Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Schlumberger Limited conducts its business in Alaska through a wholly owned subsidiary, Schlumberger Technology Corporation. Schlumberger Technology's primary business is oilfield services, but it also owns all of Schlumberger Limited's associated companies incorporated in the United States and operates all of Schlumberger Limited’s domestic businesses. Schlumberger Technology files a consolidated federal tax return for all of Schlumberger Limited’s domestic subsidiaries. For tax years 1998-2000, Schlumberger Technology filed Alaska corporate income tax returns that included only the domestic subsidiaries working in the oilfield services business. In September 2003, a Department of Revenue auditor concluded that Schlumberger Limited was engaged in a unitary business with Schlumberger Technology. Based on these conclusions, the Department issued a notice of assessment for additional corporate income taxes of $429,739 plus interest. Schlumberger Technology argued on appeal of the assessment that under the Internal Revenue Code, domestic corporations were taxed on their worldwide income, but entitled to claim a tax credit against their United States income tax liability for taxes paid to foreign countries. Foreign corporations, on the other hand, are taxed differently. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the application of Alaska's Net Income Tax Act (ANITA). ANITA incorporates certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, unless the federal provisions are "excepted to or modified by other provisions" of the act. ANITA required a corporation to report its income and the income of certain affiliates and to exclude "80 percent of dividend income received from foreign corporations." The Internal Revenue Code had a different formula; it required a foreign corporation to report only income "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States." Schlumberger Technology argued that since ANITA has no explicit exception for Internal Revenue Code (section 882), this sourcing rule was incorporated by reference. Thus, Schlumberger Technology argued that the foreign dividends paid to Schlumberger Limited should not have been included in its taxable income under ANITA. In response, the State argued that the provisions of ANITA applied to all business income of the taxpayer, not just income derived from sources in the United States. Upon review of the matter, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the Internal Revenue Code provision in question here was not adopted by reference because it was inconsistent with the formula provided by ANITA. The Court affirmed the decision of the Department of Revenue. View "Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Before the 2013-2014 school year, the Dickinson Education Association and the Dickinson Public School District conducted negotiations and developed and agreed upon a series of negotiated master agreements that contained the terms and conditions of employment between the certified staff and the District. Between December 2012 and May 2013, the Association and the Dickinson Board of Education held collaborative bargaining team meetings for purposes of formulating a negotiated agreement. The Association and the District's negotiations covered various provisions for both the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, but the parties were ultimately unable to come to a resolution on all issues. In May 2013, after declaring an impasse, the parties sought the involvement of an education fact-finding commission. The Commission's report recommended: (1) a two-year contract; (2) that all items previously agreed to remain in the agreement; (3) the Board's final offer on salary in year one and year two of the two-year contract; and (4) the addition of one professional development day in year two of the contract. In late-July 2013, with the parties still unable to reach an agreement, the District unilaterally issued contracts based on the Commission's recommendations, containing provisions for the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years. In August 2013, the Association petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus and also filed an application for temporary restraining order and other supporting documents. The district court granted an alternate writ of mandamus, suspending the continuing contract offers made by the Board for the 2013-2014 school year, prohibiting the District from requiring the contract offers be returned until further court order, and ordering the District to execute a negotiated agreement for only the 2013-2014 school year. Later, district court issued an order quashing the alternate writ of mandamus and ordering that individual teaching contracts for the 2013-2014 school year based on the Board's final offer were due September 13, 2013. The Association's petition for writ of mandamus remained pending, and the parties agreed the issue before the court was whether the District could unilaterally issue contracts for the 2014-2015 school year based on the negotiation process. In October 2013, the district court granted the petition, concluding the unilateral offer of a two-year negotiated agreement was not lawful in North Dakota and the Association was entitled to an order of mandamus requiring the District to offer the Association a one-year negotiated agreement for the 2013-2014 school year. The District appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dickinson Education Association v. Dickinson Public School District" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether autopsy reports are "medical records" under Section 30-4-20(c) of the South Carolina Code (2007), and therefore exempt from disclosure under the South Carolina Freedom of Information Act, Title 30, Chapter 4 of the South Carolina Code (the FOIA). The appellants brought a declaratory judgment action under the FOIA requesting production of an autopsy report from a coroner. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the coroner, finding the records were exempt from disclosure as medical records. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Perry v. Bullock" on Justia Law

