Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, SecurityPoint filed suit against TSA for infringement of a patent covering some equipment and methods used in the Bin Advertising Program. In 2012, TSA modified the Program, amending the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) template to require participating airports to indemnify TSA from all liability for intellectual property claims related to the checkpoint equipment. TSA also changed the template to provide that, on cancellation of an agreement between an airport and a private company, TSA would retain the right to use the checkpoint equipment as well as a license to all intellectual property necessary for such use. SecurityPoint opposed the changes and wrote a cease and desist letter to TSA's Chief Counsel. SecurityPoint then petitioned for review of TSA's changes. The court held that TSA's chief counsel's letter rejecting SecurityPoint's request is a reviewable order and the court has jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a); on the merits, the court concluded that the letter failed to provide any basis upon which the court could conclude that it was the product of reasoned decisionmaking; nor is there anything in the record beyond counsel's letter that would support TSA's decision; and because TSA failed to consider an important aspect of the problem before it, its decision must be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review.View "Security Point Holdings, Inc. v. TSA" on Justia Law

On June 24, 2014, Thad Cochran, a Republican nominee for United States Senator, won the Republican primary runoff. His opponent, Chris McDaniel, filed an election contest with the State Republican Executive Committee (SREC) on August 4, 2014 – forty-one days after the election. The SREC declined to consider McDaniel’s complaint, and McDaniel appealed. The trial judge found that McDaniel did not meet the twenty-day deadline to file his election contest and dismissed the case. On appeal, McDaniel argued that no deadline existed to contest a primary election. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court found that there indeed was a deadline, and McDaniel failed to file his election contest within twenty days. The dismissal was affirmed.View "McDaniel v. Cochran" on Justia Law

Appellee, a construction company, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Appellants, the Arkansas State Claims Commission, the General Assembly’s Claims Review Subcommittee, the General Assembly’s Joint Budget Committee, the Arkansas State Highway Commission, and the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department. The circuit court granted in part and denied in part Appellants’ motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on direct appeal and granted Appellants’ motion to dismiss the cross-appeal, holding (1) Appellee’s equal-protection claim was barred by sovereign immunity; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction over Appellee’s cross-appeal.View "Ark. State Claims Comm'n v. Duit Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Shaloa Edwards brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City of Sallisaw, the city manager, and the mayor. Plaintiff was the elected police chief of Sallisaw, Oklahoma, and just prior to Plaintiff bringing suit, the board of commissioners passed an ordinance removing Plaintiff's supervisory and management authority over the police department. The district court found that the ordinance improperly removed the police chief's authority to supervise and manage the police department and deprived the police chief of his due process protections by circumventing statutory and local removal procedures and effectively removing him from office. A home-rule city has a sovereign right to govern itself in purely municipal matters. Here, the Sallisaw Board of Commissioners had the ability to set out the duties and authority of a police chief's day-to-day responsibilities. The Supreme Court held that it would not question how a city charter allocated the authority to set the police chief's duties and responsibilities if not contrary to statute, precedent, or Constitution. The Sallisaw city charter granted that authority to the board of commissioners. The district court's order and permanent injunction was therefore vacated.View "EDWARDS v. CITY OF SALLISAW" on Justia Law

The district court found that House Bill 974 of the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, which was enacted as Act 1 of 2012 (Act 1), violated the single object requirement for legislative bills as provided for in La. Const. art. III, section 15(A). Act 1 of 2012 amended, reenacted and repealed various statutes in Title 17. Looking first at the title, and then to the body of Act 1, the Supreme Court concluded that the subject of the act is elementary and secondary education, and the object of the act was improving elementary and secondary education through tenure reform and performance standards based on effectiveness. After examining the numerous provisions of Act 1, the Court determined that "they all have a natural connection and are incidental and germane to that one object." In order to overturn a legislative enactment pursuant to the one-object rule, “the objections must be grave and the conflict between the statute and the constitution palpable.” In this case, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs the Louisiana Federation of Teachers, East Baton Rouge Federation of Teachers, Jefferson Foundation of Teachers, Nellie Joyce Meriman, and Kevin Joseph DeHart, failed to establish that such a grave and palpable conflict existed between Act 1 and the one-object rule of La. Const. art. III, section 15. Because the district court pretermitted consideration of the other constitutional arguments raised by plaintiffs, i.e., that Act 1 violated due process rights pursuant to La. Const. art. I, section 2, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the case was remanded for consideration of those issues.View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the NPS's enforcement of a regulation banning the operation of hovercrafts on the Nation River. Alaska intervened, challenging the NPS's authority to require its researchers to obtain a permit before engaging in studies on the Alagnak River. Plaintiff and Alaska argued that section 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act precludes NPS from regulating activities on state-owned lands and navigable waters that fall within the boundaries of National Park System units in Alaska. The district court granted summary judgment to appellees. The court concluded that plaintiff had Article III standing, but that his interpretation of section 103(c) is foreclosed by the plain text of the statute. NPS's hovercraft ban applies to federally owned lands and waters administered by NPS nationwide, as well as navigable waters within national parks. The court rejected plaintiff's two additional arguments, that the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority in promulgating the regulation at issue and that her action raises serious constitutional concerns. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff. The court held that Alaska lacked standing to bring its challenge and vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss.View "Sturgeon v. Masica" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, provider of short-term loans over the internet, sought a preliminary order enjoining DFS from interfering with the tribes' consumer lending business. New York's usury laws prohibit unlicensed lenders from lending money at an interest rate above 16 percent per year, and criminalized loans with interest rates higher than 25 percent per year. DFS received complaints from New York residents for loans from plaintiffs with interest rates as high as 912.49 percent. Plaintiffs argued that New York projected its regulations over the internet and onto reservations in violation of Native Americans' tribal sovereignty protected by the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because the district court reasonably concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish that the challenged loan transactions occurred on Native American soil, a fact necessary to weaken New York State's regulatory authority over them.View "Otoe-Missouria Tribe v. New York State Dept. of Fin. Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, non-profit organizations representing the manufacturers and distributors of pharmaceutical products, filed suit challenging the Alameda County Safe Drug Disposal Ordinance, which requires that prescription drug manufacturers, who either sell, offer for sale, or distribute "Covered Drugs" in Alameda, operate and finance a "Product Stewardship Program." The court concluded that the Ordinance, both on its face and in effect, does not discriminate because it applies to all manufacturers that make their drugs available in Alameda County - without respect to the geographic location of the manufacturer; the Ordinance does not directly regulate interstate commerce where it does not control conduct beyond the boundaries of the county; under the balancing test in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the court concluded that, without any evidence that the Ordinance will affect the interstate flow of goods, the Ordinance does not substantially burden interstate commerce; and therefore, the Ordinance does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.View "PRMA v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

