Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Hayden provided sewer service to the residents living in the City and to some persons living outside the City. To do so, the City entered into a joint powers agreement with the Hayden Area Regional Sewer Board, which operated a regional wastewater treatment plant serving the City and two other local entities. The City charged each customer it serves a bi-monthly fee, which covered a proportionate share of the operation and maintenance of the City's sewer collection system and of the operation and maintenance costs associated with the regional wastewater treatment facility. In addition to the bi-monthly fee, the City charged a one-time "sewer capitalization fee" for each new structure, whether residential or commercial, and for any addition to an existing commercial structure that would result in an increase in the volume of sewage generated. The capitalization fee was charged when a building permit is issued. In March 2006, the City contracted with an engineering company to update the City's sewer master plan. The engineering company submitted a capital improvement plan in which it recommended forty projects that would cost about $20 million in order to replace existing infrastructure and to construct new infrastructure so that the sewer system would reach the entire area of city impact and accommodate anticipated future population growth. In order to finance the project, the engineering company recommended that the part of the capitalization fee retained by the City be increased from $735 for one equivalent residence ("ER") to $2,280 for one ER. In 2010, the North Idaho Building Contractors Association filed suit to have the fee declared unlawful because it was an impermissible tax rather than a fee for services. The district court held that it was lawful and entered a judgment dismissing the complaint. The City requested an award of attorney fees, which the court denied. The Contractors Association appealed the dismissal of its complaint, and the City cross-appealed the denial of an award of attorney fees. Because there was nothing in the record showing that as of June 7, 2007, the sum of $2,280 was the actual cost of providing sewer service to a customer connecting to the City sewer system and there was no showing that the amount of the fee was based upon any such calculation, the fee was not authorized by Idaho Code section 63-1311(1). The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in holding that it was. View "No. Idaho Bldg Contractors Assoc. v. City of Hayden" on Justia Law

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) amended its licensing requirements to include certain minimum general-liability-insurance coverage for all child-care centers. Plaintiffs, three school districts that operated child-care centers licensed by DHS, filed a complaint alleging that DHS’s requirement that they purchase general-liability-insurance conflicted with their tort immunity under Ark. Code. 21-9-301(a). Defendants, DHS and John Selig, the director of DHS, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the school districts’ claims were barred by sovereign and statutory immunity. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss on sovereign-immunity grounds as to DHS and John Selig, in his official capacity; (2) to the extent the school district made claims against Selig individually, they were barred by Ark. Code Ann. 19-10-305(a); and (3) the remainder of Plaintiffs’ arguments were not properly before the Court. View "Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Fort Smith Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

When the Arkansas State Medical Board declined the application of Plaintiff, a breast oncology surgeon, for a permit to dispense legend drugs, Plaintiff sued, arguing that Act 515 of 1983, codified at Ark. Code Ann. 17-95-102, was unconstitutional. The circuit court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that section 17-95-102(d) was unconstitutional. The General Assembly subsequently amended the statutory provision the circuit court had declared unconstitutional by passing Act 1169 of 2013. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and other physicians similarly situated, and another individual filed a complaint alleging that Act 1169 was unconstitutional as special legislation, among other things. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) res judicata was not applicable to this case; (2) Appellants’ argument that a statute that was declared unconstitutional and void cannot be amended was without merit; (3) Appellants failed to show that Act 1169 was impermissibly vague in all of its applications; (4) Appellants failed to establish that the Board was prevented from issuing permits upon approval as a mechanism for exercising its authority to carry out Act 1169; and (5) Act 1169 does not constitute unconstitutional special legislation. View "Abraham v. Beck" on Justia Law

