Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reviewed actions of the Title Board in setting titles and ballot title and submission clauses for initiatives 2013-2014 85, 86 and 87. Proponents complained that the titles did not contain one subject or fairly reflect the purpose of the proposed initiatives. The Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Title Board. View "In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #85, #86, and #87" on Justia Law

After the Title Board set titles and submission clauses for Proposed Initiative 2013-2014 #103, petitioners moved for a rehearing, claiming the initiative contained more than one subject and was impermissibly vague. One of the initiative's representatives was unable to attend the rehearing. The Secretary of State's office suggested that a designated representative withdraw and a substitute alternate attend the hearing. The Title Board allowed the substitution and proceeded to deny the petitioner's motion. On appeal, petitioners argued that the proposed initiative still contained too many subjects and was impermissibly vague. Furthermore, the argued the Title Board did not have authority to allow the substitute representative. The Supreme Court agreed that the Title Board's approval of the substitute was improper. Therefore, the Court reversed the Title Board's action and remanded the case back to the Board without decision on claims that the initiative addressed more than one subject or was vague. View "In re Proposed Initiative 2013-2014 #103" on Justia Law

The Division of Motor Vehicles (a section of the Department of Revenue), revoked petitioner Andrew Hanson's driver's license following a hearing whereby it was determined petitioner refused a blood alcohol test in violation of state law. At the revocation hearing, the arresting officer failed to appear, and petitioner moved for dismissal of the administrative action to revoke his license. The hearing officer denied the request and submitted the officer's report into evidence. Both the district court and the court of appeals affirmed the Department. Petitioner appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. "When [petitioner] refused, he violated section 42-2-126(3)(c), C.R.S. (2011). The hearing officer was not required to consider the legality of the legality of the first police officer's contact … because any evidence regarding the legality of the initial contact … is irrelevant for the purpose of revoking his license for refusing to take the blood or breath test." View "Hanson v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Division of Motor Vehicles (a section of the Department of Revenue), revoked petitioner Tom Francen's driver's license following a hearing whereby it was determined petitioner had operated a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content in excess of the statutory minimum. The district court reversed, holding that the stop of petitioner's vehicle was not supported by a reasonable suspicion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the legality of the initial contact between petitioner and the police was not relevant in the civil administrative proceeding to revoke the driver's license. Petitioner appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Francen v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Wyoming Public Records Act, Plaintiff requested from the Office of the Governor and the Wyoming Game & Fish Department (together, the State) documents related to the status of grizzly bears under the Endangered Species Act. The State provided some documents and withheld others on grounds of the deliberative process privilege and the attorney-client communication privilege. The district court held (1) the Act incorporates the deliberative process privilege as a ground to exempt documents from disclosure under the Act, and the documents withheld under the deliberative process privilege were properly withheld by the State; and (2) two of the three documents withheld under the attorney-client privilege were properly withheld. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s ruling with respect to the documents withheld under the attorney-client privilege; (2) affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Act incorporates the deliberate process privilege; but (3) concluded that some of the documents withheld pursuant to the deliberative process privilege were not properly withheld because they were outside the scope of the privilege’s protection. View "Aland v. Mead" on Justia Law

