Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Trinity operates on its church premises a licensed preschool and daycare, the Learning Center, which has an open admissions policy. It teaches a Christian world view and incorporates daily religious instruction in its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants, a solid waste management program, providing funds for the purchase of recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. In 2012, Trinity applied for a grant, disclosing that the Learning Center was part of Trinity. DNR denied the application, stating that the Missouri Constitution specifically provides that “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion.” Trinity’s application ranked fifth out of 44 applications and 14 projects were funded. Trinity sued, citing the Equal Protection Clause; its right to free exercise of religion; the Establishment Clause, and its right of free speech. The district court dismissed and declined to reconsider in light of evidence that the DNR had previously given Scrap Tire grants to 15 religious organizations, including churches. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, citing precedent that concluding that Missouri Constitution Article I, section 7 does not conflict with the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. View "Trinity Lutheran Church v. Pauley" on Justia Law

In 2013, the General Assembly appropriated funds for the operation of the Iowa Juvenile Home (IJH) in Toledo for the 2014 fiscal year, but five months into 2014, the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) decided to close the home. Plaintiffs - two state senators, two state representatives, and the president of a labor organization representing employees at the IJH - sued Defendants - the Governor and the director of DHS - seeking, inter alia, a determination that Defendants’ refusal to spend appropriated funds to continue operating the IJH was unconstitutional. The district court entered a temporary injunction preventing closure of the IJH. While Defendants’ appeal was pending, the General Assembly declined to fund ongoing operations of the IJH for the 2015 fiscal year. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case, holding that the case was moot because the Legislature was no longer appropriating funds for the operation of the IJH. View "Man v. Branstad" on Justia Law

After Abu Wa’el (Jihad) Dhiab, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, went on a hunger strike, he was forcibly extracted from his cell and force-fed. The district court examined 32 classified videotapes of Dhiab's forcible cell extractions and force-feedings in order to grant Dhiab's motion to enjoin the government from forcibly extracting him from his cell and force-feeding him. At issue is the district court's grant of media organizations' motion to unseal and release the videotapes. The court concluded that, the district court’s decision did not terminate the action, and it does not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction. Further, this case does not present the extraordinary circumstances required for mandamus relief. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied the request for a writ of mandamus View "Dhiab v. Obama" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on unsuccessful constitutional claimants’ invocation of a statutory protection against adverse awards of attorney’s fees and the responsive assertion that they had sufficient economic incentive to bring their claim regardless of its constitutional nature. In a related decision, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision on the merits of the constitutional claim and remanded for entry of declaratory judgment in the claimants’ favor. The constitutional claimants therefore became the prevailing parties, and the Court assumed that on remand they would seek an award of attorney’s fees and costs under AS 09.60.010. Because such an award was conditioned on the absence of sufficient economic incentive to bring the claim regardless of its constitutional nature, the Court also assumed that on remand the superior court would enter the same discovery orders regarding the petitioners’ financial information and third-party funding of the litigation. After review, the Supreme Court saw "no purpose in dismissing the original applications for relief and petition for review as moot in light of the change in prevailing party status, only to have them re-filed as a result of further attorney’s fees proceedings in the superior court." Thee therefore addressed the meaning of “sufficient economic incentive.” The Court first concluded that earlier public interest litigation case law provided that the guiding parameters for the meaning of “sufficient economic incentive.” Further, the Court concluded that in this case the claimants did not have “sufficient economic incentive” to bring the claim regardless of its constitutional nature. The Court vacated the superior court’s discovery order and remanded this for further proceedings. View "Alaska Conservation Foundation v. Pebble Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Appellant was the owner of gas, oil, and other minerals situated within the Ozark Highlands Unit (OHU). SEECO, Inc. applied to create a drilling unit in the OHU and to integrate all unleased and uncommitted mineral interests within the unit. The Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission established the unit and integrated all unleased and uncommitted mineral interests within the unit with the exception of Appellant’s unleaded mineral interests. At a hearing before the Commission to hear evidence related to SEECO’s request to integrate Appellant’s unleaded mineral interests into the drilling unit, Appellant asserted that the Commission’s forced-integration procedures amounted to a taking of his property. The Commission subsequently integrated Appellant’s unleaded mineral interests into the drilling unit. The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the forced integration procedures do not amount to an unconstitutional taking; and (2) the Commission’s order did not deprive Appellant of his constitutional right to a jury trial to determine just compensation for his property. View "Gawenis v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a state law redrawing the Wake County Board of Education electoral districts, arguing that under the new redistricting plan, some citizen’s votes will get significantly more weight than other’s in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of one person, one vote and the North Carolina Constitution’s promise of equal protection. The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend as futile. The court concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations in support of their claim that the law violates the one person, one vote principle suffice to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Thus, plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief could be granted against the Wake County Board of Elections and the district court therefore erred in dismissing their suit. The court affirmed, however, the denial of the motion to amend because the state officials plaintiffs proposed to add as named defendants are not amenable to suit. View "Wright v. North Carolina" on Justia Law

