Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Elmore County’s decided to terminate employee, plaintiff-appellant Cherri Nix, without providing her a pre-termination hearing pursuant to the Elmore County Personnel Policy (ECPP). Nix filed suit alleging, among other claims, that Elmore County violated the ECPP and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated her employment without giving her a pre-termination hearing. The district court granted Elmore County’s summary judgment motion on the basis that Nix was an at-will employee subject to termination at any time and for any reason, and that Nix failed to show a contractual relationship with Elmore County that would entitle her to a pre-termination hearing. Nix appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nix v. Elmore County" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by declining to exercise its mandamus jurisdiction to remedy various alleged violations of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR). Petitioners-appellants Shawn Brittingham and Christopher Story sought mandamus relief for several alleged violations of LEOBOR while they were police officers with the Georgetown Police Department (GPD). Respondents-appellees Town of Georgetown, Georgetown Chief of Police William Topping, and Captain Ralph Holm moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court granted the motion, thereby denying Brittingham and Story’s petition. In 2007, Chief Topping issued an oral order prohibiting GPD officers from meeting or speaking with the mayor or members of the Town Council to discuss internal police business without first obtaining his permission and going through the chain of command. In spite of this order, seven off-duty officers met with a Town Council member at her home to discuss police department issues. Captain Holm learned of the meeting, and informed appellants and the other officers involved that they were being investigated for violating GPD Rules and Regulations. A written reprimand was offered to each officer. Rather than accept the reprimand, appellants elected to request a hearing as to the allegations made against them (namely, for insubordination) with the Criminal Justice Council (CJC). The panel found substantial evidence to support the insubordination charge. Chief Topping imposed discipline against appellants: Brittingham received a four-week suspension without pay and a fourteen-day reduction in rank, and placed on disciplinary probation for a year; Story received a two-week suspension without pay, a seven-day reduction in rank, and disciplinary probation of a year. The officers appealed to the Town's Disciplinary Action Appeals Board, which upheld the CJC panel. Appellants filed a civil complaint against appellees, claiming (amongst other things) a violation of their First Amendment rights. On appeal, appellants argued that the process afforded them did not comply with LEOBOR, and that their only remedy was a mandamus writ ordering vacatur of the resulting disciplinary decisions. Appellees responded that they did not violate LEOBOR, that Appellants’ claims are now moot, and that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested relief. After review, the Supreme Court found that Brittingham and Story were correct that a technical violation of LEOBOR occurred, but the Court rejected their claims as to all other alleged violations. However, as to the one meritorious claim, the matter was moot because neither Brittingham nor Story were then-employed by the GPD, and because the relief they sought was not relief that was available to them in a mandamus proceeding. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision as to all claims but one, and as to that claim, the Court held that the claim was moot. View "Brittingham v. Town of Georgetown" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained a home loan and granted a mortgage that was eventually assigned to Bank of America (BOA). Plaintiffs defaulted in 2007. In 2011, plaintiffs received a letter explaining the right to seek a loan modification. Plaintiffs sought assistance from NMCA; met with BOA’s counsel; provided information and forms prepared with help from NMCA; and were offered reduced payments for a three-month trial period. If all trial period payments were timely, the loan would be permanently modified. Plaintiffs allege that they made the three payments, but did not receive any further information, and that BOA returned two payments. BOA offered plaintiffs a permanent loan modification, instructing plaintiffs to execute and return a loan modification agreement. Plaintiffs do not allege that they returned the agreement. BOA never received the documents. BOA sent a letter informing them that because they were in default and had not accepted the modification agreement, a nonjudicial foreclosure would proceed. Notice was published. The property was sold at a sheriff’s sale. BOA purchased the property, and executed a quitclaim deed to Federal National Mortgage Association, which filed a possession action after the redemption period expired. Six months later, plaintiffs sued, claiming Quiet Title; violations of due process rights; and illegal/improper foreclosure and sheriff’s sale. The district court dismissed all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Michigan foreclosure procedure does not violate due process. View "Garcia v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Appellants Delano Farms Company, Four Star Fruit, Inc., Gerawan Farming, Inc., Bidart Bros. and Blanc Vineyards, LLC, challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme that establishes respondent, the California Table Grape Commission, and required table grape growers and packers to fund the Commission’s promotional activities. Appellants argued that being compelled to fund the Commission’s generic advertising violated their rights to free speech, free association, due process, liberty and privacy under the California Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment in the Commission’s favor. The court held that the Commission is a "governmental entity" and thus its speech is government speech that can be funded with compelled assessments. Alternatively, the trial court applied the intermediate scrutiny test set forth in "Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura," (33 Cal.4th 1, 22 (2004)), and concluded that the compelled funding scheme did not violate the California Constitution. Appellants argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. According to appellants, facts relied on by the Commission to demonstrate that the funding scheme passed constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny were not proved by admissible evidence and were in dispute. Appellants further argued the court erred in finding the speech was government speech because the Commission did not demonstrate either that the Commission is a government entity or that the government controlled the Commission’s activities and speech. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Com." on Justia Law