An individual and a hotel who incurred a one percent surcharge on their electricity bills, collected by Southern California Edison (SCE) and remitted to the City of Santa Barbara, filed a class action challenging its validity. The city did not seek voter approval of the surcharge, which is collected pursuant to an ordinance and franchise agreement with the city. The California Constitution, as amended by Proposition 218, prohibits local governments from imposing new or increased taxes without first obtaining voter consent. (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, 2.) The court of appeal reversed the trial court. The surcharge is an illegal tax masquerading as a franchise fee. Distinguishable precedent cited by the city concerned traditional franchise fees collected for grants of rights of way rather than, as here, a surcharge collected for general revenue purposes. View "Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Since 1982 Chicago has provided free or subsidized health care to certain retirees who receive pension benefits. In 2013 the ordinance establishing those benefits expired. After being notified that they would have to pay more for medical coverage in 2014, the retirees filed suit, alleging that any reduction of health care or increase in the retirees’ contribution toward it violated Art. XIII 5 of the Illinois Constitution, which says that “[m]embership in any pension or retirement system of … any unit of local government … shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired” and the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Following removal, the district court dismissed the suit, ruling that the Illinois Pensions Clause does not apply to health care. While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Pensions Clause applies to health benefits. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that the Illinois case did not address the exact issue in this case. Because the Supreme Court of Illinois has granted review of a similar case and because this suit began in state court, relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction is preferable to certifying questions to the state judiciary. View "Underwood v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (UOCAVA), Pub. L. No. 111-84, Subtitle H, 575-589, 123 Stat. 2190, 2322, amended the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 1973ff. The UOCAVA now requires a state, absent a hardship waiver, to transmit an absentee ballot to the voter "not later than 45 days before the election[.]" Georgia and Alabama appealed the district court's grant of preliminary injunctive relief, summary judgment, and permanent injunctive relief in a suit brought by the United States against Georgia and Alabama. The district court ruled that the 45-day transmittal requirement applies to runoff elections for federal office, and that the runoff election schemes in these two states violated UOCAVA. After the district court had issued its ruling and after the briefs in this appeal were filed, the Georgia Legislature passed H.B. 310, which in relevant part amends Georgia's election calendar and voting procedures to comply with the 45-day transmittal requirement. In light of H.B. 310, the court dismissed Georgia's appeal as moot. View "United States v. State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Amtrak appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing its federal Supremacy Clause claims filed against the Commissioner, claiming that the Supremacy Clause deprived the NYSDOT of authority to condemn Amtrak's property by eminent domain. The district court held that Amtrak's claims were barred under the Eleventh Amendment and, in the alternative, the claims were time-barred. The court concluded that, because one of the parcels of land is not subject to sovereign immunity, the statute of limitations issue must be resolved. Amtrak argued that it suffered two separate injuries: first, when it learned that NYSDOT planned to take its land, and second, when the Commissioner actually executed the takings. Under the circumstances of this case, the court concluded that Amtrak brought its federal claims more than six years afters its claims accrued. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court based on its alternative conclusion that the claims were time-barred. View "National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review stems from a dispute between Sheriff Tyrone Lewis of Hinds County and the judges' chambers of the Hinds County Circuit Court over the role of bailiffs. Lewis attempted to make hiring, firing, and compensation changes affecting bailiffs. In response, the circuit court issued an Order and Opinion in 2012 upholding a previous Order from 1996. The 1996 Order stated that, in several respects, further detailed below, bailiffs fell under the authority of the judiciary rather than the sheriff. Lewis filed a Motion for Relief, and the circuit court subsequently issued another order, granting the power to compensate bailiffs to the sheriff only if he follows the terms of the 1996 Order. Lewis appealed. The Supreme Court held that the 1996 Order and the 2012 Order and Opinion were void in part to the extent they directly violated the Constitution and statutory law. View "Lewis v. Hinds County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Appellants, twenty-four Pennsylvania voters, filed this action in 2006 in the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction to challenge the certification of six direct-recording electronic voting systems (DREs) models in use in Pennsylvania. Seeking declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief, Appellants claimed the Secretary of the Commonwealth should have been ordered to decertify the DREs which did not comply with the Election Code and compelled to adopt more rigorous testing standards. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Commonwealth Court erred in upholding the decision of the Secretary to certify certain DREs for use in Pennsylvania elections. The Commonwealth Court found that the DREs satisfied the certification requirements set forth in the Election Code and did not infringe on the fundamental right to vote as protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court did not err in granting the Secretary's petition for summary relief. In particular, the Court found the Secretary exercised proper discretion in determining that the certified DREs satisfied the requirements for electronic voting systems set forth in the Election Code and the use of the DREs did not violate Appellants' fundamental right to vote as embodied within Article I, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution or the uniformity requirement in Article VII, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. View "Banfield v. Sec'y of Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Sterling Suffolk Racecourse, LLC (SSR) applied for a license to place a casino in certain areas of Massachusetts. Caesars Entertainment Corporation and three Massachusetts affiliates (collectively, Caesars) were the proposed operators of the casino. The Massachusetts Gaming Commission issued an investigatory report concluding that Caesars was unsuitable as an operator, which caused Caesars to accede to SSR’s request that it withdraw from their contractual relationship. Caesars brought this action under 28 U.S.C. 1983 against certain Commission officials in their individual and official capacities and also brought a state law claim subject to supplemental jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the federal claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as beyond the scope of federal affordable relief and dismissed the state law claim as standing alone. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Caesars alleged no cognizable protected property interest, its Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim; and (2) Caesars’ class-of-one Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim could not be recognized against a state actor given the breadth of discretion provided by the Massachusetts casino licensing statute. View "Caesars Mass. Dev. Co., LLC v. Crosby" on Justia Law