This appeal was the second appeal in a dispute between Taxpayer-appellant J. Clark Bundren, M.D. and appellees City of Tulsa and Tulsa Hills, LLC. The two issues in that case were: (1) whether Taxpayer should have been allowed to intervene in a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the legality of certain public expenditures and financing; and (2) whether the appeal was moot because the appellees, Tulsa Industrial Authority, City of Tulsa Oklahoma, and Tulsa Hills, L.L.C. (TIA, City, and TH, respectively), obtained a declaratory judgment after Taxpayer was prohibited by the trial court from intervening. The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for mootness and held that Taxpayer's claim for equitable relief presented by a motion to intervene was not made moot by the judgment rendered during the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order that denied Taxpayer's motion to intervene as a qui tam plaintiff, but reversed the trial court's order denying a motion to intervene in which Taxpayer sought equitable relief. The case what then remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court ordered Taxpayer to file his "Petition in Intervention" on or before August 16, 2012. On August 15, 2012, Taxpayer complied with the order by filing the petition. On September 14, 2012, the appellees each filed separate motions to dismiss, and asserted that the bondholders were necessary parties. Several months later, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss and allowed Taxpayer twenty days to file an amended petition. The court included the requirement that if Taxpayer filed an amended petition seeking to enjoin the City from making payments to the bondholders who purchased the bonds used to finance the underlying transaction, then the Taxpayer must provide notice of the amended petition to the bondholders and file proof of such notice with the court. Taxpayer filed an amended petition, and the appellees responded with separate motions to dismiss. The trial court again dismissed Taxpayer's petition on the basis that Taxpayer did not provide notice to bondholders as necessary parties to the lawsuit, and that Taxpayer did not state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court found that the bondholders were necessary parties to the action and if not joined, the present parties to the action would face a substantial risk of incurring multiple and potentially inconsistent obligations. The court again dismissed without prejudice the causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief for failure to comply with the court's prior order and for failure to join all parties necessary "to a just adjudication of this matter." The court allowed Taxpayer twenty days to file an amended petition, and ordered that if Taxpayer did not amend the petition within that time, the action would be dismissed with prejudice to all the claims. Instead of amending the petition, Taxpayer filed an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Mandamus to the Supreme Court. The trial court entered a final order of dismissal. The dispositive issue of this matter was whether Taxpayer had to include bondholders as necessary parties to this case. The Supreme Court concluded he did, and affirmed the trial court. View "Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law

Nationwide, with 32,000 employees in 49 states, has an ERISA employee-benefits plan that provides short-term disability (STD), long-term disability (LTD), and “Your Time” benefits. An employee can receive Your Time benefits for personal reasons, such as vacation or illness. To receive STD benefits, an employee must be “STD Disabled,” which means “a substantial change in medical or physical condition due to a specific illness that prevents an Eligible Associate from working their current position.” Specific rules govern maternity leave. The first five days of paid maternity leave come out of an associate’s Your Time benefits. Thereafter, a new mother is considered STD Disabled and entitled to STD benefits for six weeks following a vaginal delivery, or eight weeks following a cesarean section. Wisconsin’s Family Medical Leave Act requires that employers allow six weeks of unpaid leave following “[t]he birth of an employee’s natural child[.]” The Act’s “substitution provision” requires employers to allow an employee to substitute “paid or unpaid leave of any other type provided by the employer” for the unpaid leave provided by the statute. A Wisconsin Nationwide employee had a baby. She received six weeks of STD benefits under Nationwide’s plan. She then requested an additional period of STD benefits pursuant to the substitution provision. The plan denied the request, finding that she was no longer short-term disabled under the plan. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that, ERISA did not preempt the Wisconsin Act. The district court held that, under the Supremacy Clause, the administrator was required to comply with ERISA rather than the Wisconsin Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Sherfel v. Newson" on Justia Law