Leading up to the 2012 state Senate elections in Texas, Texas failed to gain preclearance of its recently enacted Senate redistricting plan as required under then-existing law. Because Texas’s new plan had not been precleared, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit and successfully blocked the plan for the 2012 elections. A three-judge district court panel in San Antonio enjoined Texas’s plan and ordered an interim plan in its place. But after the election, the Supreme Court held that the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula, which automatically subjected Texas to the preclearance requirement, was unconstitutional. Regardless, after the Court’s decision, Texas repealed the contested redistricting plan and adopted the court-imposed plan in its place, thus mooting Plaintiffs’ lawsuit. The district court then awarded Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs. Texas appealed the award of costs. Because the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erroneously characterized Plaintiffs as prevailing parties, the Fifth Circuit reversed. View "Davis v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Attorney Daniel Faber filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of three assistant attorneys who alleged alleging gender discrimination in connection with their salaries. The Attorney General filed a motion to stay litigation pending resolution of his motion to dismiss the complaint based on an immunity defense. The federal district court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting the Attorney General’s motion to stay all proceedings, including discovery; the stay was lifted a few months later. Prior to lifting of the stay, Faber filed an Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) request in his own name seeking employment data for every attorney who had been employed by the Attorney General’s Office since January 1987. The records custodian of the Attorney General’s Office denied the IPRA request, stating that “[t]his request is being denied as these records involve a current lawsuit and appear to circumvent the discovery process and the current Order Staying Discovery (attached).” Faber filed a complaint for damages and a petition for writ of mandamus in the state district court against the Attorney General alleging that his IPRA request had been wrongfully denied. The state district court found that the stay of discovery entered by the federal court did not preempt the statutory rights granted to New Mexico citizens by IPRA, and that the Attorney General violated IPRA by denying Faber’s request. The court also issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Attorney General to comply and ruled that damages would be considered at a later date. Faber subsequently moved for an award of damages. The state district court awarded damages of $10 per day from the date of the wrongful denial to the date the stay was lifted and thereafter “damages of $100 per day until the records are provided,” and $257.19 in costs to Faber. The Attorney General appealed the state district court’s award of damages. The determination of the IPRA violation was not at issue on appeal. The issue in this case focused on what type of damages were authorized by the Legislature in Section 14-2-13 12(D). The Supreme Court held that Section 14-2-12(D) permitted compensatory or actual damages because the plain language, purpose, and history of IPRA indicated that neither punitive nor statutory damages were intended by the Legislature. The Court also held that Faber was not eligible for nominal damages. View "Farber v. King" on Justia Law