Shortly before the 2011 election, the Chaffee County Clerk and Recorder received a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request from Marilyn Marks for access to voted paper ballots from the 2010 general election. Because the Clerk believed that Colorado law prohibited disclosing voted ballots, and because Marks requested the ballots within twenty days of an upcoming election, the Clerk sought a declaration that it was prohibited from disclosing the ballots. Before the district court ruled on the merits of the Clerk's request, the General Assembly enacted 24-72-205.5, C.R.S. (2014) that made voted ballots subject to CORA. The Clerk thereafter produced a single voted ballot for Marks to inspect. The only remaining issue in the case was whether Marks was entitled to costs and attorney fees. After its review, the Supreme Court held that when an official custodian sought an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure, a prevailing requestor was entitled to costs and attorney fees unless the district court found that the denial of the right of inspection was proper. The district court in this case found the denial was proper, therefore Marks was not entitled to attorney fees. View "Reno v. Marks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, twenty-six states, filed suit challenging the government's Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program (“DAPA”) as violative of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. 553, and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The district court temporarily enjoined the implementation program and the government appealed, moving for a stay of the injunction. The court concluded that the government is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the states lack standing. In this case, at least one state - Texas - is likely to satisfy all three requirements of Article III standing. Further, the government has not made a strong showing that the interests that the states seek to protect fall outside the zone of interests of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1252; that judicial review is precluded in this case; that DAPA does not require notice and comment; and that the remaining factors also favor the states. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for stay and the request to narrow the scope of the injunction. View "State of Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and refused to submit to a secondary breath test. Respondent’s driver’s license was subsequently revoked by the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles for both DUI and the refusal to submit to the designated chemical test. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) rescinded the driver’s license revocation on the grounds that (1) Respondent was misled to believe that he had a choice as to whether he wanted to take a breath test or a blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was inappropriate; and (2) Respondent was effectively denied his right to obtain an independent blood test. The circuit court upheld the OAH’s order. The Supreme Court found that Respondent’s license revocations for refusal to submit to the secondary breath test were proper but his license revocations for DUI were erroneous, holding (1) the lower tribunals erroneously concluded that Respondent had a rational basis for perceiving that he had a choice between the breath test and the blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was appropriate; and (2) Respondent was denied his statutory and due process rights to have his blood tested independently. View "Reed v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Alaska Board of Game promulgated regulations managing caribou hunting in Game Management Unit 13. A hunter challenged the regulations on constitutional and statutory grounds, arguing that they wrongfully interfered with his subsistence hunting rights, and also sought a judicially imposed public reprimand of an assistant attorney general representing the Board. The superior court dismissed the claim against the attorney, granted summary judgment upholding the regulations, and awarded partial attorney’s fees to the State and an intervenor defendant. The hunter appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment orders, but vacated the attorney’s fees awards and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manning v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law