Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

These six consolidated appeals arose out of a Congressional exemption from taxation granted to the federal entities. Appellants contend that the state taxes normally imposed on real estate transfers apply when the federal entities transfer real property in their respective states. The federal entities have not paid the transfer taxes based on their Congressional charter exemptions from "all taxation." The district courts found that the statutory exemptions do apply to preclude taxation and are constitutional. The district court also found that statutory exceptions for taxation of real property contained in the federal statutes did not apply to allow appellants to impose the transfer tax. The court affirmed and agreed with its sister circuits, who have held that the charter exemptions do apply in this context, and are constitutional under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Supremacy Clauses. View "Montgomery Cnty. Comm'n v. FHFA" on Justia Law

In November 2014, Dr. Gabriela Balf-Soran filed an involuntary commitment petition claiming L.B. was mentally ill and chemically dependent. On November 13, 2014, Carmen Johnson and Dr. Lacey Armstrong filed a Report of Examination and a Report Assessing the Availability and Appropriateness of Alternate Treatment stating L.B. did not meet the mental illness commitment criteria, but she did meet "criteria for the chemical dependency commitment." At the treatment hearing, Johnson's refusal to appear without a subpoena and an order requiring her to testify was discussed. Dr. Balf-Soran was the only witness who testified, and the district court stated it would consider her testimony "[a]s the only evidence before the Court." The court issued an order finding L.B. was chemically dependent, and there was a substantial likelihood of substantial deterioration in her physical health if she did not undergo treatment and ordered her to undergo outpatient treatment with a residential component for a period not to exceed 90 days. L.B. appealed the district court's order requiring her to undergo treatment for chemical dependency, arguing the expert examiner failed to testify, there was no clear and convincing evidence to support the district court's findings, and the district court erred by not ordering the least-restrictive alternative treatment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interest of L.B." on Justia Law

Flora worked as Luzerne County Public Defender from 1980- 2013. He became Chief Public Defender in 2010, maintaining a private practice. His predecessor had tried to secure additional funding by submitting weekly reports concerning excessive caseloads and staffing deficiencies. Flora obtained grant funding for representing juveniles, but was not able to obtain additional money for adult offenders. Flora reported that the existing level of resources did not allow the Office to provide constitutionally adequate representation. The County was unresponsive, so Flora refused representation to those not faced with incarceration. In 2012 Flora initiated a class action lawsuit on behalf of indigent defendants and sought an injunction to prevent his firing. The state court ordered the County to provide adequate funding and prohibited refusing representation to indigent defendants. While the parties were in mediation, the County approved new positions. The funding litigation followed the “Kids for Cash” scandal. From 2003-2008, about 50% of Luzerne County juvenile offenders appeared in court without counsel. Virtually all were adjudicated delinquent. Federal investigators uncovered that judges had accepted kickbacks from for-profit juvenile detention facilities to send unrepresented juveniles to those facilities. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered vacatur and expungement of thousands of delinquency adjudications. Flora alleges that, in 2013, he learned that 3,000 adjudications had not been expunged and reported the matter. Flora was relieved of his duties. Flora sued, alleging retaliation for his funding lawsuit and for reporting noncompliance with the expungement order. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that, under the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Lane v. Franks, Flora pled facts sufficient to allege that he spoke as a citizen. View "Flora v. County of Luzerne" on Justia Law

Appellant had leased the same apartment at a San Juan, Puerto Rico housing cooperative (Cooperative) for several years. While living at the cooperative, Appellant received benefits under the Section 8 federal housing assistance program, which enabled her to pay her rent. When the Housing Finance Authority concluded that Appellant’s apartment unit was “over-housed” for Section 8 purposes, the Cooperative informed Appellant that she would have to pay market-rate rent without the Section 8 assistance. Appellant subsequently submitted a request to the Cooperative for reasonable accommodation on account of her disability, stating that she could not move to a different unit without compromising her health. The Cooperative denied Appellant’s request. After filing an administrative complaint without success, Appellant filed suit in federal court, alleging that the Cooperative had violated the Fair Housing Act by failing to provide the requested accommodation, by engaging in a pattern of discriminatory actions against her, and by retaliating against her because she had recently prevailed in a separate HUD proceeding against the Cooperative. The district court (1) found in the defendants’ favor regarding the reasonable accommodation and disparate treatment claims; and (2) concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the retaliation claim. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the reasonable accommodation and disparate treatment claims; and (2) reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s retaliation claim, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to decide this claim. View "Batista v. Cooperativa de Vivienda" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a radio manufacturing and repair business and two of its managers, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the City's sign ordinance. The ordinance, which governs the placement and display of signs, was enacted by the city to enhance and protect the physical appearance of all areas of the city and to reduce the distractions, obstructions, and hazards to pedestrian and auto traffic. Plaintiffs' challenges to the ordinance relate to a protest of a certain adverse action taken against Central Radio by the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the sign ordinance is a content-neutral restriction on speech that satisfies intermediate scrutiny. The court found no merit in plaintiffs' remaining constitutional challenges. View "Central Radio Co. Inc. v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law

