Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996 Ritzhoff was injured while working as a banquet server. He sustained permanent injuries to his ankle and injured his hand and back. His treating psychiatrist initially evaluated Ritzhoff in 2001 and noted that Ritzhoff demonstrated diminished cognitive functioning, had severe depression, suicidal ideation, severe anxiety, and total neuroticism. The doctor found Ritzhoff temporarily totally disabled on a psychiatric basis and in need of emotional treatment. His employer made temporary disability payments until 2006. Ritzhoff admitted working from time-to-time since his injury. At a third hearing in 2013, Ritzhoff refused to respond to cross-examination. The workers’ compensation judge found Ritzhoff totally permanently disabled on a psychiatric basis, originating in the orthopedic injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. The court of appeal annulled the determination. That the decision was supported by substantial evidence is beside the point. The appeals board exceeded its powers when it adopted a decision as its own that was flawed by a denial of due process with respect to cross-examination. View "Ogden Entm't Servs. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the City misreported charges under the Texas Driver Responsibility Program to plaintiffs and that the State overcharged plaintiffs as a result. On appeal, defendant, the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety, challenged the district court's partial denial of his motion to dismiss the case against him for want of jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiff Fontenot lacks standing to sue; plaintiffs Miller and Zamarron have no live controversy with the State for correction of driving records, and therefore the class action claim for similar relief is moot and nonjusticiable; the refund claims to recover surcharges are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity; and the court found it unnecessary to discuss the State's jurisdictional defense. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying state sovereign immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction. View "Fontenot v. McCraw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a fraternal organization and tax exempt not-for-profit corporation, owns and operates, a Macon nursing home that s licensed by the Illinois Department of Public Health, with a permit to enter into life care contracts under 210 ILCS 40/1. In 2002, the Department of Public Aid directed plaintiff to pay the “Nursing Home License Fee” of $1.50 for each licensed nursing bed day for each calendar quarter, 305 ILCS 5/5E-10. The Department then claimed that plaintiff was delinquent since 1993 and owed $244,233 in back fees plus $237,890 in penalties. Plaintiff paid under protest and sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that the fee was unconstitutional as applied to it because the fee’s purpose is to fund Medicaid-related expenditures that are neither precipitated by nor paid to plaintiff. The trial court granted plaintiff summary judgment under the uniformity clause The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The taxing classification “every nursing home,” bears some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation and to public policy. The object of the fee is not simply Medicaid reimbursement; all fees are deposited into the Long-Term Care Provider Fund, which may be used for Medicaid reimbursement, administrative expenses of the Department and its agents, enforcement of nursing home standards, the nursing home ombudsman program, expansion of home-and community-based services, and the General Obligation Bond Retirement and Interest Fund. View "Grand Chapter, Order of the E. Star of Ill. v. Topinka" on Justia Law

WestNET was a multiagency, multijurisdictional drug task force formed by an "Interlocal Drug Task Force Agreement" executed in June 2009 among several Washington State municipalities and the federal Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS). The Agreement at issue here explicitly provided that because WestNET "does and must operate confidentially and without public input," "[t]he parties do not intend to create through, this Agreement, a separate legal entity subject to suit." In 2010, petitioner John Worthington filed a public records request that WestNET disclose records related to a raid of his residence four years earlier, which he alleged was conducted by the WestNET drug task force. WestNET did not respond, and instead, the Kitsap County Sheriffs Office made some initial disclosures. The sheriffs office did not indicate why it responded instead of WestNET. Dissatisfied with the response, Worthington sued for relief under the Public Records Act, serving the complaint on the address shared by the Kitsap County Sheriffs Office and the Kitsap County Prosecutor's Office. However, the complaint named WestNET as the only defendant. Because the trial court granted the defendant's CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was a narrower procedural issue: can the parties to an inter local agreement establish, as a matter of law, that their own task forces do not exist for the purpose of the PRA? The Court held that the ICA did not provide the contributing agencies with such an unqualified power. In concluding that the terms of the agreement alone conclusively established WestNET's capacity for suit, the trial court deprived the plaintiff of an opportunity to present evidence in support of his argument that WestNET's actual operational structure subjects it to the PRA's purview. That approach is inconsistent with our general approach to PRA issues and the ICA itself. