Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In an effort to reduce illegal gun trafficking "along and across the Southwest border" of the United States, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) issued a demand letter to certain federal firearms licensees (FFLs) in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, requiring them to report sales to the same customer within five consecutive business days of "two or more semiautomatic rifles capable of accepting a detachable magazine and with a caliber greater than .22." Appellants Ron Peterson Firearms, LLC, Dale Rutherford, doing business as The Cop Shop, and Tracy Rifle and Pistol, Inc. were FFLs subject to the letter. They argued that ATF lacked the statutory authority to issue the demand letter and that the decision to target FFLs in the four Mexican border states was arbitrary and capricious. Concluding that ATF neither exceeded its statutory authority nor engaged in arbitrary and capricious action, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant. View "Ron Peterson Firearms v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Virginia Code sections 20-45.2 and 20-45.3; the Marshall/Newman Amendment, Va. Const. art. I, 15-A; and any other Virginia law that bars same sex-marriage or prohibits the State's recognition of otherwise-lawful same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions (collectively, the Virginia Marriage Laws). Plaintiffs argued that these laws violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and enjoined Virginia from enforcing the laws. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that each of the plaintiffs had standing as to at least one defendant, and the court declined to view Baker v. Nelson as binding precedent. The court concluded that strict scrutiny analysis applied in this case where the Virginia Marriage Laws impede the right to marry by preventing same-sex couples from marrying and nullifying the legal import of their out-of-state marriages. Proponents contend that five interests support the laws: federalism-based interests, history and tradition, protecting the institution of marriage, encouraging responsible procreation, and promoting the optimal childrearing environment. The court concluded, however, that these interests are not compelling interests that justify the Virginia Marriage Laws. Therefore, all of the proponents' justifications for the laws fail and the laws cannot survive strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Virginia Marriage Laws violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that they prevent same-sex couples from marrying and prohibit Virginia from recognizing same-sex couples' lawful out-of-state marriages. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bostic v. Schaefer" on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment and an injunction in favor of plaintiffs, enjoining enforcement of Florida's Firearm Owners Privacy Act, Fla. Stat. 381.026, 456.072, 790.338, on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The Act seeks to protect patients' privacy by restricting irrelevant inquiry and record-keeping by physicians regarding firearms. The court concluded that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Act and plaintiffs' claims are ripe for adjudication; the Act is a legitimate regulation of professional conduct where the Act simply codifies that good medical care does not require inquiry or record-keeping regarding firearms when unnecessary to a patient's care, and any burden the Act places on physician speech is incidental; and the Act is not unconstitutionally vague when the Act is properly understood as a regulation of physician conduct intended to protect patient privacy and curtail abuses of the physician-patient relationship, and it is readily apparent from the language of the Act the type of conduct the Act prohibits. Accordyingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and vacated the injunction. View "Wollschlaeger, et al. v. Governor State of FL, et al." on Justia Law

In 2008, the State filed a petition for the involuntary civil commitment of D.Y., who was convicted of several state and federal charges arising from sexual assaults on minors. At his initial commitment hearing, D.Y. stated that he did not want to be represented by the attorney who had been appointed for him. D.Y. did not attend his final hearing, in which his counsel moved on his behalf for an order permitting D.Y. to represent himself. The judge conducting the hearing denied the motion, stating that individuals subject to Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) commitment must be represented by counsel pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c). D.Y. appealed, asserting a right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s denial of D.Y.’s application, concluding that neither federal constitutional principle invoked by D.Y. afforded a right to self-representation in an SVPA civil commitment proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed: "We recognize that competent litigants in New Jersey have long been permitted to represent themselves in civil proceedings, with specific exceptions identified in statutes, court rules, and case law. Accordingly, we consider the Legislature’s intent when it enacted N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c), and N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.31(a). [. . .] We find no evidence that the Legislature, when it enacted those provisions, intended to preclude an individual facing SVPA commitment from speaking on his or her own behalf, as long as standby counsel is present and available to assist throughout the hearing if needed." View "In the Matter of Civil Commitment of D.Y." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his family filed suit against Lewisville for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff and his family challenged the constitutionality of a Lewisville ordinance prohibiting registered child sex offenders from residing within 1,500 feet of "where children commonly gather." Plaintiff, a registered child sex offender, asserts that he and his family cannot find a house to rent or buy based on the challenged ordinance. The district court dismissed the claims based on lack of standing and, alternatively, as moot. The court concluded that the family's inability to find a home in Lewisville is fairly traceable to the challenged ordinance and it was likely that a judgment in the family's favor would at least make it easier for them to find a residence to rent or buy in Lewisville. Although the family has moved to another town, their claims for monetary relief are sufficient to defeat mootness. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court because the family has met the traceable and redressable requirements of standing and their claim is not moot. View "Duarte, et al. v. City of Lewisville, TX" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, both individually and as the administrator of Bradley Gladden's estate, filed suit against officers and the police chief, alleging that the officers violated Bradley's rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code Ann. 16-123-101 et seq., as well as committed the tort of wrongful death under the Arkansas Wrongful Death Act, Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-101 et seq. Bradley had requested that the officers give him a ride to his sister's house in the next county because he was intoxicated, but the officers instead left him at an isolated off-ramp at the county line, which was the edge of the officers' jurisdiction. The officers instructed Bradley to seek help at a nearby factory. Bradley ended up dying of hypothermia a half-mile from the drop-off, in the opposite direction of the factory. Where the Fourteenth Amendment generally does not give private citizens a constitutional right to police assistance, the court concluded that plaintiff could not establish that a special relationship existed because Bradley accepted a ride from the officers and was sober enough to make this decision rationally; and Bradley cannot avail himself of the constitutional right to police assistance based on a custodial relationship with the state. The court also concluded that Bradley's official capacity claims failed where, assuming that it was the Police Department's custom to give rides to persons in its jurisdictions, plaintiff could not demonstrate an affirmative duty of care. Consequently, plaintiff's state law claims also failed. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting the officers summary judgment based on qualified immunity, in granting official immunity to all defendants, and dismissing the state-law claims. View "Gladden, Jr. v. Richbourg, et al." on Justia Law