Ralls, an American corporation whose owners are Chinese nationals, purchased four American limited liability companies (Project Companies) previously formed to develop windfarms in north-central Oregon. CFIUS determined that Ralls' acquisition of the Project Companies threatened national security and issued temporary mitigation orders restricting Ralls' access to, and preventing further construction at, the Project Companies' windfarm sites. The President also concluded that the transaction posed a threat to national security. On appeal, Ralls challenged CFIUS's final order and the Presidential Order, which prohibited the transaction and required Ralls to divest itself of the Project Companies. The court concluded that the Presidential Order deprived Ralls of constitutionally protected property interests without due process of law; the court remanded to the district court with instructions that Ralls be provided the requisite process which should include access to unclassified evidence on which the President relied and an opportunity to respond; and the court left it to the district court to address the merits of Ralls' remaining claims in the first instance since the CFIUS Order claims were dismissed on a jurisdictional ground and given the scant merits briefing. View "Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investments, et al." on Justia Law

This petition involves Bermuda's efforts to secure rights from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to operate a satellite at the 96.2 degree W.L. orbital location. Bermuda partnered with EchoStar to deploy and maintain its satellite at this orbital location. Meanwhile, the Netherlands also sought rights from the ITU to operate a satellite at a nearby orbital location. Petitioner, Spectrum Five, a developer and operator of satellites working in partnership with the Netherlands, filed an objection to the FCC to EchoStar's request to move its satellite from 76.8 degrees W.L. to 96.2 degrees W.L. The FCC granted EchoStar's request and determined that Bermuda secured rights to the 96.2 degree W.L. orbital location. Spectrum Five petitioned for review of the Commission's order, claiming principally that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court dismissed the petition for lack of Article III standing because Spectrum Five failed to demonstrate a significant likelihood that a decision of this court would redress its alleged injury. View "Spectrum Five LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit against the United States and others alleging, inter alia, violations of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and federal common law. The Tribe claimed that the Government breached its fiduciary duties under federal law to protect the land and natural resources subject to the aboriginal title of the Tribe. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the Tribe failed to allege "agency action" sufficient to meet the requirements of the sovereign immunity waiver in section 702, which is necessary to maintain its claims against the federal government and its agencies. View "Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of TX v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

Mother Y.Z. appealed a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her children, G.P. and A. P., and choosing adoption as the appropriate permanent plan. Mother contended the court erroneously found that the children should have been removed from their relative caregiver and placed in a foster home under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 387 deprived her of the ability to raise an exception to the adoption preference under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). Mother also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding that the beneficial relationship exception to the adoption preference was inapplicable. "Jose P.," the presumed father of G.P. and A.P., joined Mother's arguments and argued his due process rights were violated when the court terminated his parental rights without having made a detriment finding as to him. Upon review of the juvenile court order, the Court of Appeal concluded the court's findings under section 387 as well as its determination that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply were supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, the Court found that Father invited the error he appealed, and even if he did not do so, the juvenile court's findings were sufficient to support termination of Father's rights. View "In re G.P." on Justia Law

