Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Attorney Daniel Faber filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of three assistant attorneys who alleged alleging gender discrimination in connection with their salaries. The Attorney General filed a motion to stay litigation pending resolution of his motion to dismiss the complaint based on an immunity defense. The federal district court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting the Attorney General’s motion to stay all proceedings, including discovery; the stay was lifted a few months later. Prior to lifting of the stay, Faber filed an Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) request in his own name seeking employment data for every attorney who had been employed by the Attorney General’s Office since January 1987. The records custodian of the Attorney General’s Office denied the IPRA request, stating that “[t]his request is being denied as these records involve a current lawsuit and appear to circumvent the discovery process and the current Order Staying Discovery (attached).” Faber filed a complaint for damages and a petition for writ of mandamus in the state district court against the Attorney General alleging that his IPRA request had been wrongfully denied. The state district court found that the stay of discovery entered by the federal court did not preempt the statutory rights granted to New Mexico citizens by IPRA, and that the Attorney General violated IPRA by denying Faber’s request. The court also issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Attorney General to comply and ruled that damages would be considered at a later date. Faber subsequently moved for an award of damages. The state district court awarded damages of $10 per day from the date of the wrongful denial to the date the stay was lifted and thereafter “damages of $100 per day until the records are provided,” and $257.19 in costs to Faber. The Attorney General appealed the state district court’s award of damages. The determination of the IPRA violation was not at issue on appeal. The issue in this case focused on what type of damages were authorized by the Legislature in Section 14-2-13 12(D). The Supreme Court held that Section 14-2-12(D) permitted compensatory or actual damages because the plain language, purpose, and history of IPRA indicated that neither punitive nor statutory damages were intended by the Legislature. The Court also held that Faber was not eligible for nominal damages. View "Farber v. King" on Justia Law

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) has priority to use track systems owned by the freight railroads for passenger rail travel, at agreed rates or rates set by the Surface Transportation Board. In 2008, Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue “metrics and standards” addressing performance and scheduling of passenger railroad services, 122 Stat. 4907, including Amtrak’s on-time performance and delays caused by host railroads. The Association of American Railroads sued. The District of Columbia Circuit accepted a separation of powers claim, reasoning that Amtrak is a private corporation and cannot constitutionally be granted regulatory power. The Supreme Court vacated. For purposes of determining the validity of the standards, Amtrak is a governmental entity. The D.C. Circuit relied on the statutory command that Amtrak “is not a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States,” 49 U.S.C. 24301(a)(3), and “shall be operated and managed as a for profit corporation,” but independent inquiry reveals that the political branches control most of Amtrak’s stock and its Board of Directors, most of whom are appointed by the President. The political branches exercise substantial, statutorily mandated supervision over Amtrak’s priorities and operations: Amtrak is required to pursue broad public objectives; certain day-to-day operations are mandated by Congress; and Amtrak has been dependent on federal financial support during every year of its existence. Amtrak is not an autonomous private enterprise and, in jointly issuing the metrics and standards with the FRA, Amtrak acted as a governmental entity for separation of powers purposes. Treating Amtrak as governmental for these purposes is not an unbridled grant of authority to an unaccountable actor. On remand, the court may address any remaining issues respecting the lawfulness of the metrics and standards. View "Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads" on Justia Law

Employee filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission contending that her employment by Employer had been terminated because she became pregnant. The Commission found that Employer had participated in a discriminatory practice in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112. Employer filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4112.06. The common pleas court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition for review was not timely served on the parties because Employer failed to properly initiate service by the clerk within thirty days of the date the Commission’s order was filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Employer had one year to obtain service of a petition to review an order of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings initiated pursuant to section 4112.06; and (2) therefore, a petition to review an order of the Commission must be served by a clerk of courts on all parties who appeared before the Commission and on the Commission itself within one year of the date the petition was filed as required by Ohio R. Civ. P. 3(A). View "Hambuechen v. 221 Market North, Inc." on Justia Law

The Iowa Department of Economic Development (IDED) and Ghost Player, LLC executed a contract for tax credits under which Ghost Player believed it would receive certain tax credits for a documentary film it produced. CH Investors, LLC was a third-party beneficiary to the contract. The IDED declined to issue the contracted tax credit for some of the investments and expenditures of Ghost Player. Ghost Player and CH Investors subsequently filed a breach of contract action against the IDED. The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that Ghost Player failed to exhaust its remedies under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) was without authority to hear the case because the IDED actions in this case required Ghost Player to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing a case in district court; and (2) correctly found the process used by the IDED in processing the claim did not offend due process principles under the State or the Federal Constitutions. View "Ghost Player, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

Glenn Bynum and Larry Gipson appealed a trial court's order holding that certain amendments to section 28-2A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 (pertaining to the sale of alcoholic beverages in a municipality), were constitutional. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it was clear that the Alabama legislature intended to omit 3 counties from inclusion in Act No. 2009-546 allowing municipalities with a population of more than 1,000 to hold elections regarding the sale of alcohol in their municipal limits; and (2) it was clear that the legislature did not include a severability clause in Act No. 2009-546. The legislature included a general severability provision in the Alabama Code, which the Supreme Court regarded as an expression of legislative intent concerning the general power and duty of the judiciary to sever and save statutory provisions not tainted by the unconstitutionality of other provisions in the statute. However, the Court reasoned that the inclusion of a severability clause in a particular act was a clear statement of a legislative intent to sever unconstitutional provisions in that act while allowing the constitutional provisions to remain. Municipalities with more than 1,000 residents in 64 counties have held elections on whether to sell alcohol. The exclusion of the 3 counties from the provisions of Act No. 2009-546 violated the Equal Protection Clause where the exclusion was not rationally related to the regulation of alcohol because no basis existed for excluding smaller cities within those 3 counties from participating in a "wet" or "dry" election and allowing smaller cities in the remaining 64 counties to do so. However, using severability to save Act No. 2009-546 was not permissible where it was obvious that the legislature excluded the three counties for no rational reason, and to edit Act No. 2009-546 by severing that language excluding the three counties would be to undermine the clear intent of the legislature. The Supreme Court left "it to the legislature to redraft a constitutionally sound law." Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bynum v. City of Oneonta et al." on Justia Law

