Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Janet Howard and Joyce Megginson appealed the dismissal of their complaint on the grounds that the district court erred in failing to adhere to the time limits in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court held that the six-year statute of limitations for suits against the United States, 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), does not apply to claims filed pursuant to Title VII as amended to apply to federal employees. Because the district court erred in applying section 2401(a)'s six-year statute of limitations to appellants' Title VII claims, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for consideration of the second amended complaint. View "Howard v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Mrs. Bridgewater, a Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Society, Inc. (FACES) member parent, filed a complaint with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, alleging that FACES refused a reasonable accommodation for her allergic daughter by not serving her beef instead of chicken at a social event, therefore discriminating against her due to her disability. FACES subsequently expelled the Bridgewater family. Mrs. Bridgewater then filed a second complaint with the Commission, alleging that FACES unlawfully retaliated against her family for filing the disability discrimination claim. FACES filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the Commission did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because FACES was a religious organization, not an educational one. The Commission denied the motion to dismiss and awarded judgment in favor of Mrs. Bridgewater on the retaliatory discrimination claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission’s final order, holding that the Commission lacked authority to take any action other than the dismissal of these claims because the incident giving rise to the claims was not related to education and was thus not within the Commission’s prerequisite statutory authority. Remanded to grant FACES’s motion to dismiss as to both claims. View "Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Soc’y, Inc. v. Bridgewater" on Justia Law

After members of the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Gang Task Force allegedly conducted a warrantless search of her home, Pierce filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (section 1983) against the Sheriff’s Department and individual members of the Gang Task Force (Does 1–12). The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal affirmed as to the Department, but reversed as to the individual Doe defendants, none of whom appeared, and who, apparently, were never served. Binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, on both the scope of liability under section 1983 and the import of the Eleventh Amendment makes clear that the meaning of the term “person” as used in section 1983 and the reach of the Eleventh Amendment are separate issues, that the Eleventh Amendment applies only in federal court and not in state court, and that, depending on state law, a county sheriff may not be subject to a suit for damages under section 1983 because he or she is not a “person” as that term is used in the statute, and not because he or she is “immune” from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity. View "Pierce v. San Mateo Co. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

The City of Spokane filed suit against Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA, arguing that Fannie and Freddie are not statutorily exempt from paying real property transfer taxes. The court concluded that it is clear that the statutory carve-outs allowing for the taxation of real property as "other real property is taxed" encompass only property taxes, not excise taxes. Therefore, Fannie and Freddie are statutorily exempt from paying the transfer taxes in Washington. The court held that the entities' exemption statutes do not exceed Congress's constitutional authority. Because Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the secondary mortgage market, it has power under the Necessary and Proper Clause not only to create Fannie and Freddie but also to ensure their preservation by exempting them from state and local taxes. Finally, the exemptions neither commandeer state and local officials nor transgress general principles of federalism. Therefore, the court rejected Spokane's Tenth Amendment arguments. Accordingly, the court held that Congress exempted Fannie and Freddie from state and local taxation of real property transfers and that it had constitutional authority to do so. The court affirmed the judgment. View "City of Spokane v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Wayne County Employees Retirement System and the Wayne County Retirement Commission filed suit against Wayne Charter County and the Wayne County Board of Commissioners, alleging that a county ordinance defendants enacted in 2010 concerning the retirement system violated Const. 1963, art 9, sec. 24 and the Public Employment Retirement System Investment Act (PERSIA). The ordinance placed a $12 million limit on the balance of the retirement system’s reserve for inflation equity known as the Inflation Equity Fund (IEF), which was funded by investment earnings on pension assets. The ordinance also placed a $5 million limit on a discretionary distribution of money from the IEF known as the “13th check,” which had been made annually in varying amounts to eligible retirees and survivor beneficiaries to help fight the effects of inflation. The ordinance required any amount in the IEF exceeding the $12 million cap to be debited from the IEF and credited to the assets of the defined benefit plan, where it would be used to offset or reduce the annual required contribution (ARC) that the county was required to make to the defined benefit plan. The county filed a counterclaim alleging, among other things, that the retirement commission had violated its fiduciary duties by mismanaging the retirement system’s assets. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory objections to the ordinance, and plaintiffs appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the $32 million offset against the county’s ARC violated PERSIA for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion. The portion of the Court of Appeals opinion concluding that the intrasystem transfer of retirement system assets would violate PERSIA without the corresponding offset to the ARC was vacated, as were the portions of the opinion discussing the constitutional implications of the amended ordinance in relation to Const. 1963, art 9, sec. 24 and the determination that the transferred funds, once returned to the IEF, must be used only for the purposes of that fund. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wayne County Employees Retirement System v. Wayne Charter County" on Justia Law

