Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a program proposed by Harris County, Texas, known as "Uplift Harris." The program aimed to provide $500 monthly cash payments to 1,928 Harris County residents for 18 months, with recipients chosen by lottery from applicants with income below 200% of the federal poverty line living in certain zip codes. The State of Texas challenged the program, arguing that it violated the Texas Constitution’s prohibition on gratuitous payments to individuals.The State sued the County, seeking an injunction to block the implementation of the program. The district court denied the State's request for a temporary injunction, leading the State to appeal this decision and request a stay of payments under the Uplift Harris program while the appeal was ongoing. The court of appeals denied this request, prompting the State to seek mandamus relief in the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas granted the State's motion for temporary relief, prohibiting all payments under the Uplift Harris program pending further order of the court. The court found that the State had raised serious doubt about the constitutionality of the program, and that potential violation of the Texas Constitution could not be remedied if payments were to commence while the underlying appeal proceeded. The court also noted that once the funds were distributed to individuals, they could not feasibly be recouped if it was later determined they were paid in violation of the Texas Constitution. The court concluded that temporarily preventing the expenditure of these funds while the State's appeal proceeded ensured public funds were not irrecoverably spent in violation of the Texas Constitution. The State's appeal of the denial of a temporary injunction remains pending in the court of appeals. View "In re The State of Texas" on Justia Law

In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use of mifepristone tablets, marketed under the brand name Mifeprex, for terminating pregnancies up to seven weeks. The FDA imposed additional restrictions on the drug's use and distribution, including requiring doctors to prescribe or supervise the prescription of Mifeprex and requiring patients to have three in-person visits with the doctor to receive the drug. In 2016, the FDA relaxed some of these restrictions, and in 2021, it announced that it would no longer enforce the initial in-person visit requirement. Four pro-life medical associations and several individual doctors moved for a preliminary injunction that would require the FDA to either rescind approval of mifepristone or rescind the FDA’s 2016 and 2021 regulatory actions.The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs and effectively enjoined the FDA's approval of mifepristone, ordering it off the market. The FDA and Danco Laboratories, which sponsors Mifeprex, appealed and moved to stay the District Court’s order pending appeal. The Supreme Court ultimately stayed the District Court’s order pending the disposition of proceedings in the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing and concluded that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their challenge to FDA’s 2000 and 2019 drug approvals, but were likely to succeed in showing that FDA’s 2016 and 2021 actions were unlawful. The Supreme Court granted certiorari with respect to the 2016 and 2021 FDA actions.The Supreme Court of the United States held that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing to challenge the FDA’s actions regarding the regulation of mifepristone. The Court found that the plaintiffs, who are pro-life and oppose elective abortion, have sincere legal, moral, ideological, and policy objections to mifepristone being prescribed and used by others. However, because the plaintiffs do not prescribe or use mifepristone, they are unregulated parties who seek to challenge the FDA’s regulation of others. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs' theories of causation were insufficient to establish Article III standing. The Court reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the constitutionality of two Arkansas statutes that mandate the creation of certain county-funded employee positions to serve three of the seventeen judicial-district divisions within the Sixth Judicial Circuit serving Pulaski and Perry Counties. The funding for these positions was initially part of the 2023 budget, authorized by Pulaski County Ordinance No. 22-OR-45. However, Pulaski County Judge Barry Hyde later announced his decision not to fill some of the vacant positions within the Fifth Division. This led to a lawsuit by then-sitting Fifth Division Circuit Judge Wendell Griffen and his successor in office, Judge-elect LaTonya Austin Honorable, against Judge Hyde, seeking a judicial remedy to mandate the filling of these positions as appropriated in the 2023 budget.The case was first heard in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, where Judge Hyde contended that the two statutes in question are unconstitutional as special and local legislation under amendment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court ruled in favor of Judge Hyde, declaring the statutes unconstitutional because they apply only to specific divisions rather than all divisions in the Sixth Judicial Circuit. The court also dismissed arguments of estoppel raised by Judge-elect Honorable, finding that Pulaski County’s previous funding of these positions did not preclude it from now challenging the constitutionality of the statutes.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that both statutes violate amendment 14’s prohibition on local and special acts, as they arbitrarily apply specifically to the employment of certain personnel for the First, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions of the Sixth Judicial Circuit rather than uniformly across the district or the state. The court also rejected the argument of estoppel, stating that the County should not be punished for its previous compliance with the law and should not be estopped from bringing this constitutional challenge. View "Austin v. Hyde" on Justia Law