The City of Hayden provided sewer service to the residents living in the City and to some persons living outside the City. To do so, the City entered into a joint powers agreement with the Hayden Area Regional Sewer Board, which operated a regional wastewater treatment plant serving the City and two other local entities. The City charged each customer it serves a bi-monthly fee, which covered a proportionate share of the operation and maintenance of the City's sewer collection system and of the operation and maintenance costs associated with the regional wastewater treatment facility. In addition to the bi-monthly fee, the City charged a one-time "sewer capitalization fee" for each new structure, whether residential or commercial, and for any addition to an existing commercial structure that would result in an increase in the volume of sewage generated. The capitalization fee was charged when a building permit is issued. In March 2006, the City contracted with an engineering company to update the City's sewer master plan. The engineering company submitted a capital improvement plan in which it recommended forty projects that would cost about $20 million in order to replace existing infrastructure and to construct new infrastructure so that the sewer system would reach the entire area of city impact and accommodate anticipated future population growth. In order to finance the project, the engineering company recommended that the part of the capitalization fee retained by the City be increased from $735 for one equivalent residence ("ER") to $2,280 for one ER. In 2010, the North Idaho Building Contractors Association filed suit to have the fee declared unlawful because it was an impermissible tax rather than a fee for services. The district court held that it was lawful and entered a judgment dismissing the complaint. The City requested an award of attorney fees, which the court denied. The Contractors Association appealed the dismissal of its complaint, and the City cross-appealed the denial of an award of attorney fees. Because there was nothing in the record showing that as of June 7, 2007, the sum of $2,280 was the actual cost of providing sewer service to a customer connecting to the City sewer system and there was no showing that the amount of the fee was based upon any such calculation, the fee was not authorized by Idaho Code section 63-1311(1). The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in holding that it was. View "No. Idaho Bldg Contractors Assoc. v. City of Hayden" on Justia Law

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) amended its licensing requirements to include certain minimum general-liability-insurance coverage for all child-care centers. Plaintiffs, three school districts that operated child-care centers licensed by DHS, filed a complaint alleging that DHS’s requirement that they purchase general-liability-insurance conflicted with their tort immunity under Ark. Code. 21-9-301(a). Defendants, DHS and John Selig, the director of DHS, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the school districts’ claims were barred by sovereign and statutory immunity. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss on sovereign-immunity grounds as to DHS and John Selig, in his official capacity; (2) to the extent the school district made claims against Selig individually, they were barred by Ark. Code Ann. 19-10-305(a); and (3) the remainder of Plaintiffs’ arguments were not properly before the Court. View "Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Fort Smith Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

When the Arkansas State Medical Board declined the application of Plaintiff, a breast oncology surgeon, for a permit to dispense legend drugs, Plaintiff sued, arguing that Act 515 of 1983, codified at Ark. Code Ann. 17-95-102, was unconstitutional. The circuit court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that section 17-95-102(d) was unconstitutional. The General Assembly subsequently amended the statutory provision the circuit court had declared unconstitutional by passing Act 1169 of 2013. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and other physicians similarly situated, and another individual filed a complaint alleging that Act 1169 was unconstitutional as special legislation, among other things. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) res judicata was not applicable to this case; (2) Appellants’ argument that a statute that was declared unconstitutional and void cannot be amended was without merit; (3) Appellants failed to show that Act 1169 was impermissibly vague in all of its applications; (4) Appellants failed to establish that the Board was prevented from issuing permits upon approval as a mechanism for exercising its authority to carry out Act 1169; and (5) Act 1169 does not constitute unconstitutional special legislation. View "Abraham v. Beck" on Justia Law

An individual and a hotel who incurred a one percent surcharge on their electricity bills, collected by Southern California Edison (SCE) and remitted to the City of Santa Barbara, filed a class action challenging its validity. The city did not seek voter approval of the surcharge, which is collected pursuant to an ordinance and franchise agreement with the city. The California Constitution, as amended by Proposition 218, prohibits local governments from imposing new or increased taxes without first obtaining voter consent. (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, 2.) The court of appeal reversed the trial court. The surcharge is an illegal tax masquerading as a franchise fee. Distinguishable precedent cited by the city concerned traditional franchise fees collected for grants of rights of way rather than, as here, a surcharge collected for general revenue purposes. View "Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Since 1982 Chicago has provided free or subsidized health care to certain retirees who receive pension benefits. In 2013 the ordinance establishing those benefits expired. After being notified that they would have to pay more for medical coverage in 2014, the retirees filed suit, alleging that any reduction of health care or increase in the retirees’ contribution toward it violated Art. XIII 5 of the Illinois Constitution, which says that “[m]embership in any pension or retirement system of … any unit of local government … shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired” and the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Following removal, the district court dismissed the suit, ruling that the Illinois Pensions Clause does not apply to health care. While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Pensions Clause applies to health benefits. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that the Illinois case did not address the exact issue in this case. Because the Supreme Court of Illinois has granted review of a similar case and because this suit began in state court, relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction is preferable to certifying questions to the state judiciary. View "Underwood v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law