Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Passed by voter initiative, the “Lowest Law Enforcement Priority of Cannabis” (LLEP) of the Hawai’i County Code provides that the cultivation, possession and use for adult personal use of cannabis shall be the lowest law enforcement priority for law enforcement agencies in the county. Petitioners, a group of pro se individuals, filed a complaint alleging that Defendants - members of the Hawai’i County Council, Hawai’i County prosecutors, and chief of police - failed to comply with the LLEP. The circuit court granted Defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the case, concluding that the LLEP was preempted by state law. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the LLEP is preempted solely because it conflicts with state law; and (2) the entire LLEP is invalidated because it conflicts with, and is therefore preempted by, state law. View "Ruggles v. Yagong" on Justia Law

The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC), which regulates taxis and other cars for hire in New York City, engaged in a lengthy process to create the “Taxi of Tomorrow.” The process culminated in rules that established a particular make and model of vehicle as the City’s official taxicab. Petitioners sought to invalidate the rules and obtain a related declaration, arguing that the TLC lacked authority to enact the rules and violated the separation of powers doctrine in doing so. Supreme Court concluded that the rules were invalid because the TLC exceeded its authority under the City Charter and violated the separation of powers by intruding in the City Council’s domain. The Appellate Division reversed and declared that the rules were valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the TLC did not exceed its authority or violate the separation of powers doctrine by enacting the rules. View "Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. N.Y. City Taxi & Limousine Comm’n" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on the second of two qui tam actions filed by former New Mexico Education Retirement Board ("ERB") Chief Investment Officer Frank Foy and his wife Suzanne ("Foys"), attacking the management of the investment portfolios of the ERB and of the New Mexico State Investment Council ("SIC"). The Foys "allege that Defendants, who include Wall Street firms and investment advisors, as well as high-ranking state officials, executed fraudulent schemes that led to the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars at the expense of the [SIC] and the [ERB]. Specifically, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the retroactive application of the Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 44-9-1 to -14 (2007) ("FATA") violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that FATA was constitutional. The treble damages under FATA were predominantly compensatory and could be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date. The Court declined to resolve the issue of whether the civil penalties awarded under FATA were punitive and violated ex post facto principles until there was a definitive amount awarded. View "New Mexico ex rel. Foy v. Austin Capital Mgmt., Ltd." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of a felony requiring his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed an order that Petitioner be removed. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that because Padilla v. Kentucky described deportation as a “penalty,” his removal violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment or related constitutional protections unless a court conducted an individual assessment to determine whether his order of removal was a proportional punishment relative to his underlying criminal conviction. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Padilla has not signaled a break from long-settled law that removal operates simply as “a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want,” not as a punishment within the meaning of the Constitution intended to acutely sanction a noncitizen for his underlying criminal conviction. View "Hinds v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant was an employee of the North Bergen Board of Education who filed an action asserting statutory and common law employment discrimination claims against the Board. In discovery, defendant's counsel produced several hundred documents that allegedly had been removed or copied from Board files. According to the Board, the documents included highly confidential student educational and medical records that were protected by federal and state privacy laws. The Board reported the alleged theft of its documents to the county prosecutor. The State presented the matter to a grand jury, which ultimately indicted defendant for official misconduct and theft by unlawful taking of public documents. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to support the indictment and withheld exculpatory evidence about her motive. She also contended that her removal of documents for use in her employment discrimination claim was sanctioned by the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in "Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.," (204 N.J. 239 (2010)). The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial and appellate court's decisions. View "New Jersey v. Saavedra" on Justia Law

Gwendolyn Hallsmith was the planning and community development director for the City of Montpelier. Her employment was protected by a "justifiable cause" provision in the City's personnel plan. In November 2013, City Manager William Fraser placed Hallsmith on paid administrative leave, and sent a letter to her indicating that he was contemplating firing her under the City's personnel plan. In the letter, the city manager described various acts of unprofessional behavior and insubordination, damage to relationships with key individuals and governing bodies within city government, and inappropriate use of City resources. He asserted that these acts were grounds for disciplinary action under the City's personnel plan, and offered to meet with Hallsmith to consider any response she wanted to make. Hallsmith, accompanied by counsel, met with the city manager and argued her case. Following that meeting, the city manager dismissed Hallsmith from employment with the City. Hallsmith timely filed a grievance pursuant to the personnel plan, which provides for review of disciplinary action. At the grievance hearing, the city questioned Hallsmith and her witnesses extensively. Hallsmith was not permitted to cross-examine the city manager, the City's only witness. The assistant city manager, serving as the hearing officer, upheld the City's termination decision. Hallsmith subsequently filed a Rule 75 petition at the trial court, seeking reinstatement, reimbursement for lost compensation, and other remedies. In her petition, Hallsmith contested the merits of her termination, arguing that the City's decision to terminate her employment was not supported by sufficient evidence of justifiable cause, and that the hearing officer's decision to uphold the termination was not supported by the evidence and applied the wrong legal standard. She also raised a due-process challenge to the post-termination hearing procedures. In response, the City moved to dismiss the due-process claim, arguing that Hallsmith got all the process that was due. The City did not argue that the post-termination grievance hearing was constitutionally adequate. Instead, its sole argument was that the pre-termination "Loudermill" meeting, combined with the availability of a post-termination judicial remedy "Rule 75" petition challenging governmental action or a common-law action for breach of contract satisfied due process. On the merits, the City argued that there was credible evidence establishing justifiable cause for the assistant city manager's decision to sustain the City's firing of Hallsmith. The trial court rejected the City's argument that the availability of a post-termination judicial remedy in the form of a Rule 75 petition or a breach-of-contract action satisfied due process. The City appealed that decision, but after careful review of the trial court and Board records, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Hallsmith v. City of Montpelier" on Justia Law