Two environmental groups brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, challenging the Utah Department of Transportation's requirement that before granting a parade permit on a Utah state highway, an applicant must obtain liability insurance and sign an indemnification form. The groups alleged this requirement violated their constitutional rights under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the permit requirements are facially invalid. Officials from the Utah Department of Transportation appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.View "iMatter Utah v. Njord" on Justia Law

In 2008, the City of Toledo enacted an ordinance authorizing an automated traffic-law-enforcement system that assesses civil penalties against a vehicle’s owner for speeding and red-light violations. The ordinance further provides that appeals are heard through an administrative process established by the Toledo police department. Appellee received a notice of liability for a traffic violation under the ordinance and paid the civil penalty without pursuing an administrative appeal. Appellee then filed a class-action complaint against the City for unjust enrichment, asserting that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it usurped the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Ohio Constitution and statutory law do not endow municipal courts with exclusive authority over traffic-ordinance violations; and (2) Ohio municipalities have home rule-authority to impose civil liability on traffic violators through an administrative enforcement system and to establish administrative proceedings that must be exhausted before offenders can pursue judicial remedies.View "Walker v. Toledo" on Justia Law

Vandelay Entertainment, LLC d.b.a. The Lost Ogle filed suit in district court to obtain records that the Governor withheld when responding to Vandelay's Open Records Act request. The district court ruled the Governor had a common law privilege to withhold the records in question. In conclusion, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that the Governor has a privilege to protect confidential advice solicited or received from "senior executive branch officials" for use in deliberating policy and making discretionary decisions. We disagree, however, with the trial court's conclusion that this privilege rests solely upon common law. We hold that this privilege is a "power properly belonging" to the Governor's constitutional office as head of the executive branch and is protected by the separation of powers clause in Article 4, section 1. The need for confidential advice from "senior executive branch officials" for use in the Governor's deliberations and decision-making is "essential to the existence, dignity and functions" of the executive branch. Also, the need to protect such confidential advice is so ultimately connected and bound up with the executive function that the right to regulate disclosure of such confidential advice by way of a privilege naturally and logically belongs to the executive branch. This privilege is not absolute, however, and is subject to the check and balance of in camera judicial review, in lieu of legislatively-mandated public disclosure. The Governor has the burden upon in camera judicial review to demonstrate that any material relating to such confidential advice satisfies the criteria set forth in this opinion. Even confidential advice that satisfies this criteria can be subject to disclosure where (1) the requesting party can show a substantial or compelling need for disclosure and (2) the need for disclosure outweighs the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the advice.View "Vandelay Entertainment, LLC v. Fallin" on Justia Law

Michigan corrections officers must perform several pre-shift and post-shift activities, including “punching a mechanical time clock,” “waiting in line” for security, and “walking to assigned locations.” These activities take place off the clock. Corrections officers and their union filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state law to recover overtime payments, 29 U.S.C. 206, 207; Mich. Comp. Laws 408.414, .414a. The Michigan Department of Corrections successfully moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Without a past (or imminent future) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has no remedial power under Section 5 to authorize private lawsuits against the states; absent permissible Section 5 legislation abrogating the state’s immunity from suit, federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain these FLSA claims against the Department of Corrections or to grant a declaratory judgment under Ex parte Young against the Department’s director, to address an alleged ongoing violation of the FLSA.View "Mich. Corrs. Org. v. Mich. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Municipalities City of Spencer and the Town of Forest Park, and Blaze’s Tribute Equine Rescue, acting under a search warrant, seized 44 abused and neglected horses from plaintiff-appellant Ann Campbell’s properties. After a forfeiture hearing, a state district court in Oklahoma issued an order granting Spencer and Forest Park’s joint forfeiture petition. Campbell later sued the municipalities (and Blaze) in federal court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The district court dismissed Campbell’s complaint, applying both claim and issue preclusion to prevent relitigation of matters common to the state court forfeiture proceeding. Campbell appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court properly dismissed Campbell’s 1983 claims: because Campbell could have raised her constitutional claims in the forfeiture proceeding but did not do so, and because the Court's allowing her to raise these claims in this appeal would impair the Municipalities’ rights established in that proceeding, the Court held that the district court properly concluded that claim preclusion disallowed Campbell from pursuing her constitutional claims.View "Campbell v. City of Spencer" on Justia Law