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further factual determination proceedings. View "Worthington v. WestNET" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against the Secretary on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries who were placed into "observation status" by their hospitals rather than being admitted as "inpatients." Placement into "observation status" allegedly caused these beneficiaries to pay thousands of dollars more for their medical care. The district court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395, claims where plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the adequacy of the notices they received and nothing in the statute entitles plaintiffs to the process changes they seek. However, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Due Process claims where the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs lacked a property interest in being treated as "inpatients," because the district court accepted as true the Secretary's assertion that a hospital's decision to formally admit a patient is "a complex medical judgment" left to the doctor's discretion. The district court's conclusion constituted impermissible factfinding, which in any event is inconsistent with the complaint's allegations that the decision to admit is guided by fixed and objective criteria. View "Barrows v. Burwell" on Justia Law

California voters adopted Proposition 13 in 1978 to require, among other constitutionally implemented tax relief measures, that any “special taxes” for cities, counties, and special districts be approved by two-thirds of voters. In 1996, voters adopted Proposition 218 with one of its aims being “to tighten the two-thirds voter approval requirement for „special taxes‟ and assessments imposed by Proposition 13.” To this end, Proposition 218 added article XIII C to require that new taxes imposed by a local government be subject to two-thirds vote by the electorate. Article XIII C was amended by the voters in 2010 when they passed Proposition 26. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether Proposition 26 applied to a practice by the City of Redding of making an annual budget transfer from the Redding Electrical Utility to Redding's general fund. Because the Utility was municipally owned, it was not subject to a one percent ad valorem tax imposed on privately owned utilities in California. However, the amount transferred between the Utility's funds and the Redding general fund was designed to be equivalent to the ad valorem tax the Utility would have to pay if privately owned. Redding described the annual transfer as a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT). The PILOT was not set by ordinance, but was part of the Redding biennial budget. Plaintiffs in this case (Citizens for Fair REU Rates, Michael Schmitz, Shirlyn Pappas, and Fee Fighter LLC) challenged the PILOT on grounds it constituted a tax for which article XIII C required approval by two-thirds of voters. Redding argued the PILOT was not a tax, and if it was, it was grandfathered-in because it precedesd the adoption of Proposition 26. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded the PILOT was a tax under Proposition 26 for which Redding needed to secure two-thirds voter approval unless it proved the amount collected was necessary to cover the reasonable costs to the city to provide electric service. The Court rejected Redding's assertion the PILOT is grandfathered-in by preceding Proposition 26's adoption: "[t]he PILOT does not escape the purview of Proposition 26 because it is a long-standing practice." Because the trial court concluded the PILOT was reasonable as a matter of law, that judgment was reversed and the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing in which Redding would have the opportunity to prove the PILOT did not exceed reasonable costs under article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(2). View "Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding" on Justia Law

Petitioner Farhad Fredericks made a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request to defendant and real party in interest, the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police Department (the Department), for all "complaints and/or requests for assistance" made to the Department during a six-month period (180 days), pertaining to burglary and identity theft. In response to the request, the Department notified Fredericks that its investigation reports were exempt from disclosure under the CPRA, but it would provide him with redacted, summarized information in its relevant "Calls for Service" reports (e.g., deletion of names of victims), but only about incidents that had occurred during the 60 days before the date of the request. If he continued to seek the Incident History Reports for the same period, they would be provided in redacted form, conditioned on payment of costs for staff preparation costs, plus charged per page disclosed. In response, Fredericks filed a petition for writ of mandate with the trial court to challenge the Department's incomplete compliance with his request. The trial court denied the