The case involves the Edmond Public Schools (the Petitioner) and the State of Oklahoma, the State Board of Education, and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction (the Respondents). The Petitioner filed an application for the Supreme Court to prevent the enforcement of rules by the Respondents. These rules were to be used in enforcement proceedings against the school district before the State Board. The Petitioner argued that the State Board lacked the authority to supervise, examine, and control a local school board's discretion in supplying books for a school library that meet local community standards.The State Board of Education had publicized proposed rules for school library media programs, which included prohibitions on pornographic and sexualized content for books and other media. The Board adopted these rules, citing the Oklahoma Constitution and state statutes as their authority. However, the Oklahoma Attorney General issued an opinion stating that the proposed rules were not based on a specific grant of legislative authority, which was necessary for the Board to create these rules. The Legislature passed a resolution that did not expressly approve or disapprove the State Board's new rules. The Governor later issued a Declaration stating that the proposed rules for the State Department of Education were not subject to the joint resolution and approved these proposed rules as permanent rules for the State Department of Education.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction, in part, over the controversy. The court held that state statutes give a local school board power and a type of statutory discretion to supply books for a school library that meet local community standards. The court also held that no statute gives the State Board of Education, State Department of Education, and Superintendent of Public Instruction the authority to supervise, examine, and control a local school board's exercise of this discretion when the local school board applies local community standards for books it supplies for a local school library. The court issued a writ of prohibition to prevent additional enforcement proceedings against the school district based on the respondents' objection to the presence of certain books in the local school library. The court denied the petitioner's request for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 12 v. STATE" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Monique H. Worrell, who was suspended from her position as State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit by Governor Ron DeSantis through Executive Order 23-160. The order alleged that during Worrell's tenure, the administration of criminal justice in the Ninth Circuit was fundamentally derelict, constituting both neglect of duty and incompetence. The order detailed that Worrell authorized or allowed charging practices that permitted violent offenders, drug traffickers, serious juvenile offenders, and pedophiles to evade incarceration when otherwise warranted under Florida law. It also alleged that Worrell authorized or allowed practices that prevented assistant state attorneys from seeking certain sentencing enhancements and limited charges for possession of child pornography.The Florida Constitution allows the governor to suspend any state officer not subject to impeachment for neglect of duty or incompetence. Worrell, not being subject to impeachment, was constitutionally subject to suspension. The Florida Senate has the power to remove from office or reinstate the suspended official.The Supreme Court of Florida's role was to determine whether the governor had met the constitutional mandate to state the grounds of the officer's suspension. The court's review was deferential, confirming that the governor had specified the applicable grounds for suspension and that the allegations in the suspension order bore a reasonable relation to the asserted basis for the suspension.The Supreme Court of Florida found that the Executive Order passed this test. It named the grounds for Worrell's suspension—neglect of duty and incompetence—and provided various factual allegations that reasonably related to those grounds of suspension. The court disagreed with Worrell's claim that the allegations in the Executive Order were impermissibly vague or that they addressed conduct that fell within the lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, the court denied Worrell's petition for a writ of quo warranto. View "Worrell v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

Leachco, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation that manufactures and markets various products, appealed the denial of its request for a preliminary injunction to halt administrative enforcement proceedings by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). Leachco argued that the statutory removal protections for CPSC commissioners and administrative law judges (ALJs) violated Article II of the Constitution and the separation of powers. The district court denied Leachco's motion for a preliminary injunction, stating that even if Leachco's constitutional arguments were valid, the alleged constitutional violations were insufficient to establish that Leachco would suffer "irreparable harm" if the injunction was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that under current Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, Leachco's subjection to proceedings before an agency whose officials allegedly have unconstitutional protection against removal is insufficient, by itself, to establish irreparable harm. The court also found that Leachco failed to show that the removal protections for CPSC commissioners and its administrative law judge were unconstitutional. Therefore, Leachco failed to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction. View "Leachco v. Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law

