Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

ATC filed suit challenging the City's denial of its Conditional Use Permit (CUP) applications for three of its San Diego telecommunications facilities. ATC raised claims under, among other provisions, the California Permit Streamlining Act (PSA), Cal. Gov't Code 65956(b); the Federal Telecommunications Act (TCA), 47 U.S.C. 332; California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5; and the Equal Protection Clause. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ATC on the PSA claim because the court concluded that the CUP applications were not deemed approved before the City denied them. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the TCA claim where the City evaluated the CUP applications under the proper provision of the Land Development Code and supported its decision to deny them with substantial evidence; the City did not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services because ATC and the City are not "similarly situated" providers; and ATC has failed to show effective prohibition because it has not demonstrated that its proposals were the least intrusive means of filling a significant gap in coverage. ATC could not prevail on California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5 because it does not have a fundamental vested right to the continued use of the Verus, Border, and Mission Valley Facilities. There was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the City's decision to deny the CUP applications was rationally related to the City's legitimate interest in minimizing the aesthetic impact of wireless facilities and in providing public communications services. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "American Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of qualified immunity in an Eighth Amendment case brought by a Colorado state prisoner. Plaintiff Homaidan Al-Turki filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several prison officials, including Defendant Mary Robinson (a prison nurse) based on these officials’ failure to provide him with any type of medical evaluation or treatment while he was suffering through several hours of severe abdominal pain from what turned out to be kidney stones. The district court granted qualified immunity to the other prison officials, none of whom were medical professionals, but denied Defendant Robinson’s summary judgment motion for qualified immunity. Defendant then filed this interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the issues this case presented to the Tenth Circuit were: (1) whether the hours of severe pain Plaintiff experienced constituted a sufficiently serious medical need to satisfy the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference test; and (2) whether Defendant’s alleged actions violated clearly established law. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on both issues. View "Al-Turki v. Robinson, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was blind, requested transportation subsidies from a Maine state agency. The agency refused the request. After an unsuccessful appeal to an administrative hearing officer, Plaintiff brought suit in the federal district court. A magistrate judge recommended dismissal but suggested that Plaintiff reframe his action as one for judicial review under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff subsequently sought leave to amend his complaint to assert a claim for judicial review. The agency objected, arguing that Plaintiff’s proposed claim was barred by Maine’s general thirty-day statute of limitations for judicial review of administrative decisions. The district court allowed Plaintiff to file his proposed amended complaint and concluded that the hearing officer should have granted Plaintiff relief. The agency appealed, arguing that Plaintiff’s action for judicial review was time-barred. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s judicial review action under 29 U.S.C. 722(c)(5)(J) arises out of a post-1990 congressional enactment within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 1658, which enactment does not explicitly incorporate any specific limitations period; and (2) accordingly, the right to judicial review that the statute creates is subject to the general catch-all limitations period contained in section 1658(a). View "Millay v. State of Maine Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Alaska Judicial Council recommended that the electorate not retain a sitting district court judge. Susan Kruse and a handful of other voters1 challenged the constitutionality of AS 22.15.195, which granted the Council power to make such recommendations. The superior court concluded that the statute was constitutional but enjoined the Council from releasing new information about the judge in the 60 days prior to an election. On appeal, the Supreme Court also found that AS 22.15.195 was constitutional and does not limit the Council's dissemination of new information. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's ruling in part but reversed and vacated the superior court's injunction prohibiting the Council's public dissemination of new information in the 60 days preceding an election. View "Alaska Judicial Council v. Kruse" on Justia Law

Appellant James Price appealed a superior court order affirming the Kenai Peninsula Borough Clerk's rejection of his ballot referendum application. The proposed referendum would have repealed Borough Ordinance 2008-28, which authorized the general law cities within the Borough to tax non-prepared food items on a year-round basis. The Borough Clerk and the superior court rejected the application on the ground that it violated AS 29.26.100's prohibition on local or special legislation. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the referendum did not violate the prohibition on local or special legislation and would be enforceable if passed. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Price v. Kenai Peninsula Borough" on Justia Law