petition, reasoning that the CPRA only requires the Department to provide information relating to current or "contemporaneous" police activity. In this original proceeding, the Court of Appeal addressed the interpretation of CPRA section 6254, subdivision (f)(2), about the temporal and substantive scope of disclosure that a local law enforcement agency must make under the CPRA: (1) Whether the Department adequately responded to the request by supplying its summary Calls for Service reports, in light of any applicable exemptions from disclosure of records or information; and (2) whether the Department was justified in denying Fredericks the requested access to information from "complaints and/or requests for assistance" that was more than 60 days old, that it categorized as "historical" in nature. After review, the Court concluded the trial court's narrow construction of the Department's disclosure duties under the CPRA is incorrect both as to the substantive and temporal limits placed upon them. Accordingly, the Court granted Fredericks' petition and directed the trial court to allow such appropriate further proceedings as will determine the reasonable and appropriate levels of disclosures and the allowable costs. View "Fredericks v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The State appealed a Superior Court’s ruling that legislative changes to the definition of "earnable compensation" applicable to members of the New Hampshire Retirement System violated the Contract Clauses of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs and the intervenors cross-appealed the court’s rulings that members’ rights to retirement benefits do not vest until they accrue ten years of creditable service, and that members do not have vested rights to cost-of-living adjustments to their pensions. The New Hampshire Retirement System took no position on the legal issues raised in the appeal, but objected to the remedy sought by plaintiffs and the intervenors. After review of the parties' arguments, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on "earnable compensation," and affirmed its ruling on cost-of-living adjustments. View "American Federation of Teachers v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ralph Nelson, the former town manager of St. Johnsbury, appealed a trial court decision granting partial summary judgment to defendants, the Town of St. Johnsbury and its individual selectboard members (collectively "the Town"), on his claims of wrongful termination; violation of procedural due process under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983; violation of Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution; and promissory estoppel. In September 2010, the selectboard formally hired plaintiff as town manager after he served briefly on an interim basis. According to plaintiff, the Town's attorney advised him on three separate occasions that he could be removed only for serious misconduct, which the attorney assured was "an extremely high bar." As town manager, plaintiff undertook a major project to renovate and lease the Town's Pomerleau Building. He gained voter approval on a renovation budget and negotiated a lease with a potential tenant. The selectboard contended plaintiff made certain misrepresentations about the proposed lease, which plaintiff denied. Selectboard chair James Rust informed plaintiff that the board had concerns about his performance and gave him a letter stating that the board would be conducting an inquiry. Rust called plaintiff and notified him that the selectboard would be meeting but that plaintiff was not obligated to attend (plaintiff nonetheless attended). When the meeting convened that evening, the selectboard immediately recessed to executive session. After forty-five minutes, the board asked plaintiff to join them, at which time they discussed the lease. The selectboard asked plaintiff if he wanted to resign, and he declined. Consequently, the board returned to public session and passed a vote of "no confidence." According to plaintiff, he did not understand until that time that the selectboard was terminating his employment. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful termination, Civil Rights Act, and state constitutional claims. The Court affirmed the court's dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim and its grant of summary judgment on the qualified immunity defense. View "Nelson v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

These six consolidated appeals arose out of a Congressional exemption from taxation granted to the federal entities. Appellants contend that the state taxes normally imposed on real estate transfers apply when the federal entities transfer real property in their respective states. The federal entities have not paid the transfer taxes based on their Congressional charter exemptions from "all taxation." The district courts found that the statutory exemptions do apply to preclude taxation and are constitutional. The district court also found that statutory exceptions for taxation of real property contained in the federal statutes did not apply to allow appellants to impose the transfer tax. The court affirmed and agreed with its sister circuits, who have held that the charter exemptions do apply in this context, and are constitutional under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Supremacy Clauses. View "Montgomery Cnty. Comm'n v. FHFA" on Justia Law