Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Mahindra & Mahindra, Ltd. Appealed a superior court decision to affirm a default judgment by the New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Industry Board in favor of respondents Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester, LLC, Peters Auto Sales, Inc., and Crest Chevrolet, Inc. (collectively "dealers"). Mahindra argued that "there is no dispute that [it] was never properly served by the [dealers] in this matter," and argues that the trial court erred in finding that it waived its right to insist on proper service pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. The dealers contended they were not bound by the requirements of the Hague Service Convention in this case and that, regardless of the convention's applicability, Mahindra waived its challenge to service and jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed with Mahindra, and found that the trial court erred as a matter of law. View "Mahindra & Mahindra, Ltd. V. Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondents, Larry M. and Sonia M. appealed a Circuit Court order terminating their parental rights over their children, A.M. and C.M. On appeal, Larry argued that the trial court erred by: (1) proceeding with the termination case based on an underlying neglect case in which he was improperly denied counsel; and (2) finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Sonia argues that the court erred because: (3) the trial judge did not recuse himself despite the fact that he presided over the underlying neglect case in the circuit court. Both respondents argue that the court erred by: (4) failing to afford them twelve months from the superior court's de novo finding of neglect within which to correct the conditions which led to the finding of neglect; and (5) finding that the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), made reasonable efforts to assist them in correcting the conditions that led to the neglect finding. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re C.M." on Justia Law

The Jackson County Board of Education petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter an order dismissing the complaint of D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. on the ground of sovereign immunity. Pruett Contracting submitted a proposal for renovations to the Pisgah High School gymnasium. The Jackson County superintendent of education executed a purchase order authorizing Pruett Contracting to make certain renovations to the gymnasium, totaling $231,309. Pruett Contracting then began renovating the gymnasium. The Superintendent later received a letter from the State of Alabama Building Commission stating that "all work on the renovation of the Pisgah High School gymnasium [was] to stop immediately" because the project had not been submitted to or approved by the Building Commission. The Board instructed Pruett Contracting to cease all work on the gymnasium. Pruett Contracting submitted an invoice to the Board for the work that had been performed prior to the letter. Months later, because it had not received payment for its work, Pruett Contracting sued the Board, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking recovery of damages on theories of quantum meruit, work and labor done, open account, and account stated. The Board moved the court to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as to the claims alleged by Pruett Contracting and that the court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Pruett Contracting responded, arguing that this case involved a protected property interest, that immunity was thus precluded, and that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. The Supreme Court concluded the Board established that it was entitled to sovereign immunity and that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this action; therefore, the action had to be dismissed. Because the Board demonstrated a clear legal right to an order directing the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint, the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint. View "D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. v. Jackson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Alabama Rivers Alliance and Friends of Hurricane Creek (collectively, "ARA") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision reversing the trial court's decision to dismiss an appeal by Tuscaloosa Resources, Inc. ("TRI") of a decision of the Environmental Management Commission. The Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") oversees the Commission. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicted with its decision in "Price v. South Central Bell," (313 So. 2d 184 (1975)), and the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in "Personnel Board of Jefferson County v. Bailey," (475 So. 2d 863 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in this case conflicted with "Price" and "Bailey," and accordingly reversed its judgment. View "Tuscaloosa Resources, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Enviromental Management" on Justia Law

Mr. and Mrs. Melot owed millions of dollars in federal taxes. Billy Melot was serving time in federal prison for tax crimes. The debt led the United States to foreclose on the Melots’ real properties, and the Melots tried to stop the foreclosure. Sanctions were imposed because of the methods used by the Melots in relation to their attempts to stop the foreclosure: the district court regarded them as fraudulent. The disagreement began when the district court reduced the tax assessments to judgments and ordered the sale of the Melots’ real properties. That order prompted a motion to intervene by Steven Byers, who filed documents asserting liens on the property. The documents were mailed from the city where the Melots’ properties were located (Hobbs, New Mexico). The government suspected fraud and collaboration with the Melots, pointing out to the court that: (1) Byers lived in prison; (2) he could not own any liens because he was destitute; (3) the Melots never disclosed any liens; (4) Mrs. Melot had signed Byers’ name on the lien and motion to intervene; and (5) the New Mexico address listed for Byers was actually the home of Mrs. Melot’s friends. At the hearing on the motion to intervene, Byers moved to withdraw his motion for lack of proof. The court denied the motion to withdraw, and the government presented evidence tending to show that the Melots and Byers created a scheme to derail the foreclosure. Mrs. Melot refused to answer questions, invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The magistrate judge certified criminal contempt by the Melots. More than a year later, the district court issued its order addressing the contempt certification with sanctions including removal of Mrs. Melots from the property, reimbursing the government's costs for the hearing, striking of the Melots' pending motions, and filing restrictions. The Melots argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the district court violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by imposing sanctions without notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Tenth Circuit agreed, reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Melot (Katherine), et al" on Justia Law