Defendants Catherine Bailey, Rhylan Bruss, Benjamin DiZoglio, Elizabeth Edwards, Elizabeth Grunewald, Charlene Higgins, William Hopkins, Michael Joseph, Brian Kelly, Matthew Lawrence, Keith Martin, Christian Pannapacker, Tara Powell, Matthew Richards, Katheryn Talbert, and Leah Wolczko, appealed a circuit court ruling that they violated a City of Manchester ordinance establishing a park curfew of 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. In October 2011, defendants were participating in a movement known nationally as "Occupy Wall Street." One defendant explained that "[o]ccupy is a tactic. Occupy means staying in one place until your grievances are addressed." On October 19, shortly after 11 p.m., the Manchester police told the people present in the park that the police would enforce the park curfew ordinance and asked those present to leave. The defendants declined to do so and received summonses for violating Manchester City Ordinance 96.04. Defendants moved to dismiss the charges against them, arguing, in part, that the "application of the criminal law to their protected rights to free speech" violated the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions. The court denied defendants' motion after a hearing, and found the defendants guilty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling. View "New Hampshire v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Keith Thompson was killed when a county sheriff ended a two-hour high-speed chase by firing an assault rifle into the vehicle Keith had stolen. Plaintiffs, Keith's parents, filed suit against the sheriff and the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the sheriff used excessive force. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that there was no constitutional violation in the sheriff's use of deadly force and he was entitled to qualified immunity. Because there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the seizure of Keith, plaintiffs' section 1983 claims failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Thompson, et al. v. Mercer, et al." on Justia Law

In early 2013, Pierce County detained the 10 respondents in this case (all patients) under the Involuntary Treatment Act (ITA). In most cases, the respondents were initially held in hospital emergency rooms or in local acute care medical hospitals. None of these sites were certified as evaluation and treatment centers under the ITA. In all cases, the county, through one of its designated mental health providers, filed petitions to hold the respondents for up to 14 more days. Several of the involuntarily detained patients moved to dismiss these 14-day petitions on the grounds that they had not been, and believed they would not be, detained in a certified evaluation and treatment facility. A trial judge found that the patients' placement in uncertified treatment centers, a/k/a "psychiatric boarding," was unlawful. Pierce County appealed, but the Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge and affirmed. View "In Re Det. of D.W." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Coons and Novack filed suit challenging the constitutionality of two provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (Affordable Care Act): the individual mandate and the establishment of the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB). Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the Arizona Health Care Freedom Act, Ariz. Const. art. XXVII, section 2, is not preempted by the Affordable Care Act. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the individual mandate does not violate Coons' substantive due process right to medical autonomy; affirmed the dismissal of Coons' challenge, based on lack of ripeness, to the individual mandate for violation of his substantive due process right to informational privacy; affirmed the district court's holding that the Affordable Care Act preempts the Arizona Act; and, with respect to Novack's challenge to IPAB, the court vacated the district court's decision on the merits of the claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Coons v. Lew" on Justia Law

This appeal consolidated two cases about United States Forest Service actions in the Black Hills National Forest (BHNF). Appellants, (collectively, "Biodiversity") were largely non-profit organizations interested in species and habitat protection in the BHNF. Appellees were the Forest Service and several of its officials tasked with managing the BHNF. Intervenors-Appellees were state and county governments and private groups concerned with how management of the BHNF affected nearby private land, state and county citizens, and visitors. Biodiversity sued the Forest Service regarding the BHNF in two separate proceedings: (1) in the United States Federal District Court for the District of Wyoming, Biodiversity claimed the Forest Service had failed to comply with various federal statutes and regulations; and (2) in the United States Federal District Court for the District of Colorado, Biodiversity moved for relief, arguing the Forest Service had violated a settlement agreement. The district courts denied Biodiversity's petition for review and dismissed Biodiversity's motion, respectively. After careful consideration of the district courts' records, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible errors and affirmed the Wyoming and Colorado courts. View "Biodiversity Conservation, et al v. Jiron, et al" on Justia Law