In 2010, two Fare Enforcement Officers entered a train car at the Rainier Beach station and instructed all passengers to present proof of fare. When FEO Willet asked fifteen-year-old K.L.B. and his two companions to present proof of fare payment, they gave him their bus transfers. FEO Willet informed them that while bus transfers used to be valid on the light-rail, they were no longer accepted. The three young males were instructed by FEO Willet to exit the train at the next station. The FEOs asked the three males for identification once they exited the train. All three were either unable or unwilling to provide identification. K.L.B. was temporarily detained at the Othello station. The King County Sheriff's Office was called to assist in identifying K.L.B. and his companions so they could potentially be cited for fare evasion. Deputy Adams then asked K.L.B. to identify one of his male companions. He responded that he did not know his companion's full name and that he: knew him only as '"Marty."' Deputy Adams returned to the station and used a computer database to identify "Marty." There was an assault warrant out for "Marty's" arrest. K.L.B. was charged with two counts of making a false or misleading statement to a public servant under RCW 9A.76. 175. K.L.B. was found guilty of making a false statement to FEO Willet (count II). He was found not guilty of making a false statement to Deputy Adams (count I). K.L.B. appealed to Division One of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction. K.L.B. argued that a Sound Transit FEO was not a "public servant" as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(23). He also argued that the definition of "public servant" was unconstitutionally vague and that to convict a person of making a false or misleading statement to a public servant, the State must prove that the defendant knew the statement was made to a public servant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that under the statute, FEO Willet was a public servant at the time K.L.B. made the false statement. The Supreme Court held that under these circumstances, because FEOs are not government employees, are not officers of government, and do not perform a governmental function, they are not "public servants" as defined by the statute. View "Washington v. K.L.B." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case were David and Barbara Green, their three children, and the businesses they collectively owned and operated: Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc. As owners and operators of both Hobby Lobby and Mardel, the Greens organized their businesses with express religious principles in mind. As was particularly relevant to this case, one aspect of the Greens’ religious principles was a belief that human life begins when sperm fertilizes an egg. In addition, the Greens believed it was immoral for them to facilitate any act that caused the death of a human embryo. Plaintiffs brought an action to challenge portions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) whereby employment-based group health plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) were required provide certain types of health services for women that implicated contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling (without cost-sharing by plan participants or beneficiaries) - all "abortifacients" that went against plaintiffs' religious beliefs. Plaintiffs filed suit to challenge the contraceptive-coverage requirement of the ACA under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs simultaneously moved for a preliminary injunction on the basis of their RFRA and Free Exercise claims. The district court denied that motion. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of the injunction. After review by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court held that Hobby Lobby and Mardel were entitled to bring claims under RFRA, established a likelihood of success that their rights under statute were substantially burdened by the contraceptive-coverage requirement, and established an irreparable harm. However, the case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings on two remaining factors governing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction. View "Hobby Lobby Stores, et al v. Sebelius, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the County and the sheriff after he was terminated as deputy sheriff. The court concluded, under the Pickering/Connick balancing test, that at least some of plaintiff's campaign speech does not merit First Amendment protection; that even if plaintiff's speech was fully protected by the Constitution, the sheriff could have reasonably believed that the speech would be at least potentially damaging and disruptive of the discipline and harmony of and among coworkers in the sheriff's office and detrimental to the close working relationships and personal loyalties necessary for an effective and trusted local policing operation; considering North Dakota law and well-established federal and state jurisprudence, the sheriff could have logically and rationally believed that his decision to terminate plaintiff was well within his duties as a public official; and that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity to shield him from any liability. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the sheriff's motion for summary judgment. View "Nord v. Walsh County, et al." on Justia Law

Daily Services, owned by Mason, provided short-term temporary employment services. Mason also owned I-Force, which provided longer-term temporary employment services. After losing coverage under the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation group insurance rating plan, I-Force unsuccessfully applied for self-insurance status. I-Force owed $3 million in premiums. Unable to make payments, I-Force closed. Daily acquired some of its customers and began offering longer-term temporary employment services. Ohio law provides the employer with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Bureau may file a judgment or lien against it and allows the Bureau to deem one company the successor of another for purposes of an experience rating to calculate premiums, and, if an employer “wholly succeeds another in the operation of a business,” to transfer the obligation to pay unpaid premiums. The Bureau decided that Daily wholly succeeded I-Force, but did not provide notice of its assessment or an opportunity to be heard before it filed judgments and liens against Daily for more than $54 million. A state court vacated the judgments. The Bureau tried again and provided prior notice, but filed a lien before hearing an appeal. The court again vacated. The Bureau’s efforts to recover continue. Daily sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of procedural due process. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, recognizing that under the Supreme Court decision Parratt v. Taylor, a state may sometimes satisfy due process without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard pre-deprivation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Parratt doctrine does apply, and Daily did not plead that Ohio provided inadequate post- deprivation remedies . View "Daily Services, LLC v. Valentino" on Justia Law

The nominations of three members of the National Labor Relations Board were pending in the Senate when it passed a December 17, 2011, resolution providing for a series of “pro forma session[s],” with “no business ... transacted,” every Tuesday and Friday through January 20, 2012. The President appointed the three members between the January 3 and January 6 pro forma sessions, invoking the Recess Appointments Clause, which gives the President the power “to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate,” Art. II, section 2, cl. 3. The D.C. Circuit held that the appointments fell outside the scope of the Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Clause reflects the tension between the President’s continuous need for “the assistance of subordinates,” and the Senate’s early practice of meeting for a single brief session each year and should be interpreted as granting the President power to make appointments during a recess, but not offering authority routinely to avoid the need for Senate confirmation. Putting “significant weight” on historical practice, the Court found that the Clause applies to both intersession and intra-session recesses of substantial length. A three-day recess would be too short. In light of historical practice, a recess of more than three but less than 10 days is presumptively too short. The phrase “vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate” applies both to vacancies that come into existence during a recess and to vacancies that initially occur before a recess but continue during the recess. Although the Senate’s own determination of when it is in session should be given great weight, deference is not absolute. When the Senate is without the capacity to act, under its own rules, it is not in session even if it so declares. Under these standards, the Senate was in session during the pro forma sessions at issue. It said it was in session, and, under Senate rules, it retained the power to con-duct business. Because the Senate was in session, the President made the recess appointments at issue during a three-day recess, which is too short a time to fall within the scope of the Clause, so the President lacked the authority to make the appointments. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning" on Justia Law