A Rhode Island oral and maxillofacial surgeon, Dr. Stephen T. Skoly, refused to comply with a COVID-19 Emergency Regulation issued by the Rhode Island Department of Health (RI DOH) that required all healthcare workers and providers to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Following his public declaration of noncompliance, the RI DOH issued a Notice of Violation and Compliance Order against him. Skoly then filed a lawsuit in federal court against the state and its officials, alleging violations of equal protection, due process, and First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The district court's decision was based on the fact that the state officials were either entitled to absolute or qualified immunity for their actions. The court held that the RI DOH directors were exercising prosecutorial authority delegated to them by Rhode Island law, thus granting them absolute immunity. As for Governor McKee, the court found that he was protected by qualified immunity as Skoly had no clearly established right to continue practicing while violating the vaccine mandate. The court also rejected Skoly's First Amendment retaliation claim, stating that the posting of the Notice constituted government speech, which could not form the basis of a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Skoly's complaint. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's findings that the state officials were entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity and that Skoly's constitutional claims were without merit. The court also upheld the dismissal of Skoly's First Amendment retaliation claim, stating that Skoly had not sufficiently alleged that he was targeted due to his opposition to the First Emergency Regulation. View "Skoly v. McKee" on Justia Law

The case involves the National Rifle Association (NRA) and Maria Vullo, the former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS). The NRA alleged that Vullo violated their First Amendment rights by pressuring regulated entities to disassociate from the NRA and other gun-promotion advocacy groups. The NRA claimed that Vullo threatened enforcement actions against those entities that refused to disassociate, thereby stifling the NRA's pro-gun advocacy.The District Court initially denied Vullo's motion to dismiss the NRA's First Amendment damages claims, holding that the NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo's actions could be interpreted as a veiled threat to regulated industries to disassociate with the NRA or risk DFS enforcement action. However, the Second Circuit reversed this decision, concluding that Vullo's alleged actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate law enforcement, not unconstitutional coercion. The Second Circuit also held that even if the complaint stated a First Amendment violation, the law was not clearly established, and so Vullo was entitled to qualified immunity.The Supreme Court of the United States, however, vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA's advocacy. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo" on Justia Law

The case involves journalist Robert Schilling's attempt to obtain records related to the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the United States House of Representatives' use of outside consultants as part of a congressional investigation. Schilling sought these records under the common law right of access, alleging that the hearings were part of a series of public-private collaborations targeting political opponents of the climate policy agenda. He claimed that the requested records would show that the Committee used unpaid consulting services to prepare for the hearings, in violation of federal law and House rules.The district court dismissed Schilling's petition, ruling that the Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause barred the case. The court held that the Clause acts as an absolute jurisdictional bar to suits seeking compelled disclosure of materials related to legislative activity. Schilling appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, but on different grounds. The appellate court did not address the question of whether the Speech or Debate Clause barred Schilling's claim. Instead, it dismissed the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The court found that the documents Schilling sought were not "public records," and thus, there was no duty imposed on Congress to grant Schilling's request. As a result, the Larson-Dugan exception to sovereign immunity did not apply, and Schilling's claim was barred by sovereign immunity. View "Schilling v. United States House of Representatives" on Justia Law

In 2017, the City of Greenville, North Carolina, installed traffic cameras at its most dangerous intersections as part of its Red Light Camera Enforcement Program (RLCEP). The program was funded through a cost-sharing agreement with the Pitt County Board of Education (Board), which received 100% of the collected red light penalties and then reimbursed the City for the actual costs of maintaining the program. In 2018, plaintiffs Eric Fearrington and Craig Malmrose received citations for red light violations captured by RLCEP cameras and challenged their citations in court, arguing that the RLCEP violated Article IX, Section 7 of North Carolina’s Constitution, which promises public schools the “clear proceeds” of all penalties, forfeitures, and fines.The trial court ruled in favor of the Board and City, but the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim and remanded for entry of summary judgment in their favor. The Board and City then petitioned the Supreme Court of North Carolina for discretionary review.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals decision on plaintiffs’ taxpayer standing but limited the available remedies to injunctive and declaratory relief, not a “refund.” On plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge, however, the court reversed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the Interlocal Agreement and the Local Act authorizing it did not countermand the constitutional provision’s text or purpose. The court did not discern a “plain and clear” constitutional violation, and thus reversed the award of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their constitutional claim, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in favor of Greenville and the Board. View "Fearrington v. City of Greenville" on Justia Law