In 2011, while driving home from a funeral reception, Appellee William Bell crossed the center line of a road and struck another vehicle. A woman was killed as a result of the impact. Following trial, Bell was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance-bac.16+, homicide by vehicle while DUI, and homicide by vehicle, In this appeal, the Supreme Court addressed questions of whether convictions for homicide by vehicle and homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence (DUI) merged for operating privilege suspension purposes under the Vehicle Code, and, more generally, whether the criminal doctrine of merger was applicable to the collateral civil consequences which flow from merged, underlying criminal convictions. The Court held that the Commonwealth Court improperly found the criminal doctrine of merger was applicable in the civil arena of operating privilege suspensions under 75 Pa.C.S. sections 1532(a), (a.1). Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Bell v. Bureau of Driver Licensing" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the widow of the deceased, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims that individual defendants used excessive force against her husband and that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment as to all of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the record presented genuine issues of material fact from which a jury could conclude that excessive force was used against the husband. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider in the first instance whether any or all of the individual defendants may proceed to trial on a theory of direct liability for use of force or, in the alternative, on a theory of bystander liability. The district court should also consider whether individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in regards to the deliberate indifference claim and the municipal liability claim for failing to provide adequate training. View "Kitchen v. Dallas County Texas, et al." on Justia Law

The Minto Tribal Court terminated the parental rights of Edward Parks and Bessie Stearman to their daughter S.P. At the termination hearing, the attorney for Parks and Stearman was not permitted to present oral argument to the tribal court. Parks did not file an appeal with the Minto Court of Appeals and instead brought suit against S.P.'s foster parents, the Simmondses, in the state superior court in an attempt to regain custody of S.P. The Simmondses moved to dismiss Parks's state lawsuit on the basis that the tribal court judgment terminating parental rights was entitled to full faith and credit under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that full faith and credit should not be afforded because the tribal court had denied Parks minimum due process by prohibiting his attorney from presenting oral argument on his objections to tribal court jurisdiction based on his status as a non-tribal member. Although the superior court recognized that oral argument is not a per se requirement of minimum due process, the superior court concluded that the denial of oral argument in this case deprived Parks of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Parks did not receive sufficient notice that his attorney would not be allowed to present oral argument to the tribal court. The Simmondses appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court for further findings. On remand, the superior court reiterated its prior conclusion of a violation of minimum due process and further concluded that the due process error was not harmless because Parks's objections to the Minto Tribal Court's jurisdiction might have had merit. The Simmondses appealed again to the Supreme Court. Because Parks failed to exhaust his remedies in the Minto Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that his state court suit should have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded for dismissal of Parks's suit. View "Simmonds v. Parks" on Justia Law

The superior court terminated a mother's parental rights based on evidence of her chronic delusions and the danger these delusions posed to her child. On appeal, the mother argued that several aspects of the court's decision were not adequately supported. Namely, she argues that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) should have required an assessment of her psychiatric condition and monitored the course of her psychological therapy. The Supreme Court's review of the record revealed that the mother did receive a psychiatric evaluation at OCS's direction and that it would likely have been harmful to disrupt the positive relationship she had with her counselor. Therefore, the Court concluded that the record supported the superior court's conclusion that OCS fulfilled its duty to make active efforts to provide this mother with services designed to prevent the breakup of her family. View "Grace L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law