Appellant Friends of Pennsylvania Leadership Charter School appealed an order of the Commonwealth Court which held that the retroactive real estate tax exemption provided in Section 1722-A(e)(3) of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. 17-1722-A(e)(3), was unconstitutional. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed (though by different reasoning), concluding that retroactive application of the real estate tax exemption of Section 1722-A(e)(3) was unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it violated the separation of powers doctrine.View "Friends of PaLCS v. Chester Cty Bd of Assess" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Newtown Township Board of Supervisors enacted a Planned Residential Development Ordinance. This appeal centered on challenges to the validity of that ordinance and to the approval of a Tentative PRD Plan pursuant to it. Intervenors BPG Real Estate Investors (BPG) submitted an application under the anticipated PRD Ordinance for approval of a Tentative PRD Plan, proposing multi-use development of an approximately 218-acre tract of land that it owned. The Township Board orally approved BPG's Tentative PRD Plan, and later issued a written decision granting approval. Newtown Square East, L.P. (NSE), which owned a two-acre tract of land adjacent to BPG's tract, filed a challenge to the validity of the PRD Ordinance with the Newtown Township Zoning Hearing Board, and filed an appeal of the Township Board's approval of BPG's Tentative PRD Plan with the court of common pleas. With regard to its validity challenge before the Zoning Board, NSE argued, inter alia, that the PRD Ordinance violated Article VII of the MPC by, allegedly, failing to require that a tentative plan identify the uses of buildings and other structures, and permitting the location of buildings to be subject to free modification between the time of tentative plan approval and final plan approval. Following several hearings, the Zoning Board upheld the validity of the PRD Ordinance, finding that its minor textual variations from the relevant provisions of the MPC, Article VII, did not create an inconsistency or conflict with the enabling legislation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the ordinance. View "Newtown Square East v. Twp. of Newtown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review in this case principally to clarify the standard for determining whether a municipal ordinance applied to an agency or instrumentality of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Court concluded here that the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) was not subject to either the provisions of the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (FPO), or the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations. The Commonwealth Court also concluded that, because SEPTA was not subject to the Philadelphia Commission’s jurisdiction, it had no duty to exhaust its administrative remedies before that agency. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the Commonwealth Court order and remanded for reconsideration under the proper standard. View "SEPTA v. City of Phila., et al" on Justia Law

The primary question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a municipal authority could exercise its eminent domain powers to condemn an easement over privately-owned land, where the sole purpose of the easement is to supply a private developer with land to install sewer drainage facilities needed for a proposed private residential subdivision. "While this determination may seem to interfere with the ability of municipal water and/or sewer authorities to expand their operations under circumstances where, as here, there is an overarching nexus between the taking and private development, it is not this Court’s function to ameliorate such difficulties by departing from the statutory text. [. . .] The Legislature’s decision to exempt regulated public utilities, but not municipal authorities, from the preclusive rule set forth in Section 204(a) demonstrates that it intended to allow – within constitutional limitations – the continued use of eminent domain for the provision of public services such as water and sewer access in tandem with private development for a limited, defined class of condemnors. As RAWA is not within that class, its condemnation of the drainage easement is in violation of PRPA." View "Reading Area Wat Auth v. Schuyl River Grwy, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Michael Galardi appealed the trial court's order denying his special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute in a malicious prosecution action brought against him by Michael Zucchet. Galardi owned several strip clubs in Las Vegas and one in San Diego. In 2000, the San Diego City Council enacted a "no-touch" ordinance, which banned touching between exotic dancers and patrons in strip clubs. Galardi hired Lance Malone as a lobbyist to try to obtain repeal of the ordinance. Malone's lobbying activities included meeting with and making campaign contributions to members of the San Diego City Council, including Zucchet, who was elected to the city council in November 2002. In 2001, Malone made campaign contributions to city council member Ralph Inzunza, and Malone and Inzunza discussed a strategy to repeal the ordinance. Inzunza and Malone arranged to have an ostensibly corrupt police officer (who turned out to be an FBI informant) express public support for the plan. Inzunza advised Malone to contribute to Zucchet's campaign. Malone attempted to make a $6,750 contribution to Zucchet's campaign in 2001, but Zucchet returned the money because it was a political liability to be associated with Galardi's adult entertainment business. In 2002, Malone donated approximately $5,000 to Zucchet's campaign in checks that were not traceable to Galardi through one of Galardi's employees (and who also turned out to be an FBI informant). In 2003, the government executed a series of search warrants, raiding city hall. A federal grand jury indictment was filed, naming Inzunza, Zucchet, Galardi, Malone and others as defendants in numerous counts of fraud and other crimes, all arising from the scheme to repeal the no-touch ordinance. Galardi agreed to enter a guilty plea to a charge of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and agreed to cooperate with the government's prosecution of the other defendants. After an approximate 11-week trial, the jury acquitted Zucchet of 28 of the 37 counts against him. Zucchet filed this lawsuit against Galardi in October 2012, asserting a single cause of action for malicious prosecution. Zucchet alleged that: (1) Galardi falsely told the United States Attorney's Office that he had given $10,000 in cash to Malone to bribe three city council members, including Zucchet; and (2) Galardi falsely testified to that cash bribery during the criminal trial against Zucchet. Galardi filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the complaint arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because it arose from statements he made during Zucchet's trial and to the United States Attorney's Office in preparation for that trial. The trial court granted the special motion to strike, concluding that Galardi had not rebutted the allegation that his conduct was illegal and therefore not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court also concluded that Zucchet had established a probability of prevailing on his malicious prosecution claim. As permitted by the anti-SLAPP statute, Galardi filed a notice of appeal of the order denying his special motion to strike. After review of the matter, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in denying the special motion to strike, reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "Zucchet v. Galardi" on Justia Law