The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed the grant of a writ of ordinary mandate compelling it to set aside its calculation of the period of postconviction suspension of licensee Charles James Piper, arguing the trial court misconstrued the statutes governing the interplay of suspensions due to administrative actions by the DMV and criminal actions in drunk driving (DUI) cases. After Piper was arrested for DUI, he was issued an administrative per se suspension notice, alleging his blood alcohol reading exceeded .08 percent. After a hearing, DMV suspended his driver’s license for four months. After 51 days, Piper applied for and received a restricted license that allowed him to drive to and from work and his mandatory first DUI offender class. DMV thereafter reinstated his full, unrestricted, driving privileges. However, one day before the reinstatement, Piper was convicted of DUI based on the same incident. DMV again suspended his license. He could again apply for a restricted license, but his license could not be reinstated until six months after his conviction. Piper sought a writ of mandate compelling the DMV to credit him for the first suspension, so that the total suspension would not exceed the longer of the two suspension periods. DMV credited Piper with only the 51 days his license was suspended before he asked for and received a restricted license based on his first (administrative) suspension. Piper received a restricted license after his second (postconviction) suspension, which again allowed him to drive to and from DUI classes and work. Based on these facts, the trial court found Piper was “treated in an arbitrary and capricious fashion simply because of the unusually lengthy time lapse between his arrest and administrative suspension pursuant to [] 13353.2, and his eventual conviction and resultant suspension pursuant to [] 13352.” The court issued a writ of mandate compelling DMV to reinstate Piper’s driving privileges.The DMV appealed. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court's conclusion and its judgment granting the writ. Section 13352.4 (relied upon by the trial court), which allowed for postconviction restricted licenses in lieu of suspensions, defined when the postconviction suspension restriction begins and provided that it “shall remain in effect until the final day of the original suspension imposed” under section 13352 “and may include credit for any suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3.” But by its terms, the reference to “the final day of the original suspension imposed” merely marked the end of the period of restriction, and did not mean that a restricted license is a type of suspended license. Piper conceded he was given 51 days credit towards his postconviction suspension for the preconviction period during which his license was suspended, before he asked for and received a restricted license. He was entitled to no additional credit. Based on the statutory scheme, the Court of Appeal saw no mandatory duty that DMV failed to carry out. Accordingly, Piper was not entitled to writ relief. View "Piper v. Dept. Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

L.B. 1161, which was passed in 2012, allows major oil pipeline carriers to bypass the regulatory procedures of the Public Service Commission, instead allowing them to obtain approval from the Governor to exercise the power of eminent domain for building a pipeline in Nebraska. Appellees, a group of landowners, filed a complaint alleging that the bill violated the state Constitution’s equal protection, due process, and separation of powers provisions, as well as the Constitution’s prohibition of special legislation. The district court determined that L.B. 1161 was unconstitutional. Four members of the Supreme Court - a majority of its seven members - held that Appellees had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the bill and that the legislation was unconstitutional. However, because five judges of the Court did not vote on the constitutionality of the bill, the Court held that L.B. must stand by default. View "Thompson v. Heineman" on Justia Law

Robert Gillam and two of his business ventures filed suit, alleging that the Alaska Public Offices Commission should not have been allowed to investigate and decide whether Gillam and his businesses had committed certain campaign finance violations. Gillam alleged that both the Executive Director and the Chair of the Commission were biased and that further consideration by the Commission would violate his right to due process protected by the Alaska and federal constitutions and his Alaska constitutional right to a fair investigation. The superior court concluded that Gillam’s claims were not ripe and that Gillam has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Upon review, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed that there was an administrative recusal procedure for Gillam’s state law claims and that Gillam needed to exhaust that remedy before bringing his state law claims to court. The Court also agreed that Gillam’s federal due process claim was not ripe because the recusal procedure might resolve that claim. View "RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Kirk" on Justia Law

Following nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate, Brigadier General Schwalier was scheduled to be appointed to major general in 1997. His appointment was delayed and the President later chose not to appoint him, 10 U.S.C. 624(c). Schwalier argued that he was appointed by operation of law after the delay of his appointment expired and before the President’s decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court finding that the appointment process for senior military officers does not allow for automatic appointments, and a President’s decision not to appoint an officer is unreviewable. The Air Force and the Department of Defense did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by not retroactively appointing Schwalier. View "Schwalier v. Hagel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of New York State's requirement that all children be vaccinated in order to attend public school. The statute provides two exemptions from the immunization mandate: a medical exemption and a religious exemption. Rejecting plaintiffs' substantive due process, free exercise of religion, equal protection, and Ninth Amendment challenges, the court concluded that the statute and regulation are a constitutionally permissible exercise of the State's police power and do not infringe on the free exercise of religion. The court further concluded that plaintiff's remaining arguments are either meritless or waived. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss. View "Phillips v. City of New York" on Justia Law