The legislature passed Public Act 97–18, which was signed on June 28, 2011 and took effect three days later, ending the terms of all incumbent arbitrators effective July 1, 2011 and providing that the Governor would make new appointments. The law allowed incumbent arbitrators to serve as holdovers until the Governor made new appointments. By July 1, 2012, both Dibble and Akemann had lost their positions. They alleged that by shortening their six‐year terms as arbitrators under the prior law, Public Act 97–18 deprived them of a property interest without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgments for defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief were moot, and the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ claims for damages. Even if plaintiffs plausibly allege a constitutional violation, the applicable law was not clearly established under the circumstances of these cases, where a statutory amendment eliminated the property interest that a statute had previously conferred. View "Dibble v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered a workplace injury to his back and applied for permanent partial disability. The Workers’ Compensation Division denied benefits. Appellant requested a contested case hearing. During discovery, the Division served interrogatories and requests for production requesting information regarding Appellant’s work history since the time of his injury. Appellant objected to a number of the interrogatories and requests, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The hearing examiner compelled Appellant to answer the discovery, but Appellant continued to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The hearing examiner dismissed the contested case as a discovery sanction. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant was justified in asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because he reasonably believed his answers to the discovery requests could be used in a criminal prosecution against him; and (2) the hearing examiner abused his discretion by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing the case as a discovery sanction without engaging in the proper balancing of Appellant’s and the Division’s conflicting interests. View "Debyah v. State, ex rel., Dep’t of Workforce Servs." on Justia Law

After an incident involving his then-deputy coroner, Grant County Coroner Jerry Lee Jasman pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and resigned. By statute, Jasman's conviction prohibited him from holding public office again. However, the new Grant County coroner, Craig Morrison, quickly hired Jasman as chief deputy coroner and chief investigator. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review asked whether Jasman could hold those positions given that he was prohibited from holding public office: Jasman could not hold those positions if they were "public officer" positions. As a separate issue, the Court had to decide whether Coroner Morrison was entitled to a special prosecutor's representation when he intervened as a defendant in this lawsuit. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) both positions were "public officer" positions and that Jasman could not hold either position; and (2) Coroner Morrison was not sued for money damages and the State or county was not the real party in interest, so he was not entitled to a special prosecutor's representation. View "Grant County Prosecuting Att'y v. Jasman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated this action against the Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of ORS 250.048(9), which provided that a person who registered with the Secretary of State to collect initiative petition signatures for pay may not, “at the same time, obtain signatures on a petition or prospective petition for which the person is not being paid.” At the time he initiated the action, plaintiff had registered to collect initiative petition signatures for pay and had been hired to do just that. At the same time, he wanted to collect signatures on other measures on a volunteer basis. He contended that ORS 250.048(9) violated his constitutional rights of freedom of expression and association. During the pendency of the litigation, however, plaintiff stopped working as a paid signature collector, and his registration expired. The secretary moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action had become moot. Plaintiff opposed the motion, submitting an affidavit stating that he intended to work as a paid signature collector in the future and that he might be interested in collecting signatures on a volunteer basis on other measures at the same time. He also argued that, even if his action had become moot, the action nevertheless should proceed because it was “likely to evade judicial review in the future,” and ORS 14.175 expressly authorized courts to adjudicate such cases. The trial court granted the secretary's motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal. The issues, therefore, before the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the averments in plaintiff’s affidavit were sufficient to establish that his action was not moot; (2) even if the action was moot, whether it was nevertheless justiciable under ORS 14.175 because it was likely to evade review; and (3) if it is subject to ORS 14.175, whether the legislature possessed the constitutional authority to enact it. The Court concluded: (1) plaintiff’s affidavit was insufficient to establish that his action was not moot; (2) the action nevertheless was likely to evade judicial review under the standard set out in ORS 14.175, because it was not necessary to request expedited consideration to meet its terms; and (3) the legislature did possess the constitutional authority to enact the statute. Accordingly, because the Court concluded that the case was justiciable under ORS 14.175, it reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and trial court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Couey v. Atkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Maine dairy farmer, had a business dispute with Defendant, his neighbor, and the former Commissioner of the Maine Department of Agriculture (DOA). Soon after taking office, the Commissioner recused himself from regulatory matters involving Plaintiff. The DOA eventually took four adverse regulatory actions against Plaintiff, including the action of ceasing to protect Plaintiff from the regulatory authority of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The DEP then issued several notices of violation of Plaintiff’s license conditions. As a result, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began administrative and judicial proceedings against Plaintiff that resulted in Plaintiff losing his farm. Plaintiff brought this suit for damages against Defendant, claiming that Defendant had violated his First Amendment rights through the adverse actions taken by the DOA. The district court awarded summary judgment against Plaintiff. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was correctly granted with respect tot he three adverse regulatory actions that the DOA was alleged to have taken after the Commissioner’s purported recusal; but (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Commissioner’s retaliatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in the one alleged adverse action that occurred prior to the recusal. Remanded. View "McCue v. Bradstreet" on Justia Law