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) has priority to use track systems owned by the freight railroads for passenger rail travel, at agreed rates or rates set by the Surface Transportation Board. In 2008, Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue “metrics and standards” addressing performance and scheduling of passenger railroad services, 122 Stat. 4907, including Amtrak’s on-time performance and delays caused by host railroads. The Association of American Railroads sued. The District of Columbia Circuit accepted a separation of powers claim, reasoning that Amtrak is a private corporation and cannot constitutionally be granted regulatory power. The Supreme Court vacated. For purposes of determining the validity of the standards, Amtrak is a governmental entity. The D.C. Circuit relied on the statutory command that Amtrak “is not a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States,” 49 U.S.C. 24301(a)(3), and “shall be operated and managed as a for profit corporation,” but independent inquiry reveals that the political branches control most of Amtrak’s stock and its Board of Directors, most of whom are appointed by the President. The political branches exercise substantial, statutorily mandated supervision over Amtrak’s priorities and operations: Amtrak is required to pursue broad public objectives; certain day-to-day operations are mandated by Congress; and Amtrak has been dependent on federal financial support during every year of its existence. Amtrak is not an autonomous private enterprise and, in jointly issuing the metrics and standards with the FRA, Amtrak acted as a governmental entity for separation of powers purposes. Treating Amtrak as governmental for these purposes is not an unbridled grant of authority to an unaccountable actor. On remand, the court may address any remaining issues respecting the lawfulness of the metrics and standards. View "Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads" on Justia Law

Employee filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission contending that her employment by Employer had been terminated because she became pregnant. The Commission found that Employer had participated in a discriminatory practice in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112. Employer filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4112.06. The common pleas court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition for review was not timely served on the parties because Employer failed to properly initiate service by the clerk within thirty days of the date the Commission’s order was filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Employer had one year to obtain service of a petition to review an order of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings initiated pursuant to section 4112.06; and (2) therefore, a petition to review an order of the Commission must be served by a clerk of courts on all parties who appeared before the Commission and on the Commission itself within one year of the date the petition was filed as required by Ohio R. Civ. P. 3(A). View "Hambuechen v. 221 Market North, Inc." on Justia Law

The Iowa Department of Economic Development (IDED) and Ghost Player, LLC executed a contract for tax credits under which Ghost Player believed it would receive certain tax credits for a documentary film it produced. CH Investors, LLC was a third-party beneficiary to the contract. The IDED declined to issue the contracted tax credit for some of the investments and expenditures of Ghost Player. Ghost Player and CH Investors subsequently filed a breach of contract action against the IDED. The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that Ghost Player failed to exhaust its remedies under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) was without authority to hear the case because the IDED actions in this case required Ghost Player to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing a case in district court; and (2) correctly found the process used by the IDED in processing the claim did not offend due process principles under the State or the Federal Constitutions. View "Ghost Player, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

Glenn Bynum and Larry Gipson appealed a trial court's order holding that certain amendments to section 28-2A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 (pertaining to the sale of alcoholic beverages in a municipality), were constitutional. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it was clear that the Alabama legislature intended to omit 3 counties from inclusion in Act No. 2009-546 allowing municipalities with a population of more than 1,000 to hold elections regarding the sale of alcohol in their municipal limits; and (2) it was clear that the legislature did not include a severability clause in Act No. 2009-546. The legislature included a general severability provision in the Alabama Code, which the Supreme Court regarded as an expression of legislative intent concerning the general power and duty of the judiciary to sever and save statutory provisions not tainted by the unconstitutionality of other provisions in the statute. However, the Court reasoned that the inclusion of a severability clause in a particular act was a clear statement of a legislative intent to sever unconstitutional provisions in that act while allowing the constitutional provisions to remain. Municipalities with more than 1,000 residents in 64 counties have held elections on whether to sell alcohol. The exclusion of the 3 counties from the provisions of Act No. 2009-546 violated the Equal Protection Clause where the exclusion was not rationally related to the regulation of alcohol because no basis existed for excluding smaller cities within those 3 counties from participating in a "wet" or "dry" election and allowing smaller cities in the remaining 64 counties to do so. However, using severability to save Act No. 2009-546 was not permissible where it was obvious that the legislature excluded the three counties for no rational reason, and to edit Act No. 2009-546 by severing that language excluding the three counties would be to undermine the clear intent of the legislature. The Supreme Court left "it to the legislature to redraft a constitutionally sound law." Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bynum v. City of Oneonta et al." on Justia Law