The issue in these consolidated cases was the passing of the Financial Stability Act and the appointment of a Receiver for the City of Central Falls. The Supreme Court already held that the Act is constitutional, and the issues now before the Court on appeal dealt with the superior court’s holdings that (1) the Central Falls Receiver was entitled to reimbursement of his attorney’s fees; (2) the Central Falls Mayor was not entitled to indemnification from the Receiver for costs and expenses arising out of the instant cases; and (3) denied advance attorney’s fees filed by Attorney Lawrence Goldberg. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s judgment in all respects, holding (1) in granting the Receiver reimbursement of its attorneys’ fees, the hearing justice misapplied R.I. Gen. Stat. 45-9-11; (2) the hearing justice erred in concluding that the Mayor was not acting in his official capacity when he challenged the constitutionality of the Act and when he defended himself in the action filed by the Receiver and therefore was not entitled to indemnification for his legal costs; and (3) because Attorney Goldberg was properly retained by the City Council for Central Falls to represent it in the suit regarding the constitutionality of the Act, the attorney was entitled to remuneration. View "Shine v. Moreau" on Justia Law

Texas automobile owners can choose between general-issue and specialty license plates. People can propose a specialty plate design, with a slogan, a graphic, or both. If the Department of Motor Vehicles Board approves the design, the state makes it available. The Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) claimed that rejection of SCV’s proposal for a specialty plate design featuring a Confederate flag violated the Free Speech Clause. The Fifth Circuit held that Texas’s specialty license plate designs were private speech and that the Board engaged in constitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed. Texas’s specialty license plate designs constitute government speech. When government speaks, it is not barred from determining the content of what it says; it is generally entitled to promote a program, espouse a policy, or take a position. States have long used license plates to convey government speech, e.g., slogans urging action and touting local industries and license plate designs are often closely identified in the public mind with the state. Plates serve the governmental purposes of vehicle registration and identification and are, essentially, government IDs. Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates. Forum analysis, which applies to government restrictions on purely private speech occurring on government property, is not appropriate when the state is speaking on its own behalf. That private parties take part in the design and pay for specialty plates does not transform the government’s role into that of a mere forum provider. The Court acknowledged that the First Amendment stringently limits state authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. Just as Texas cannot require SCV to convey the state’s ideological message, SCV cannot dictate design. View "Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, eight male, "out-of-status" aliens who were arrested on immigration charges and detained following the September 11th attacks, filed a putative class action asserting various claims arising out of the discriminatory and punitive treatment they suffered while confined at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) or the Passaic County Jail (Passaic). The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that: (1) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a substantive due process claim against the DOJ defendants, against Hasty with regard to both official and unofficial conditions, and against Sherman with regard to official conditions only, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (2) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an equal protection claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (3) the free exercise claim is dismissed as to all defendants; (4) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged their Fourth Amendment strip search claim against Hasty and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (5) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; and (6) the MDC plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any claims against Zenk.  The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims brought by the Passaic plaintiffs. View "Turkmen v. Hasty, et al." on Justia Law

Shortly before the 2011 election, the Chaffee County Clerk and Recorder received a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request from Marilyn Marks for access to voted paper ballots from the 2010 general election. Because the Clerk believed that Colorado law prohibited disclosing voted ballots, and because Marks requested the ballots within twenty days of an upcoming election, the Clerk filed an action in district court under section 24-72-204(6)(a) seeking an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure of the ballots. Before the district court ruled on the merits of the Clerk's request, however, the General Assembly enacted section 24-72-205.5, C.R.S. (2014), providing that voted ballots are subject to CORA and describing the process by which records custodians must make them available. The Clerk then produced a single voted ballot for Marks to inspect, and the parties agreed that the only remaining issue in the case was whether Marks was entitled to costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that where an official custodian sought an order prohibiting or restricting disclosure under section 24-72-204(6)(a), a prevailing records request or is entitled to costs and attorney fees in accordance with section 24-72-204(5). "Under section 24-72-204(5), a prevailing records requestor is entitled to costs and attorney fees unless the district court finds that the denial of the right of inspection was proper. Here, the district court's order reflects that the Clerk's denial of Marks' request was proper. Consequently, Marks is not entitled to attorney fees in this case." The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding to the contrary. View "Reno v. Marks" on Justia Law