On February 14, 2013, the Attorney General received an ethics complaint, alleging possible violations of the Ethics Act by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Robert W. Harrell, Jr. The complaint was originally submitted by a private citizen to the House Legislative Ethics Committee. That same day, the Attorney General forwarded the complaint to South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), and SLED carried out a 10-month criminal investigation into the matter. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Chief of SLED and the Attorney General petitioned the presiding judge of the state grand jury to impanel the state grand jury on January 13, 2014. Acting presiding judge of the state grand jury, the Honorable L. Casey Manning, subsequently impaneled the state grand jury. On February 24, 2014, the Speaker filed a motion to disqualify the Attorney General from participating in the grand jury investigation. On March 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion after which the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Another hearing was held, and the court found, as presiding judge of the state grand jury, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear any matter arising from the Ethics Act, and refused to reach the issue of disqualification. The court discharged the grand jury and ordered the Attorney General to cease his criminal investigation. The Attorney General appealed that order to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in concluding that the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction over the original complaint. While the crime of public corruption could include violations of the Ethics Act, the state grand jury's jurisdiction is confined to the purposes set forth in the constitution and the state grand jury statute, as circumscribed by the impaneling order. While the Court reversed the circuit court's order, it "in no way suggest[ed] that it was error for the presiding judge to inquire whether the state grand jury was 'conducting investigative activity within its jurisdiction or proper investigative activity.'" The case was remanded for a decision on whether the Attorney General should have been disqualified from participating in the state grand jury proceedings. View "Harrell v. Attorney General of South Carolina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate and practicing Muslim, filed suit against prison officials alleging that they unconstitutionally burdened his religious exercise when they ordered him to provide a urine sample within a three-hour window while he fasted in observance of Ramadan. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's entry of judgment in favor of the officials. The court concluded that the choice either to provide a urine sample by drinking water during plaintiff's fast or to face disciplinary action placed a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment insofar as it concerns defendant's claim for damages under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and remanded for further consideration of the claim. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the officials on plaintiff's Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., claim, his Fourteenth Amendment claim, his First Amendment retaliation claim, and his free exercise claim for an injunction. View "Holland v. Goord" on Justia Law

Twenty California counties were plaintiffs in this petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants the State and its pertinent officials (DHCS and DMH). In their petition, the Counties alleged that a DHCS 2009 Memorandum and a DMH 2010 Letter were invalid. Under federal Medicaid law, the federal government did not pay for services to IMD patients between the ages of 21 and 65. In 1999, California added a state-only Medi-Cal benefit by enacting Welfare and Institutions Code section 14053.1. The section provided that the State would pay for "ancillary outpatient services" for IMD patients within the federal IMD exclusion. The specific focus of this appeal involved two Assembly Bills: No. 2877 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) and No. 430 (2000-2001 Reg. Sess.) that concerned subsequent sunsetting legislation regarding section 14053.1. Assembly Bill 2877 (enacted in 2000) sought to extend the original sunset provision an additional year, and Assembly Bill 430 (enacted in 2001) sought to eliminate the sunset provision altogether, thereby making section 14053.1 effective indefinitely. The counties argued the memorandum and letter were: (1) inconsistent with section 14053.1; and (2) they constituted underground regulations adopted in violation of the state Administrative Procedures Act (Gov. Code, 11340.5, subd. (a)). The Counties similarly sought a writ/injunction prohibiting the State from applying them against the Counties. The trial court denied the Counties' petition for writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive relief, and issued a declaratory judgment in favor of the State. The court concluded that the subsequent sunsetting amendments (Assem. Bills 2877 & 430) were void because they were enacted after the statute had already sunset by its own terms in 2000. Thus, in the absence of section 14053.1, the State did not promulgate an underground regulation by issuing the DHCS 2009 Memorandum and the DMH 2010 Letter and ancillary outpatient services for Medi-Cal eligible IMD patients within the federal IMD exclusion. The Court of Appeal concluded that section 14053.1 remained a valid law, and that 14053.1's presence in the California statutes was not the result of a legislative amendment to a repealed act. The Counties' petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was granted: the DHCS 2009 Memorandum and the DMH 2010 Letter contravened section 14053.1 and were therefore invalid. The State was enjoined from applying them. The judgment of the trial court was reversed. View "Colusa County v. Douglas" on Justia Law